Opinion

City of Dayton v. Erickson

  • 76 Ohio St. 3d 3
  • 665 N.E.2d 1091
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 3, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Pfeifer
On the bench
Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney
Cited by
730 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.2%

Overruled — as noted by a later court

holding that when a law enforcement officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a driver for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is a constitutionally valid regardless of the officers' subjective motivation for stopping the driver

How later courts described this case

  • holding that when a law enforcement officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a driver for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is a constitutionally valid regardless of the officers' subjective motivation for stopping the driver
  • holding that when an officer has an articulable and reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a driver for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer's subjective motivation for stopping the driver
  • determining that where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
  • recognizing that “a police officer who observes a traffic violation may make a stop based upon the violation, even though the officer’s purpose is to develop evidence of a more serious criminal violation”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Overruled — as noted by a later court

    The cases cited by appellant concerning de minimis traffic violation stops have been effectively overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Wilhelm (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 444, and Erickson,76 Ohio St.3d at 3.
    medium confidence

The opinion

Pfeifer, J.,

dissenting. You drive by a policeman, and for some reason, he doesn’t much like the looks of you. Maybe your car is shabby; maybe you are. Maybe you are out late in a high-crime neighborhood. Maybe you are in a low-crime area, but you are part of a high-crime demographic group. The reason does not much matter — to him you are a suspicious character, that’s all. The policeman pulls up behind you. You unll make a mistake. You say you did use your turn signal to change lanes? He didn’t see it. Or, prove to him that you did not exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour when you were busy looking at him in your rear-view mirror. You’ll never be charged with the violations— you’re just being stopped and detained to see if his hunch about you was right. Perhaps he’ll ask if you mind if he searches your car. You wouldn’t refuse unless you had something to hide, right? You have just been detained and possibly searched because someone did not like the looks of you.

The majority holds today that police officers, based upon a hunch of nefarious activity, may stop a car they would not stop under any other circumstances. I agree with the trial and appellate courts in this case which held, citing United States v. Smith (C.A.11, 1986), 799 F.2d 704, 708 , that the relevant inquiry is not whether the officer could have made the stop, but whether a reasonable officer would have done so in the absence of the invalid purpose. The majority opinion allows the existence of a technical offense to obfuscate the true motivation for what otherwise would be an invalid stop. If the stop would not have been made but for the invalid purpose, the invalid purpose is the motivation behind the stop. The fruits of such stops should be suppressed, as the lower courts correctly held.

Fourth Amendment cases are some of the most difficult cases for judges to decide for the simple reason that it is most often unsympathetic people who seek protection from unlawful searches. These cases are brought by persons confronted with damning evidence, which evidence, they claim, while relevant and probably persuasive, was unlawfully gained and ought to be ignored. While it is always a criminal defendant seeking the Fourth Amendment’s protection, ulti *13 mately Fourth Amendment jurisprudence protects us all from unreasonable intrusions on our liberty. It was not a criminal who lost in this case today — all of us who value our freedom did.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.