Opinion

Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co.

  • 62 Ohio St. 2d 245
  • 16 Ohio Op. 3d 280
  • 405 N.E.2d 264
  • 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,015
  • 1980 Ohio LEXIS 730
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
May 28, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Holmes
On the bench
Brown, Celebrezze, Herbert, Holmes, Locher, Sweeney
Cited by
41 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.1%

finding the statute of limitations in that case began to run on the date of the last instance of a “continuing violation” in the context of a wage discrimination claim under Ohio Rev.Code § 4111.17

How later courts described this case

  • finding the statute of limitations in that case began to run on the date of the last instance of a “continuing violation” in the context of a wage discrimination claim under Ohio Rev.Code § 4111.17
  • “Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) defines ‘offense’ as ‘a felony or misdemeanor; a breach of the criminal laws.’ . . . Black's Law Dictionary defines ‘violation’ as a ‘breach of right, duty, or law.’” (brackets omitted
  • “By defining ‘recovery’ in terms of commencement 12 of the violation, the legislature clearly indicated its intent to permit recovery from the beginning of the prohibited discrimination until its termination.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Holmes, J.,

dissenting. The statute under consideration presents certain inequities if interpreted purely from either the standpoint of the employer or of the employee. If interpreted as here by the majority, the employee may continue working for the employer for a number of years at the claimed discriminatory wage rate, and then bring an action for double the differential, which recovery could conceivably be an astronomical amount.

On the other hand, if the section were interpreted so that the employee is limited in bringing the action to one year after the inception of the employment at the unlawful rate, this *250 would grant the employer the unfair advantage of being able to continue the unlawful employment practice indefinitely beyond the one-year period.

These were the considerations of the panel of the Tenth District Court of Appeals when it decided in Evans v. Western Electric Co. (1976), 50 Ohio App. 2d 233 , that a recovery under R. C. 4111.17 would be limited under subsection (E) thereof to any wage differential occurring within the one-year period immediately prior to the initiation of an action therefor. I prefer to continue to follow that rule.

W. Brown, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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