holding that public policy warranted exception to employment-at-will doctrine when employee is discharged for a reason prohibited by statute, and that cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be brought in tort
How later courts described this case
- holding that public policy warranted exception to employment-at-will doctrine when employee is discharged for a reason prohibited by statute, and that cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy may be brought in tort
- holding Greely claim not available when plaintiff has another private right of action under which to pursue claim
- holding that "public policy warrants an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine when an employee is discharged or disciplined for a reason which is prohibited by statute"
- holding that the employment-at-will doctrine “permits termination of employment for no cause or for ‘any cause’ which is not unlawful, at any time and regardless of motive”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St. 3d 541 (1992)
49 Ohio St.3d 228 , 551 N.E.2d 981 (1990), overruled in part by Tulloh v. Goodyear Atomic Corp., 62 Ohio St.3d 541 , 584 N.E.2d 729
The opinion
Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting. When the General Assembly amended R.C. 3113.21(J) to remove the requirement that an employer reinstate an employee with back pay where an employer had improperly discharged such employee contrary to R.C. 3113.21(J), it made a clear policy statement with respect to the law on this issue. The question is not whether we agree that a $500 fine is appropriate or inappropriate. The question is who has the authority to define the sanction.
It would be difficult to find a better example of a blurring of the distinction between legislative and judicial functions than the majority opinion in this case. The judgment of the court of appeals which properly applied the will of the General Assembly should be affirmed.