Mega Construction Co. v. United States

OPINION

MOODY R. TIDWELL, III, Judge:

On April 17, 1992, the court issued its initial opinion in this case, reported at 25 Cl.Ct. 735 (1992), concluding that plaintiff had failed to prove it had been improperly terminated for default. On April 29, 1992, plaintiff moved to amend or modify the opinion, or for reconsideration and/or a new trial. The motion was premised on arguments that the court had not found the facts or law to be to the liking of plaintiff; the court had failed to make separate findings of liability on each of plaintiff’s numerous claims; a case relied upon by the court, Al Johnson Constr. Co. v. United States, 854 F.2d 467 (Fed.Cir.1988), as applied was unconstitutional or at least distinguishable from the instant case in some unidentified way; and that the court’s conclusion that the termination for default was proper was not supported “by any substantial evidence” or was completely unsupported by any evidence.

The law governing motions for reconsideration is ably set out in Bishop v. United States:

It is well recognized that “[a] motion for reconsideration is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.” Triax Co. v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 507, 509 (1990) (citing Eyre v. McDonough Power Equip., 755 F.2d 416 , 420 (5th Cir.1985) (construing FRCP 59)); see Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1990); Gelco Builders & Burjay Constr. Corp. v. United States, [ 177 Ct.Cl. 1025 , 369 F.2d 992 , 1000 n. 7 (1966) ]. Post-opinion motions to reconsider are not favored[.] General Elec. Co. v. United States, [ 189 Ct.Cl. 116 , 416 F.2d 1320, 1321 (1969)]. It is well-settled that “[t]he court has a right to know before it decides [the controversy at hand] whether the parties have anything further to present.” [Id., 416 F.2d] at 1322.

Generally, “[a] motion under RUSCC 59 must be based upon manifest error of law, or mistake of fact, and is not intended to give an unhappy litigant an addi *405 tional chance to sway the court.” Circle K Corp. v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 659, 664-65 (1991). The movant must show either that an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, evidence not previously available has become available, or that the motion is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Weyer-haeuser Corp. v. Koppers Co., 771 F.Supp. 1406, 1419 (D.Md.1991). “Litigants should not, on a motion for reconsideration, be permitted to attempt an extensive retrial based on evidence which was manifestly available at [the] time of the hearing.” Gelco, [ 369 F.2d at 1000 n. 7], The litigation process rests on the assumption that both parties present their case once, to their best advantage.

Bishop v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 281, 285-86 (1992).

Plaintiff has not argued or presented any credible argument or evidence that any of the conditions cited in Weyerhaeuser Corp. are present here. However, to provide the parties with a basis upon which to determine quantum, the court will reissue its opinion to give a detailed discourse on the reasons why the termination for default was proper, and to fully address the delay and non-delay claims. Plaintiff provided no support for its contention that Al Johnson was unconstitutional or distinguishable, and the court can imagine of none: That argument need not be addressed. Plaintiff’s motion to amend or modify is granted; plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and/or for a new trial is denied. The opinion of the court reported at 25 Cl.Ct. 735 (1992) is vacated. The modified opinion follows.

I. INTRODUCTION

On August 20, 1985, plaintiff, Mega Construction Company, Inc., entered into a fixed-price construction contract with defendant, through the United States Postal Service (U.S.P.S. or Postal Service), for the construction of the Main Post Office at Canoga Park, California. The contract price, as amended was $2,316,609.68. On September 9, 1985, defendant issued its Notice To Proceed, and on either September 17 or 23, 1985, plaintiff commenced work on the project. 1 The contract originally contemplated completion of the project on October 20, 1986, but defendant administratively allowed several of plaintiff’s requested extensions of the completion date, adding a total of 118 days to the performance period. The amended completion date was February 15, 1987. In December 1986, after the discovery of cracks in the concrete floor of the main workroom of the postal service building, the contracting officer determined that the concrete floor slab failed to conform to contract specifications. The contracting officer directed plaintiff on several occasions to submit a plan to remove and replace the slab. Plaintiff refused to comply with the contracting officer’s directives, and on July 22, 1987 defendant terminated the contract for default based on plaintiff’s failure to comply with directives of the contracting officer, lack of job action, and abandonment. Both parties alleged incompetence and mismanagement of the project on the part of the opposing party. Plaintiff also alleged bad faith and malice on the part of defendant and several of its contracting officials. The case will not turn on a finding that one party or the other acted with the least malice or incompetence. Each party must prove its claims and the case will be disposed of in favor of the party who has provided the requisite degree of credible evidence. All facts are disputed.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following the termination for default, plaintiff filed suit in this court on October 14, 1987, requesting a conversion of the termination for default to a termination for convenience of defendant. The complaint *406 was arguably defective at the time because it did not contain a monetary claim. On December 14, 1987, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit because (1) plaintiff filed suit before submitting a monetary claim to the contracting officer, and (2) the complaint did not seek monetary damages. However, on December 9, 1987 the contracting officer issued a final decision that assessed partial reprocurement costs. The sole issue before the court in December 1987 was the propriety of the termination for default and assessment of reprocurement costs. Oral argument on the motion to dismiss was heard February 19, 1988. The court held that a bare termination for default, unaccompanied by a monetary claim did not — at that time — constitute a basis for a claim cognizable before this court, Mega Constr. Co. v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 555, 557 (1988) (Mega I), but that once defendant made its monetary counterclaim, jurisdiction was perfected, bringing this case within the jurisdiction of the court. Id. at 557-58 . The court held that it lacked jurisdiction at the time the complaint was filed.

In the interest of substantial justice this court concludes that plaintiffs earlier pleadings in response to defendant’s motion to dismiss brought the issues properly before this court. [RUSCC] 8(f). This is not a case in which the complaint would be statutorily time-barred or otherwise dismissed as untimely. The court concludes that it would be a waste of judicial resources and a denial of justice to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint only to have it immediately refiled. Instead, the court concludes, and the parties are noticed that the suit is properly and timely before the court. In order to clarify the issues, plaintiff is ordered to amend its complaint within 30 days of the date of oral argument to specifically address the December 9, 1987 monetary demand of the contracting officer.

Id. at 557 . 2 The court concluded that it unquestionably had jurisdiction to determine the propriety of the termination for default and assessment of reprocurement costs. Id. at 558 . Courts strive to avoid nonsensical interpretations of the law. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 , 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3252 , 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982). Defendant’s motion to dismiss was accordingly denied. Mega I, 14 Cl.Ct. at 558 .

Plaintiff submitted its claim for $2,569,-380.58 to the contracting officer on August 30, 1988. On September 21, 1988, the contracting officer issued a second final decision which allowed part and denied part of plaintiff’s claim, and assessed $531,495.44 in reprocurement costs. On November 25, 1988, the contracting officer issued a third final decision allowing plaintiff an additional $31,323.30. On May 9, 1989 plaintiff filed its second amended complaint, challenging the contracting officer’s second final decision, and stating an affirmative claim in the same amount presented to the contracting officer on August 30,1988. On October 26, 1989, defendant filed an amended counterclaim increasing the assessed reprocurement costs to $559,460.08. This opinion issues following trial.

III. THE TERMINATION FOR DEFAULT

A. Facts

Plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of California, doing business in that state as a licensed general contractor. Mr. Marvin N. Kaplan is president of plaintiff, and his assistant, Mr. Barry Harman, was construction manager on the Canoga Park Main Post Office project. As the general contractor, plaintiff was responsible for coordinating and managing the work of the various subcontractors on the job-site.

Among the many tasks that plaintiff performed under the contract was the installation of a poured-concrete (non-prestressed), non-structural slab on grade measuring ap *407 proximately 22,000 square feet that was to be the floor of the Canoga Park Main Post Office (the slab). The contract specifications required a slab four inches thick, with No. 4 steel reinforcing bars (rebar) embedded in a checkerboard pattern, twenty-four inches apart and at least one inch below the upper surface of the slab. Because the slab was non-structural, the rebar was present to prevent cracking as the concrete shrank, not to provide reinforcement. The contract also required plaintiff to insert the rebar through control joints, placed every thirty-seven feet in a north-south direction and every twenty-nine feet in an east-west direction. A control joint is any purposeful break made in the concrete to control cracking. Control joints take different forms. One type of control joint consists of a galvanized steel stakes embedded approximately one inch below the surface of the concrete. After the concrete is poured, the stakes in conjunction with the rebar act as a control break in the concrete to contain cracking as the concrete cures. As one structural engineering expert noted at trial, the lines that appear every three to four feet in sidewalks perform the same function, but, for aesthetic reasons, owners of buildings do not want cut or drawn lines every three to four feet in the floor. Here, the control joints were “Keyed Kold” joints.

The slab sat atop two inches of sand that covered a layer of 6 MIL plastic vapor barrier. The vapor barrier covered another two inches of sand. The layers of sand rested on approximately five to six feet of compacted fill. The slab was to be finished covered with Va-inch asphalt plank. Because the slab was non-structural, its most important feature was its ability to endure the weight of loaded mail carts weighing up to 2000 pounds, as well as substantial foot traffic. Defendant’s engineering consultant, R.T. Frankian & Associates (Fran-kian), specified to defendant’s structural engineering subcontractor, Mr. Gordon Kelsen of Martin & Kelsen, Inc., one of defendant’s contract consultants, that the fill under the slab was to be non-expansive, meaning that it was not to expand if, for example, water seeped into the fill due to heavy rains or a broken water pipe. A non-expansive soil is composed of a mixture of small, medium, and large grains, carefully compacted to specification. If water seeps into a properly mixed fill, the large and medium particles will provide space for the water, thereby preventing the fill from expanding and causing the slab on top to shift and crack. If fill is comprised of too many small grains, water is simply absorbed into the fill like water into a compressed dry sponge; the reaction is the same. If the fill is five feet deep and experiences a three percent expansion, the fill will expand three inches, which, in turn, will cause substantial movement, and therefore cracking, in the slab. Frankian performed soils tests prior to installation of the slab and found the fill to be non-expansive.

The floor of the post office building’s main workroom, measuring approximately 10,300 square feet, comprised the largest section of the slab. In December 1986, cracking, and, in at least one or two areas, vertical displacement (also known as “differential settlement”) were discovered in the main workroom portion of the slab. Differential settlement is a severe form of cracking in which one side of a crack sinks or rises, resulting in a rough, uneven surface. On January 16, 1987, defendant’s architect, Lane Architectural Group (Lane), instructed Mr. Kelsen to inspect the slab. In a January 27, 1987, letter to Mr. Edward Jones, Jr., Lane’s manager for the project, Mr. Kelsen recommended coring the areas of vertical displacement to obtain a sample of the slab in hopes of determining the cause of the cracking. Mr. Kelsen also stated that the cracks and vertical displacement did not affect the structural integrity of the building, but that repairs should be effected for “architectural considerations.”

On February 26, 1987, the contracting officer, Mr. Joseph M. Cipriani, directed plaintiff to investigate the cracks and differential settlement of the slab and submit soil and concrete samples for testing. By letter of March 10, 1987, Mr. Harman, plaintiff’s construction manager, protested that physical testing was the owner’s re *408 sponsibility, and that plaintiff was “unwilling to expend costs in connection with testing.” However, Mr. Harman also stated that plaintiff was “more than willing to furnish all necessary facilities, labor, material and equipment to accommodate all such removal, tearing out and/or replacement, understanding that [the Postal Service’s] endorsement would equitably adjust the contract price should the examination substantially reflect conformance.” 3 The cracks worsened, and on March 27, 1987, Mr. Cipriani formally determined that the slab was defective pursuant to General Provision 51 of the contract, entitled Inspection and Acceptance. 4 Mr. Cipriani wanted a slab no better and no worse than the one for which defendant had contracted. He also testified that he did not want a “glued-together” slab in a new facility; he did not want a slab with different elevations caused by vertical displacement, nor one that would continue to crack so seriously. He especially did not want to have to tear up a new building a few months or years after completion to replace the slab because it had become unusable.

The trial record demonstrated that the extent of the cracking in the slab was massive, with at least four cracks running the entire distance of the workroom portion of the slab in an east-west direction, and numerous other smaller east-west cracks as well. There were also at least ten smaller north-south cracks running through this area of the slab. Some of the cracks, according to Mr. Cipriani, were approximately three-sixteenths of an inch wide. While the trial concentrated on the slab in the main workroom because that was the portion ultimately removed, the entire slab, including areas in all of the other rooms, also contained cracks, albeit to a lesser extent than in the main workroom. For instance, there was evidence of vertical displacement of the slab in at least one office or hall area. According to Mr. Phillips T. Ruffalo, a registered architect and structural engineer under contract to defendant as its on-site representative and project manager, some of the cracks were typical hairline cracks, while others were large enough in places to see the sand beneath the slab.

*409 It was clear from testimony at trial that the cracks worsened in both length and width between December 1986 and June 1987. Mr. Daniel Whalen, an architect employed by Joncich, Sturm and Associates 5 (JS & A), the architectural firm employed to replace Lane on the reprocurement, testified that

During my time of association with this project before the slab was removed ... October 19, 1987 through early January of 1988, I noticed the cracks were getting worse. I — I would say that the slab ... had dynamic characteristics____ [I]t didn’t crack and then just stop cracking, and that was the end of it. The cracks were getting deeper, wider, and there were more of them every time I [visited the site.]

Mr. Ruffalo confirmed Mr. Whalen’s observations about the growth in size and number of the cracks. Mr. Ruffalo also testified that he saw worsening of the vertical displacement and actual “curling” of the concrete where several cracks came together.

After the major cracks in the slab appeared, defendant contracted with several engineering consultants to obtain independent appraisals of the cracking. One such firm, Pacific Architects and Engineers, retained Mr. Paul Winter, a structural engineer, to examine the slab design and specifications, and inspect the slab. Mr. Winter concluded that the cracking was caused by the wide spacing of control joints in the design of the slab. He stated in his March 30, 1987 letter that:

control joints in the main area of the building occur at from [sic] 30 to 37 Vb feet on center____ ‘Textbook’ spacing of control joints varies from 15 to 20 feet on center____ Shrinkage cracks will always occur in non-prestressed slab on grade, and control joints are provided to confine the cracks to pre-determined locations.

Mr. Kelsen countered that it was not uncommon to place expansion joints as far apart as forty feet by forty feet. Mr. Winter concluded his report with the recommendation that part of the slab should be repaired and part replaced. He suggested filling small cracks with non-shrink grout and replacing areas where vertical displacement had occurred.

Mr. Richard Levitt of Wagner, Hohns, Inglis, Inc., a construction consulting firm retained by defendant, also inspected the slab. In a memorandum dated March 24, 1987, Mr. Levitt stated:

The concrete slab ... had cracks as had been reported, mostly midway between the joints at approx. 20 foot spacings. Looks like an expansive soil problem or insufficient reinforcing in the design or construction. Most of the cracks are of no consequence____ Otherwise, the momentum observed today tells me it would not be a good time to terminate the contract, if that is being considered.

On May 14, 1987, two and half months after being directed to do so by the contracting officer, plaintiff finally removed a four foot by ten foot section of the slab. Mr. Kelsen reported in a letter to Lane that all of the rebar in the cut section, but one, lay in the sand under the floor and was not embedded in the slab as required by the contract. Mr. Kelsen also reported that no “Key[ed] Kold” control joint was present, although the contract drawings indicated that a control joint was to be used at that location. Mr. Kaplan reluctantly agreed, even though the photographs taken of the cut section overwhelmingly demonstrated that the rebar in the cut section had not been installed in conformance with the requirements of the contract. Mr. Kelsen, as did several other consultants, recommended that defendant ignore the almost-certain long term problems with the slab, *410 and the fact that defendant had not received the slab for which it had contracted, and apply a “quick fix” to the slab by filling the cracks with a non-shrink material and cutting the main workroom slab with one inch deep saw cuts in place of control joints to prevent further cracking and vertical displacement. No consultant of the “quick-fix” school of thought would guarantee how long any repaired slab would last, much less the thirty years for which the taxpayer had paid. Mr. Kelsen testified that he qualifiedly recommended that the slab be repaired for aesthetic reasons, “from the standpoint of acceptability to the client of a cracked slab,” and for safety reasons. “The only advice I gave [defendant] was that they were buying the building, [and] if they were not happy with that building the way it was, with the cracked slab, then it was up to them to make [the] decision [to accept or reject the slab.]” When asked by counsel for plaintiff if he believed as late as September 1987 that the slab could be repaired, Mr. Kelsen responded, “[y]es, if acceptable to the client.”

On June 8, 1987, Mr. Cipriani met at the job-site with Mr. William Peterson, a senior structural engineer with the architectural and engineering firm of Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall to seek yet another independent appraisal of the cracking. In confirming what Mr. Kelsen had observed, Mr. Peterson reported that in the section of slab cut for sampling, the rebar rested on the top sand layer of the fill beneath the slab. Mr. Peterson did find some control joints but noted that they were improperly placed; i.e., the control joints were placed too low, and were parallel to columns rather than intersecting the column corners as specified in the contract drawings. Mr. Peterson opined that the fill underneath the slab was of proper quality and had been compacted sufficiently to ensure that the slab had not shifted unreasonably due to poor soil quality. Mr. Peterson's June 8, 1987 report concluded:

The owner did not get what was contracted for however, and this is the main problem. My recommendation is not to do anything to the slab, just use it as it is. But the owner should be reimbursed for the cost of the reinforcing [the rebar] as well as the placement of it. He [sic] should also be reimbursed about 50% of the cost of the joint materials and placement. 6

Mr. Whalen, who personally observed removal of the concrete slab in the workroom, testified that in his estimation, seventy percent of the rebar lay beneath the concrete.

I was there when the whole slab was removed, and the only portions [of the rebar] I saw that were embedded in the slab, would pass through the key[ed] joints. [The rebar] would go up ... through the key joint and back down a few feet [on] either side of the key joint. So you count those sections, it’s about 30 percent of the slab.

Mr. Rudolph Paolini, whom the court found to be an impressive witness, was also present during the demolition of workroom slab. Mr. Paolini, an architect employed by Wagner, Hohns, Inglis, Inc., also under contract to defendant, “engaged principally in construction claims investigation” was an expert witness called by defendant. He testified that he saw approximately eighty percent of the rebar lying on the sand under, not in, the slab. Mr. Cipriani testified that the majority of the rebar was “all down in the sand.” Photographs entered into evidence typically showed large sections of the slab — after being removed— with the rebar “just stuck to the bottom.” Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland (F & D), plaintiff’s surety on the contract, retained the Construction Consulting Group, Inc., a subsidiary of the American Concrete Institute, to perform tests on the slab to determine whether the rebar in the slab was properly positioned. Before demolition, Mr. Edward R. Fiske of CCG used an electronic device known as a pachometer to determine the distance of the rebar from *411 the center of the slab in eighty locations. Astoundingly, in view of what was already known about placement of the rebar and what was subsequently discovered, Mr. Fiske reported that only nineteen percent of the rebar was not positioned in the con-' Crete according to contract specifications.

Mr. Charles Macintosh, an independent construction consultant, called by plaintiff as an expert witness, also disagreed that eighty percent of the rebar lay beneath the slab on the sand for the same reason that Mr. Kelsen testified that it was, and that he would expect rebar to fall beneath the concrete because he knew of no contractual requirement that required plaintiff to take even ordinary steps to place “[the rebar] in the middle of the slab at the center of the span.” He also testified that if the rebar was held up in the concrete on the “Keyed Kold” joints, it would have been impossible for so much rebar to have fallen to the bottom. He testified that “there was probably[,] as on most jobs, 20 percent” on the ground. He also testified, however, that when he viewed the exposed soil on August 26, 1987, he saw only one instance where the rebar was placed too low in the concrete, and two instances where the rebar “was exposed near the middle of the slab.” In this regard, Mr. Macintosh testified as a fact witness, and his testimony is flawed because he did not consider that so many supports had fallen during pouring of the concrete. Neither had Mr. Macintosh read the design specifications at any time prior to his appearance in court. Mr. Macintosh further testified that the largest vertical displacement which he personally saw was not 3/i6 of an inch as reported by most witnesses but only Vk of an inch, 600 percent smaller, “which was nothing and would be completely covered up when you put any covering on it of any kind.” Mr. Macintosh did not even ascribe to. the general consensus that the slab would have to be repaired by grinding down the vertical displacement before covering it with tile or carpet. The photographic evidence alone clearly shows a much larger vertical displacement than Mr. Macintosh said he saw, and credible testimony by other witnesses supported the photographic evidence of a larger vertical displacement. In a hapless attempt to negate the value of the photographic evidence, Mr. Macintosh at one point testified that a length of rebar shown lying on the ground beneath an overturned piece of concrete had been simply “pushed” down and out of the concrete when it was removed, notwithstanding that the concrete was unbroken horizontally.

Mr. Macintosh’s testimony consisted in the main of his disagreement with the design of the slab, though there was no credible evidence that the design was not sufficient for its purpose. He also completely ignored the fact that plaintiff failed to construct the slab as per the design, as even Mr. Kaplan admitted. 7 Mr. Macintosh’s presumptuous “determination” that the slab was “perfectly satisfactory to use for the purpose intended” could not pass the smile test. Judge Cardozo, addressing the rights of an owner, aptly put it when he stated “[t]here is no general license [for a builder] to install whatever, in the builder’s judgment, may be regarded as ‘just as good,’ ” Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 243 , 129 N.E. 889, 891 (1921) (citation omitted). Mr. Macintosh’s comments on other aspects of the project were equally unbelievable and as a witness he was methodically impeached by defendant. Because so much of Mr. Macintosh’s testimony was at odds with the testimony of other witnesses, and with the facts as they became known later, his testimony was as unbelievable as Mr. Fiske’s. The court gave no weight to his testimony. 8

*412 In a June 9, 1987 letter to defendant, Mr. Alan Wing of Frankian presented the results of tests from the soil beneath the four-foot-by-ten-foot section of the slab which had been removed. Frankian tested two samples of the soil, one from six inches below the slab and another from fifteen inches below the slab. The tests concluded that the subgrade soils were non-expansive.

In another directive dated June 17, 1987, Mr. Cipriani repeated his determination that the workroom portion of the slab did not conform to the contract specifications and ordered plaintiff to provide defendant with a plan and schedule to remove and replace the workroom slab within seven days of plaintiffs receipt of this directive. Instead of providing defendant with a plan and schedule for the work, plaintiff waited nine days, until June 26, 1987, and demanded copies of the various structural engineering reports that defendant had obtained from its contractors, Messrs. Kel-sen, Winter, Levitt, and Peterson. Mr. Ci-priani did not provide plaintiff with the requested reports.

On July 9, 1987, Mr. Cipriani again ordered plaintiff to remove and replace the slab, and to provide a plan to do so within five days of receipt of the letter, or be subject to termination for default. Mr. Ci-priani simultaneously informed F & D, plaintiffs surety, that grounds for default termination existed by reason of plaintiffs failure to comply with the directive of June 17, 1987. Mr. Kaplan, long after the fact, and for the first time, asserted at trial that he did not understand what was required of him. He did not, however, ever contemporaneously ask defendant for advice, instructions, or clarification. Plaintiffs argument that it did not understand the contracting officer’s directives to provide a plan to demonstrate how and when it would correct its defective work was not inyented until years later. Plaintiff's correspondence with the contracting officer, contemporaneous with the notices, never expressed confusion or doubt about what was expected of plaintiff. Instead of complying with the directives, Mr. Kaplan contacted his attorney who, in response to the June 17 and July 9, 1987 directives, wrote to Mr. Cipriani on July 14, 1987 reiterating plaintiff’s request for the reports and disputing Mr. Cipriani’s rejection of the slab. Plaintiff’s attorney, who at the time apparently did not grasp the critical position of his client, informed the contracting officer that “Mega is prepared to work with you to evaluate whether a problem exists, and if so, how to solve it, but you must be prepared to cooperate.” See note 3, supra. Plaintiff did not comply with Mr. Cipriani’s directives.

On July 22, 1987, Mr. Cipriani’s supervisor, Mr. Russell W. Harter, also a contracting officer, terminated plaintiff for default based upon lack of action, job abandonment, and failure to follow directives of the contracting officer. The evidence is clear that at about the time the first notice was issued, plaintiff had virtually no employees or subcontractors at the job-site. Following the last directive giving plaintiff one more opportunity to comply, plaintiff — for all practical purposes — had abandoned the project. Defendant gave plaintiff two clear directives in June and July 1987, both of which plaintiff failed or refused to follow. 9

Following the termination for default of plaintiff’s contract, JS & A contracted with the soils engineering firm of Smith-Emery Company (Smith-Emery) to perform a series of tests on the soils beneath the slab. The court found the several Smith-Emery reports to be the most credible of all the *413 soils reports, in part because there was no express or implied organizational conflict of interest presenting even a hint of the need to “preserve or protect” any earlier action on the project, and because its reports were more straightforward and objective than the several other soils reports submitted into evidence. In August 1987, Smith-Emery tested nine samples and concluded that the soil under the slab had been compacted according to contract specifications, and that

2. ... soils are not the cause of the cracks observed in the slab.

3. It is our opinion that the cracks in the concrete slab are due to the reinforcing stee[l] not located at the proper depth in the slab and the lack of expansion joints around the columns and at other appropriate locations in the slab.

The following month, on September 28, 1987, F & D also contracted with Smith-Emery to investigate the soils beneath the slab. Smith-Emery took and tested another nineteen samples and concluded, for the second time, that the fill soils were “not the cause of the distress observed in the floor slab ... [t]he fill soils have a low expansion potential.” Between October 26 and 27, 1987, Smith-Emery extracted and tested samples from nine or ten more locations under the slab. In contrast to its reports of August and September 1987, Smith-Emery concluded in its report of November 3, 1987, that boring locations one, five, seven, nine, and ten exhibited a medium potential for soil expansion, while locations two, three, four, and six exhibited a low potential.

Defendant redesigned the slab based on Smith-Emery’s November 3d report that the soil placed by plaintiff under the existing slab was, low-to-moderately expansive. Mr. Paolini testified that in his expert opinion the soil was slightly expansive. In a November 13, 1987 letter to defendant, Mr. Kelsen, who re-designed the slab, stated:

Recent tests by Smith-Emery indicate potentially expansive soil in the low-to-medium range. We have increased the slab thickness and the amount of slab reinforcing due to these tests.

If the compacted fill had tested non-expansive, we would have recommended replacement with the same slab and reinforcing as shown on the [original] contract documents. 10

On the reprocurement, Mr. Kelsen increased the thickness of the slab from four inches to five inches, placed the rebar eighteen inches apart rather than twenty-four, and spaced control joints approximately twenty-nine feet apart in both directions vice twenty-nine feet east to west and thirty-seven feet north to south. On November 6, 1987, Mr. Cipriani met with Messrs. Ruffalo, Kelsen, and Paolini, among others, to discuss possible solutions to the cracking in the slab. None of the consultants at the meeting recommended removing and replacing the slab in the main workroom, and, indeed, all advanced theories on how to solve the cracking in the slab through filling and grinding. Mr. Paolini explained that even though he believed the soil was slightly expansive, the contract, as a matter of principle, should not have been terminated. He explained:

It just — it messes a project up. It’s so difficult to get a bonding company or a surety to perform after that and it just delays the project even more. And as a firm we have taken a position and in fact have given seminars advising owners if at all possible, do not terminate either a designer or a contractor.

However, Mr. Paolini also stated that, in his opinion based on the contract specifications, defendant had cause to terminate the contract for default because of his observations of the nature of the slab and the November 3d Smith-Emery report identifying the low-to-medium expansive nature of the underlying soil.

*414 After terminating plaintiff for default, defendant undertook negotiations with F & D to complete the project. F & D refused, and on December 11, 1987, defendant contracted with B.G. Construction Company to complete the remainder of work under plaintiff’s contract, including demolition of the old slab and installation of a new workroom floor. JS & A discovered approximately four hundred construction deficiencies in other areas of the project. B.G. Construction completed the project in six months for $559,460.08, and defendant took beneficial occupancy on June 6, 1988.

B. Discussion

Default termination is a “drastic sanction,” and should be imposed only on the basis of “solid evidence.” J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 187 Ct.Cl. 45 , 408 F.2d 424, 431 (1969); Sun Cal, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 31, 39 (1990) (citing Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed.Cir.1987)). It is a type of forfeiture. De Vito v. United States, 188 Ct.Cl. 979 , 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969). Nevertheless, it is well settled that the contracting officer possesses authority to terminate a contract for default, and under the proper circumstances is obligated to exercise his discretion to do so. Schlesinger v. United States, 182 Ct.Cl. 571 , 390 F.2d 702, 707-08 (1968). The government bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish that the default termination was justified. Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 765 (Fed.Cir.1987).

Pursuant to General Provision 4 of the contract, all claims arising under the contract were subject to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988). In proceedings under the CDA, “the facts, as well as the law, are decided de novo by the ... court.” Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States, 903 F.2d 1560, 1562 (Fed.Cir.1990) (citing 41 U.S.C. § 609 (a)(3) (1982)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 , 111 S.Ct. 1308 , 113 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); accord Lathan Co., Inc v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 122, 125 (1990) (citing Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1206 (Fed.Cir.1987)). “The court is not bound by either the findings of fact or the conclusions [of law] of the [contracting officer].” Lathan Co. v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 122, 125 (1990); accord 41 U.S.C. § 605 (a). The administrative award of time or money under the Changes clause is not to be treated as if it were the unappealed determination of a lower court or a board of contract appeals that might be owed some sort of special deference on appeal. Wilner v. United States, 994 F.2d 783 (Fed.Cir.1993). “However, contracting officer testimony is not without value. It constitutes evidence which may be considered and weighed by [the court] in the same way as any other piece of evidence.” Id. (citing J.D. Hedin v. United States, 171 Ct.Cl. 70 , 347 F.2d 235, 245 (1965)). The contracting officer has discretion, but it is not unbridled and it must be exercised in a fair and reasonable manner, never arbitrary and capricious, and always in the best interest of the government. Id. (citing Udis v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 379, 387 (1985)). It is with these rules in mind that the court evaluated and weighed the administrative determinations and testimony of the contracting officer. In its role as the finder-of-fact the court gave the contracting officer’s testimony weight, not deference.

1. Breach of Contract

Plaintiff pled that the termination for default constituted a breach of the contract by defendant because it was not premised on legal or sound grounds and thereby entitled plaintiff to common law damages outside of the scope of General Provision 11, the Disputes clause of the contract. Plaintiff argued that the rules of the court permitted it to plead in the alternative, either in one count or in separate counts, and that it may also assert alternative theories of recovery which may conflict with one another. Upon first glance, plaintiff’s position appears to have merit. See In re King Enters., 678 F.2d 73, 76-77 (8th Cir.1982); Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir.1977). However, its application to government contract cases is limited, and, under the *415 circumstances of this case, precluded. H.H.O. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 147, 162 (1987). “A contractor cannot maintain breach claims based on claims for which contractual relief is available.” Id. (citing Hoel-Steffen Constr. Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 561 , 456 F.2d 760, 768 (1972)). Plaintiff cannot give life to breach of contract claim by merely relabeling claims for which relief is available under the contract. Northbridge Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 195 Ct.Cl. 453 , 444 F.2d 1124, 1127 (1971); Edward R. Marden Corp. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 799 , 442 F.2d 364, 369 (1971). This is so because the contract converted what would have been deemed a breach of contract into a claim for an equitable adjustment. 11

*416 2. Defective Workmanship

Contract clause 3.07, entitled Defective Concrete in section 03300, Concrete Work, of the Scope of Work, stated that “[a]ny concrete not in accordance with these specifications, ... or showing cracks, [or] ... exposed reinforcing ... will be considered defective____ Correct and replace defective concrete as directed by the Architect at no additional cost to the Owner.” In addition, the contract drawings called for the rebar to be placed one inch below the top surface of the concrete. Without exception, the architectural and structural engineering experts who testified at trial agreed that concrete shrinks when it cures, and that hairline cracks in poured concrete slabs are normal occurrences. However, credible evidence made it clear beyond doubt that the cracks in defendant’s slab were far more than the usual hairline cracks. It was uncontroverted that at least four of the cracks ran the entire length of the slab, and that some were so wide that the sand under the slab was clearly visible and a coin could fall to the sand fill through the crack. It is also clear from the record that seventy to eighty percent of the rebar lay exposed on the sand beneath the slab, and that the cracking was caused by plaintiff’s failure to install the' rebar according to the contract. Mr. Kelsen, the designer of both the original and replacement slabs noted that if the rebar lay at the bottom of the concrete, it would act as a crack inducer whereas properly placed rebar controls and minimizes cracking. All credible expert testimony confirmed this elementary principle of concrete engineering. Ample testimony and photographic evidence revealed that most of the rebar in the four foot by ten foot section that plaintiff removed on May 14, 1987, was not inserted through the holes of the “Keyed Kold” control joints and that a number of the control joints were either absent or improperly placed. Mr. Kaplan had to concede that the rebar in that section of the main workroom floor was in the sand, not the concrete, and that plaintiff had not installed it in accordance with the contract specifications.

Had plaintiff installed the control joints properly, the rebar would have run through the pre-formed holes in the control joints according to the specifications, which in turn would have secured the rebar in its proper position. Properly placed, the rebar would have functioned as designed to control excessive shrinkage cracking and differential settlement as the concrete cured. Mr. Kaplan’s assertion at trial that plaintiff had complied “completely” with the contract specifications directing placement of the rebar, because it had placed the rebar properly before the concrete was poured, was at best a nonsequitur, albeit an expression of his attitude about the contract and plaintiff's case; i.e., to prevail at any cost including the lack of logic, sound legal advice, the contract, and law.

According to the deposition of Mr. James Hearn, plaintiff's on-site project superintendent, Amber Steel Co., plaintiff’s subcontractor, placed the rebar in a checkerboard fashion. 12 Before the concrete was poured into the wooden forms, the rebar was elevated on masonry blocks so that the rebar was the proper height above the top layer of sand. The rebar was wired together at every intersection. The evidence was that, plaintiff’s pumping subcontractor poured the concrete from six-inch hoses, *417 swaying the heavy hoses to-and-fro spreading the concrete over the fill and rebar. Mr. Hearn was present during the entire concrete pour and observed at least one masonry block fall during the pour, causing the rebar in that area to sag. He also noted that as concrete accumulated atop the rebar, it caused the rebar to sag at the midpoints between the blocks. He, however, claimed in his deposition that those instances of misplaced and sagging rebar were corrected immediately, even though he failed to note that fact in his daily log. In fact, Mr. Hearn failed to note any significant problem of rebar support in his daily log. According to the testimony of Messrs. Cipriani and Paolini, after the slab was removed, it was clearly apparent to them that as the concrete spewed from the six-inch hoses, it overturned many of the blocks that supported the rebar, causing the rebar to fall into the sand.

Based on Mr. Hearn’s firsthand account of the crucial concrete pours, the court was not totally persuaded by Messrs. Cipriani and Paolini that plaintiff’s carelessness in pouring the concrete was the principal cause of the misplaced rebar. Rather, it was plaintiff’s slipshod misplacement of control joints which caused the fatal fall of the rebar from its proper position. The court was also not convinced that the cracking of the slab was due to the expansive nature of the soils beneath the slab. Even though Smith-Emery’s November 3, 1987 report found the soils to be of low-to-medium expansiveness, there was no evidence of water seepage into the fill or expansion of the soils beneath the slab. In the absence of water seepage into the fill, expansion was not the reason for the severe cracking.

Mr. Cipriani testified that the original slab design used at the Canoga Park Main Post Office was a generic concrete slab design used in dozens of post offices in California. Although the design of the slab was changed on the reprocurement, the court disagrees with plaintiff’s argument that the redesign proved the original design was defective. According to Mr. Hearn, it was not uncommon for rebar to be spaced at twenty-four inches, as demonstrated by the pre-formed cut-outs on the control joints that were located twelve, sixteen, and twenty-four inches apart. As a result of tests showing that the fill had low-to-moderate potential for expansion, defendant reasonably redesigned the slab in an attempt to safeguard against the effects of future fill expansion. The court agreed with Mr. Cipriani’s common sense observation that redesigning the slab was less expensive than removing and replacing approximately 50,000 cubic feet of low-to-moderately expansive, and hence, defective fill.

At trial, Mr. Kaplan testified that an unknown employee of plaintiff’s alleged that an ambiguity existed in the structural drawings governing placement of the re-bar, but not in the specifications. This argument was not presented to the contracting officer as required by the CDA, and the court has no jurisdiction to consider it a claim under the contract. See Transamerica Ins. Corp. ex rel. Stroup Sheet Metal Works v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1578-79 (Fed.Cir.1992). In any event, the argument is without merit because General Provision 60(a) provides in part that “[i]n case of difference between the drawings and specifications, the specifications shall govern.” Moreover, plaintiff’s argument that the slab specifications were somehow defective has no basis in fact; what was obviously defective was plaintiff’s workmanship.

Plaintiff also argued that the termination for default was improper because the slab specifications were defective. Government liability for faulty design specifications is well settled. “[I]f the contractor is bound to build according to plans and specifications prepared by the owner, the contractor will not be responsible for the consequences of defects in the plans and specifications.” United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 136 , 39 S.Ct. 59, 61 , 63 L.Ed. 166 (1918) (citations omitted).

When the Government contracts for supplies to be manufactured in accordance with Government specifications, there is an implied warranty that if the specifica *418 tions are followed, a satisfactory product will result. If the warranty is breached, i.e., the specifications are defective, the plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to the amount expended in trying to comply with the defective specifications.

Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 175 Ct.Cl. 518 , 360 F.2d 634, 638 (1966) (citations omitted).

In particular, this court has stated that “[t]he implied warranty of adequacy of specifications applies only to design specifications such as detailed measurements, tolerances, materials, i.e., elaborate instructions on how to perform the contract____” Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, 11 Cl.Ct. 853, 860 , aff'd, 834 F.2d 1576 (Fed.Cir.1987). Counsel for defendant “conceded” that the specifications, including the drawings, in this contract were design specifications. Plaintiff naturally agreed. The court believes that while the slab design was more in the nature of a design specification than a performance specification, this was not the case for all of the contract specifications. “Contracts may have both design and performance characteristics.” Blake Constr. Co. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743, 746 (Fed.Cir. 1993) (citing Utility Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl.Ct. 42 , 50 n. 7 (1985); Aleutian Constructors v. United States, 24 Cl.Ct. 372, 379 (1991)). Further,

[o]n occasion the labels “design specification” and “performance specification” have been used to connote the degree to which the government has prescribed certain details of performance on which the contractor could rely. However, those labels do not independently create, limit, or remove a contractor's obli-gations____ Contracts are viewed in their entirety and given the meaning imputed to a “reasonably intelligent contractor” acquainted with the involved circumstances, regardless of whether la-belled “design,” “performance,” or both.

Id. (quoting Zinger Constr. Co. v. United States, 807 F.2d 979, 981 (Fed.Cir.1986)). “It is the obligations imposed by the specification which determine the extent to which it is ‘performance’ or ‘design,’ not the other way around.” Id. The issue of the amount of discretion given a contractor in meeting the terms of the contract is a matter of legal interpretation for the court to decide. Id. (citing R.B. Wright Constr. Co. v. United States, 919 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed.Cir.1990)).

The Federal Circuit has refined the Spearin test by requiring the court to inquire whether the contractor complied fully with the design specifications that it asserted were defective. See Al Johnson Constr. Co. v. United States, 854 F.2d 467, 469-70 (Fed.Cir.1988). If the contractor failed to comply fully with even faulty design specifications, recovery on the implied warranty is precluded. The photographic evidence showed vividly, and the testimony was overwhelming, that plaintiff did not position the rebar and control joints according to the specifications. Therefore, even if the contract specifications were defective — which the court does not find — plaintiff is precluded from recovery based on the government’s implied warranty because plaintiff failed to comply fully with the specifications.

3. Failure to Submit Plan to Remove and Replace Slab; Consultants’Reports

On two occasions, June 17 and July 9, 1987 the contracting officer directed plaintiff to submit a plan to remove and replace the rejected slab. Plaintiff refused to comply with either directive, complaining that it could not proceed unless Mr. Cipriani forwarded the consultants’ reports. Plaintiff argued that Mr. Cipriani withheld the reports in bad faith because he sought to prevent plaintiff’s compliance, thereby obtaining a new slab at no additional cost to defendant. Plaintiff also contended that Mr. Cipriani was under pressure from the U.S.P.S. to complete the project and therefore had an ulterior motive for terminating plaintiff for default without sufficient cause. Plaintiff asserted that the November 6, 1987 meeting, at which defendant discussed repair of the slab with its consultants, proved that the prior directives to *419 remove and replace the slab were an artifice to terminate plaintiff.

The court finds plaintiffs argument unconvincing. Even if plaintiff disagreed with the merit of Mr. Cipriani’s position, it was bound by General Provisions 4 13 and 51 of the contract to proceed in accordance with his June 17, and July 9, 1987 directives. The contract unequivocally required plaintiff to submit a plan pursuant to the contracting officer’s directives and to proceed with the contract as directed. If plaintiff was dissatisfied with the directives it could then seek an equitable adjustment to the contract, with the right to appeal the contracting officer’s decision to the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals, or this court. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 606 , 609 and General Provision 4(e)(i)(ii) of the contract. Plaintiff pointedly refused to comply with a lawful directives of the contracting officer to provide a plan and schedule to remove and replace the slab. Instead, plaintiff took an intractable position and made unwarranted demands upon the contracting officer. Plaintiff was properly terminated for default because it refused to comply with Mr. Cipriani’s directives. Stoeckert v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 152 , 391 F.2d 639, 645 (1968). 14

It took plaintiff considerable time to realize its position with respect to the project subsequent to the termination. Plaintiff’s counsel’s letter of August 27, 1987, over a month after the default, is illustrative of plaintiff's irresponsible behavior. In that letter, Mr. Lawrence R. Greenberg, with more than a minimum degree of arrogance, stated that plaintiff was

ready, willing, and able to complete the ... project while leaving in abeyance the issue pertaining to the slab until it can be determined what is the cause and remedy for the alleged problem with regard to the slab.

If the above is agreeable with you, please forward your consent in writing so that the same is received by the undersigned by September 1, 1987. If same is not received by the undersigned by September 1, 1987, time being expressly of the essence, my client will assume that you are unwilling to allow it to proceed on the above construction project, (emphasis added).

The coveted consultants’ reports, which would no doubt have been of general interest to plaintiff, discussed possible repair of the slab, not its removal and replacement, *420 and therefore, were irrelevant to Mr. Ci-priani’s directives. Contrary to plaintiff’s contentions the reports would not have not made plaintiff’s task easier, as they did not address removal and replacement of the workroom slab. In PBI Elec. Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 128, 135 (1989), a factually similar case, the court held that defendant did not breach any duty it owed its contractor by refusing to give further information to the contractor because the information was not needed to finish the project. Under the facts presented, Mr. Cipriani was under no obligation to provide plaintiff with government-owned reports, and his refusal to do so did not undermine plaintiff’s ability to perform. The consultants recommendations were just that— recommendations. Defendant did not know at the time it issued the February 26 and March 27, 1987 determinations to plaintiff whether it would accept the consultant’s recommendations, or not. The court is convinced that Mr. Cipriani sincerely wanted plaintiff’s independent recommendations on how to proceed. Had plaintiff presented any recommendations, Mr. Ci-priani and his staff would have considered them in conjunction with its views and those of its consultants. After discovering the full story of plaintiff’s shoddy construction of the slab, Mr. Cipriani, in a legitimate effort to protect the best interests of the government acted within the scope of his responsibility and duty to demand a slab in accordance with the contract, and not to accept a defective slab that had been repaired, even in the face of apparent contrary advice of several consultants.

Plaintiff was in clear and incontrovertible violation of the contract and the government is entitled to compliance with the contract requirements. Jet Constr. Co. v. United States, 209 Ct.Cl. 200 , 531 F.2d 538, 543 (1976); Farwell Co. v. United States, 137 Ct.Cl. 832 , 148 F.Supp. 947, 949 (1957). Defendant had “a near absolute right to insist on strict compliance” with the specifications, Martin J. Simko Constr., Inc. v. United States, 11 Cl.Ct. 257, 268 (1986), vacated in part on other grounds, 852 F.2d 540 (Fed.Cir.1988), and was under no obligation to accept defective work even with a price adjustment. See General Provision 51(b) and (c), the Inspection and Acceptance clause of the contract; S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 193 Ct.Cl. 269 , 433 F.2d 1314, 1323 (1970). Cascade Pacific Int’l v. United States, 773 F.2d 287 (Fed.Cir.1985) held that “the Government, just as any other party, is entitled to receive that for which it contracted and has the right to accept only goods that conform to the specifications.” Cascade Pac., 773 F.2d at 291 (citing American Elec. Contracting Corp. v. United States, 217 Ct.Cl. 338 , 579 F.2d 602, 608 (1978) (per curiam)). It is the contracting officer who is commissioned to protect the best interests of the United States in matters of government procurement, not its hired consultants and engineers.

There is an implied duty in contract law that both parties will cooperate and refrain from hindering each other’s performance. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 , 550 F.2d 26, 32 (1977); Cedar Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl.Ct. 539, 549 (1984). To determine if defendant violated its implied obligation not to hinder plaintiff or delay the contract the court must analyze the reasonableness of defendant’s actions in the particular context of the issues presented. L.L. Hall Constr. Co. v. United States, 177 Ct.Cl. 870 , 379 F.2d 559, 563 (1966); Commerce Int’l. Co. v. United States, 167 Ct.Cl. 529 , 338 F.2d 81, 86 (1964). Even if the consultants’ reports would have made plaintiff’s tasks under the directives easier, plaintiff was not “stranded,” as plaintiff would have the court believe. Messrs. Kaplan, Harman, and Hearn, and plaintiff’s subcontractors, all qualified construction professionals, were quite capable of submitting a plan to Mr. Cipriani to satisfy the directives. It is clear from the record that plaintiff was more interested in using the known conclusions of the consultants’ reports as arrows in its quiver to take aim at Mr. Cipriani’s directives, rather than to assist plaintiff in complying with the directives. The court finds that defendant did not hinder plaintiff’s performance un *421 der the contract. See PBI Elec., 17 Cl.Ct. at 135 .

4. Bad Faith Allegations

Plaintiff argued that defendant’s agents acted in bad faith in terminating the contract and that the termination should be converted to one for the convenience of the government pursuant to General Provision 10 and 11 of the contract, the Termination for Convenience of the Government and Termination for Default clauses, and damages for defendant’s “bad faith” termination of the contract. Plaintiff has a high burden of proof to meet. This court assumes that government officials act in good faith. Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 20 , 681 F.2d 756, 770-71 (1982); Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 192 , 543 F.2d 1298, 1301-02 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 , 98 S.Ct. 112 , 54 L.Ed.2d 89 (1977); Librach v. United States, 147 Ct.Cl. 605, 612 , 1959 WL 7633 (1959) (citations omitted). Plaintiff must establish “well-nigh irrefragable proof” of bad faith. Torncello, 681 F.2d at 770 . In cases where bad faith is alleged, this quantum of proof requires evidence of “specific intent to injure the plaintiff.” Kalvar, 543 F.2d at 1302 .

As evidence of bad faith, plaintiff pointed to several unrelated instances in which defendant’s agents acted, or failed to act, with which plaintiff disagreed. There was no analysis of the alleged misdeeds, nor did plaintiff present evidence that the alleged misdeeds were causative of delay or other damages. It is amply clear that as the contract began to disintegrate, relationships between the parties deteriorated to the point where defendant, pursuant to General Provision 16(b), the Material and Workmanship clause of the contract, directed that plaintiff remove Mr. Hearn, its project superintendent, from the project.

Although plaintiff implied bad faith specifically on the part of Mr. Cipriani, it was unable to produce the quantum of proof necessary to dislodge the presumption that public officials act in good faith. Sanders v. United States Postal Serv., 801 F.2d 1328, 1331 (Fed.Cir.1986); McEachern v. Office of Personnel Management, 776 F.2d 1539, 1545 (Fed.Cir.1985) (citing Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 211 Ct.Cl. 192 , 543 F.2d 1298 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 , 98 S.Ct. 112 , 54 L.Ed.2d 89 (1977)). Plaintiff failed to prove that the contracting officer or any of defendant’s other agents acted outside the reasonable scope of their duties. Plaintiff argued that defendant consciously and intentionally acted to interfere with or endanger plaintiff’s work on the project, but provided no proof of such acts. Defendant took a tough stance with plaintiff, but there was no proof that any person acted with malice or bad faith towards plaintiff. There was no evidence that the contracting officer specifically intended to injure plaintiff. See Kalvar, 543 F.2d at 1302 . In sum, the actions of defendant do not show bad faith by “well-nigh irrefragable proof.” Id. at 1301; Embrey v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 617, 626 (1989).

5. Subsequently Discovered Reasons for Termination

The contracting officer’s decision to terminate plaintiff for default was also supported by clear documented evidence of plaintiff’s substandard performance in other areas of the contract as well. As noted, the record demonstrated over four hundred instances of deficient work discovered on the reprocurement.

Plaintiff argued, without support, at trial, in its post-hearing briefs, and request for reconsideration that the government cannot use information discovered “after the fact” to justify a termination for default. The law says otherwise. Any extant reasons supporting a default termination are sufficient to sustain the default, even if not known or discovered until after the decision to terminate for default is made. College Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12, 15-16 , 45 S.Ct. 199, 200-01 , 69 L.Ed. 490 (1925); Pots Unlimited, Ltd. v. United States, 220 Ct.Cl. 405 , 600 F.2d 790, 793 (1979) (citations omitted); Samuel T. Isaac & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 255, 258 (1985); Joseph Morton Co. v. United States, 3 Cl.Ct. 120 *422 (1983), aff'd, 757 F.2d 1273 (Fed.Cir.1985). The termination for default was initially based on plaintiffs refusal to comply with the June 17 and July 9, 1987 directives of the contracting officer. The termination was justified, as well, by the later-discovered shoddy workmanship, and failure to meet contract specifications.

Plaintiff was obligated under General Provision 4, paragraph (h), the Claims and Disputes clause of the contract, to continue work in accordance with the directives while simultaneously disputing the directives. See Stoeckert, 391 F.2d at 645 ; H & H Mfg. Co. v. United States, 168 Ct.Cl. 873, 879 , 1964 WL 8568 (1964). Plaintiff had no right under the contract to cease work and appeal the contracting officer’s directives. It is irrelevant whether the contracting officer was right or wrong in directing plaintiff to furnish a plan addressing what appeared to be a serious problem. A. McBride and I. Wachtel, Government Contracts § 31.150[1] (1978). The quid pro quo for defendant’s mandate that plaintiff continue work in the face of disputed directives of the contracting officer is found in General Provision 51, paragraph (e), the Inspection and Acceptance clause of the contract. Under that provision of the contract, had plaintiff prepared a plan, tested the concrete, and made necessary repairs or removed and replaced the slab, and found to have been without fault for the cracking, plaintiff would have been reimbursed all its costs, plus interest. See also General Provision 4(g) of the contract.

Because it so finds, the court need not address the other reasons for the termination for default (e.g., lack of job action and abandonment) at this time, though there will be reference to inaction and abandonment by plaintiff in the following discussion of the delay and other claims. Defendant has shown that it had reasonable and proper grounds for the default termination. Plaintiff’s work on the slab, and in other areas, clearly did not meet its contractual requirements, and it refused to obey two properly issued directives of the contracting officer. The court cannot find that any of defendant’s agents acted so improperly as to justify conversion of the default termination to one for the convenience of the government. See Norwood Mfg., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 300, 309-10 (1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 38 (Fed.Cir. 1991).

6. Alleged Abuse of Discretion and Bad Faith

Plaintiff argued that the contracting officer acted arbitrarily and abused his discretion by terminating the contract. It is indisputable that the contracting officer had the power and authority to terminate the contract. Schlesinger v. United States, 182 Ct.Cl. 571 , 390 F.2d 702, 707 (1968). Plaintiff must satisfy a significant burden of proof to show abuse of discretion. Continental Business Enters., Inc. v. United States, 196 Ct.Cl. 627 , 452 F.2d 1016, 1021 (1971) (citing Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 773 , 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (1970)). Keco Industries identified four factors used in determining whether a government official acted arbitrarily and abused his discretion. See Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 203 Ct.Cl. 566 , 492 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (1974).

1. Is there evidence indicating the official’s subjective bad faith? Keco Industries, a case in which an unsuccessful bidder sought recovery of bid preparation costs, limited this element to subjective bad faith on the part of procuring officials in depriving a bidder of full and honest consideration of its bid. Id., 492 F.2d at 1203 . Warranted damages were recovery of bid preparation costs. Id. (citing Heyer Prods. Co. v. United States, 135 Ct.Cl. 63 , 140 F.Supp. 409 (1956)).

2. Was there any reasonable basis for the decision to terminate? Normally “no reasonable basis” for the administrative decision will suffice for a showing of capriciousness. Id. at 1203-04 (citing Continental Business Enters. Inc. v. United States, 196 Ct.Cl. 627 , 452 F.2d 1016, 1021 (1971)).

3. What amount of discretion was granted to the government’s agent? “[T]he degree of proof of error necessary *423 for recovery is ordinarily related to the amount of discretion entrusted to the procurement officials by applicable statutes and regulations. Id. at 1204 (citing Continental Business, 452 F.2d at 1021 ; Keco Indus., 428 F.2d at 1240 ).

4. Was there a proven violation of an applicable statute or regulation? A “proven violation of pertinent statutes or regulations can, but need not necessarily, be a ground for recovery.” Id. (cf. Keco Indus., 428 F.2d at 1240 ).

Bad faith is distinguishable from abuse of discretion; the standard is high but does not reach the higher “well-nigh irrefraga-ble proof” standard. Embrey, 17 Cl.Ct. at 626 . The Court of Claims

... pointed out that the standard of proof to be applied in eases where arbitrary and capricious action is charged should be a high one. Final decisions should be based on the particular circumstances of each case. It will remain for [the] plaintiff to meet this high standard by proving to the [court] that such arbitrary and capricious action as alleged did in fact exist.

Keco Indus., Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 773 , 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (1970).

Weighed against these factors plaintiff has not met its burden of proof. The court has found that there was no persuasive evidence of any malice or bad faith by the contracting officer or any of defendant’s agents. “Subjective bad faith” did not cause the termination. Rather, in response to his duty to provide a post office building, the contracting officer acted to protect defendant’s interests. Defendant has proved that plaintiff failed to respond to proper directives it was bound to follow, and that the slab and other items were defective and not in compliance with the terms of the contract. Plaintiff simply cannot show that there is no reasonable basis for the adverse administrative decision. The contracting officer acted reasonably, not in bad faith, when he terminated the contract for default, and did not abuse his broad discretion. Finally, try as it might, plaintiff did not prove violation of an applicable statute or regulation by defendant.

IV. THE DELAY CLAIM

Plaintiff claims entitlement to damages for a total of 272 days of delay on the project. As discussed above, every contract with the government contains an implied obligation that neither party will do anything to prevent, hinder, or delay performance. Lewis-Nicholson, Inc. v. United States, 213 Ct.Cl. 192 , 550 F.2d 26, 32 (1977); Cedar Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl.Ct. 539, 549 (1984). The government is said to have violated the implied obligations where its action or inaction delays performance of the project thus increasing costs. Lewis-Nicholson, 550 F.2d 26 . When this occurs the contractor may have a claim for damages. See id. at 26-27, 32.

A. Suspension of Work

Plaintiff did not specify exactly under which clause of the contract its delay claims were predicated but, with a few exceptions, presented proof and argued entitlement consonant with government-caused project delay to the critical path. There are, of course, two possible routes to successful prosecution of a delay claim. See Chaney & James Constr. Co. v. United States, 190 Ct.Cl. 699 , 421 F.2d 728 (1970). The Suspension of Work clause of the contract, General Provision 9, provides in paragraph (b) that:

If the performance of all or any part of the work is, for an unreasonable period of time, suspended, delayed, or interrupted by an act of the Contracting Officer ... an adjustment shall be made for any increase in the cost of performance of this contract ... necessarily caused by such unreasonable suspension, delay or interruption and the contract modified in writing accordingly. However, no adjustment shall be made under this clause for any suspension, delay, or interruption to the extent (1) that performance would have been so suspended, delayed, or interrupted by any other cause, including the fault or negligence of the Contractor, or (2) for which an equitable adjustment *424 is provided for or excluded under any other provision of this contract.

The Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have held that under the Suspension of Work clause, the contractor may be awarded compensation for “government-caused delays of an unreasonable duration.” Beauchamp Construction Co. v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 430, 436-37 (1988) (citing John A. Johnson & Sons v. United States, 180 Ct.Cl. 969 , 1967 WL 8810 (1967)); Chaney and James Construction Co. 421 F.2d at 731-32 . The clause makes an adjustment unavailable, however, “to the extent that other causes, attributable to said contractor, would have simultaneously suspended, delayed, or interrupted contract performance.” Beauchamp, 14 Cl.Ct. at 437 . The delay need not be a Government ordered work stoppage to be compensable. Any unreasonable delay attributable solely and directly to the Government will be considered a constructive suspension of work for purposes of the clause. John A. Johnson & Sons, 180 Ct.Cl. at 984-85 ; see Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 180 , 351 F.2d 956, 967-68 (1965). Contract completion need not be delayed. Delay to part of the performance may result in compensation. See Chaney and James Constr. Co., 421 F.2d at 733 .

To recover, the contractor must show: (1) the delay is of an “unreasonable length of time,” Wunderlich, 351 F.2d at 967 (citing River Construction Corp. v. United States, 159 Ct.Cl. 254, 270 , 1962 WL 9302 (1962)); F.H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 131 Ct.Cl. 501, 506-07 , 130 F.Supp. 394 (1955); (2) the delay was proximately caused by the Governments actions, id. (citing River Construction, 159 Ct.Cl. at 270 ; Laburnum Construction Corp. v. United States, 163 Ct.Cl. 339 , 325 F.2d 451 (1963); J.A. Ross & Co. v. United States, 126 Ct.Cl. 323, 331-34 , 115 F.Supp. 187 (1953)); and (3) the delay resulted in some injury to the contractor, see Wunderlich at 968 (citing River Construction, 159 Ct.Cl. 254 ; Addison Miller, Inc. v. United States, 108 Ct.Cl. 513 , 70 F.Supp. 893 , cert. denied, 332 U.S. 836 , 68 S.Ct. 217 , 92 L.Ed. 408 (1947); J.D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 171 Ct.Cl. 70 , 347 F.2d 235, 246-47 ). 15 Plaintiff must show that defendant was the “sole proximate cause” of the delay, and that no concurrent cause would have equally delayed the contract regardless of the Government’s action or inaction. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 639 , 528 F.2d 1392, 1397 (1976). This is not to say that where there are concurrent delays, a contractor may not attempt to prove the effect of government caused delay as distinct from others. Rather, “[t]he general rule is that ‘[wjhere both parties contribute to the delay, neither can recover damage[s], unless there is in the proof a clear apportionment of the delay and expense attributable to each.’ ” William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 805, 809 (Fed.Cir. 1984) (quoting Blinderman Construction Co. v. United States, 695 F.2d 552, 559 (Fed.Cir.1982); Coath & Goss, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct.Cl. 702 , 714-15, 1944 WL 3694 (1944)). As a result, “[cjourts will deny recovery where the delays are concurrent and the contractor has not established its delay apart from that attributable to the government.” Id.

B. Delay to Critical Path

Not only must plaintiff disentangle its delays from those allegedly caused by the government, but the delays must have affected activities on the critical path. See Wilner v. United States (Wilner II), 26 Cl.Ct. 260 (1992), rev’d on other grounds, 994 F.2d 783 (Fed.Cir.1993). It‘ is not enough that an activity is delayed: there *425 must be delay of an activity on the critical path for there to be project, or compensa-ble, delay. See id. “An interruption in one phase of the work ... does not always result in an increase in the time necessary for total performance. In such a case, the absence of any delay would obviously preclude recovery____” Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. United States, 186 Ct.Cl. 743 , 406 F.2d 1357, 1361 (1969).

The Court of Claims described critical path method analysis as “an efficient way of organizing and scheduling a complex project which consists of numerous interrelated separate small projects.” Haney v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 148 , 676 F.2d 584, 595 (1982). Critical path analysis is utilized to prove delay solely attributable to defendant. Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 274 (citing Wilner v. United States (Wilner I), 23 Cl.Ct. 241, 245 (1991)). Wilner I discussed in detail the necessity for, and value of, critical path analysis in order for plaintiff to prove a delay claim.

Each subproject is identified and classified as to the duration and precedence of the work. (E.g., one could not carpet an area until the flooring is down and the flooring cannot be completed until the underlying electrical and telephone conduits are installed.) The data is then analyzed, usually by computer, to determine the most efficient schedule for the entire project. Many subprojects may be performed at any time within a given period without any effect on the completion of the entire project. However, some items of work are given no leeway and must be performed on schedule; otherwise, the entire project will be delayed. These latter items of work are on the “critical path.” A delay, or acceleration, of work along the critical path will affect the entire project.

Wilner v. United States (Wilner I), 23 Cl.Ct. 241, 244-45 (1991) (quoting Haney, 676 F.2d at 595 ). This court has noted that determining the critical path is essential to determining damages.

The reason that the determination of the critical path is crucial to the calculation of delay damages is that only construction work on the critical path ha[s] an impact upon the time in which the project [i]s completed. If work on the critical path [i]s delayed, then the eventual completion date of the project [i]s delayed. Delay involving work not on the critical path generally ha[s] no impact on the eventual completion date of the project. * * * * * *

[The] critical path periods provide the court with the foundation necessary to reach delay damage conclusions.

G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl.Ct. 662, 728-30 (1984).

A requisite for government liability for the consequences of a critical path delay is fault on the part of the Government. Courts will deny recovery where the delays [of the Government and the contractor] are concurrent and the contractor has not established its delay apart from that attributable to the government. Furthermore, the court is constrained ... to award delay damages only for the unreasonable portion of a government-caused delay. Not all delay that occurs along the critical path is unreasonable.

Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 263 (citations omitted); Chaney & James Constr. Co. v. United States, 190 Ct.Cl. 699 , 421 F.2d 728, 737 (1970). Only delay on the critical path which affects a project’s completion date is compensable.

C. Proof of Critical Path and Critical Path Delay 16

“In order for the court to be able to award damages to plaintiff for government-caused project delay along the critical path, the court must have before it evidence that establishes the critical path of *426 plaintiff’s project.” Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 263. However, the maximum number of delay days for which plaintiff may recover is the number of days that work continued on the contract beyond the original completion date of October 8, 1986, until the termination for default on July 22, 1987, i.e., 274 days, minus the 118 days the contract was extended by change order. 17 See id. at 263 n. 4. This amounts to 156 days, not 272 as claimed by plaintiff.

The contract did not dictate the preparation and updating of a Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) chart, to provide critical path method (CPM) analysis, both of which are traditionally used by construction contractors. General Provision 65, the Construction Project clause of the contract, simply required plaintiff to provide a “practicable progress chart.” 18 Rather than trying to integrate alleged government-caused delays into a critical path analysis pursuant to Shupe and Haney , plaintiff simply listed instances of delay allegedly attributable to defendant, in the form of a bar chart, and referred the court to the record to read anecdotal testimony about the delays. Plaintiff provided brief summaries of alleged government mismanagement kept intermittently by Mr. Hearn in his daily logs, but did not address the relevance or significance of those allegations in the context of the critical path method analysis. In fact, plaintiff failed to provide the court with any credible coherent analysis of critical path delay, leaving to the court the well-nigh impossible task of identifying, quantifying, and assigning responsibility for critical path delay.

Plaintiff called Mr. Patrick Cumine as its expert construction delay witness to identify the delays and to establish the duration of, and responsibility for, the delays. Mr. Cumine did not expressly state as much, but before he could address the alleged project delays, he had to identify the critical path. It was clear to the court that plaintiff’s principals understood the critical path method of construction planning by the date of trial, but there is ample evidence that plaintiff did not know what the critical path was during the contract period. Mr. Cumine testified that he reviewed most of the record and interviewed Messrs. Kaplan and Hearn at length in preparing his analysis. Based on his investigations, Mr. Cumine prepared a “construction schedule” bar chart for trial, supposedly based on plaintiff’s as-planned bar chart. However, Mr. Cumine did not know if plaintiff’s chart, upon which he based his chart, was the original construction schedule bar chart or a version that had been revised at some unknown later date. The latter point is important because in order to establish delay to completion of the project, one must have a starting point and the contractor’s original intent in order to show *427 how and when the contractor intended to perform each phase of the work.

If the base bar chart Mr. Cumine used was actually a revised version, it did not accurately depict plaintiffs original intended construction schedule. Just how it differed was not explained. Mr. Cumine could not state whether his chart was based either on plaintiffs original chart, or on an amended version; none of plaintiffs witnesses offered any clarification on this point of confusion. Neither did plaintiff offer any evidence that its as-planned bar chart was reasonable. Compounding this problem was that the base bar chart that Mr. Cumine prepared for trial was, in his words, in a “different format” than plaintiffs. In the interests of judicial economy, the court permitted use of Mr. Cumine’s bar chart with the caveat that at some point during trial plaintiff would lay a foundation showing that the alleged as-planned bar chart prepared by Mr. Cumine was the same as the original chart prepared by Mr. Kaplan. Plaintiff never did so, and the court does not know to this day whether the two charts are the same. The best Mr. Kaplan could do was state he “believed” the two charts were identical.

Mr. Cumine’s bar chart had three clear plastic overlays. The first overlay depicted what he identified as the as-built bar chart and the “duration as-planned/as-built” comparison. His second overlay was a “pure graphical representation of the date of a document which relate[d] to a delay or impact on the specific work activity____” Not all of the documents to which he referred were specifically identified and there was no way for the court to confirm the accuracy of the information shown on the overlay. Nor was there any proffer of proof that the underlying documentation was factually accurate. The third overlay was Mr. Cumine’s “simplified critical path ... and the critical path logic.” He explained that his “simplified critical path” showed only, critical path delays but not non-critical path delays, which should not have been shown in any event. Mr. Cu-mine admitted that he assumed all time extensions allowed by defendant were on the critical path, but logic and credible evidence revealed that no to be the case.

Mr. Cumine also “identified” several instances where there were two concurrent delays on the critical path thereby invalidating much of his analysis. The suggestion of two concurrent delays on the critical path flies in the face of the critical path concept. Logically there cannot be two concurrent delays on the critical path because there is but one critical path at any one point in time, running in sequence from one critical activity to another. 19 See Sterling Millwrights, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 49, 75 (1992). There is a sequence of work to be done through the project, and on that sequence work must be followed every day. The critical path may change during performance, but still remains the only critical path at any one time. Id.

Mr. Cumine admitted that neither the base bar chart he prepared, nor plaintiff’s as-planned bar chart, actually constituted a critical path schedule; they did not “indicate the interrelationship between a preceding and succeeding activity ... [with] an interdependency link.” See Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 264. Nevertheless he argued that “[t]he delays are identified by the comparison of the activity for the duration of the activities in comparing the ‘as planned’ and the ‘as built’ critical path activities.” The court agrees that plaintiff’s diagram is not a critical path analysis, but it does not agree that critical path delays are identifiable in the manner Mr. Cumine suggested. “Essential to a determination that an activity belongs on the critical path of a project is an understanding of how that activity affects the other activities.” Wilner II at 263. The critical path method is an efficient way of organizing and scheduling a project which consists of numerous interrelated separate work

*428 items. Each work item is identified and classified as to the duration and precedence of the work. Plaintiffs bar chart depicted its version of numerous work items. However, it failed to prove that the claimed delays occurred along the critical path, because it does not indicate the interdependence of any one or more of the work items with any other work items. Plaintiff proffered documents prepared solely for use at trial as its estimate of work items that were on the critical path while the project was on-going, but offered no credible evidence of the interdependence of the project’s activities. Id. (citing WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 409, 426 , 1968 WL 9146 (1968)). Plaintiff admitted into evidence much data reflecting alleged days of delay, dollars lost, and expenses incurred, but offered no credible proof of how the data related to delay or causation of delay. Without being able to allocate expenses to delay claims, this court cannot award a judgment in favor of plaintiff. Westerhold v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 172 (1993). Plaintiff appears to be seeking a total cost claim for which it did not make an adequate showing. The total cost approach to damages may be used only in rare cases where it is proved that

(1) the nature of the particular losses make it impossible or highly impracticable to determine them with a reasonable degree of accuracy; (2) the plaintiff’s bid or estimate was realistic; (3) its actual costs were reasonable; and (4) it was not responsible for the added expenses.

WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct.Cl. 409, 426 (1968) (citations omitted); accord Servidone Construction Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed.Cir.1991).

Based on his analysis, Mr. Cumine alleged that he identified fifteen separate quantifiable “items of critical delay.” Mr. Cumine may have used the phrase “critical delay” as a shorthand term to mean “critical path delay,” but even if he did so, the court does not know whether the “critical delays” he allegedly identified were found using his concept of “concurrent” critical delays or by some other method. If the latter, the “critical delays” axiomatically may or may not have been on the critical path. A discussion and analysis of specific delay claims follows.

1. Site Preparation Work

Mr. Cumine alleged that the first critical delay occurred at the very outset of the contract. Plaintiff was prepared to begin work on September 23, 1985, but found that the job-site was “not ready” and that “[t]he Post Office required Mega to do considerable additional work in order to get the site prepared to the state that it should have been in on September 23rd.” 20 Defendant allowed a thirty-two day extension of time in Modification No. 2 for plaintiff to complete this site-work. Mr. Cumine’s analysis showed that it took plaintiff an additional thirty-nine days to prepare the site to begin construction, seven days more than allowed, thereby allegedly causing a delay of seven days to the critical path. The court finds fault with this analysis. The additional work at the outset of the contract was not on Mr. Cumine’s as-planned bar chart, and may or may not have been on plaintiff’s original, or amended, as-planned schedule. In fact, at the conclusion of his testimony, Mr. Cumine stated that the very same site-work was not on the critical path; “the critical path lies in the building itself.” Mr. William Irwin, defendant’s expert construction delay witness, agreed that site-work was not on the critical path. 21 Mr. Kaplan confirmed on cross-examination that site prep *429 aration work was not on the critical path and that he could not say that the claimed site-work delayed the project, even though he requested and received thirty-two additional days.

The fact that the pre-construction site-work was not on the critical path, and that defendant’s allowance of thirty-two additional days for performance at the outset of the contract thus did not affect the critical path, further confused the entire delay issue. While the thirty-two days in practical terms would have been reflected at the end of the contract, for analysis of any delay, they had to be counted at the beginning of the contract. Mr. Cumine’s delay analysis was flawed because the impact of that initial “lost” time was not calculated from when it occurred, and thus not considered a factor in the later periods of alleged delay. The thirty-two day period may have constituted a non-critical path delay at the beginning the contract, but Mr. Cumine did not take that into account in his calculations of “the delay” that he alleged occurred during the actual construction phase. By not counting the initial delay at the beginning of the contract, Mr. Cumine added thirty-two days of project delay to the as-planned construction phase. 22

2. Earthwork and Footing Excavation

Plaintiff’s base bar chart identified “Earthwork” and “Footing Excavation” as the third and fourth tasks to be performed on the project. “Earthwork” was apparently to have begun September 23, 1985, and be completed October 18 of the same year. “Footing Excavation” was not scheduled to begin until ten days later, on October 28, and be completed November 8, 1985. The only activity running during that ten-day gap in the as-planned schedule was “Mobilization,” that was to begin September 23 and be completed November 1, 1985. Mr. Cumine surmised that the “Earthwork” did not actually begin until the second week of October and was not completed until the last week of October, approximately the same time “Footing Excavation” was to begin. Mr. Cumine attempted to justify the as-built dates for “Earthwork” by adding an unexplained week of “impact” delay at the beginning of the period during which plaintiff was ostensibly to have performed “Earthwork.” Without understanding the basis or reason for the alleged “impact” delay week at the very outset of the contract — before any work on the project began — the court cannot find that the “Earthwork” actually delayed “Footing Excavation” by a week, thereby adding seven days delay to the alleged critical path. In addition, the three week period between the apparent end of “Earthwork” and the start of “Footing Excavation,” as shown on Mr. Cumine’s version of the base chart and overlays, indicated that plaintiff intended only to continue the six week mobilization of its work force, and had no intention of working on site preparation, or on the building during that time.

3. Rain Delays

Other factors also bring into question the validity of Mr. Cumine’s delay analysis. For example, his chart and narrative testimony indicated that he included days of rain in the alleged delay claims. Special Provision 13, entitled Time Extensions, provides that “[t]ime extensions will be considered only for climatic conditions that are more severe than the average seasonal conditions recorded by the U.S. National Weather Service.” Early in his testimony, Mr. Cumine stated that rain was included in his base as-planned chart even though his analysis of the number of rain days that occurred over the “last five or six years” was average. On redirect, Mr. Cu-mine testified that he showed rain days on the chart and included them in his narrative of the delays but did not add days of delay to the alleged critical path, even though the charts allegedly showed only the critical path delays. He affirmed plaintiff’s counsel’s suggested answer that the *430 rain days were shown on the charts, and had been discussed earlier in his testimony, for “informational purposes only.” Cf. Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. 260, 272 . In light of all of Mr. Cumine’s testimony, the court’s study of his charts and overlays, and observation of the witness on direct and cross-examination, the court believes that the rain days were included in the alleged “critical path” delay claims, in contravention of clause SP-13 of the contract.

4. Plaintiffs Claimed Completion of Work Items

Mr. Cumine included days of delay attributable to defendant on which plaintiff was not working, but could have been. On February 3, 1986, defendant wrote to plaintiff, stating that, according to the project schedule, plaintiff was to have completed thirty-five percent of the project by the time it submitted its third request for progress payment. Yet, plaintiff’s third request for progress payment showed that only thirteen percent of the project had been completed. Defendant’s calculations included “no-work” time within the claimed delay period, further discrediting plaintiff’s assertions that defendant was liable for 272 days of delay to the project. Defendant wrote, “[i]n accordance with clause 65(b) of the General Provisions, we request that you submit a revised schedule and plan to make up the lag in scheduled prog-ress____” Plaintiff’s “response” was that the project was arguably twenty-three to twenty-five percent complete vice the thirteen percent shown in the record. There was sufficient evidence in the record to establish that defendant was faced with a serious discrepancy between actual project accomplishment and plaintiff’s claimed degree of completion. Defendant was well justified in not blindly making progress payments without inquiring into the discrepancy. The time taken to compare claimed completion with actual completion was not unreasonably long, and there was no evidence that any delayed progress payments actually hindered plaintiff's work, or that any delay was not the result of plaintiff’s submissions of questionable claims of accomplishment in support of its requests for progress payments.

5. Job-site Abandonment During Construction Period

The record revealed a number of instances when the job-site was vacant, or no work was being accomplished, even though there was work to be done that could have been done. One example was the delay caused by plaintiff when it ran out of rebar on April 3,1986 in the midst of construction of the slab, and was forced to idle its workers for nearly a week until it could purchase more rebar and have it delivered to the site. The same was true for concrete that was rejected as substandard by defendant. Plaintiff did not explain the impact of the shortage of rebar or rejection of concrete but did include those periods as part of the alleged government-caused delay. The record reflects many days, even weeks, when the job-site was vacant but for plaintiff’s project superintendent, when work could have been performed. 23 Another document included in the record reported that plaintiff had done almost “zero” work on the project between June 23, 1986 and January 6, 1987. A December 20, 1985 letter from Mr. Larry Reynolds, a U.S.P.S. Construction Inspector, to Mr. Harman, plaintiff’s construction manager, four months after award, asked if plaintiff had abandoned the project because no workmen had been at the site for the “last 6 consecutive working days.” The letter continued

[t]he gates are all locked so that even your sub-contractors [sic] cannot access the site. I don’t see why your electri *431 cians and plumbers are not doing their ground work. Also, you could have framed and poured the dock wall, formed for the slab and finished pouring the remaining spread footings.

It is beyond my comprehension as to the way you are running this project. The weather has been some of the best of the year for the past two weeks____ We would like a meeting with you in our office at your earliest convenience, so that we may know what your intentions are.

Mr. Kaplan testified on cross-examination that there were periods when the project was “effectively” shut down because defendant had not provided needed guidance. “We literally ran out of work to do or any kind of consequential work to do.” There was, however, no persuasive evidence that the alleged lack of guidance caused critical path delay or constituted delay to any work item. The record does reveal that the job-site was closed for seventeen days between August 8 and 25, 1986. Plaintiff argued that defendant was liable for this seventeen-day delay because it failed to provide crucial instructions to plaintiff on the fire sprinkler system, impact doors, and approximately thirty other items that allegedly required written instructions or directives from defendant. Again, plaintiff totally failed to analyze the alleged delay in light of its burden under Shupe and Haney . Consequently, the court cannot find defendant liable for the alleged seventeen-day shutdown.

In its post-trial brief, plaintiff asserted that a design problem with the fire sprinkler system arose on December 20, 1985, and that defendant failed to solve the problem until June 19,1986. Yet, in the Appendix to its post-trial brief, plaintiff only referred to the fire sprinkler problem obliquely in construction log entries of May 1, 1986, and October 8, 1986, when the installation of the fire sprinklers began. The court has no idea when, or even if, plaintiff submitted shop drawings to resolve the fire sprinkler design problem; whether the delay from June 19 to October 8, 1986 was attributable to defendant, plaintiff, or both; or why installation did not begin until October 1986 if the problem had been resolved in June 1986. Nor was there credible proof of when plaintiff planned to begin installation of the fire sprinkler system, whether the alleged delay was on the critical path, or if the alleged delay was concurrent with other activities on or off the critical path. Such disarray of proof was typical of dozens of similarly incomprehensible delay claims for which plaintiff seeks recovery.

The longest single delay to the project, according to Messrs. Kaplan and Cumine, was the installation and finishing of drywall, which allegedly delayed completion of the project by 119 days. Plaintiff contended that defendant was responsible for this delay because it failed to provide timely resolution of design defects in impact doors, fire sprinkler systems, heating and ventilation controls, electrical outlets, and screen walls, all of which allegedly required resolution before drywall activities could commence. However, plaintiff admitted that it did not want to install the drywall in a piecemeal fashion because to do so would be “inconvenient” and “not cost-effective.” As a result, plaintiff asserted, the installation and finishing of drywall was delayed from approximately October 30, 1986, until January 7, 1987. 24

Mr. Irwin, defendant’s delay expert, testified, apart from his highly complex and discredited delay chart, that the impact door design problem was resolved in September 1986, and that installation of the fire sprinklers was completed by November 14, 1986. 25 Moreover, plaintiff’s stolid re *432 fusal to install even one side of the drywall while awaiting changes to the temperature control units is totally without merit. Only seven units had to be installed and it is amply clear from the record that the units could easily have been installed with one side of the drywall in place. Even Mr. Cumine admitted on cross-examination that the temperature control units could have been installed with one side of the drywall installed. Based on this evidence, the court finds that plaintiff caused delay to the project, at the very least, between November 14, 1986, the day on which the installation of the fire sprinklers was completed, and January 7, 1987, the day on which drywall activities commenced, a total of fifty-four days.

It is also painfully obvious that plaintiff could not have continued work on the drywall through completion during the claim period because not all of the metal studs to which the drywall was to be attached had been installed. Even if plaintiff could have installed the drywall during the claim period there was no evidence of the amount of time plaintiff could have saved by installing all of the drywall at one time. Nor was there evidence of the allegedly additional time incurred because plaintiff insisted on delaying drywall installation until it could all be installed. Moreover, notwithstanding plaintiffs assertions that it could not have effectively installed the drywall in stages, it did partially install sections of the drywall before it was terminated for default. In fact, once plaintiff did begin to install drywall it did so on a piece-meal basis.

A further complicating factor facing the court was that plaintiffs pay requests for the drywall were grossly inaccurate. The record shows that in its May 1986 pay request, plaintiff stated that it had completed sixty-five percent of the value of the drywall installation. The amount of drywall installation remained at sixty-five percent until December 1986 when plaintiff claimed seventy-five percent completion. In January 1987, plaintiff claimed eighty-one percent completion of the drywall. Plaintiff raised the percentage of completion to ninety-five percent in its February 1987 pay request, and to ninety-nine percent in its April 1987 pay request. Plaintiff later claimed 100 percent of the drywall had been completed. Mr. Irwin, defendant’s delay expert, whose testimony bears close watch, did state that when he visited the site in January 1987, the drywall was approximately twenty-five percent complete, not eighty-one percent complete as claimed in plaintiff’s pay request for that month. The record also shows that between August or September 1986 through December 1986 when plaintiff claimed to have installed ten percent of the drywall, the job-site for all practical purposes had been abandoned. Mr. Ruffalo, defendant’s on-site project manager, testified that by December 1986, no drywall had been installed, and that there was no reason why plaintiff could not have commenced installation by then. Only a few of plaintiff’s employees were on-site on those days, and plaintiff provided no credible proof that the drywall subcontractor was on-site at all during the claim period.

Plaintiff consistently claimed that defendant was slow in giving necessary guidance, approving shop drawings, and answering its requests for clarifications. The claim has some basis; however, after careful examination of the record, the court finds that plaintiff has not proved that any such delay was on the critical path. The court is not unmindful that the contracting officer administratively allowed plaintiff *433 additional time for delay. While the contracting officer may have been willing to provide plaintiff with additional time and delay costs the court cannot do so in the absence of proof of causation or apportionment of causation for the delay. Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 276. The evidence relating to alleged changed work is insufficient for this court to attribute work item or critical path delay to defendant. In the absence of proof of critical path analysis, it is impossible to determine if some activities could have been scheduled earlier, but for delay attributable to defendant. The significance of this finding is that if the activities could have been scheduled earlier and conducted earlier they would have been completed prior to the original contract completion date. The absence of a critical path analysis for the project prevents the court from determining that critical path delay, attributable to defendant, actually occurred with respect to the claimed changes or other work. Id. Nor was there credible proof that plaintiff suffered material damage as the result of alleged government-caused delay. See Wunderlich, 351 F.2d at 967 (citing River Construction Corp. v. United States, 159 Ct.Cl. 254, 270 , 1962 WL 9302 (1962)).

6. Delay Occurring “After” Default Termination

Mr. Cumine defined his fifteenth delay period as “indeterminate” because it was for delays that allegedly occurred after plaintiff’s contract had been terminated for default. One such claim was for government-furnished equipment that was not delivered to the job-site until after the default. Mr. Cumine measured the duration of this element of the delay claim from the time plaintiff first requested the equipment, even though it was a clear that plaintiff was not ready to install the equipment at that time, or at any time in the reasonably near future. The problem with making a delay claim for the period of time after the termination for default is that plaintiff had no legal interest in the contract, and defendant was under no duty to deliver the equipment until it was needed by the reprocurement contractor. 26 That Mr. Cumine, a professed expert on delay claims, would attempt to justify a delay claim beyond the date of a termination for default in total disregard of the contract and the law further diluted his credibility. See also section IV.D. of this opinion, infra.

7. Unsubstantiated and Incomplete Analysis of Claims

Mr. Cumine gathered the information he used in his analysis from documents and discussions he had with plaintiff’s officers. Many of the documents used were not identified nor in the record, did not state what he alleged they reported, or were successfully refuted by defendant. The fact that Mr. Cumine discussed contract documents with plaintiff only and did not solicit comments from any of defendant’s inspectors, managers, or contracting officers raises a strong presumption that his analysis was biased in favor of plaintiff. At one point during Mr. Cumine’s testimony, plaintiff’s counsel Mr. Greenberg, responding to an objection of hearsay, confirmed that portions of Mr. Cumine’s analysis were based on bare self-serving statements made by plaintiff’s officers, which Mr. Cumine opined were true, but to have them admitted into the record over defendant’s hearsay objections, stated they were not offered for the truth of the matters contained therein. A good portion of Mr. Cumine’s analysis was based upon plaintiff’s construction logs, which are also highly suspect. Finally, Mr. Cumine included work in his delay analysis performed by plaintiff that was defective and had to be repaired or replaced by the reprocurement contractor.

8. Credibility of Expert Witness

The court was initially impressed with Mr. Cumine’s demeanor at trial, but as his *434 testimony continued, and upon reflection and study of the record, discerned a strong partisan position by Mr. Cumine in favor of plaintiff, in conflict with one of his duties as an expert witness to objectively assist the court to understand the facts and issues. 27 Based upon the partisan nature of Mr. Cumine’s testimony, his suspect version of plaintiff’s bar chart with its incomprehensible overlays, his failure to consider defendant’s position, and the totality of the evidence in the record, the court finds that Mr. Cumine’s analysis was based upon unsupported or inaccurate information, ignorance of critical facts, misinterpretation of the terms of the contract, and misapplication or misunderstanding of the law and the contract. His testimony was thus flawed, and like Mr. Irwin’s, given little or no weight. See Fed.R.Evid. 702 (1993), and Notes of the Advisory Committee thereto. “When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time.” Id. (citing 7 Wigmore § 1918). See Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B. which held that the trier of fact’s determination of the credibility of witnesses based on the trier’s observation of their demeanor or conduct at the hearing is to be given great deference. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 495-96 , 71 S.Ct. 456, 468-69 , 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 , 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189 , 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982); Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1325 (Fed.Cir.1987); Krayf v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 750, 764 (1989). See also Publix Suyermarkets v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 161, 169 (1992), where the court concluded that the government’s expert witnesses were not credible and their testimony was entitled to little or no deference.

9. Credibility of Lay Witness

Mr. Kaplan’s testimony was no more helpful. He stated simply that plaintiff had worked on the project from the bottom upwards, but gave no specific description of the critical path or specifics of work item delays. Instead, he testified generally that plaintiff planned, seriatim, to prepare the soil, pour concrete, put up the framing and roof, install mechanical and electric items, drywall, and finish the project. Mr. Kaplan referred to his bar graph as a “Gantt Chart,” a bar chart that shows actual completion dates and can be used to compare an as-planned schedule with actual performance. It does not permit logical CPM analysis because it does not depict a “critical path schedule;” the bars did not “indicate the interrelationship between a preceding and succeeding activity” with the all-important “interdependency link.” Wil-ner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 264. A PERT Chart permits identification of the critical path by the means of links between the activities. While the path will often change during construction the links reflect the changes and allow for subsequent analysis of the critical path activities, and where needed, an analysis of claimed delays against the known critical path. The bar charts lack objectivity in the analysis of claimed delays and required the trier of fact to subjectively guess at the path. The failure of the bar chart system is exemplified here where expert witnesses gave conflicting testimony on what each opined was the critical path, leaving to the court the task of considering claimed delays against an unknown critical path. Id. Mr. Kaplan’s discussion of his undated bar chart was as unfathomable as Mr. Cumine’s chart, and of no value to the court in dissecting the delay claims. Rather than presenting a theory of suspension of work or critical path delays in its briefs, plaintiff simply paraphrased the testimony of its witnesses and referred the court to ineffective, unpersuasive charts. The court has reviewed the evidence extensively, yet cannot make plaintiff’s case for it. The testimony was equally unenlightening. *435 In sum, plaintiff did not demonstrate what the critical path was; nor did it demonstrate that the delays allegedly attributable to defendant were work item or critical path delays or that it suffered material damage as the result of any government-caused delay. “Where both parties contribute to the delay, neither can recover damage[s], unless there is in the proof a clear apportionment of the delay and expense attributable to each.” William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 805, 809 (Fed.Cir.1984) (quoting Blinderman Construction Co. v. United States, 695 F.2d 552, 559 (Fed.Cir.1982); Coath & Goss, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct.Cl. 702 , 714-15, 1944 WL 3694 (1944)). The testimony and bar charts prepared by Mr. Kaplan, and his “expert” delay witnesses, were of no help and were given no weight. See Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 264, 275 (citing Wilner I, 23 Cl.Ct. at 255-56); Krapf v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 750, 754 (1989) (citations omitted). “Determining the weight and credibility of the evidence is the special province of the trier of fact.” Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 856 , 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2189 , 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). When asked to indicate how specific activities on the progress schedule related to each other, plaintiff could not elucidate how the schedule exhibited interdependence of activities. It might have been possible for plaintiff to have developed some detail from its progress schedules — to develop the interdependence of activities from the start date, finish date, and duration given for the activities— but plaintiff offered no credible detail of that nature. The court does not view plaintiffs incomprehensible, and suspect bar charts as demonstrating the critical path of the project, and no other evidence revealed the interdependence of the various activities of the project. The bar charts do not show the critical path, and thus do not permit a critical path analysis. See Wilner II, 26 Cl.Ct. at 263-64. At best, there may have been concurrent delay by both parties, but plaintiff-made no attempt to apportion such delay.

Specifically, plaintiff failed to prove that any claimed delay was of an “unreasonable length of time,” Wunderlich, 351 F.2d at 967 (citations omitted), defendant was the sole proximate cause of the delay, id.; Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 208 Ct.Cl. 639 , 528 F.2d 1392, 1397 (1976), and the delay resulted in some injury, Wunderlich at 968 (citations omitted). Without a critical path analysis the court cannot exclude the possibility that the contractor caused concurrent delay on the project. See Wilner I, 23 Cl.Ct. at 245. Plaintiffs charts are not sufficient to prove allocation between the parties or attribution to defendant. The court cannot rely on assertions of a contractor, not supported by a critical path analysis of the project, to award critical path delay costs. Wilner I, 23 Cl.Ct. at 255-56. Neither did plaintiff show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimed delays were of an unreasonable length and that any of the claimed work item delays caused material damage. See Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 180, 351 F.2d 956, 967-68 (1965) (citations omitted); Commerce Int’l Co. v. United States, 167 Ct.Cl. 529 , 338 F.2d 81, 89 (1964) (citations omitted). This was insufficient to sustain plaintiffs contention that defendant’s actions delayed the completion of the project by 272 days, or for any other quantifiable period of time. Plaintiff failed to prove entitlement to an equitable adjustment for delay to any work item, or project delay.

D. Periods Included in the Delay Claims

Plaintiff divided its delay claims into three separate time periods. The first spanned commencement of the work on September 23, 1985, two weeks after receipt of the Notice to Proceed, until July 22, 1987, the date of the termination for default (first period). The second period of delay claims lasted from July 23, 1987, until October 20, 1987, during which time plaintiff alleged that it was still “actively involved in the Project” (second period). The third time period spanned October 21, 1987 “to on or about December 31, 1988 [when plaintiff] was still actively involved in the project on a day-to-day basis as to, *436 among other things, its home office____” (third period). Plaintiff pled in the alternative, as to the latter two time periods, that if the court could not find entitlement to an equitable adjustment for delay after default termination, that plaintiff, “at the very least, ... is entitled to [compensation for] a reasonable time period for the winding down of its involvement in this Project.”

Plaintiff claimed that support for its first-period delay claims arises from admissions of fault contained in the testimony of various government officers, and from the charts and testimony of its delay claims expert witness, Mr. Cumine. As noted, Mr. Cumine concluded from his analysis of fifteen items in the construction record that defendant was responsible for 272 days of delay, and plaintiff for five days of delay during the first period. 28 The 272 days of alleged government-caused delay include 118 days administratively allowed by the contracting officer by modifications to the contract. The actual number of days of delay included in the first claim period is therefore 154 days. Plaintiff asked that the court find defendant responsible for the full 272 days of alleged delay, but that the dollar value of the delay claim be reserved for subsequent proceedings.

Plaintiffs second-period delay claim was for ninety days, and began the day following the termination for default, until October 20, 1987, the date its superintendent and a round-the-clock watchmen left the job-site and “the site was fully turned over to the USPS [sic].” Plaintiff alleged that its home office remained active during this period, dealing with subcontractors and general “winding down” of the project. According to Mr. Cumine, defendant was the sole cause of the entire ninety-day delay and plaintiff was entitled to delay, impact, “and other” unidentified costs for the entire second period. Plaintiff referred the court to contract General Provision 10, The Termination for the Convenience of the Government clause, as the sole basis of its contention that damages incurred during the second period entitled plaintiff to an equitable adjustment.

The third period encompassed a total of 437 days. The delays claimed are the same as those claimed in the second period, i.e., home office involvement with subcontractors and “winding down.” Mr. Kaplan testified about the scope of the claim:

A. ... It takes [in] any project — even if it is completed — it takes time to wind the project down. This, of course, went well beyond that because of problems that had arisen with it. We had lots of problems with sub[contractor]s, for example ____ [D]uring that period, I had Mr. Harman working as a consultant for us. He had elected to leave the company. And I employed him to continue at least for a while to work as a consultant. He was off the payroll.

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Q. Was [Mr. Harman] responding to subcontractor claims and things like that at the time?

A. Well, I was really dealing more directly with the subcontractors on that, but certainly, I had to utilize him for the very detailed knowledge that he had on certain issues.

Q. What else was being done by Mega during this time frame with regard to this job that Mega is claiming?

A. Our Accounts Payable Department was certainly very active in trying to hold our sub[contractor]s at bay. We had been threatened with many lawsuits, some of which came to fruition. I had a lot of explaining to do to a lot of people. I spent a lot of time trying to [mollify] people and that’s never stopped.

As it did for its second-period delay claim, plaintiff relied upon the Termi *437 nation for Convenience of the Government clause, as the sole basis for its third-period delay claim. However, this provision of the contract is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case, as the court has previously found that plaintiff was properly terminated for default. See section III of this opinion, supra.

Throughout the record plaintiff characterized the termination for default as “alleged” and cited to the termination for convenience clause to justify entitlement to an equitable adjustment for costs incurred following its termination for default. However, once plaintiff’s contract was terminated for default, its only responsibility, as it was instructed, was to vacate the job-site immediately. The default termination can be analogized to the final payment to a contractor in that it marks the end of the contract. No doubt plaintiff did incur costs in dealing with its subcontractors and attempting to put its books in order in anticipation of litigation. However, post-termination for default costs are not recoverable in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, see, e.g., J.D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 782 , 456 F.2d 1315 (1972) (per curiam), Preload Corp. v. United States, 115 Ct.Cl. 596 , 1950 WL 5017 (1950), or judicial conversion of the default termination to a termination for the convenience of the government, Nolan Bros., Inc. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 1 , 437 F.2d 1371 (1971); General Provision 10(e)(2), which will not occur here. See Murdock Mach. & Eng’r Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1410, 1413 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citing Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1446 (Fed.Cir.1988)), where the court held that the Termination for Default clause in the contract automatically converted a wrongful default termination into a termination for convenience. Because the termination for default was not wrongful, the court will not consider any of plaintiff’s claims of entitlement to an equitable adjustment for costs allegedly incurred after the date of the termination for default, including its claim, in the alternative, to costs for a reasonable period of time for “winding down.” The court is not so naive that it believes that once plaintiff's contract was terminated for default, plaintiff would not incur costs; however, that is a burden that every contractor must undertake with its own resources in the absence of proper contractual or other legal authority permitting or obligating the government to reimburse the contractor. The Termination for Convenience clause is not applicable in this case, plaintiff cited no other authority, and the court is aware of none that would require or permit reimbursement.

Without making a finding at this time, the court seriously questions whether plaintiff actually incurred “winding down” expenses for a total period of 527 days in addition to its other claims for all costs and expenses. 41 U.S.C. § 605 (c)(1). The claimed second and third period delay claim costs appear to overlap, or duplicate those in the claim for litigation costs, discussed in section V.C. 17 of this opinion, infra, and, if that is the case, would constitute a violation of plaintiff’s certification of costs submitted with its claim to the contracting officer as a condition of this court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. See W.M. Schlosser Co. v. United States, 705 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Fed.Cir.1983). 29 The court agrees with defendant’s characterization of the second and third period claims as nothing more than a crude attempt to pass on duplicative litigation expenses to the taxpayer.

*438 y. ADDITIONAL COST AND CHANGE ORDER CLAIMS

This portion of the opinion addresses additional issues of liability on numerous fact-intensive cost claims that allegedly occurred prior to the July 22, 1987 termination for default. Plaintiff requested separate findings of fact of liability on all additional cost and change order claims to which defendant had not admitted liability. Because defendant did not admit liability on any specific claims at trial, the court assumes that plaintiff meant to exclude from this case on liability those claims which the contracting officer allowed administratively in whole or in part. 30 In light of the contracting officer’s allowance of the nine claims identified in note 29, and because defendant did not refute its liability for any of the claims administratively allowed by the contracting officer, the only remaining issue as to those claims may be the amount of the damages. Plaintiff also seeks additional — i.e., ripple or impact— damages stemming from many of its claims, but not included in the administrative adjustments previously allowed by the contracting officer, or if allowed, unpaid. Under the circumstances of this case, the contracting officer was not only entitled to offset funds owed plaintiff, and those remaining in the contract, but would have been derelict in his duty to protect defendant’s rights had he not done so. 31 The burden is upon plaintiff to convince defendant of the value of those claims in negotiations following issuance of this opinion, or to convince the court to reopen the administrative changes allowed by the contracting officer to prove greater damages by a preponderance of the evidence in the quantum phase of this litigation.

A. Jurisdiction Over the Claims

1. Filing of Claims Under the Contract Disputes Act

Because the claims were presented in such a disjointed illogical manner a question of jurisdiction has been presented which the court, sua sponte, must address. Hambsch v. United States, 857 F.2d 763, 764-65 (Fed.Gir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1054 , 109 S.Ct. 1969 , 104 L.Ed.2d 437 (1989). The Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988) (CDA), requires that “[a]ll claims by a contractor against the government relating to a contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision.” Id. § 605(a). No particular magic language or format is required to create a claim over which this court has jurisdiction, see Contract Cleaning Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 586, 592 (Fed. Cir.1987), even though, as the Federal Circuit stated in Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board, “ ‘^Jurisdiction’ is a term that is one of the most slippery in the legal lexicon.” Spruill v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 978 F.2d 679, 686 (Fed. Cir.1992). The jurisdictional requirement for filing a claim under the CDA is that the contractor “submit in writing to the contracting officer a clear and unequivocal statement that gives the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim.” Contract Cleaning, 811 F.2d at 592 (citing Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 935, 936-37 (Fed.Cir.1984)); Metric Constr. Co. v. United States, 1 Cl.Ct. 383, 392 (1983).

This court has further articulated the prerequisites for jurisdiction as including the following additional elements: (1) a let *439 ter to the contracting officer specifying the relief desired; (2) an assertion of specific rights; (3) a request for a final decision from the contracting officer; (4) a final decision of the contracting officer or the failure to issue such a decision within the statutory time periods; and (5) a clear indication of the amount of monetary compensation requested. Cubic Corp. v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 610, 616-17 (1990); Men-denhall v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 78, 82-83 (1990). Moreover, there is authority indicating that a claimant should state that the statutory basis for jurisdiction in this court is the Contract Disputes Act. Hoffman Constr. Co. v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 518, 526 (1985).

It could be argued that plaintiff failed to present its claims to the contracting officer in a manner which would give this court jurisdiction, and that this jurisdictional defect has not been cured as was the case with plaintiffs initial complaint addressed by the court in its Order on defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Mega Constr. Co. v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 555 (1988). Plaintiff presented its additional cost and change order claims to the contracting officer in a letter dated August 30,1988. That letter read as follows:

Mega Construction Co., Inc. submits the following Claim pursuant to the Contract Dispute [sic] Act of 1978 [P.L. 95-563, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 ] and Section 4 of the General Provisions for the above-referenced contract. 32

The undersigned certifies that the claims set forth herein are made in good faith; that the supporting data is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief; and that the amounts requested accurately reflect the contract adjustment for which Mega Construction Co., Inc. believes that the United States Postal Service is liable.

The letter was signed by Marvin N. Kap-lan, President. In the introduction to the August 30, 1988 claim, plaintiff stated:

As to the claims on the contract amounts due Mega, purported monies claimed by the U.S.P.S. and as to the challenge by Mega of the purported termination for default, Mega takes the position that there has already been a final decision [of the contracting officer] with regard to the aforementioned pursuant to the U.S.P.S.’s letters dated July 22, 1987 [the termination for default] and December 9, 1987 [the assessment of re-procurement costs] to Mega and therefore, Mega is merely reasserting same to make certain that if in fact there is a determination made that the prior letters were not sufficient for such determination for purported termination for default in terms of the appeals process herein, or as the U.S.P.S. may assert in the U.S. Court of Claims [sic] action involving this matter, that same is at least asserted pursuant to this claim. However, Mega does reserve its rights to contend that the prior aforementioned letters in fact are final decisions on the aforementioned issues perfecting Mega’s right to appeal pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act, including, but not limited to the U.S. Court of Claims [sic]. Mega does not waive that right by asserting such claims herein.

The language is unwieldy, but it is clear that the August 30, 1988 letter constituted plaintiff’s additional cost and change order claims. The contracting officer believed that to be the case because he responded to the letter with a final decision on November 25, 1988. The final decision of the contracting officer ended with the mandatory standard language advising plaintiff of its rights of appeal. See 41 U.S.C. §§ 605 (b), 607(d), 609(a).

Plaintiff might also argue that numerous of its letters prior to the August 30, 1988 letter submitting cost items to the contracting officer should be considered claims. There are two categories of such letters. One group begins with the statement, “[attached are our claims for costs *440 for the following.” The other group begins, “[attached is our proposal to do the following work.” Following each introductory statement, plaintiff then identified the claim or proposal. The letters were form letters and each contained the same “reservation” language in the final paragraph. An example is the letter claiming costs for protective barricades and the screen wall. That “claim” letter, addressed to the attention of the contracting officer, reads as follows:

Attached are our claims for costs for the following:

Provide protective barricades for building due to delays in glass and hardware selection by USPS:

Total Amount: $14,551.50 Provide connection to wall (screen wall tube) per revised sketch SK-32:

Total Amount: $6,657.68

Please note that our claims are limited to the direct costs of the above work. Other costs incurred since discovery of the condition and to be incurred at a later date, (including but not limited to additional home and field office overhead resulting from overrun of the contract time, wage and fringe benefits escalations, increase of taxes, added weather protection, effects on work not modified by these changes, impact costs by subcontractors, ripple effect costs, etc., as well as liquidated damages are not included and are hereby specifically reserved. The extent of such additional costs will be evaluated only when fully known, but no later than the end of the project, and will be submitted at that time for equitable compensation. We do not recognize the granting of an appropriate time extension to be a waiver of any claim for costs.

Each so-called “claim” was accompanied by a completed standard form entitled “request for proposal” identifying plaintiffs direct and indirect costs for performing the claimed extra work, and in some instances, a voucher or bill from a subcontractor or supplier. 33 When asked what the last paragraph quoted above meant, Mr. Kaplan professed that he did not know, even though the paragraph was one he had developed “many years ago” for use in all of plaintiffs contracts to assert claims for contract modifications.

The court finds that the letters enclosing the request for proposals did not constitute claims under the CDA. Many did not give the contracting officer “adequate notice of the basis” of the claim, and none gave adequate notice of the amount claimed. Contract Cleaning, 811 F.2d at 592 (citing Tecom, 732 F.2d at 936-37 ); Metric Constr., 1 Cl.Ct. at 392 . Therefore, under the law of Cubic Corp. and Mendenhall, the contracting officer did not possess the authority to issue a final decision on those “claims.” Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States and Straga v. United States denied the contracting officer the authority to issue a final decision under the CDA unless the claim had been properly submitted. Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 227 Ct.Cl. 176 , 645 F.2d 966, 971 (1981); Straga v. United States, 8 Cl.Ct. 61, 66-68 (1985). In Straga , the contracting officer rendered a purported final decision, but because the claim had not been properly submitted, the Claims Court found that it had no jurisdiction to address the claims. Straga, 8 Cl.Ct. at 66-68 . If the claim does not satisfy the requirements of the CDA, even if the contracting officer inferred, or boldly stated, that the jurisdictional requirements were satisfied, jurisdiction does not vest. RSH Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 655, 659 (1988) (citing Paragon, 227 Ct.Cl. 176 , 645 F.2d 966 ). The jurisdictional prerequisites established by statute may never be waived by either party. See W.M. Schlosser Co. v. *441 United States, 705 F.2d 1336, 1338 (Fed.Cir.1983) and Gardner Mach. Corp. v. United States, 14 Cl.Ct. 286 , 290 n. 1 (1988) holding that the contracting officer’s “final decision” rendered on an uncertified claim was invalid, as the contracting officer had no authority to waive a requirement that Congress had imposed, and that the reviewing tribunal likewise could not waive the certification requirement in order to review the contracting officer’s decision. Although W.M. Schlosser dealt with plaintiff’s failure to certify a claim greater than $50,000, the absence of authority to waive a jurisdictional requirement under the CDA applies equally to the instant situation. In Shelly & Loy v. United States, the court, also addressing a certification deficiency, indicated that failure to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequisites “taint[s] every ‘decision’ that follows.” Shelly & Loy v. United States, 231 Ct.Cl. 370 , 685 F.2d 414, 419 (1982).

One element of a properly submitted claim which the request for proposal letters and the August 30, 1988 claim specifically lack is a request that the contracting officer render a final decision on the “claim.” In Transamerica Insurance Corp. ex rel. Stroup Sheet Metal Works v. United States, Senior Circuit Judge Marion T. Bennett, writing for a three judge panel, reversed an opinion of the United States Claims Court holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims before it because the contractor had not expressly requested a final decision from the contracting officer. See Transamerica Ins. Corp. ex rel. Stroup Sheet Metal Works v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572 (Fed.Cir. 1992).

This court’s bench opinion in Trans-america was based upon an interpretation of a lengthy series of opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, our common predecessor court the United States Court of Claims, and persuasive opinions of this court applying the law of the Federal Circuit, that a request for a final decision from the contracting officer is a jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal in this court. The Transamerica Insurance Corporation, surety to a contractor that had been terminated for default, took over the project through another contractor. The claims had first been submitted by the defaulted contractor on behalf of an unpaid subcontractor, Stroup Sheet Metal Works (Stroup). The record in Transamerica reflected that Stroup had written and spoken to the contracting officer, asking that he expedite his final decision. Id. at 1575 . In the process of preparing the final decision, the contracting officer requested additional information of Stroup, which Stroup provided. Id. The contracting officer ultimately denied the claims in part, and Stroup accepted the allowed portions in a unilateral modification to the contract “as partial payment.” Id. at 1576 . The lawsuit filed in this court in Transamerica was for the difference between the amount awarded in the unilateral modification and the amount sought as equitable adjustment. The Federal Circuit stated that the main question before it was whether the Claims Court erred in holding that the original contractor’s letter requesting an equitable adjustment on behalf of its subcontractor did not include “a request for a final decision, either express or implied.” Id.

Section 605(a) [of the Contract Disputes Act] by requiring submittal of a written claim ‘for decision’ does not of itself add any authority to the argument that there must be an explicit request for a contracting officer’s final decision. The statute’s broad language demonstrates that as long as what the contractor desires by its submissions is a final decision, that prong of the CDA claim test is met.

Id. The Federal Circuit in Transamerica distinguished the cases cited by defendant in support of its position that a request for a final decision is a jurisdictional prerequisite. One such case, Hoffman Construction Co. v. United States, 7 Cl.Ct. 518 (1985), relied extensively on Paragon. Transamerica however stated that reliance upon Paragon was “off the mark,” id. at 1577, because the Court of Claims had not established a requirement for a request for a final decision under section *442 605(a) but had simply stated that “the particular factual showing in its case met the articulated statutory standard ... all that need be shown is an ‘expression of interest’ [for a final decision] which may be made implicitly.” Id. Transamerica held that the original contractor’s letter made clear that the contractor considered the letter to serve as a CDA claim and intended that the contracting officer either allow or deny the claims in a final decision. Id. at 1578. It is also clear that the contracting officer was on notice that the contractor intended the letter to serve as a request for a final decision. Id.

This court will not require contractors to do more than to comply as fully and reasonably as possible with the statutory requirements of the CDA when this court has definitively stated that certain ‘magic words’ need not be used and that the intent of the ‘claim’ governs. See Contract Cleaning Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d [586,] 592 [(Fed.Cir.1987).]

The [claim] letter was in writing, was submitted to the contracting officer for a decision, requested payment of a sum certain, and gave the contracting officer adequate notice of the basis and the amount of the claim. This court is loathe to believe that in this case a reasonable contractor would submit to the contracting officer a letter containing a payment request after a dispute had arisen solely for the contracting officer’s information and without at the very least an implied request that the contracting officer make a decision as to entitlement. Any other finding offends logic.

Id. Transamerica Insurance Corporation argued that the CDA requirements, as interpreted by the Federal Circuit, suggested applying “a common sense analysis to determine whether (1) the contractor asserted in writing and with sufficient specificity a right to additional compensation, (2) the government disputed that right, and (3) the contractor communicated his desire for a contracting officer decision.” Id. at 1579 (emphasis in original). The court agreed, 34 stating “[a]pplying such a logical, common sense analysis in this case, [the original contractor’s] submissions were sufficient to qualify as CDA claims.” Id.

In its letter of August 30, 1988, plaintiff met all of the elements traditionally relied upon by the court to establish jurisdiction, see Cubic Corp. v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 610, 616-17 (1990); Mendenhall v. United States, 20 Cl.Ct. 78, 82-83 (1990), save one. The August 30 letter was a written document, submitted to the contracting officer, which specified the relief desired and the justification therefor, including the amount requested. However, plaintiff never expressly requested a final decision of the contracting officer in any of its correspondence with defendant. The issue thus presented is whether the court must dismiss plaintiff’s claims with the exception of the termination for default and reprocurement cost claims. The court thinks not. The Transamerica court limited its holding to a specific factual setting, i.e., where there is virtually no question but that the contractor asked for and received a contracting officer’s final decision. See Trans-america, 973 F.2d at 1581 . As in Trans-america, Mr. Kaplan’s letter of August 30, 1988, and his other writings and conversations with the contracting officer and the latter’s representatives, at the very least impliedly expressed plaintiff’s desire for a *443 final decision of the contracting officer on those claims, and thus satisfied the statutory requirements of 41 U.S.C. § 605 (a). Moreover, the contracting officer in his correspondence with plaintiff specifically referred to the submission as a claim, and asked for additional supporting documents for several of the items contained therein in order that he might address them fully in his final decision, just as the contracting officer in Transamerica had done. See id. at 1575 . Plaintiffs compliance with the contracting officer’s request for additional documents to support the claims laid to rest any doubt that the August 30, 1988 letter was not a proper claim.

Based upon an analysis of the opinions of this court and of the Federal Circuit, the court finds that a request for a final decision of a contracting officer need not be in any particular format, or even expressly made. As long as the basic requirements of the CDA are met, and the contracting officer knows the bases of the claims and the final amounts sought, the “request” for a final decision may be inferred from the circumstances of the case. With the information available to the contracting officer defendant could not argue persuasively that the contracting officer was surprised at or lacked sufficient information to properly address plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff’s additional cost item claims are properly before the court. Other claims, not included in the August 30, 1988 letter, are not properly before the court.

2. Untimely Filing of Claims

Under General Provision 6, the Changes clause, for any change which causes an increase or decrease in the contractor’s cost of or time for performance, an equitable adjustment shall be made, provided that the contractor gives written notice of the date, circumstances, and source of the order and that the contractor regards the order as a change order. Although no starting point need be specified, notice must be given within twenty days from incurring costs as a result of a change order. Costs incurred more than twenty days prior to this notification cannot be recovered, except in the case of defective specifications. Under the same clause, any claim for equitable adjustment must be provided by the contractor within thirty days from receipt of any written change order or written notice of a constructive change. The contractor must set forth, in writing, the general nature and monetary extent of the claim. The government has discretion to receive any claim asserted under this clause prior to final payment. The consequences of a contractor’s failure to follow the notice provisions of the clause may result in its claim being disallowed. In any event, a claim must be submitted no later than the date of final payment. The filing of a claim within the administration period of a contract is plainly a prerequisite to relief. Jo-Bar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 210 Ct.Cl. 149 , 535 F.2d 62, 66 (1976) (citing Eggers & Higgins v. United States, 185 Ct.Cl. 765 , 403 F.2d 225, 236 (1968)). Pursuant to the terms of the contract the government has discretion to receive and consider, prior to final payment, any claim that was not filed within appropriate time limits. However, in the absence of special circumstances not present in the case at bar, final payment to a contractor bars consideration of any subsequent claims for damages under the contract. See G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 947 , 1982 WL 25285 (1982); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 742, 751 (1984).

Defendant argued that plaintiff’s proposal for the extra costs was untimely because it was not presented to the contracting officer until weeks after plaintiff’s contract was terminated for default and well after the thirty-day notice requirement in the Changes clause of the contract, and that a default termination was analogous to final payment to a contractor marking the end of the contract. This is not the law. See G.M. Shupe, Inc. v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 947 (1982); Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 742 (1984). Defendant argued that all claims submitted (1) after the termination, and (2) after the thirty days specified in the *444 Changes clause were out of time and should be dismissed, because the untimely filing of claims prejudiced defendant’s right to take corrective action, which it might have taken had it been given timely notice. As to the purpose of the notice requirement generally, see Roberts v. United, States, 174 Ct.Cl. 940 , 357 F.2d 938, 946 (1966) and Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cl.Ct. 173 (1986), aff'd, 812 F.2d 1387 (Fed.Cir.1987).

Plaintiff does not deny that formal notice of its claims was not presented to the contracting officer until after the contract was terminated for default, but rather that the contracting officer had actual notice of the events and circumstances underlying its claims, and that this notice was sufficient to meet the notice requirements of the various contract clauses. The question thus is whether the notice requirements of the contract clauses in question can be subordinated to the actual or constructive knowledge by the contracting officer of the facts and events underscoring the claim. Plaintiff relied on the argument that the notice provisions should “not be applied too technically and illiberally where the government is quite aware of the operative facts,” citing Martin J. Simko Constr., Inc. v. United States, 11 Cl.Ct. 257 (1986), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 852 F.2d 540 (Fed.Cir.1988); Hoel-Steffen Constr. Co. v. United States, 197 Ct.Cl. 561 , 456 F.2d 760, 768 (1972); Copco Steel & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 169 Ct.Cl. 601 , 341 F.2d 590, 598 (1965). It is clear that the contracting officer knew prior to the termination that plaintiff would assert formal claims for additional compensation, and he addressed all claims presented to him in the August 30, 1988 claim letter as timely. See Jo-Bar Mfg., 535 F.2d at 66 . Based on these facts, the court cannot find that defendant was in any way prejudiced by the late date of the filing of many of plaintiff’s claims. With Hoel-Steffen’s admonition to apply the rules liberally in favor of plaintiff the court finds that the claims, except as noted hereinafter, were properly before the contracting officer and are properly before this court. Hoel-Steffen, 456 F.2d at 768 . The court, in fact, in H.H.O. Co. v. United States went as far as to find that because the contracting officer considered the claim on the merits there was no prejudice to defendant and that any argument of untimeliness had been waived. H.H. 0. Co. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 147, 160 (1987) (citing Copco Steel & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 169 Ct.Cl. 601 , 341 F.2d 590, 598-600 (1965)).

B. Burden of Proof

The burden of proving its claims is solely upon plaintiff. It has long been held that the contractor bears the burden of proving the amount of its damages “with sufficient certainty so that the determination of the amount of damages will be more than mere speculation.” Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 767 (Fed.Cir.1987) (quoting Willems Indus., Inc. v. United States, 155 Ct.Cl. 360 , 295 F.2d 822, 831 (1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 903 , 82 S.Ct. 1249 , 8 L.Ed.2d 400 (1962)). The burden is measurable. Since plaintiff has the burden of establishing entitlement to an equitable adjustment under the terms of the contract, Nager Elec. Co. v. United States, 194 Ct.Cl. 835 , 442 F.2d 936, 946 (1971), it must present proof sufficient to convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in fact entitled to an equitable adjustment. Even though this phase of the litigation is limited to liability, the court is constrained to point out, and consider where necessary, that this standard of proof also applies to proof of the amount of plaintiff’s increased costs. 4 McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts § 28.240, at 28-428 (1963 & Supp. 1993). In adjudicating plaintiff’s additional cost and change order claims the court must consider, and apply where proper, its findings made on the delay claim discussed in section IV. of this opinion, because a determination of liability for delay is intertwined with many of these claims.

C. Offsets

Defendant administratively allowed costs and time extensions on nine claims, see note 30, supra, but the costs allowed were withheld by defendant to be *445 offset against its counterclaims. Plaintiff challenged defendant’s right to offset funds it had agreed to pay under previous modifications to the contract, but withheld. Even when no contract clause permits the withholding of payments defendant has the implied right to protect its interests by this means. Setoff “is a common law right available to any creditor.” Southeastern Airways Corp. v. United States, 230 Ct.Cl. 47 , 673 F.2d 368, 379 (1982) (citations omitted). United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 , 67 S.Ct. 1599 , 91 L.Ed. 2022 (1947) recognized the common law right of every creditor, including the government, to collect debts that are or later become due. Cascade Pacific International v. United States found that any procurement contract entered into subsequent to the 1979 containing the CDA “all-disputes” clause, reserved to defendant the common law right to offset money owed by the defaulted contractor. Cascade Pac. Int’l v. United States, 773 F.2d 287, 295-96 (Fed.Cir.1985), see also Project Map, Inc. v. United States, 203 Ct.Cl. 52 , 486 F.2d 1375 (1973). For defendant to exercise its common law right of offset, the claim need not be reduced to judgment; the offset may be effected pending resolution of the controversy. Mazama Timber Prods., Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl.Ct. 87, 88-89 (1984) (citations omitted); Americold Corp. v. United States, 28 Fed.Cl. 747 (1993).

1. HVAC Controls and Permanent Power for Testing

The HVAC Controls claim is primarily a delay claim that was administratively allowed in part by the contracting officer. However, because it includes elements of additional costs, it will be addressed in this section of the opinion. Defendant changed the HVAC Control design and allowed plaintiff an equitable adjustment in the amount of $1,061.05. Plaintiff contends that additional costs and time for delay were incurred by reason of a change that was not included in the equitable adjustment, some of which costs were allegedly unknown at the time of the change. Defendant conceded that the administrative adjustment only reimbursed plaintiff for a “portion” of its extra expenses on this item and that its full damages, including overhead and general and administrative costs, should be addressed and proven during the quantum stage of this litigation. Plaintiff also alleged entitlement to additional time for performance, and defendant admitted to a delay of seven days after drywall installation had been completed, from June 12 through June 19, 1987. Following a thorough review of the record, the court is unable to find that plaintiff proved entitlement by a preponderance of the evidence to additional time. Moreover, it appears that plaintiff’s claim was for the total cost of installing the HVAC Controls with no reliable evidence of its original allocated cost. In the absence of such proof, the court cannot find defendant liable for any extra costs for installation of the HVAC system. See, however, the discussion of the Condensing Unit counterclaim in section VI. B.9. of this opinion.

Plaintiff also claims delay for the failure of defendant to “turn on permanent power to the project which resulted in the inability of Mega to be able to test certain equipment, ... [including HVAC].” Temporary power was provided in accordance with clause SP-8 of the Special Provisions. Mr. Whalen testified that temporary electric power was available on-site. He saw a temporary power pole that had been on-site throughout the whole period of performance. In fact, following completion of the project by the reprocurement contractor, defendant encountered difficulty getting the electrical subcontractor to remove the pole and power lines.

According to the electrical subcontractor, it needed three-phase power to complete electric testing of equipment such as the HVAC, the lighting system controlled by the “Lutron” panel, and three phase motors. The original electrical subcontractor claimed that the temporary electric power was only single phase power. The subcontractor testified that the reason the building did not have the correct type of power was because defendant had to apply for a meter permit, yet had not done so. “The contractor cannot do it ... [and] the Post *446 Office would not apply for it,” according to the electrical subcontractor. However, section 16100 of the Scope of Work, at paragraph 1.02 A 3., placed the duty to provide the proper electrical service squarely on plaintiff. Section 16100 stated, “[w]ork includes ... the following: Complete 120/208 volt, three[-]phase, four[-]wire lighting and power service, including meter facilities as required by serving utility company.” Plaintiff provided no legal or other support for the subcontractor’s statement that it was defendant’s responsibility to apply to the local electric company for the meter permit, and that defendant “refused” do so. Furthermore, not all electrical systems were even ready for testing by the date of the termination for default.

Inasmuch as the claim is for delay damages which the court denied in section IV of this opinion, supra, the claim is denied. Moreover, in the complete absence of any support for the bare allegation that defendant needed to apply for three-phase power and refused to do so and because plaintiff was not ready for testing before the termination for default, the court finds that plaintiff has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to an equitable adjustment to compensate it for any alleged extra costs caused by the government’s refusal to provide three-phase electric power. The HVAC claim is dismissed.

2. Price Escalation (General)

Plaintiff made a price escalation delay claim disguised as a change order claim. Plaintiff claimed entitlement to an equitable adjustment for increased subcontractor billings due to delay caused by defendant. In support of its claim, plaintiff inserted into the record several letters from subcontractors claiming that because of government-caused delay, their costs were increased. This may or may not have been the case, but is certainly not dispositive of the issue. A recitation of second- and third-hand, non-contemporaneous facts is insufficient to prove injury. See, e.g., Commerce Int’l Co. v. United States, 167 Ct.Cl. 529 , 338 F.2d 81, 86, 89 (1964), which held that once a claimant establishes violation of a contract provision, it must show that the violation caused injury. Plaintiff failed to show any delay caused by the government and failed to apportion delay such as to support this price escalation claim. See id. at 89 ; section IV of this opinion, supra. While it might be possible to arrive at an approximation of the subcontractors’ original costs, the proof offered is insufficient to meet plaintiff's burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that increased costs arose out of any alleged government-caused delay, or that the costs were not caused by some other factor. Moreover, as an self-professed experienced government contractor, plaintiff should have anticipated such costs. The court has reviewed the entire record and cannot find support for plaintiff’s price escalation claim. The claim is denied and dismissed.

3. Site Meeting Costs

Plaintiff sought an equitable adjustment to the contract for extra costs it incurred because defendant allegedly failed to attend one meeting at the job-site. The most meaningful evidence of the missed meeting was found in the deposition of Mr. James Hearn, plaintiff’s on-site project superintendent. Mr. Hearn stated that Marvin Nelson, a representative of Lane Architectural Group, requested a meeting at 9:00 a.m. on May 30, 1985 with representatives of plaintiff and two subcontractors “to settle out the problems we had with the electrical part of the heating, air conditioning and fire sprinklers.” Mr. Greenberg, counsel for plaintiff, led Mr. Hearn through his deposition testimony, as follows:

Q. So you went out to the site that day, the date set for the meeting by Mr. Nelson?

A. Right.

Q. And no one showed up from the Postal Service?

A. No one showed up from the Postal Service.

Q. And Mr. Nelson didn’t show up?

A. Mr. Nelson was at the job.

*447 Mr. Hearn went on to explain that he knew defendant was aware of the meeting because “Mr. Nelson said” he had called defendant and told “them” of the meeting.

In its post-trial brief, plaintiff cited to “Number 3, Index Item 37, on page 11” as support for the claim. The court has reviewed two identical Index Items 37, as it did all Indices, and there is no page eleven. Nor, for that matter is there any document identified as “Number 3.” Both Index Item No.’s 37 contain letters dated June 4, and June 18, 1986, a year after the alleged meeting, from two subcontractors purporting to bill plaintiff for four hours “wasted” waiting for representatives to attend the meeting. There is no proof, other than double hearsay, that defendant was even told of the meeting. Nor is there proof that defendant’s representatives agreed to attend any meeting. Plaintiff completely failed to meet its burden to show that it was damaged by defendant’s alleged derelictions. See Commerce Int’l, 338 F.2d at 86, 89 . The court agrees with Mr. Kap-lan’s admission that this sort of expense, if indeed it was incurred, is typically a part of a contractor’s overhead expenses, and included in plaintiff’s bid. For the record, the court notes that in late-March or early-April 1987, Mr. Ruffalo, defendant’s on-site project manager, telephoned Mr. Harman, plaintiff’s construction manager, to set a meeting at the job-site, and Mr. Harman failed to appear.

Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that the meeting of which it complains was nothing more than a typical on-site meeting, or that plaintiff incurred any unexpected expenses beyond the scope of its contract bid negates any entitlement to an equitable adjustment. Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of proof, and the claim is denied and dismissed. Because of the nature of the evidence, coupled with a total lack of substance, the claim is frivolous.

4. Additional Demolition and Moving of Field Office

In support of this claim plaintiff provided the usual jumbled accumulation of documents and citations to the transcript, leaving the relevance of the material to the court to guess. Plaintiff claimed entitlement to an equitable adjustment for removal of existing pavement at the outer perimeter of the site, demolition, earthwork, and repaving. Plaintiff also sought an equitable adjustment for relocation of its on-site temporary field office trailer resulting from defendant’s decision to demolish the existing pavement and to fill, grade, and repave the area. The area was approximately thirty-five by eighty-five feet. The contract called for the existing pavement at issue to remain in place and for plaintiff to fill, grade, and pave “the entire parking area.” Thereafter, defendant determined that the existing pavement should be removed. Plaintiff was directed to remove the old pavement and

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