concluding that the language of R.C.2925.03(A)(1), which prohibits trafficking in drugs, does not permit knowledge of the nature of the substance to be implied as an element of the offense
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the language of R.C.2925.03(A)(1), which prohibits trafficking in drugs, does not permit knowledge of the nature of the substance to be implied as an element of the offense
- reiterating that failure to deliver is not a defense
- interpreting R.C. 2925.03, drug-trafficking statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Jordan, Unpublished Decision (7-30-1999) (1999)
At the simplest level, then, Patterson is distinguishable from the instant case because the Supreme Court was interpreting a different statute.
The opinion
Clifford F. Brown, J.,
dissenting. In both cases, I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent today in State v. Scott (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 439, 443 . A sale or offer to sell a controlled substance was not made in any of these cases within the meaning of R. C. 2925.03(A)(1)(5) or (7), since the goods transferred were not controlled substances, regardless of what defendants thought they were selling. To conclude otherwise violates the principle that criminal statutes defining offenses must be strictly construed against the state and liberally construed in favor of the accused. R. C. 2901.04(A).
W. Brown, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.