contrasting with AWA and holding that “Court does not possess the authority to issue declarative relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act”, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, because Court is not “Court of the United States” within the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 451 that applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2201
How later courts described this case
- contrasting with AWA and holding that “Court does not possess the authority to issue declarative relief under the Declaratory Judgments Act”, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, because Court is not “Court of the United States” within the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 451 that applies to 28 U.S.C. § 2201
- stating that parties to Board’s review of fee agreement are the claimant and the attorney
- term "court of the United States” in 28 U.S.C. § 2201 is defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451 as including only "the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts ... [, and] the Court of International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during good behavior”; thus, the Declaratory Judgments Act does not apply to this Court because its judges are appointed "by the President ... for a term of 15 years”
- in context of BVA’s review of fee agreement, the Court remarked that “the parties to a review of a fee agreement are the claimant on the one hand and the attorney on the other.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Thomas J. Kuzma, Claimant-Appellant v. Anthony J. Principi, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 341 F.3d 1327 (2003)
341 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (overruling Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 307 (1991) to the extent that it conflicts with the precedents of the United States Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit).
The opinion
STEINBERG, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the Court’s excellent opinion. I write separately to stress one point about the Court’s holding in Part IV.A. of the opinion. In concluding that “it is appropriate, indeed necessary, for the BVA to communicate directly with a represented client in connection with the review of a fee agreement authorized and conducted under 38 U.S.C. § 3404 (c)(2)” (ante, p. 304), the Court has resolved that question in the context of the attorney-client agreements presented in these two cases. Neither of those agreements provide explicitly that all contacts (including as to fee agreements) by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) with respect to particular claims for benefits by the client should be made with the attorney and not directly with the client. Were we presented with such a provision in an agreement and timely notice of it to VA, I believe we would have a very different matter to resolve.