holding that a claimant " 'can abandon a former position or remove himself or herself from the work force only if he or she has the physical capacity for employment at the time of the abandonment or removal' "
How later courts described this case
- holding that a claimant " 'can abandon a former position or remove himself or herself from the work force only if he or she has the physical capacity for employment at the time of the abandonment or removal' "
- holding claimant’s entitlement to be substantive right measured by statutes in force on date of injury and subsequent statute regulating benefits payable during incarceration deemed inapplicable
- permanently and totally disabled employee whose injury predated an amendment’s effective date may collect benefits while incarcerated because “it is not the subsequent incarceration which prevents the claimant’s return to sustained remunerative employment, it is the disability itself’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Wright, J., dissenting.
Whether the compensation received by an injured employee is labeled temporary total disability or permanent total disability, the purpose behind the compensation provided by the workers’ compensation laws remains the same: to replace lost wages. Individuals confined to penal institutions have removed themselves from the work force and consequently have no wages, actual or potential, that can be replaced. Our decision in State ex rel. Ashcraft v. Indus. Comm. (1987), 34 Ohio St.3d 42 , 517 N.E.2d 533 , implicitly recognized this idea.
The decision in Ashcraft was based on sound public policy, a policy now codified at R.C. 4123.54(B). Unlike the majority’s opinion, the statute does not distinguish between temporary total benefits and permanent benefits. And its explicit mandate is that compensation is not payable to individuals confined to penal institutions. I see no reason to depart from this policy in the case before us today.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.