analyzing that “there is nothing in the record below to indicate that the state’s failure to disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16 or anything other than a negligent omission on its part”
How later courts described this case
- analyzing that “there is nothing in the record below to indicate that the state’s failure to disclose was a willful violation of Crim.R. 16 or anything other than a negligent omission on its part”
- finding no abuse of discretion in admitting untimely disclosed evidence where none of the three elements was present
- emphasizing that by the time the undisclosed evidence was admitted into the trial, appellant was well aware of its existence
- In determining the appropriate sanctions for a discovery violation, the trial court considers whether the prosecution’s violation was wilful, whether the undisclosed statement would have benefitted the defense, or whether the accused was prejudiced.
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
William B. Brown, J.,
dissenting. While I would agree with the majority’s position that the statement at issue was discoverable pursuant to Crim. *447 R. 16, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the failure to comply with Crim. R. 16 in this case was nonprejudicial to the rights of the appellant herein.
Appellant’s entire defense rested on a credible alibi. The extrajudicial statement of appellant’s co-defendant, which the state wrongfully failed to disclose, bore directly on the credibility of appellant’s alibi defense. If the defense had known of this statement, as the majority holds it should have, and of its potential for admission prior to the commencement of the trial, it may well have changed the entire posture of its defense strategy.
Under the facts of this case, “* * * prohibiting] the * * * [state] from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed * * *” as provided for in Crim. R. 16 (E)(3) is the only viable sanction.