holding that discriminatory remarks regarding age were insufficient to create an issue of fact in an age-discrimination case, where the remarks were not directed toward the plaintiffs
How later courts described this case
- holding that discriminatory remarks regarding age were insufficient to create an issue of fact in an age-discrimination case, where the remarks were not directed toward the plaintiffs
- finding that there “[m]ust be a link or nexus between the discriminatory statement or conduct and the prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation of the statute.”
- finding that the employee did not meet the fourth prong of the Barker test because the employee was not replaced “by a person outside the statutorily protected class”
- noting that the Mauzy court clarified the methods for establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under section 4112.14 of the Ohio Revised Code and that the same methods apply to section 4112.02, which is at issue here
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Douglas, J.,
concurring. I concur in the judgment. In doing so, I continue to subscribe to our holding in Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 .
My concurrence herein is based specifically on the fact that the fourth prong of the test established in Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146 , 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807 , is absent in this case, to wit, that plaintiffs-appellees were not replaced by a person or persons not belonging to the protected class. Plaintiffsappellees were, in fact, not replaced at all.
In concurring, I am not unmindful of the “direct evidence” standard as so well set forth in the dissent of Justice Resnick. I believe the standard, where it can be shown to exist, still lives.
F.E. Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.