Goodrum v. Quarterman

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 22, 2008

No. 06-20980 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

RANDY EDWARD GOODRUM

Petitioner Appellant

v.

NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, Director,

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division

Respondent Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

Before REAVLEY, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:

Randy Edward Goodrum appeals the district court’s summary judgment

denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Goodrum’s petition was based solely on the State’s alleged denial of his Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial. Because we agree with the district court

that the state court’s rejection of Goodrum’s speedy trial claim was not

objectively unreasonable, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On October 27, 2000, Goodrum was charged in Harris County under two

separate indictments for aggravated sexual assault. Another Harris County

indictment against Goodrum for aggravated sexual assault was filed on May 18,

No. 06-20980

2000. Before these indictments were issued, Goodrum had been arrested in

Brazoria County for another charge of aggravated sexual assault. He was tried

on that offense, and, on September 28, 2001, was adjudged guilty, sentenced to

life in prison, and transferred to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

Goodrum received a letter dated November 12, 2001, notifying him that

Harris County had lodged a detainer against him under the indictments. Two

days later, Goodrum sent a letter to the Harris County District Attorney’s office

in which he expressly invoked his right to a speedy trial and requested that he

be bench warranted to Harris County to answer to those charges. He also stated

that the detainers were “detrimental” to his incarceration. Goodrum sent

similar letters to the District Attorney on March 4, 2002, and May 12, 2002. He

received no response.

On January 8, 2003, Goodrum sent to the Harris County District Clerk a

request for information regarding the pending indictments, in particular, the

names of the complainants, the dates of the offenses, probable cause affidavits,

the court number where the cases were pending, and copies of the indictments.

The District Clerk responded with a letter invoking a state law which exempts

governmental bodies from complying with a request for information from, among

other persons, an individual imprisoned in a correctional facility.

On October 19, 2003, Goodrum sent yet another letter, this time addressed

to the District Attorney himself. In that letter, Goodrum referenced his previous

letters and again requested that he be bench warranted to Harris County. He

also mentioned that he was “concerned” about the impact of the delay on his

ability to mount a defense. The District Attorney did not respond.

By March 23, 2004, Goodrum had been bench warranted to Houston, had

appeared in court, and had filed a motion to dismiss the indictments for violation

of his right to speedy trial. The trial court conducted two hearings on Goodrum’s

motion on May 21, 2004, and June 4, 2004. Goodrum and his mother testified

2

No. 06-20980

that Goodrum was worried and concerned about the charges while they were

pending. The evidence presented by Goodrum also reflects that the detainers

rendered him ineligible for “SSI approval” for a job in the prison library,

precluded him from taking vocational courses, and disqualified him from taking

college classes for free. Additionally, Goodum testified that the presence of the

detainers precluded him from being considered for trustee status. He conceded,

however, that even without the detainers his qualification for such status was

subject to the approval of prison officials. The State did not controvert any of

these contentions.

Goodrum asserted that the delay impaired his defense. Goodrum

contended that the Brazoria County conviction became final in 2003 and

therefore became available to impeach him if he were to testify in his own

behalf.1 However, the State stipulated that it would not use that conviction to

impeach Goodrum if he were to testify in his own defense, although it might rely

on it to enhance his sentence.

The trial court ruled that Goodrum had failed sufficiently to establish

prejudice resulting from the delay and denied his motion to dismiss. Goodrum

later entered a plea of nolo contendere to three charges of aggravated assault

with a deadly weapon, conditioned upon his ability to appeal the denial of his

speedy trial claim and in exchange for a sentence of 10 years in prison and the

1

Goodrum also argued that the delay affected the memories of key witnesses, whose

testimony would allegedly have corroborated his assertion that he had dated the alleged

victims and the sex was therefore consensual. After hearing the testimony presented by these

potential witnesses, the trial court rejected this contention. Later, Goodrum pressed this

argument on appeal in state court and in his federal habeas proceedings before the district

court. On the instant appeal, however, Goodrum “voluntarily abandoned” this contention.

That portion of the state court decision is therefore not relevant to our analysis.

3

No. 06-20980

dismissal of a fourth charge. The trial court certified his right to appeal the

ruling on the motion to dismiss.2

Goodrum appealed. The Texas Court of Appeals applied the four-factor

balancing test from Barker v. Wingo3 and affirmed the trial court’s ruling that

the State had not violated Goodrum’s right to a speedy trial.4 Noting that

Goodrum had been indicted in October 2000 and May 2001, but was imprisoned

in and being tried in Brazoria County until September 28, 2001, the court

concluded that “the length of the delay was well beyond” that which triggered

examination of the remaining Barker factors and weighed this factor “heavily

against the State.”5 The court then found the record to be “silent as to the

reasons for the delay,” and declined to presume either intentional delay by the

State or valid reason for the delay. Accordingly, the court weighed the reasons

for the delay “against the State, but not heavily so.”6 Because the court agreed

that Goodrum “persistently demanded his right to a speedy trial in a timely

manner,” it also weighed Goodrum’s assertion of the right in his favor.7

Finally, the court addressed the various forms of prejudice alleged by

Goodrum. Regarding Goodrum’s asserted anxiety and concern over the pending

charges, the court noted recent authority from the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals “stat[ing] that as [Goodrum] was incarcerated most of the time in

2

Because Goodrum’s plea was expressly conditioned on his right to appeal the denial

of his speedy trial claim, he adequately preserved that claim in subsequent proceedings. Cf.

United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing express conditional guilty

pleas under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2)).

3

407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972).

4

Goodrum v. State, No. 08-04-00265-CR, 2005 WL 2592219 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2005,

pet. denied).

5

Id. at *3.

6

Id.

7

Id.

4

No. 06-20980

question, we are mainly concerned with whether or not [his] ability to defend

himself was prejudiced by the delay.”8 In a footnote, the court also acknowledged

Goodrum’s asserted worsened prison conditions due to his loss of eligibility for

certain jobs, trustee status, and free schooling.9 The court distinguished

Goodrum’s circumstances from those in a state court case where the loss of

trustee status and educational opportunities was associated with the defendant’s

loss of good time credit and impliedly rejected these detriments as not probative

of prejudice.10

The final contention the court addressed was the alleged impairment of

Goodrum’s defense. Goodrum had argued that during the relevant period his

conviction in Brazoria County became final and was therefore available to

impeach his testimony. The court, however, focused on Goodrum’s “twelve to

thirteen prior felony convictions,” the last of which was in 1993. Although

Goodrum asserted that these prior convictions were too remote to be admitted

under state rules of evidence, the court disagreed. The court reasoned that

Texas Rule of Evidence 609(a) excepts from the rule against admission of felony

convictions over 10 years old any such conviction “if the witness’s lack of

reformation is shown by evidence of an intervening felony conviction.”11 Thus,

the admissibility of Goodrum’s numerous other prior felonies for impeachment

purposes “greatly lessen[ed] any prejudice” attributable to the Brazoria County

conviction.12 Having rejected all the forms of prejudice alleged by Goodrum, the

court weighed this factor “in favor of the State,” and concluded that the balance

8

Id. at *4.

9

Id. at *4 n.2.

10

Id. at 4 & n.2.

11

Id.

12

Id.

5

No. 06-20980

of factors “weighs against a finding that [Goodrum’s] right to a speedy trial was

impaired.13

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Goodrum’s petition for

review. Goodrum did not file a state habeas petition, but filed a petition for

habeas relief in federal district court.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State and

dismissed Goodrum’s habeas petition. The court’s opinion largely tracked that

of the state appeals court, except for the portion dealing with Goodrum’s

arguments relating to prejudice.14 In that latter part of the opinion, the district

court noted in pertinent part Goodrum’s assertions of “undue anxiety and

concern” caused by the delay that the State did not challenge and which the

court viewed to have been established by Goodrum’s pleadings.15 Regarding the

availability of the Brazoria County conviction for impeachment purposes, the

district court deferred to the state court’s evidentiary ruling regarding the

admissibility of Goodrum’s numerous other prior convictions, explaining it was

bound by that finding.16 The court also noted the State’s stipulation that it

would not use the conviction in Brazoria County to impeach Goodrum’s

testimony if he chose to testify at trial. Thus, Goodrum had not shown “that the

delay resulted in the potential use of otherwise inadmissible criminal convictions

against him for impeachment purposes.”17 Addressing Goodrum’s ineligibility

13

Id. at **4-5.

14

Goodrum v. Quarterman, No. Civ. A. H-06-1329, 2006 WL 3420245, at **6-9 (S.D.

Tex. Nov. 21, 2006).

15

Id. at *8.

16

Id.

17

Id.

6

No. 06-20980

for job assignments, educational programs, and preferential custody status,

together with his uncontroverted anxiety and concern, the court explained:

In short, the record shows that the delay resulted in petitioner’s

experiencing anxiety and concern, and being ineligible to participate

in certain prison programs. The importance of these results is not

without significance; but, in a balance of all four Barker factors, it

cannot be said that petitioner’s constitutional right to a speedy trial

was violated.18

The district court concluded that the state court did not unreasonably reject

Goodrum’s speedy trial claim and granted the State’s motion for summary

judgment.19 It also denied Goodrum’s motion for a certificate of appealability,

but we granted the certificate and authorized Goodrum to file the instant appeal.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment denying

a state petitioner’s request for habeas relief. Salazar v. Dretke.20 We may affirm

a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs

from that relied upon by the district court.21 Our review of the district court’s

legal conclusions is de novo, but we review the court’s factual findings only for

clear error. Busby v. Dretke.22

Entitlement to habeas relief was restricted by Congress in 1996 by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. As will be clear to the reader,

the severity of that statute is demonstrated in this case. Now a federal court

18

Id. at *9.

19

Id.

20

419 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2005).

21

Id.

22

359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004).

7

No. 06-20980

may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court failed in one of two

grounds. First, relief may be granted if the state court’s resolution of a

petitioner’s claim on the merits was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable

application of” clearly-established federal law as declared by the Supreme Court.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is contrary to clearly-established federal law

“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.”

Williams v. Taylor.23 A state court’s application of clearly established federal

law is “unreasonable” within the meaning of AEDPA when it correctly identifies

the governing principle but applies it to the facts of the case in an objectively

unreasonable manner. Wiggins v. Smith.24 An unreasonable application may

also occur if “the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or

unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should

apply.”25 Thus, “[b]efore this court may grant habeas relief under the

unreasonable application clause, the state court’s application of clearly

established federal law must be more than merely incorrect or erroneous, it must

be objectively unreasonable.” Young v. Dretke.26

Second, habeas relief is appropriate if the state court’s decision was “based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” presented

23

529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000).

24

539 U.S. 510, 520, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003).

25

Williams, 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S. Ct. at 1520.

26

356 F.3d 616, 623 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520-21, 123 S. Ct.

at 2535.

8

No. 06-20980

to the state court.27 However, the state court’s factual findings are presumed

correct unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Reed v. Quarterman.28

III. Discussion

Though not addressed by the district court, we first note that Goodrum has

exhausted his speedy trial claim as generally required under AEDPA. A state

prisoner must present his claims to the state court and exhaust state remedies

before seeking federal habeas relief. Martinez v. Johnson.29 The exhaustion

requirement is satisfied “when the substance of the federal habeas claim has

been fairly presented to the highest state court,” either through direct appeal or

state habeas proceedings. Morris v. Dretke.30 Here, Goodrum’s sole claim on

federal habeas is the asserted violation of his right to speedy trial, a claim that

he presented in state court and pursued on direct appeal to the state’s highest

court. Goodrum has therefore exhausted his state law remedies, and we will

therefore review the merits of the speedy trial claim.

Goodrum contends that the district court erred in holding the state court’s

rejection of his speedy trial claim was not objectively unreasonable or contrary

to clearly-established federal law. Specifically, Goodrum argues that the state

court failed to accord due weight to his repeated assertion of his right to speedy

trial throughout the pendency of the indictments, and failed appropriately to

presume prejudice, or, in the alternative, to construe the uncontroverted proof

of his anxiety and concern and loss of certain prison benefits and privileges as

27

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

28

504 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 2007); see § 2254(e)(1).

29

255 F.3d 229, 238 (5th Cir. 2001).

30

413 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).

9

No. 06-20980

an adequate demonstration of prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we agree

with the district court’s conclusion that the state court neither contravened nor

unreasonably applied clearly-established federal law when it denied Goodrum’s

speedy trial claim.

The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and

applies to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S.

CONST. amend. VI; Klopfer v. North Carolina.31 A violation of the speedy trial

right, if found, requires dismissal of the indictment. See Strunk v. United

States.32 In Barker, the Supreme Court prescribed several factors to be

considered when evaluating a speedy trial claim: (1) the length of the delay, (2)

the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to speedy trial,

and (4) prejudice to the defendant.33 None of these factors is either necessary or

sufficient to find a speedy trial violation; “[r]ather, they are related factors and

must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be

relevant.”34 The speedy trial inquiry therefore involves a “difficult and sensitive”

balancing of these factors under the particular circumstances of a given case.35

Because the state appellate court properly identified the Barker test as the

framework for analyzing Goodrum’s speedy trial claim, AEDPA limits our focus

to the objective reasonableness of the result of the state court’s balancing of the

Barker factors under the facts in Goodrum’s case. See Santellan v. Cockrell.36

31

386 U.S. 213, 223-26, 87 S. Ct. 988, 993-95 (1967).

32

412 U.S. 434, 439-40, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 (1973).

33

407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.

34

Id. at 533, 92 S. Ct. 2182.

35

Id. at 530, 533, 92 S. Ct. at 2192, 2193.

36

271 F.3d 190, 193-94 (5th Cir. 2001) (construing the focus under AEDPA to be the

result, not “every jot” of the state court’s reasoning).

10

No. 06-20980

Nonetheless, to facilitate our evaluation of the reasonableness of the state court’s

decision, we will conduct a limited review of the state court’s analysis of each

Barker factor. We keep in mind, however, the fact that the state court’s

preliminary conclusions regarding one or more of the factors, even if contrary to

or objectively unreasonable in light of controlling Supreme Court precedent, are

insufficient to grant habeas relief, so long as we find the ultimate decision

reached by the state court not objectively unreasonable. Cf. Jackson v. Ray.37

A. Length of the delay

The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, consists of a two-part

inquiry. First, the delay must be extensive enough to give rise to a presumption

of prejudice that triggers examination of the remaining Barker factors. See

Doggett v. United States.38 As the Supreme Court has observed, courts generally

view a delay of approximately one year as sufficient to require a full Barker

analysis.39 This is the rule in the Fifth Circuit. United States v. Serna-

Villarreal.40 If this threshold showing is made, the court must examine the

extent to which the delay extends beyond the bare minimum required to trigger

a Barker analysis, because “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced

the accused intensifies over time.”41

37

390 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (similarly reviewing the state court’s

preliminary factors underlying its speedy trial analysis but noting that habeas relief is

appropriate only if its decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent).

38

505 U.S. 647, 651-52, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690-91 (1992); see also Barker, 407 U.S. at

530-31, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.

39

Id. at 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 2691.

40

352 F.3d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 488

(5th Cir. 2002)).

41

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 112 S. Ct. at 2691.

11

No. 06-20980

The parties agree that the 2 1/2 year delay between Goodrum’s conviction

in Brazoria County on September 28, 2001, and his initial appearance in Harris

County on March 23, 2004, both exceeds the threshold required to trigger full

consideration of the Barker factors and weighs in Goodrum’s favor. However,

the State contends that, in concluding that this factor should weigh “heavily

against the State,” the appellate court must have erroneously calculated the

delay as the nearly 4-year period after the first Harris County indictment issued

on October 27, 2000, until his March 2004 initial appearance, including that

period during which Goodrum was being tried in Brazoria County for a separate

offense.

The State’s contention is belied by the opinion of the state appeals court.

Although the court observed that the Harris County indictments were handed

down in October 2000 and May 2001, it emphasized that until September 28,

2001, Goodrum “was incarcerated and being tried in Brazoria County . . . .”42

This statement strongly suggests that the court excluded from its calculation

that initial period during which Goodrum was being prosecuted for the charge

in Brazoria County and based its analysis only on the 2 1/2 years following

Goodrum’s conviction for that offense. Moreover, given that the delay was more

than double the minimum necessary to trigger the Barker analysis, the state

appeals court reasonably weighed this factor heavily in Goodrum’s favor.

B. Reason for the delay

The weight assigned to a state’s reasons for post-accusation delay depends

on the reasons proffered.43 At one extreme, a deliberate delay to disadvantage

42

Goodrum, 2005 WL 2592219, at *3.

43

Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.

12

No. 06-20980

the defense is weighted heavily against the state.44 At the other end of the

spectrum, delays explained by valid reasons or attributable to the conduct of the

defendant weigh in favor of the state. See Cowart v. Hargett.45 Between these

extremes fall unexplained or negligent delays, which weigh against the state,

“but not heavily.”46

Although Goodrum at oral argument characterized the conduct of the

State as “grossly” and not merely negligent, in his briefs he does not challenge

the appeals court’s conclusion that “[t]his factor weighs against the State, but

not heavily so.”47 We agree with the state court’s analysis. The State clearly

knew of Goodrum’s whereabouts during the 2 1/2 years before his initial

appearance in Harris County, as is reflected by the State’s notice to Goodrum

regarding the detainers for the Harris County charges and the numerous letters

Goodrum sent from prison to the District Attorney’s office inquiring about the

indictments. But for this factor to weigh heavily against the State, Goodrum

must have shown that the State delayed the prosecution in order to gain an

“impermissible advantage at trial.”48 Because the State proffered no explanation

to justify the delay, and Goodrum did not demonstrate deliberate conduct by the

State,49 the state court correctly declined to presume the delay was either

44

Id.

45

16 F.3d 642, 647 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing Barker).

46

Id.; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (viewing negligence as a

“more neutral reason . . . [that] should be weighted less heavily” than an intentional delay).

47

Goodrum, 2005 WL 2592219, at *3.

48

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656, 112 S. Ct. at 2693; see also United States v. Frye, 372 F.3d

729, 738 (5th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing between delay to allow for further investigation and

the type of impermissible delay described in Doggett and Barker).

49

Goodrum for the first time in his reply brief challenges the state court’s implied

factual finding that the State did not intentionally delay its prosecution, an argument he failed

to raise before the district court. Generally, arguments not raised in an appellant’s opening

13

No. 06-20980

intentional or justified. As such, the State’s unexplained failure expeditiously

to bring Goodrum to trial on the Harris County charges supports the court’s

finding of official negligence that weighs against the State, albeit not heavily.

C. Assertion of the right

Based on the numerous letters sent by Goodrum to the Harris County

District Attorney’s office in which he vigorously and repeatedly asserted his

right to speedy trial, Goodrum contends that the state appeals court contravened

clearly established Supreme Court precedent by failing to weigh this third

Barker factor “strongly” in his favor. The state appeals court noted that

Goodrum had “persistently demanded his right to a speedy trial in a timely

manner,” viewed this factor to weigh in favor of Goodrum, but did not specifically

assign it heavy or strong weight.50 The district court did not address this issue.

Barker instructs that “[t]he defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial

right . . . is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the

defendant is being deprived of the right.”51 This is because the vigorousness

with which a defendant complains about the delay will often correspond to the

seriousness of the deprivation.52 Moreover, one justification articulated in

Barker for adopting a flexible balancing test is the ability of courts to vary the

weight assigned to a defendant’s invocation of the right depending on its

brief are waived. See United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 352 n.36 (5th Cir. 2007).

Additionally, “[w]e have repeatedly held that a contention not raised by a habeas petitioner

in the district court cannot be considered for the first time on appeal from that court’s denial

of habeas relief.” Johnson v. Puckett, 930 F.2d 445, 448 (5th Cir. 1991).

In any event, we find that Goodrum in the state court proceedings did not show what,

if any, advantage the State gained by waiting to try him under the indictments or that the

State delayed his prosecution to obtain that advantage.

50

See Goodrum, 2005 WL 2592219, at *3.

51

407 U.S. at 531-32, 92 S. Ct. at 2192 (emphasis added).

52

Id.

14

No. 06-20980

frequency and forcefulness.53 Accordingly, we have applied these clearly

articulated principles from Barker and construed vigorous and timely assertions

of the right to speedy trial as weighing strongly or heavily in the defendant’s

favor.54

The evidence presented in the state court proceedings reflects that

Goodrum, within 2 days of receiving notice of the detainers in Harris County on

November 12, 2001, and throughout the next 2 1/2 years, doggedly invoked his

speedy trial right in numerous letters he sent to the District Attorney’s office.

When he was finally bench warranted to Houston and brought to court for his

initial appearance on March 23, 2004, Goodrum immediately moved for

dismissal on speedy trial grounds. Under the Supreme Court’s precedent in

Barker, Goodrum’s persistent invocation of the right must weigh strongly in his

favor and hence, the state court’s failure to accord due weight to this factor is

contrary to clearly-established law.

D. Prejudice

The final prong of the Barker test requires an assessment of prejudice “in

the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed

to protect.”55 These interests include: (1) prevention of oppressive pretrial

incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3)

limiting the possibility of impairment to the defense.56 Stated differently,

53

Id. at 528-29, 92 S. Ct. at 2191.

54

See United States v. Cardona, 302 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Cain

v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 383-84 (6th Cir. 1982) (construing Barker to require that a defendant’s

diligent and persistent assertion of his right to speedy trial “will weigh most heavily against

the government”).

55

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193.

56

Id.

15

No. 06-20980

“unreasonable delay between formal accusation and trial threatens to produce”

these recognized categories of harm.57

Goodrum first suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Doggett

relieves him of the burden of making a particularized showing of prejudice

resulting from the delay. We have construed Doggett to presume prejudice when

the three initial Barker factors weigh heavily in favor of the defendant.58

Goodrum has not been made this showing, however, based on our conclusion

that only two of the three factors—length of delay and invocation of the right to

speedy trial—are weighted heavily in his favor.

Additionally, the 2 1/2 year length of the delay in this case falls well short

of the 6 years attributed to official negligence in Doggett and which warranted

a presumption of prejudice in that case.59 The presumption recognized in

Doggett stemmed from the Court’s reasoning that the likelihood of evidentiary

prejudice, though difficult to prove, increases in tandem with the length of the

delay.60 At least when the delay results from official negligence, Doggett

therefore does not clearly establish that prejudice is presumed except where

length of the delay is exceptional. Indeed, under our precedent, as well as that

of other courts, the Doggett presumption applies only where the delay is at least

5 years.61 Because Goodrum was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice

57

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.

58

Serna-Villarreal, 352 F.3d at 231.

59

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652-53, 658, 112 S. Ct. at 2691, 2694.

60

See id. at 655, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (explaining that "excessive delay presumptively

compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter,

identify"); id. at 657, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 ("[T]he weight we assign to official negligence

compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, our toleration

of such negligence varies inversely with its protractedness.").

61

See Bergfeld, 280 F.3d at 491; see also United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 344, 349,

351 (6th Cir. 1999) (5 1/2 years); United States v. Shell, 974 F.2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir. 1992)

16

No. 06-20980

under Doggett, the state court therefore correctly required Goodrum to make a

particularized showing of how the delay impacted him.

Alternatively, Goodrum identifies four forms of prejudice he allegedly

suffered due to the delay. Each is discussed in turn.

1. Admissibility of Brazoria County conviction

Goodrum contends that his conviction in Brazoria County became final

during the pendency of the indictments and therefore became available to

impeach his testimony at trial. As noted by the district court, the state appeals

court reasoned that whatever prejudice may have resulted from the admissibility

of the recent Brazoria County conviction was substantially mitigated by

Goodrum’s 12 to 13 other prior felony convictions, which, though over 10 years

old, could also be used to impeach Goodrum’s testimony under Rule 609(b) of the

Texas Rules of Evidence.62 Goodrum, characterizing this ruling as an

“unreasonable determination of the facts” unsupported by any evidence

presented by the State, asserts the district court erred when it declined to review

the state court’s conclusion that the prior convictions were not too remote to be

admitted. We disagree. The admissibility of Goodrum’s numerous other

convictions for impeachment purposes involves a question of law, not fact. More

importantly, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-

court determinations on state-law questions” such as the admissibility of

evidence under state procedural rules. Estelle v. McGuire.63 Goodrum neither

asserts nor demonstrates that the evidentiary ruling itself violated a specific

constitutional right or rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, the sole

exceptions on habeas to the non-reviewability of such a ruling. See Johnson v.

(5 years).

62

See Goodrum, 2006 WL 3420245, at *8; Goodrum, 2005 WL 2592219, at *5.

63

502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991).

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No. 06-20980

Puckett.64 The district court did not err in deferring to the ruling of the state

court regarding the admissibility of Goodrum’s other convictions.

The availability of the Brazoria County conviction in this case also

resulted in no actual prejudice to Goodrum. Not only had the State stipulated

that it would not use that conviction to impeach him, but the trial itself never

occurred because Goodrum pleaded nolo contendere to the Harris County

charges. To the extent that Goodrum relies on the State’s initial threat to

enhance Goodrum’s sentence based on the conviction, the records reflect that the

State later agreed to abandon the enhancement paragraphs in exchange for his

plea. The prior conviction was therefore not used as a basis for enhancing

Goodrum’s sentence. In sum, the state court reasonably determined that

Goodrum was not prejudiced by the Brazoria County conviction.

2. Impediment to the ability to investigate

Goodrum additionally argues prejudice to his ability to investigate based

on the District Clerk’s denial of his request for information about the charges.

The Clerk relied on Section 552.028 of the Texas Government Code, which

exempts governmental agencies from complying with requests for information

from, inter alia, a person who is imprisoned in a correctional facility.65 Goodrum

asserts that his inability to obtain “basic information” regarding names of the

complainants, dates of the offenses, dates of the indictments, probable cause

64

176 F.3d 809, 820 (5th Cir. 1999).

65

The statute provides, in pertinent part:

(a) A governmental body is not required to accept or comply with a request for

information from:

(1) an individual who is imprisoned or confined in a correctional

facility . . . .

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.028.

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No. 06-20980

affidavits, the court number, and a copy of the indictments “severely impaired”

his defense by rendering him unable to file unspecified motions or to contact

unnamed witnesses whose memories might otherwise fade. The State contends

Goodrum has waived this contention by failing to raise it before the state

appeals or district courts.

Even assuming that Goodrum preserved this argument, his vague and

conclusory allegations that the denial of information impeded his defense are

insufficient to constitute proof of prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes.66

While “‘faded memory [of witnesses] may result in prejudice, we have held that

in order to prejudice the defense to the extent necessary to constitute a speedy

trial violation, the faded memory must substantially relate to a material fact in

issue.’” Jamerson v. Estelle.67 Goodrum has not identified those witnesses

whose memories he might have refreshed or demonstrated the requisite nexus

between their testimony and a fact material to his defense. In fact, Goodrum

has conceded that he cannot show that the delay “caused his witnesses to be

unable to recall certain facts concerning the case.” Goodrum similarly does not

explain what motions he would have filed if the State had provided the

requested information, let alone what those motions would have accomplished.

We conclude that Goodrum has not shown prejudice to his case resulting from

his inability personally to obtain information from the District Clerk regarding

the pending indictments.

66

40 F.3d 362, 366 (11th Cir. 1994) (rejecting “conclusory allegations” that a delayed

trial caused a witness’s inability to recall certain events and that prejudice resulted from the

unspecified “‘erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony’”).

67

666 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883,

889 (5th Cir. 1978)).

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No. 06-20980

3. Anxiety and concern

According to Goodrum, the state court unreasonably discounted the

relevance of evidence that he was generally worried and concerned about the

pending charges, evidence that was not challenged by the State. The State

responds that Goodrum’s imprisonment for a life term on a separate charge

undercuts his assertions of anxiety and concern stemming from the later

indictments.

The state appeals court acknowledged Goodrum’s asserted anxiety or

depression but, citing a case from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,

construed Goodrum’s status as an individual incarcerated on another offense to

shift the focus primarily to whether the delay affected his defense.68 In doing so,

the court impliedly viewed Goodrum’s anxiety and concern as irrelevant to its

prejudice analysis. Without directly addressing this aspect of the state court’s

opinion, the district court impliedly viewed Goodrum’s uncontroverted anxiety

or concern as some prejudice but ultimately deemed it inadequate to sustain his

speedy trial claim.69

The “most serious” form of prejudice occurs when the delay undermines a

defendant’s ability adequately to prepare his case.70 But we have already noted

Barker’s recognition of anxiety and concern of the accused as a type of cognizable

harm that may result from a delayed trial, and other cases stress its

independence from whatever impact the delay may or may not have on the

defense.71 It is equally established that one who is already in prison may

68

Goodrum, 2005 WL 2592219, at *4.

69

Goodrum, 2006 WL 3420245, at *9.

70

See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.

71

See, e.g., Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 27-28, 94 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1973) (per curiam)

(emphasizing that prejudice in the speedy trial context is “not confined to the possible prejudice

to [the] defense” but includes, among other things, the defendant's anxiety); United States v.

20

No. 06-20980

nonetheless suffer the same degree of “anxiety and concern accompanying public

accusation” as someone at large. Smith v. Hooey.72 Accordingly, the state court’s

rejection of Goodrum’s anxiety and concern as probative of prejudice was

unreasonable.

Nonetheless, we think Goodrum’s generalized expressions of anxiety and

concern amount to little more than a nominal showing of prejudice. Hooey

described the “most corrosive” effect a detainer may have on an incarcerated

individual as the “strain of having to serve a sentence with the uncertain

prospect of being taken into the custody of another [entity] at the conclusion

[that] interferes with the prisoner’s ability to take maximum advantage of his

institutional opportunities.”73 Goodrum at oral argument attempted to associate

the distress he felt with the added burden of having to defend himself against

new charges when he was in the process of appealing the Brazoria County

conviction. We find nothing in the record indicating anxiety and concern of this

nature. There is likewise no evidence that Goodrum’s anxiety interfered with

his participation in rehabilitative activities or undermined his efforts toward

self-improvement. We also take into account the fact that Goodrum was already

serving a life sentence, itself a grim prospect, which renders it unlikely that the

detainers caused him severe anxiety or concern.74

In short, Goodrum has not demonstrated that the anxiety he felt was of

such an extreme degree that it differed in any way from that which would

Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S. Ct. 455, 463 (1971) (explaining that “the major evils protected

against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an

accused’s defense” and mentioning anxiety of the accused as one of potential threats of a

delayed trial).

72

393 U.S. 374, 379, 89 S. Ct. 575, 577 (1969).

73

Id., 89 S. Ct. at 578 (internal quotation marks omitted).

74

Cf. Jamerson, 666 F.2d at 244 (“[I]n view of the pending death sentence, an

outstanding armed robbery indictment could occasion little additional anxiety or concern.”).

21

No. 06-20980

naturally be expected to accompany a defendant’s awareness of pending charges.

Given this minimal showing, the state court did not unreasonably view

Goodrum’s generalized anxiety and concern as insufficient to sustain his speedy

trial claim.

4. Worsened conditions of confinement

Goodrum asserts that the conditions of his confinement were worsened

because the detainers affected his classification and disqualified him from

certain prison jobs and privileges. During the state court proceedings, Goodrum

presented evidence that the detainers rendered him ineligible to be considered

for outside trustee status or for a position in the prison library, and disqualified

him entirely from taking vocational classes and from taking college classes for

free. Goodrum argues that the state court unreasonably applied principles

enunciated in Hooey when it concluded that the detainers did not affect the

length of his sentence and, hence, were insufficient to establish prejudice. The

State views the language in Hooey relied upon by Goodrum as dicta. In the

alternative, the State contends that the impact of Goodrum’s lost privileges was

de minimis and therefore inadequate to support a speedy trial claim.

In Hooey, the Supreme Court held that a state was not exempted from the

speedy trial requirement solely on the grounds that to bring a defendant to trial

expeditiously would require it to seek the defendant’s transfer from a federal

prison where he was serving a lawfully-imposed sentence.75 Central to the

Court’s reasoning was its recognition of ways in which a delayed trial could

prejudice the interests of an individual already lawfully-incarcerated, much as

it would a person jailed without bail on a yet-untried charge.76 The Court

75

393 U.S. at 377, 89 S. Ct. at 576-77.

76

See id. at 377-80, 89 S. Ct. at 576-78.

22

No. 06-20980

discussed as one type of potential prejudice the possibility of undue and

oppressive incarceration prior to trial:

First, the possibility that the defendant already in prison might

receive a sentence at least partially concurrent with the one he is

serving may be forever lost if trial of the pending charge is

postponed. Secondly, under procedures now widely practiced, the

duration of his present imprisonment may be increased, and the

conditions under which he must serve his sentence greatly

worsened, by the pendency of another criminal charge outstanding

against him.77

Thus, Hooey, in critical part, identified negative effects on the conditions of

incarceration as a form of prejudice the speedy trial right was designed to

protect. The Court’s decision to remand the case to the Texas Supreme Court for

further development78 does not undercut in any way its emphasis on this and

other identified interests as a basis for its holding that the State had a duty to

provide a speedy trial. Accordingly, we reject the State’s characterization of this

language as mere dicta.

The state court deemed Goodrum’s asserted loss of eligibility for certain

jobs, trustee status, and educational opportunities to be insufficient to constitute

prejudice stemming from worsened prison conditions.79 Its reasoning

distinguished Goodrum’s disqualification from these prison programs from a

prior state court decision in which “the loss of trustee status and schooling

opportunities was directly linked to loss of good time credit.”80 The court thus

impliedly required a demonstrated impact on the length of Goodrum’s sentence

before prejudice would be found. This analysis is incorrect. Hooey acknowledges

77

Id. at 378, 89 S. Ct. at 577 (footnote omitted).

78

Id. at 383, 89 S. Ct. at 579-80.

79

Goodrum, 2005 WL 2592219, at *4 n.2.

80

Id.

23

No. 06-20980

that unduly oppressive pretrial incarceration may occur when a defendant’s

sentence is lengthened but does not limit cognizable prejudice to that which

increases the length of incarceration. Indeed, Supreme Court cases decided after

Hooey explain that delays may prejudice a defendant by adversely affecting his

prospect for rehabilitation, which facially has no bearing on the duration of his

sentence.81

The district court, like the state court, credited Goodrum’s assertions that

the detainers rendered him ineligible to participate in certain prison programs,

noting that the State did not dispute these allegations at the state court

hearing.82 Based on our review of the state court record, however, the evidence

presented by Goodrum did not establish that he was actually deprived of some

of the asserted privileges because of the detainers. For example, Goodrum

admitted that trustee status is subject to approval by prison officials. The

detainers disqualified Goodrum from being considered for trustee status, but

Goodrum did not show that he would have been qualified for or would have

attained that status but-for the detainers. This is also true with regard to the

position Goodrum sought in the prison library. According to an official response

to Goodrum’s request, the presence of the detainer rendered him ineligible for

“SSI approval” for the position. Goodrum made no further showing that he

would have received SSI approval for the job if the detainers had not

automatically disqualified him from consideration. Goodrum’s loss of eligibility

for being considered for these privileges does not equate to loss of the privileges

themselves. The alleged impact of the detainers on his ability to attain trustee

status and library job is clearly too attenuated to establish a causal link between

the detainers and the loss of these privileges.

81

See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439, 93 S. Ct. 2260, 2263 (1973); see

also Moore, 414 U.S. at 27, 94 S. Ct. at 190.

82

Goodrum, 2006 WL 3420245, at *9.

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No. 06-20980

The record evidence does reflect that Goodrum was denied access to

vocational classes and was unable to take college classes for free because of the

detainers. But the concern expressed in Hooey regarding the potentially

oppressive effect of detainers on incarcerated individuals related to “greatly

worsened” prison conditions.83 Loss of educational opportunities colorably falls

under the broad heading of worsened prison conditions, but the impact of this

loss on the conditions of Goodrum’s confinement, whether viewed alone or

aggregated with Goodrum’s disqualification for trustee status and a library job,

was facially insubstantial. Indeed, with respect to defendants not similarly

incarcerated on a separate offense, the articulated interests protected by the

speedy trial right involve serious and potentially long-lasting impacts on an

individual’s life such as deprivations of liberty, significant financial losses, loss

of employment, severing of associations, and disruptions to family life.84

Goodrum does not assert, and we do not find, that the magnitude of the impact

of the detainers approximates the severity of these recognized harms. While we

agree with Goodrum that the state court’s outright rejection of his loss of prison

privileges was unreasonable, we conclude that, even assuming that Goodrum’s

failure to obtain trustee status and the library job may be attributed to the

detainers, those losses, combined with the deprivation of vocational classes and

free college courses, constitute only a minimal showing of prejudice.

5. Balancing

83

393 U.S. at 378, 89 S. Ct. at 577.

84

See Moore, 414 U.S. at 27, 94 S. Ct. at 190 (citing interference with liberty,

disruption of employment, financial loss, and curtailment of associations as forms of prejudice

apart from harm to a defendant’s case (quoting Marion, 404 U.S. at 320, 92 S. Ct. at 463));

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532-33, 92 S. Ct. at 2193 (describing detrimental impacts such as loss of

a job and disruption to family life).

25

No. 06-20980

We now come to the determinative question: whether the state court

unreasonably concluded that the balance of all four Barker factors in this case

does not establish a violation of the speedy trial right. We reiterate that our

disagreement with some of the state court’s preliminary conclusions does not

provide grounds for reversal so long as we find the ultimate decision to be

objectively reasonable.85

Goodrum contends that the unreasonableness of the state court’s

conclusion is apparent because all four factors weigh in his favor, in varying

degrees, and none favor the State. Reviewing our preliminary findings, we have

agreed with the state court’s threshold conclusions that the length of delay

strongly favors Goodrum, and the State’s lack of diligence favors him, though not

heavily. We additionally construed Supreme Court precedent to mandate that

Goodrum’s repeated assertion of the right be weighed heavily in his favor.

Significantly, however, we concluded that Goodrum is not entitled to a

presumption of prejudice under Doggett and therefore must prove that he

suffered prejudice due to the delay in order to sustain his claim.

Regarding the last Barker factor, we recognize that Goodrum has shown

some prejudice in the form of lost prison privileges, though we emphasize how

minimal that showing was. Because AEDPA limits our review to the

reasonableness rather than the correctness of the state court’s decision, we need

not and do not decide today the result we would reach if this case had come

before us on direct appeal, and in particular, whether such a modest showing of

prejudice would suffice when balanced with the other Barker factors. Instead,

we conclude that it would not be unreasonable to view the insubstantial and

limited prejudice proven by Goodrum, combined with the other relevant factors

as we have found them, not to tip the balance enough in Goodrum’s favor so as

85

See Santellan, 271 F.3d at 193-94.

26

No. 06-20980

to establish a violation of the speedy trial right. Accordingly, the state court’s

denial of Goodrum’s speedy trial claim was not objectively unreasonable, and the

district court’s dismissal of Goodrum’s habeas petition on summary judgment

was proper.

AFFIRMED.

27