instructing courts to approach a divorce action like an action in partition by using their authority to dissolve, windup and distribute assets and liabilities
How later courts described this case
- instructing courts to approach a divorce action like an action in partition by using their authority to dissolve, windup and distribute assets and liabilities
- “ ‘if the paramour resides in the wife’s home without contributing anything toward the purchase of food or the payment of normal household bills, then there may be a reasonable inference that the wife’s alimony is being used, at least in part, for the benefit of the paramour, in which case it could be argued with force that the amount thereof should be modified accordingly’ ”
- “fair [separation] agreements may be rendered manifestly oppressive ... such as ... where the economic situation of either or both of the parties drastically changes”
- i.e., that unchastity alone is not sufficient to terminate alimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St. 2d 348 (1981)
See Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St. 2d 318, 432 N.E.2d 183, 184-185 (Ohio 1982); Wolfe v. Wolfe, 46 Ohio St. 2d 399, 350 N.E.2d 413, 422 (Ohio 1976), overruled on other grounds Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 421 N.E.2d 1293 (Ohio 1981).
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Morris v. Morris (Slip Opinion)
46 Ohio St.2d 399 , 350 N.E.2d 413 (1976), superseded by statute as stated in Morris v. Morris, 148 Ohio St.3d 138 , 2016-Ohio-5002 , 69 N.E.3d 664, ¶ 28
Limited by McClain v. McClain, 15 Ohio St. 3d 289 (1984)
However, "a division of marital property is not subject to modification through the continuing jurisdiction of the court."Robins, at ¶ 11, citing Wolfe v. Wolfe (1976),46 Ohio St.2d 399, limited by McClain v. McClain (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 289;Bean v. Bean (1983), 14 Ohio App.3d 358, 361-362.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ressler v. Ressler, 17 Ohio St. 3d 17 (1985)
However, Wolfe is distinguishable because that case involved a sustenance award that was extended indefinitely and terminable on certain conditions subsequent, whereas this case involves a sustenance award that is subject to conditions subsequent, but definitely terminates after a term of years.
The opinion
Corrigan, J.,
dissenting. There is nothing arcane about the provisions of the separation agreement under, .study in this.case. It is; free from qualification or limitation,. The. intent of the parties is plainly stated in Item 9: ■1 * * * The liability of [Mr,] Wolfe for the payment set forth in this paragraph shall cease upon the happening of whichever of the following events shall occur first: (a) the.remarriage of the wife; (b) the death of the wife. * : .
Neither of these contingencies has occurred. Whether entering into the separation agreement in 1967.;was:wise or unwise on Mr. Wolfe’s part, in view of his former •wife’s admitted scandalous personal behavior, flaunting her disregard of conventional moral standards of rectitude, ;is not for decision by this court. He is the architect of his .own continuous mortification until one of the contingencies occurs. He is obligated by the terms of that agreement as long as he or his estate is able to fulfill its conditions.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.