The opinion
Case: 21-51056 Document: 00516377512 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/30/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 21-51056 June 30, 2022
Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Jonita Desirrae Brown,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:07-CR-41-4
Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
In 2007, Jonita Desirrae Brown pleaded guilty to possessing with
intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of an
elementary school and playground, and the district court sentenced her to
135 months of imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. In 2014, the
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 21-51056
district court reduced Brown’s term of imprisonment to 120 months under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In August 2021, Brown’s probation officer
petitioned the district court to revoke her supervised release, alleging that
Brown violated her conditions of supervised release by committing a new law
violation and by using alcohol and drugs. The district court revoked
supervised release and sentenced Brown to an above-guidelines maximum
sentence of 60 months of imprisonment; it did not order a further term of
supervised release.
Brown appeals, arguing that her revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable because the district court failed to articulate any fact-specific
reasons for imposing the maximum sentence. Sentences imposed upon
revocation of supervised release are reviewed under the plainly unreasonable
standard. United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011). In
conducting this review, we follow many of the same considerations that are
employed in the review of original sentences but provide more deference to
revocation sentences than to original sentences. See id. at 843-44.
Here, the district court adequately explained its chosen sentence, see
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007), and there is no indication in
the record that a more thorough explanation would have resulted in a
different sentence, see United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357,
361-64 (5th Cir. 2009). Further, the court relied on appropriate 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors in determining that a 60-month sentence was warranted. It
addressed Brown’s history on supervised release, which included several
modifications to the conditions to account for Brown’s struggles with alcohol
and drug abuse, and concluded that the maximum sentence was appropriate
in light of Brown’s history and characteristics, her likelihood of recidivism,
the need to deter her from criminal conduct, and the duty to protect the
public from Brown’s crimes. See § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D); § 3583(e)(3);
United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 332-33 (5th Cir. 2013). We have
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routinely upheld revocation sentences exceeding the recommended
guidelines range, even where the sentence is the statutory maximum. See,
e.g., United States v. Kippers, 685 F.3d 491, 500-01 (5th Cir. 2012). The fact
that we “might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was
appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” Warren,
720 F.3d at 332 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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