stating that "if a trial court was rendered powerless to recognize and determine property rights in assets that do not exist at the time of the final decree, one party, from the time of separation to the time of the final decree, could withdraw all funds and, unilaterally and with impunity, squander the fruits of the marital labor. Such a position would not only be antithetical to public policy, but also to prior case law"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "if a trial court was rendered powerless to recognize and determine property rights in assets that do not exist at the time of the final decree, one party, from the time of separation to the time of the final decree, could withdraw all funds and, unilaterally and with impunity, squander the fruits of the marital labor. Such a position would not only be antithetical to public policy, but also to prior case law"
- stating that a trial court is authorized to use a de facto termination date under R.C. 3105.171(A)(2) provided that it is “reasonable under the facts and circumstances presented in a particular case”
- applying an abuse of discretion standard when establishing the duration of a marriage for purposes of valuation
- dissipation found where husband removed funds from joint savings account before institution of divorce proceedings, but while parties were separated
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Holmes, J., concurring.
I wholeheartedly concur in this *322 opinion as another positive step, like Cherry v. Cherry, supra, in correcting some very unfortunate and misleading language in Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 399 . If this court will avail itself of the opportunity in the near future to recant and recuse the language of Wolfe , opining that a separation agreement is merged within the divorce decree, then all of the unfortunate dictum, as set forth in Wolfe , but not necessary to its determination, will be behind us.