holding that in order to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that the result at trial would have been different had it not been for counsel's mistakes.
How later courts described this case
- holding that in order to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that a reasonable probability exists that the result at trial would have been different had it not been for counsel's mistakes.
- holding that we are to "presume that a broad range of choices, perhaps even disastrous ones, are made on the basis of tactical decisions and do not constitute ineffective assistance"
- refusing to review for plain error after finding that the defendant waived any error in the admission of an investigation report when his trial counsel, after ample time to reflect, consciously refused to object to the report’s admission into evidence
- holding that a conviction may be reversed on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel only upon proof of an outcome-determinative deficiency in counsel’s performance
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Wright, J.,
dissenting. I heartily concur with Justice Brown’s dissent in its entirety. I must say that I have mixed emotions about this case since I happen to believe that a murder committed while one is incarcerated should lead to a speedy demise of the culprit in accordance with law. Both deterrence and retribution would be served by this course of action. A review of the two-hundred-eighty-five-page “investigative report” admitted into evidence as the result of the gross incompetence of counsel most certainly strengthens my personal feelings as aforesaid.
However, I feel that my duty as a judge requires a course of decision-making which will protect the constitutional rights of every person, regardless of his or her station in life. This obligation does not stop even when confronted with a vicious individual such as Bradley.
I suggest that no fair-minded person — be he layman or lawyer — could reasonably conclude that Bradley’s counsel properly represented their client at trial. Likewise, the “report,” which Justice Brown has dissected in detail, is just about the most prejudicial document I have ever encountered in my nineteen years as a judge, the analysis of the majority to the contrary notwithstanding.
The plain truth of the matter is *150 that appellant would have been far, far better off remaining silent without anyone “representing” him.
I would invite the members of the United States Supreme Court to review this case.