holding that the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) when accepting the defendant’s guilty plea to murder, even though the trial court did not specifically inform the defendant that he would be ineligible for probation, because the trial court informed him of the maximum penalty of an indefinite term of 15 years to life in prison
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) when accepting the defendant’s guilty plea to murder, even though the trial court did not specifically inform the defendant that he would be ineligible for probation, because the trial court informed him of the maximum penalty of an indefinite term of 15 years to life in prison
- stating that prejudice must be alleged in cases where the court fails to inform the defendant of Crim.R. 11 disclosures that are nonconstitutional and implying that failure to inform the pleading defendant of the constitutional rights being waived does not require a showing of prejudice
- holding that the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a
- finding that the appellant’s plea “was voluntarily made, with the knowledge and understanding by the defendant that he had been promised neither ‘a lighter sentence, or probation[.]’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’Neill, C. J.,
dissenting. The holding of the majority that the failure to advise the defendant that he is ineligible for probation does not constitute prejudicial error is an unwarranted retreat from the principle enunciated in State v. Caudill (1976), 48 Ohio St. 2d 342 , 358 N. E. 2d 601 , that the provisions of Crim. R. 11(C)(2) must be scrupulously adhered to in order to enable the trial court to “determine fully the defendant’s understanding of the consequences of his plea of guilty * *
I would reverse the judgment on the authority of Caudill.
W. Brown and P. Brown, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.