concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by not finding that the adoption would be in children's best interests when evidence illustrated that the petitioners provided the children with "the stability and continuity essential to healthy development"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by not finding that the adoption would be in children's best interests when evidence illustrated that the petitioners provided the children with "the stability and continuity essential to healthy development"
- “[T]here is nothing in the language of [former R.C. 3109.05 and its current analogue, R.C. 3109.051, that] suggests that through their passage the legislature intended to indirectly liberalize the strict dictates of R.C. 3107.15 to allow post-adoption visitation * * *.”
- “[Tjhere is nothing in the language of [former R.C. 3109.05 and its current analogue, R.C. 3109.051, that] suggests that through their passage the legislature intended to indirectly liberalize the strict dictates of R.C. 3107.15 to allow post-adoption visitation * * *.”
- termination of rights of biological or other legal parents of adopted person tenders adopted person a stranger to his former relatives
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Douglas, J.,
concurring. I concur with the judgment of the majority except as to the question of remand. I would follow the dictates of R.C. 3107.15. In addition, from the overwhelming evidence presented to us and as detailed in part in the majority opinion, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant the petitions for adoption. Upon the record presented to us, I cannot believe that a majority of this court would do other than find an abuse of discretion if the petitions were denied. That being the case, time, court and litigants’ expense, and judicial economy would seem to argue favorably for our entering judgment.
Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.