Opinion

Robb v. Chagrin Lagoons Yacht Club, Inc.

  • 75 Ohio St. 3d 264
  • 662 N.E.2d 9
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
Mar 6, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Resnick
On the bench
Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright
Cited by
134 cases

“Simply, abuse of process occurs where someone attempts to achieve through use of the court that which the court is itself powerless to order.”

How later courts described this case

  • “Simply, abuse of process occurs where someone attempts to achieve through use of the court that which the court is itself powerless to order.”
  • “[a] cause of action for malicious civil prosecution will lie only in cases where there is a prejudgment seizure of property ….”
  • “[I]n order to properly assert a claim of malicious civil prosecution, appellants were required to satisfy the seizure element. Since appellants presented no evidence of seizure, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court on this issue.”
  • “[T]he improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the process as a threat or a club.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Alice Robie Resnick, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree in substance with the majority’s statement that “[t]o substantially comply with the club’s constitution, appellants had to provide appellees notice and an opportunity to be heard.” However, as the court of appeals correctly points out, “Article 2, Section 4 of the club’s constitution states that if the grievance committee cannot resolve the dispute raised in a grievance, notice of the charges must be forwarded to the member by certified mail. Section 4 then expressly states that a formal closed ‘hearing’ must be conducted by the board of trustees, which must afterwards make a recommendation as to whether disciplinary action is warranted.

“As appellants [Frank Robb et al.] aptly note, the trial court’s entire analysis as to whether they had received due process was predicated upon the determination that the special meeting of the voting members constituted a ‘hearing.’ However, the plain wording of the club’s constitution indicates that the ‘hearing’ on a grievance is to be held before the board, not the voting members.”

Clearly, pursuant to this constitution, the grievant must be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to present a defense at the board meeting. Appellees were not afforded this opportunity. While I strongly believe that disagreements within a private club should be resolved internally, the club does not have carte blanche to proceed however it pleases. Due process must still be provided to a member. The process that is due a grievant member in such circumstances is that which is set forth in the club’s regulations, constitution, and by-laws.

The majority mistakenly determines that the club “substantially” complied with the club’s constitution when in actuality there was not even a semblance of compliance. I agree with the court of appeals that the “board of trustees acted beyond [its] power” by not holding a proper hearing. Due to their failure to comply with Section 4, Article 2 of the club constitution regarding notice and hearing, appellants should not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals in its entirety.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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