explaining that “Civ.R.60(B), not a motion for reconsideration, is the proper way to bring to the trial court’s attention its errors following a final judgment entry”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “Civ.R.60(B), not a motion for reconsideration, is the proper way to bring to the trial court’s attention its errors following a final judgment entry”
- noting that a motion for reconsideration after a final order in the trial court is a nullity and all judgments or final orders flowing from a motion for reconsideration are also a nullity
- stating that reconsideration of a final order is a nullity
- “Interpretation of the Rules of Civil Procedure and practical considerations warrant our determination that motions for reconsideration of a final judgment in the trial court are a nullity.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Ronan, Unpublished Decision (1-18-2007), 2007 Ohio 168 (2007)
" In this case, however, we specifically found that there was no final order in the civil sex offender classification and therefore, we had no jurisdiction to proceed.4 Because the trial court never journalized the sex offender classification, there was no final judgment on that issue.Pitts is inapplicable.
Distinguished by Ohio Bar Liability Ins. v. INA Underwriters Ins., 8 Ohio App. Unrep. 10 (1990)
There being no final judgment, Pitts v. Dept. of Transportation (1981), 67 Ohio St. 2d 378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 is inapplicable, and a motion to vacate or to reconsider the interlocutory decision is a permissible method, if not the only method, to petition the court to address again an issue in the light of further law or facts.
The opinion
Holmes, J.,
dissenting. I dissent in that it is my view that it was not the intent of the General Assembly to grant an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of an employee’s job abolishment. It is true that such a review may, by virtue of R. C. 124.03, be had in the State Personnel Board of Review, but such section does not provide an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas on the issue of the abolishment of a position.
Even though this court held in State, ex rel. Kendrick, v. Masheter (1964), 176 Ohio St. 232 , and State, ex rel. Osborn, v. Jackson (1976), 46 Ohio St. 2d 41 , that a right of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas is provided an employee under R. C. 119.12 in a decision involving a layoff, this is not a reasonable basis for extending such appeal to a job abolishment. Such a determination concerning the basis of the abolishment of a job is quite separate and apart from the consideration of a case involving a layoff, which is reasonably within the legislatively intended realm of the removal or reduction in pay of an employee for disciplinary reasons.
I would reverse the Court of Appeals, and hold that the trial court was correct in its determination that it had no jurisdiction of this appeal.