Opinion

State v. Robinette

  • 80 Ohio St. 3d 234
  • 685 N.E.2d 762
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Nov 12, 1997
Status
Published
Author
Sweeney
On the bench
Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Only, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney
Cited by
577 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.2%

stating that the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 7 We also note that the courts in both Hardy and Bowman found that regardless of the warrants’ validity, the police officers’ execution of the warrants was in good faith and consequently did not create any constitutional infirmity. Bowman at ¶ 15-16; Hardy, surpa. -13- Case No. 11-12-04 of the Ohio Constitution should be “harmonize[d]”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 7 We also note that the courts in both Hardy and Bowman found that regardless of the warrants’ validity, the police officers’ execution of the warrants was in good faith and consequently did not create any constitutional infirmity. Bowman at ¶ 15-16; Hardy, surpa. -13- Case No. 11-12-04 of the Ohio Constitution should be “harmonize[d]”
  • concluding that “the Ohio Constitution does not require a police officer to inform' an individual, stopped for a traffic violation, that he or she is free to go before the officer may attempt to engage in a consensual interrogation”
  • stating that courts "should harmonize * * * interpretation of Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth Amendment, unless there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise"
  • recognizing that states may "rely on their own constitutions to provide broader protection for individual rights, independent of protections afforded by the United States Constitution"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Francis E. Sweeney; Sr., J.,

dissenting. In State v. Robinette (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 650 , 653 N.E.2d 695 , I rejected the majority’s “bright line” test, which required police officers to recite certain words before instituting a consensual interrogation. Instead, I stated that the correct test to be applied is the totality-of-the-circumstances test, which takes into consideration all of the circumstances surrounding the encounter. Id. at 655-658 , 653 N.E.2d at 699-701 (F.E. Sweeney, J., dissenting). The United States Supreme Court also eschewed the bright-line test and stated that voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette (1996), 519 U.S.-,-, 117 S.Ct. 417, 421 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347, 355 . The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to this court. Upon remand, the majority now applies the correct test (totality of the circumstances), but, in my opinion, still reaches the wrong result.

*250 Based upon the testimony presented, it is clear that Robinette consented to the search of his vehicle. Robinette specifically stated that he thought he was free to leave at the time the police officer asked whether he could search the vehicle. Robinette conceded that the police officer was nice to him during the encounter and acted in a nonthreatening manner. Based upon these facts, I am unwilling to hold that Robinette “merely submitted to ‘a claim of lawful authority’ ” as the majority concludes. Instead, under the totality of the circumstances, I believe that there was no coercion and that Robinette voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle.

Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

Douglas, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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