Opinion

Hocking Conservancy District v. Dodson-Lindblom Associates, Inc.

  • 62 Ohio St. 2d 195
  • 16 Ohio Op. 3d 217
  • 404 N.E.2d 164
  • 1980 Ohio LEXIS 718
Court
Ohio Supreme Court
Filed
May 14, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Holmes
On the bench
Brown, Celebrezze, Herbert, Holmes, Kerns, Locher, Second, Sweeney
Cited by
29 cases
Authority
More cited than 15.1%

holding that engineering was not one of the traditional professions at common law and, accordingly, not subject to the malpractice statute of limitations

How later courts described this case

  • holding that engineering was not one of the traditional professions at common law and, accordingly, not subject to the malpractice statute of limitations
  • which limits malpractice actions to the professions of lawyers and physicians because they exercise independent judgment directly affecting their client/patient and necessarily will often fail to fulfill expectations yet fulfill their professional duties
  • professional engineer is not considered to have committed “malpractice”
  • Negligence of professional engineer did not constitute malpractice.

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Holmes, J., dissenting.

I have had a great deal of reservation in accepting the principle that we must continue the more limited common law definition of “malpractice.” I was in agreement with the panel of the Tenth District Court of Appeals when it extended the one-year statute of limitations to accountants upon the basis that such professionals exercise independent judgment, as do physicians and attorneys.

A number of appellate decisions have held the practice of *199 dentistry to fall within the orbit of the statute of limitations pertaining to malpractice. See, e.g., Cox v. Cartwright (1953), 96 Ohio App. 245 ; Cook v. Yager (1968), 13 Ohio App. 2d 1 . I agree with this line of cases.

It would also seem to be reasonable to extend the one-year limitation to the profession of engineering, where in the functions of such profession there is usually to be found the exercise of a high degree of independent judgment. The majority herein not seeing fit to go further than what is specifically provided for by statute, and that which has been included within the common law definition of “malpractice,” I must dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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