stating that "[f]or an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the court"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[f]or an order to determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party appealing, it must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the court"
- finding that R.C. 1331.01(A)’s definition of “person” is inapplicable to a determination of whether a county board of mental retardation and developmental disabilities is a “person” under R.C. 119.01(F)
- determining that a county agency was a “person” entitled to appeal a decision of the State Employment Relations Board pursuant to R.C. 119.12
- holding that orders by the State Employment Relations Board must comply with R.C. 2505.02 to be appealable under R.C. 119.12.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
H. Brown, J.,
concurring. I concur in the judgment, the syllabus law and the analysis of legal issues contained in Parts I, II, and IV of the majority opinion. I further agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the majority in Part III of the opinion. However, I believe that the want of a final appealable order results from the lack of an adjudication (see the dissent by Justice Douglas in South Community, Inc. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. [1988], 38 Ohio St. 3d 224, 229 , 527 N.E. 2d 864, 868 ), as well as from the lack of compliance with R.C. 2505.02 as specified in the majority opinion.