stating that "[w]hen a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a `thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[w]hen a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a `thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony"
- holding that where an individual brandishes a gun and implicitly but not expressly threatens to discharge it, the threat can be sufficient to satisfy the state's burden of proving operability
- noting that "[w]hen a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a 'thirteenth juror' and disagrees with the factfinder's resolution of the conflicting testimony"
- noting an appellate court, in considering a manifest weight challenge, must determine whether the trier of fact "clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in State v. Smith
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389 (1997), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89
Disagreed with by Squires v. Luckey Farmers, Inc., Unpublished Decision (9-17-2004), 2004 Ohio 4919 (2004)
" Id. We disagree with this rationale.
The opinion
Cook, J.,
concurring. I concur in the well-reasoned opinion of the majority, but add one point of clarification. Today’s case signals our appellate courts that it is improper to apply the same standard of review for questions involving the weight and sufficiency of evidence in reliance on State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 , 574 N.E.2d 492, 503 .
A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction requires a court to determine whether the state has met its burden of production at trial. On review for sufficiency, courts are to assess not whether the state’s evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction. Accordingly, application of the test set forth in the second paragraph of the syllabus in Jenks, supra, is proper.
In contrast, in deciding whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court determines whether the state has appropriately carried its burden of persuasion. A court reviewing questions of weight is not required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, but may consider and weigh all of the evidence produced at trial. The only special deference given in a manifest-weight review attaches to the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. See State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230 , 39 O.O.2d 366 , 227 N.E.2d 212 , paragraph one of the syllabus. Accordingly, the standard set forth in State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 , 20 OBR 215, 219, 485 N.E.2d 717, 720-721 , and approved by the majority in this case, is suitable for the manifest-weight inquiry.
*391 The distinct inquiries that an appellate court undertakes in determining whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of evidence require different standards of review. Today’s opinion acknowledges this and elucidates the appropriate standard for each inquiry.
Lundberg Stratton, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.