holding that, under strict scrutiny, a grandparent visitation statute did not violate equal protection principles, given legislative recognition that children of unmarried or separated parents may be at heightened risk for certain kinds of harm when compared with children of intact families
How later courts described this case
- holding that, under strict scrutiny, a grandparent visitation statute did not violate equal protection principles, given legislative recognition that children of unmarried or separated parents may be at heightened risk for certain kinds of harm when compared with children of intact families
- recognizing burden of litigation on parents, court requires grandparent to submit detailed and verified petition to show grandparent can meet evidentiary burden because notice pleading is not adequate to safeguard parents from unwarranted grandparent visitation petitions
- holding that "the grandparents must allege and prove that the failure to grant visitation will cause the child significant harm by adversely affecting the child's health, safety, or welfare"
- construing Troxel to provide following guideposts: reaffirmation of parent's liberty interest in raising his or her child is fundamental right; any person should not be granted standing to seek visitation; presumption exists that parents act in child's best interest, which warrants significant deference; and potential impact of grandparent visitation on parent-child relationship should be considered in trial court's analysis
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Cowin, J.
(dissenting in part). I join with that portion of Justice Sosman’s dissent that would declare the statute *667 unconstitutional on its face because it infringes on parents’ fundamental right to make decisions concerning the upbringing of their children. In that regard, I agree with Justice Sosman (a) that the statute violates due process guarantees because its substantive provisions fail to satisfy the requirement that they be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest; and (b) that the court has impermissibly rewritten the statute in an effort to make it comply with due process requirements.
Because the court has determined that the statute (“as rewritten”) satisfies due process requirements, it considers the validity of the statute on equal protection grounds “as it pertains to the class in which the mother belongs, that is, a parent of a non-marital child bom out of wedlock, living apart from the child’s other parent, in this case, the child’s father.” Ante at 661. I agree with this portion of the court’s opinion that concludes that “the Legislature does not offend the principles of equal protection, as seen through the narrow lens of strict scmtiny, by confining the reach of the grandparent’s visitation statute, as [the court] constme[s] it today, to a discrete class of children within the discrete class of households at issue.” Ante at 664.