stating that the Court must apply a “presumption of regularity” to “official acts of public officers, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the Court must apply a “presumption of regularity” to “official acts of public officers, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties”
- providing that “the presumption [of official regularity] operates in reverse. If [the action] appears irregular, it is irregular, and the burden shifts to the proponent to show the contrary” (quoting United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563, 1567 (Fed.Cir.1983))
- providing that the “presumption of regularity” applies to the official acts of public officers, and in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed they have properly discharged their official duties
- holding that the presumption of regularity applies to official acts of public officers absent clear evidence to the contrary
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IVERS, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the opinion of the Court. However, in reviewing the record in this case, I am left with the impression that appellant’s representatives may have had notice, either actual or, at a minimum, constructive of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (BVA) decision of October 24, 1990. Thus, either through an oversight or, in a manner calculated to establish a point of law, the time for filing of a Notice of Appeal was allowed to expire. In either case, had the Secretary instituted a system of accountability for mailing, and, thus, been in a position to establish that a copy of the BVA decision was mailed to both appellant and counsel, appellant’s right to appeal would have been lost.