holding that the determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees is “committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge . . . but the judge’s discretion is not unlimited. It is essential that the judge provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination, including any award of an enhancement.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the determination of reasonable attorneys’ fees is “committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge . . . but the judge’s discretion is not unlimited. It is essential that the judge provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination, including any award of an enhancement.”
- recognizing “there is a ‘strong presumption’ that the base lodestar figure is reasonable, but that presumption may be overcome in those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in determining a reasonable fee.”
- explaining that even in “a matter that is committed to the sound discretion of a trial judge . . . [i]t is essential that the judge provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects” of its determination because otherwise “adequate appellate review is not feasible”
- recognizing that the lodestar method "[d]eveloped after the practice of hourly billing had become widespread" and provides a rough approximation of such billing practices, but "if hourly billing becomes unusual, an alternative to the lodestar method may have to be found"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
concurring.
Nearly 30 years ago, a group of attorneys sought a fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after “achieving] only limited success” litigating their clients’ constitutional claims. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 431 , 103 S. Ct. 1933 , 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). This Court’s opinion resolving their claim for fees observed that “in some cases of exceptional success an enhanced award” of attorney’s fees under § 1988 “may be justified.” Id., at 435, 103 S. Ct. 1933 , 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (emphasis added). That observation plainly was dictum, but one year later this Court relied on it to reject the “argument that an ‘upward adjustment’ ” to the lodestar calculation “is never permissible.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 , 104 S. Ct. 1541 , 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984). Yet “we have never sustained an enhancement of a
[ 559 U.S. 561 ]
lodestar amount for performance,” ante, at 552, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 505, and our jurisprudence since Blum has charted “a decisional arc that bends decidedly against enhancements,” 532 F.3d 1209, 1221 (CA11 2008) (Carnes, J.). See also ante, at 552-553, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 505-506.
Today the Court holds, consistent with Hensley and Blum , that a lodestar fee award under § 1988 may be enhanced for attorney performance in a “few” circumstances that “are indeed ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional.’ ’’Ante, at *511 554, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 507. But careful readers will observe the precise limitations that the Court imposes on the availability of such enhancements. See ante, at 554-557, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 506-508; see also ante, at 560, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 510 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t must be understood that extraordinary cases are presented only in the rarest circumstances”). These limitations preserve our prior cases and advance our attorney’s fees jurisprudence further along the deci-sional arc that Judge Carnes described. I agree with the Court’s approach and its conclusion because, as the Court emphasizes, see ante, at 553, 176 L. Ed. 2d, at 505-506, the lodestar calculation will in virtually every case already reflect all indicia of attorney performance relevant to a fee award.