stating that Longval “affirmed the requirement under the [MCRA] that proof of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ be in addition to the interference with the exercise or enjoyment of secured rights”
How later courts described this case
- stating that Longval “affirmed the requirement under the [MCRA] that proof of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ be in addition to the interference with the exercise or enjoyment of secured rights”
- affirming judgment for plaintiffs on MCRA claim, where plaintiffs were arrested as part of defendants’ attempt to interfere with their statutory rights to a summary process hearing prior to eviction
- "In holding that a corporation may be vicariously liable under G.L. c. 151B, § 4 . . . for a supervisory employee's sexual harassment of a subordinate, the Supreme Judicial Court . . . concluded that § 4 was to be afforded a liberal construction to accomplish its statutory purposes."
- “Our decisions have impliedly recognized that a plaintiff may state a cause of action under the MCRA against a private employer based on respondeat superior…”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Kass, J.
(concurring). This opportunistic private action by two individuals who were well aware that they no longer had a right to occupy the premises they had hunkered down in trivializes the noble purpose of the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act. See Batchelder v. Allied Stores Corp., 393 Mass. 819, 821 (1985). As the opinion of the court in the instant case points out, however, the defendants have not raised the issue whether the MCRA applies to a private quarrel of the sort involved. I make these concurring comments to emphasize that not more should be read into that particular aspect of the court’s opinion than is in it.