noting that R.C. 3937.18 does not displace principles of contract law
How later courts described this case
- noting that R.C. 3937.18 does not displace principles of contract law
- specifying that the claimant must be an insured in order to recover
- invalidating other owned vehicle/household family member exclusion (superseded by statute)
- "The rationale in Scott-Pontzer creates seemingly absurd results[.]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Baughman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
70 Ohio St.3d 478 (1994), superseded by statute as stated in Baughman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d 480
The opinion
Wright, J.,
dissenting. I concur in the Chief Justice’s dissent and feel that a brief response to Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion is in order. Justice Douglas accurately summarizes the purpose and scope of uninsured motorist coverage, quoting this writer in Watson v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 195 , 532 N.E.2d 758 , and Stanton v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 111 , 623 N.E.2d 1197 . However, it would appear that the concurrence loses sight of what this case is about. This matter is not about whether uninsured motorist coverage covers persons or motor vehicles. To the contrary, at bottom, this case involves whether appellant should get something for nothing.
As the Chief Justice points out, appellant was offered and specifically rejected any coverage arising out of the use of his motorcycle. We learned in our first year in law school that parties have the constitutional right to enter into contracts and that courts will generally enforce same. That, of course, is what Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 42 , 22 OBR 63, 488 N.E.2d 840 , was all about. That is what this case is all about. I think it an unfortunate state of affairs that we depart from these principles and discard yet another solid precedent, and, thus, I respectfully dissent.