The opinion
Ames, J.
This is a case of a deposit of personal property by a debtor in the hands of a creditor as collateral security for the debt. If it presented merely the ordinary incidents of a pledge, it would be manifest that the action could not be maintained. The destruction of the property is conceded to have been accidental, without fault or neglect of duty on the part of the defendants.
But the claim of the plaintiff is, that the transaction differs widely from an ordinary pledge, and he contends that, by the terms of a written contract, the defendants have taken upon themselves a special liability of a much more extensive character. If, in the common case of a pledge, the common law contract *13 were reduced to writing, it would contain among other things a stipulation that the pledgee should not be responsible for the loss of the property, unless some want of reasonable and ordinary care on his part were the cause of such loss. In the present case the parties have reduced their contract to writing, and have omitted to attach to the defendants’ liability for the property any limitation whatever. On the contrary, their express promise is to do one or the other of two things: either to return the property specifically, or to pay for it in money. There can be no doubt that if a creditor sees fit to accept a deposit of security upon such terms, and to place himself in the position of an insurer of its safety, he can legally do so. It is not difficult to suppose a case in which the parties might find it convenient that the business of guarding against the risk of fire or other accident should be attended to by the depositary. But however that may be, the proper interpretation of the contract is to be determined by the general rules of construction recognized by the law; and if the parties have improvidently made their contract more onerous than they expected, the difficulty cannot be removed by a violation of those rules.
It is said that the written instrument declared upon is a receipt, and as such is open to explanation. It is true that it is a receipt, but it is also a promise clearly expressed. Brown v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474 . We see no way to avoid the conclusion that the plaintiff’s construction of that promise is correct. The difficulty with the defendants’ case is, that, although their purpose was to take collateral security for a debt, the terms in which they have expressed themselves as to what they are to do with the pledge on the payment of the debt contain a positive and unequivocal promise either to return it, or to pay an equivalent. The fact that one part of this alternative promise has become impossible of fulfilment does not relieve them from the other. Chit, on Con. (11th Am. ed.) 1061. Stevens v. Webb, 7 C. & P. 60. State v. Worthington, 7 Ohio, 171. Exceptions overruled.