holding that such classification was based on valid distinction
How later courts described this case
- holding that such classification was based on valid distinction
- holding another statute of repose constitutional
- the statute did not take away an existing cause of action from a plaintiff who was injured after the expiration of the ten-year period, but it merely prevented a potential cause of action from ever arising
- noting “the general demise of the privity requirement”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St. 3d 460 (1994)
49 Ohio St.3d 193, 195 , 551 N.E.2d 938 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 460 , 639 N.E.2d 425
Distinguished
Distinguished by Groch v. General Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St. 3d 192 (2008)
However, as explained in Sedar, 49 Ohio St.3d at 202, 551 N.E.2d 938, those cases are distinguishable because the medical-malpractice statute of repose interpreted in them took away an existing, actionable negligence claim before the injured person discovered the injury (when the injury had already occurred) or gave the injured person too little time to file suit, and therefore denied the injured party’s right to a r…
The opinion
Douglas, J.,
dissenting. Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides in relevant part:
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” (Emphasis added.)
Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution is clear and unambiguous. The courthouse doors are to be open to an individual who suffers an injury to his person. The individual has a right to a remedy for his injuries and to have justice administered without denial.
In the case at bar, Sedar suffered severe injuries to his person. However, Sedar was denied a remedy for his injuries because R.C. 2305.131, a statute of repose, effectively barred his pursuit of a remedy before his injuries even occurred.
The majority attempts to distinguish the present case from our recent analysis of Section 16, Article I in the context of the four-year repose statute for medical malpractice actions, R.C. 2305.11(B). In doing so, the majority states that the medical-repose statute takes away an existing actionable claim before the injured party discovered his claim and, therefore, denies a legal remedy to one who has suffered injury to his person, thereby violating Section 16, Article I. In contrast, says the majority, R.C. 2305.131 does not take away an existing cause of action from Sedar but, rather, prevents the cause of action from ever arising. Hence, reasons the majority, denial of a future legal remedy to one who has not yet suffered bodily injury does not violate Section 16, Article I when the injury actually occurs. I fail to see the distinction! This is circuitous reasoning at its best.
Section 16, Article I should not be read so as to discriminate between how a violation of its protections occurs. R.C. 2305.131 effectively closes the courthouse to Sedar and individuals like him in contravention of the express language of Section 16, Article I, thereby violating constitutionally protected rights. Therefore, in my judgment, R.C. 2305.131 is unconstitutional.
Accordingly, I dissent.
Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.