recognizing that § 4123.74 does not protect employers against their employees’ intentional tort claims
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that § 4123.74 does not protect employers against their employees’ intentional tort claims
- opining that the syllabus “states broadly what might be considered as accurate law” regarding an employee’s right to bring an intentional tort suit and that the syllabus established a “basic valid premise,” but strongly denying that any intentional or malicious tort had been alleged given the facts of the case, so that dismissal of the complaint was appropriate
- agreeing with the syllabus “as an abstract proposition of law” in that “intentional torts fall outside the workers’ compensation scheme,” but stating that “[w]e should not circumvent the statutory framework for workers’ compensation merely because a known risk existed. We should demand a virtual certainty”
- stating that insurance against intentional torts is against public policy
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Vandemark v. Southland Corp., 38 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1988)
In footnote 7 of the Blankenship opinion, it was stated that Greenwatt was factually distinguishable on the basis that Greenwatt involved “omission” on the part of the employer, and not “commission.
The opinion
Holmes, J.,
dissenting. In the syllabus the majority states broadly what might be considered as accurate law re *622 garding the right of an employee to bring an action against his employer for the latter’s commission of an intentional tort against the employee. However, the opinion then proceeds to emasculate this basic valid premise and radically depart from historic Ohio law by validating actions brought by employees against their employer for their condition, illness or disease occasioned by and arising out of their employment, and while working within the scope of their employment.
The use of the particular chemicals, found here to be utilized by the employing company, were so introduced into the manufacturing process by way of a business or commercial judgment to effect an end product of the manufacturing process and not utilized to intentionally injure these employees. These appellants, and other employees of Milacron, were employed to engage in the manufacturing process, using the necessary ingredients or products reasonably determined by the management of the employer. Injuries, occupational disease, or bodily condition received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his employment and use of the materials of manufacture must, insofar as bringing an action against an employer, be considered a hazard of employment which may be compensable under R. C. 4123.01 to 4123.94, but not actionable in a civil suit against the employer. Section 35 of Article II, Ohio Constitution; R. C. 4123.74 and 4123.741.
There has been no intentional or malicious tort alleged here which could reasonably withstand a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Civ. R. 12(B)(1) and (6). The trial court was correct in granting such motion, and the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court’s judgment.
I would accordingly affirm the Court of Appeals.