overruling, inter alia, State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rose [1991], 61 Ohio St.3d 528, 575 N.E.2d 459; paragraphs one and two of the syllabus of Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos. [1989], 46 Ohio St.3d 84, 545 N.E.2d 83; Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co. [1990], 51 Ohio St.3d 713, 556 N.E.2d 189
How later courts described this case
- overruling, inter alia, State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rose [1991], 61 Ohio St.3d 528, 575 N.E.2d 459; paragraphs one and two of the syllabus of Burris v. Grange Mut. Cos. [1989], 46 Ohio St.3d 84, 545 N.E.2d 83; Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co. [1990], 51 Ohio St.3d 713, 556 N.E.2d 189
- invalidating insurance policy provisions that prohibit interfamily stacking
- “Each person who is presumed to have been damaged as a result of a wrongful death claim may, to the extent of his or her damages, collect from the tortfea-sor’s liability policy up to its per person limits subject to any per accident limit. Liability policy provisions which purport to consolidate wrongful death damages suffered by individuals into one ‘each person’ policy limit are unenforceable” (citations omitted)
- Ohio wrongful death statute allows for separate wrongful death claim subject to a separate per person policy limit
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Katz v. Ohio Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 103 Ohio St. 3d 4 (2004)
{¶ 24} In short, we refuse to extend the rationale of the first paragraph of Savoie beyond the context of automobile insurance cases.
Disagreed with by Doran v. Allstate Insurance Company, Unpublished Decision (12-10-1999) (1999)
conflicts with Savoie and must be overruled.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Kulikowski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Unpublished Decision (10-10-2002) (2002)
{¶ 38} We have concluded that the anti-stacking provisions of R.C. 3937.18(G) apply to this case and Kulikowski's arguments underSavoie are inapplicable.
Distinguished by Snyder v. Cross, Unpublished Decision (11-29-2000) (2000)
Therefore, appellant concludes that Savoie, supra is inapplicable, and R.C. 3937.18 as amended should apply.
The opinion
Wright, J.,
dissenting. I admire the measured tone adopted by the Chief Justice in his incisive and compelling dissent, and certainly concur in same. I would not and could not have been so restrained in addressing the majority’s lack of deference to the clear will of the General Assembly and disregard for the doctrine of stare decisis.