holding that the duty to warn “does not extend to the speculative anticipation of how manufactured components, not in and of themselves dangerous or defective, can become potentially dangerous dependent upon the nature of their integration into a unit designed and assembled by another”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the duty to warn “does not extend to the speculative anticipation of how manufactured components, not in and of themselves dangerous or defective, can become potentially dangerous dependent upon the nature of their integration into a unit designed and assembled by another”
- holding duty to warn does not extend to speculative anticipation of how manufactured components, not in and of themselves dangerous or defective, can become potentially dangerous depending on integration into unit designed and assembled by another
- providing that a plaintiff must prove that the product was defective when it was manufactured and sold by the defendant, that the defect existed when it left the defendant’s control, and that the defect proximately caused the plaintiffs injury or loss
- stating that it is "futile to require that [a manufacturer] notify the employee of that which the responsible party, the employer, was already aware"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’Neill, C. J.,
concurring.
I concur in paragraphs three, four and five of the syllabus and the judgment.
Paragraphs one and two of the syllabus are not necessary to the decision in this case.
The majority opinion, at page 323, states as follows:
“* # # it is our conclusion that there was no original defect of any sort in the punch press, and that, as a matter of law, Superior’s alteration of the safety device, coupled with the utilization of the press for the stamping of stock long enough to bridge the 24 inch gap between the [safety] buttons, was the sole responsible cause of the maiming of Mrs. Temple.”
That language forms the basis for the formulation of paragraph three of the syllabus, which rule is dispositive of this case except for the issue of the safety button guards. Paragraph four of the syllabus states the rule which is dispositive of that issue.
The holding of the majority that the sole responsible *329 cause of the injury to the plaintiff was the acts of her employer, and the further holding that there was no original defect of any sort in the punch press, make it unnecessary and inappropriate to determine in general, without facts upon which to base a rule of law, what sort of defect would make the original manufacturer and the successor seller liable to the injured employee on the theory of strict liability in tort as a matter of law.
HbRbeet and P. Brown, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring opinion.