Williams v. Zachary

Case: 21-60753 Document: 00516353343 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/10/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

June 10, 2022

No. 21-60753 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Kameko R. Williams, as the administratrix of the Estate of James

Lee Brownlee, and as natural daughter and next friend of James Lee

Brownlee, Deceased, and on behalf of all of the Heirs-at-

Law and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of James Lee

Brownlee, Deceased; The Estate of James Lee Brownlee,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Patrolman Adam Zachary, in his individual capacity; Deputy

Cody Shankle, in his individual capacity; Deputy Diana

Westmoreland, in her individual capacity; Sheriff James D.

Meyers, in his official capacity; Other Unknown John and Jane

Does 1-10; Chickasaw County, Mississippi; Chickasaw

County, Mississippi Sheriff’s Department,

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:18-cv-128

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Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Police arrested James Brownlee on the evening of July 4, 2016, and

booked him into the Chickasaw County, Mississippi jail that night. Brownlee,

who had no known preexisting conditions, went into cardiac arrest and died

early the next morning. Brownlee’s daughter sued law enforcement officers

and the county. The district court granted summary judgment, and we affirm.

I.

A.

For summary-judgment purposes, we view the facts in the light most

favorable to the non-movant. E.g., Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th

Cir. 2010). Here, that is Kameko Williams—Brownlee’s daughter—who

brings this lawsuit on Brownlee’s behalf.

We summarize (1) events starting with Brownlee’s first encounter

with police and ending when Chickasaw County jailors took custody of him.

These facts are primarily relevant to Mississippi Highway Patrol Trooper

Adam Zachary. Then we summarize (2) events starting with the jailors’

custody and ending with Brownlee’s death. These facts are primarily relevant

to Jailor Cody Shankle.

1.

On July 4, 2016, Trooper Zachary and Trooper Kindle Jones were

manning a traffic checkpoint. They stopped James Brownlee at that

checkpoint. Mrs. Brownlee, Brownlee’s wife, was driving. But the officers

suspected that Brownlee had been driving drunk, and that the pair had

stopped the car about 100 yards shy of the checkpoint in order to switch

*

Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

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drivers. After some discussion not relevant here, Zachary arrested Brownlee

on various misdemeanor charges.

Shortly after the stop, Mrs. Brownlee saw her husband “leaning over”

in a way that made her think “he was sick.” (But there is no affirmative

indication that Zachary saw this.) Brownlee was very intoxicated at the time,

nearly double the legal limit for driving.

Before driving Brownlee to the jail, Zachary stopped along the side of

the road, rolled down his window, and talked with Jones. Brownlee

repeatedly complained of back pain and said he needed to stand up and

stretch. Brownlee said, “my back is killing me.” Zachary and Jones both

heard this, and Jones opened up the door to let Brownlee get out and stretch.

Brownlee also said the handcuffs were hurting him, so Zachary took them off

and “swapped them to the front.”

On the way to the jail, Brownlee said, “Man, I don’t know if I am going

to make it to the jail. I just want to stand up.” So Zachary turned on his patrol

car’s blue lights and sped up in order to get to the jail faster. Zachary did not

stop at the hospital, and Brownlee did not ask him to do so. Zachary’s car had

a recording system that turns on by default when the blue lights are on, but it

was switched off.

Upon arrival, Zachary transferred Brownlee into the custody of jail

sheriffs. There is nothing in the record establishing that Zachary told the jail

sheriffs about Brownlee’s back pain. Before Zachary left, Brownlee told him

he wanted to see a doctor. Zachary responded that Brownlee had a right to

one phone call “for legal or medical assistance.” A phone was available, but

Brownlee did not call a doctor. Williams does not contend that Zachary had

any reason to believe Brownlee had a pre-existing medical condition.

The record includes various video recordings, including a recording

of the room where Brownlee was held during the booking process. Williams’s

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brief claims the video footage of Brownlee in the booking room shows that

Brownlee was in significant pain. Zachary and Shankle say Brownlee’s

extreme intoxication, along with his upset stomach, explain the fact that

Brownlee seemed unable to get comfortable in the booking room. For

purposes of this appeal, we assume the video establishes that Brownlee was

in pain. We also assume that both Zachary and Shankle saw Brownlee’s

indicators of pain.

2.

The district court found the following five facts, none of which

Williams now contests, in its summary-judgment order. First, Shankle

booked Brownlee into the jail and put him in a segregated cell specifically for

intoxicated inmates. Second, neither Zachary, nor Brownlee himself, nor

anybody else told Shankle that Brownlee had any pre-existing medical

condition. Third, Brownlee filled out an intake form and did not indicate any

preexisting medical condition—and he specifically indicated on the form that

he did not have a heart condition. Fourth, Brownlee said his stomach hurt

during the booking process, and Shankle gave him permission to use the

restroom. And fifth, Brownlee made no further complaints of stomach pain

after returning from the restroom.

Once Brownlee was booked and in his cell, Shankle and Deputy Diana

Westmoreland (“Westmoreland”) checked on him intermittently—an

average of once every half-hour or so. Williams does not contest this, but she

says Shankle and Westmoreland checked on Brownlee less thoroughly than

they should have. For instance, she points to deposition testimony that

Westmoreland “could have done better,” and that she looked into

Brownlee’s cell without stopping outside the cell. We assume Williams is right

about this. We also assume, as Williams contends, that Shankle signed off as

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having checked on Brownlee in some instances when Westmoreland was in

fact the one doing the checking.

In the morning, Shankle went to Brownlee’s cell to bring him his

breakfast. Brownlee did not respond, so Shankle eventually entered.

Brownlee was unresponsive. Shankle called for help, and several officers and

medical personnel responded. They performed CPR, but it did not work.

Brownlee was pronounced dead at 6:28 a.m. The cause of death was listed as

hypertension and arthroscopic vascular disease. Williams does not now

contend that this cause of death is inaccurate.

B.

Williams brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She sued Zachary,

Shankle, and Westmoreland 1 in their individual capacities, arguing the

officers violated Brownlee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate

medical care as a pretrial detainee.

She also brought a claim against Chickasaw County, Mississippi and

Sheriff Myers (in his official capacity). We refer to the County and Myers

collectively as “Chickasaw” or the “County.” Williams argued Chickasaw

was liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,

436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the ground that the County had violated Brownlee’s

constitutional rights by failing to train its officers.

1

Williams purports to bring a claim against Westmoreland in her individual

capacity. But the district court dismissed this claim on the ground that Westmoreland never

received adequate process. Williams in no way contests that holding. Thus, we hold

Williams forfeited the issue by failing to brief it, and we affirm the dismissal as to

Westmoreland on that ground. See Ctr. for Bio. Diversity v. EPA, 937 F.3d 533, 542 (5th Cir.

2019) (“Petitioners forfeited [an] argument by failing to include it in their opening brief.”).

We discuss Westmoreland herein only to the extent her actions are relevant to the other

defendants.

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After some discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The court held Zachary and

Shankle were entitled to qualified immunity because, among other things,

they had not violated a clearly established constitutional right. And the court

held Williams had failed to show Chickasaw was liable under Monell. So the

court granted summary judgment in favor of Zachary, Shankle, and

Chickasaw.

Williams timely appealed. We have jurisdiction to review the district

court’s final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. E.g., Zurich Am. Ins.

Co. v. Arch Ins. Co., 20 F.4th 250, 254 (5th Cir. 2021). Generally, as

mentioned above, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-

movant (here, Williams). Brown, 623 F.3d at 253. And generally, summary-

judgment movants (here, the defendants) bear the burden of showing “that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

We (A) hold that Zachary and Shankle are entitled to qualified

immunity. Then we (B) affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Chickasaw.

A.

We begin by outlining (1) the rules governing qualified immunity.

Then we hold (2) Williams’s argument fails (as to both officers) because her

brief frames the constitutional issue at an impermissibly high level of

generality. Next, we hold (3) Williams’s argument fails (as to both officers)

because, even if she had framed the issue with the requisite specificity, she

does not point to any precedents that clearly establish the right the officers

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are supposed to have violated. And finally, we hold (4) to the extent there is

clearly established law in this case, it cuts against Williams rather than in her

favor—again, as to both officers.

1.

Because the officers have asserted qualified immunity in good faith,

Williams bears the burden of showing a genuine dispute of material fact on

that issue. See Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 328–29 (5th Cir. 2020). More

specifically, Williams must first show there is a genuine dispute of material

fact concerning “whether the officer[s] violated a constitutional right.”

Morrow v. Meachum, 917 F.3d 870, 874 (5th Cir. 2019); Joseph, 981 F.3d at

329. Second, she must show there is a genuine dispute of material fact

concerning “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of

the alleged misconduct.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874 (quotation omitted);

Joseph, 981 F.3d at 329. “We can decide one question or both.” Morrow, 917

F.3d at 874.

In this case, we need decide only the second question—whether the

officers violated clearly established law. “A Government official’s conduct

violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct,

the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v.

Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quotation omitted). Importantly for

present purposes, “we must frame the constitutional question with

specificity and granularity.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874–75. It is almost never

enough to point to “general rules set forth in” existing precedents: General

rules “do not by themselves create clearly established law outside an obvious

case.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (per curiam) (quotation

omitted); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (“We do not require a case directly

on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

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question beyond debate.” (emphasis added)). For purposes of this appeal,

“[w]e assume without deciding that our precedent,” as opposed to Supreme

Court precedent, “could, in an appropriate case, clearly establish the law.”

Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 677 (5th Cir. 2019).

2.

Williams argues that Zachary violated one of Brownlee’s clearly

established constitutional rights. Williams points to the Fourteenth

Amendment, which guarantees that pretrial detainees will not “have their

serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference on the part of . . .

confining officials.” Thompson v. Upshur Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir.

2001) (using this formulation in a rule statement). “To establish a

constitutional violation [on this theory], a plaintiff must show that the

defendant: (1) was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; (2) subjectively drew the

inference that the risk existed; and (3) disregarded the risk.” Cleveland, 938

F.3d at 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted).

Williams’s brief first states the no-deliberate-indifference rule, citing

Thompson. Then it applies that general rule to the facts of this case. It

concludes that Zachary and Shankle violated Brownlee’s clearly established

right to adequate pretrial care by showing deliberate indifference to his

medical needs.

That is not nearly specific enough. To the extent (if any) cases like

Thompson clearly establish law, they do not do so merely by stating the general

no-deliberate-indifference rule. They do so by applying the rule to a particular

set of facts. See Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2020) (running

down the facts in Thompson and explaining Thompson had clearly established

law with respect to factually similar scenarios—not in virtue of its mere rule

statement); see also infra, Part II.A.3 (discussing these facts in more detail).

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“The dispositive question in this step of the qualified-immunity analysis is

whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. Cases

that are too factually distinct to speak clearly to the specific circumstances

here are not enough to deny qualified immunity.” Cleveland, 938 F.3d at 677

(quotations omitted). It is simply not enough to rely on general rule

statements, as most of Williams’s briefing does. We therefore reject

Williams’s impermissibly high-level framing of the right at issue. See Morrow,

917 F.3d at 875 (“The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly told courts not to

define clearly established law at [a] high level of generality.’” (quoting al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742) (alteration omitted)).

3.

Even if Williams had framed the right with adequate specificity, she

has not shown that either Zachary or Shankle “violated clearly established

law.” Morrow, 917 F.3d at 874. That is because Williams points to no

“existing precedent” that “place[s] the . . . constitutional question[s]” in

this case “beyond debate.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

Consider the cases Williams does cite. One is Nerren v. Livingston

Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 1996), a case where we found officers had

violated a detainee’s clearly established constitutional rights. See id. at 473.

The detainee’s “face and chest were marred with abrasions, he was in

[obvious] pain, and he informed the Arresting Officers that he needed

medical attention” for his injuries. Id. The detainee’s need for care was

obvious because the officers knew he “had recently been involved in a

multiple vehicle . . . accident.” Id. But the officers flat-out “denied [the

detainee’s] request for the express reason that he had fled the scene of the

accident without regard for the plight of the other victims.” Id. We affirmed

the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. Id. at 474.

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Nerren does not place it “beyond debate” that Zachary violated

Brownlee’s constitutional rights. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. It is undisputed

that Brownlee complained only of wrist pain, back pain, and stomach

discomfort—and only intermittently at that. And Zachary, unlike the officers

in Nerren, was not on notice that Brownlee had recently undergone

significant trauma. (This is true even on the assumption that the booking-

room video demonstrates Brownlee was in significant pain and not just

discomfort.) Further, rather than denying Brownlee care, Zachary explicitly

told Brownlee he could use a readily accessible phone to call a doctor if he

needed one.

Likewise with Shankle. Williams does not contend that Brownlee

asked Shankle for medical care even once. That alone puts Shankle outside

Nerren’s domain. Moreover, the only complaint Brownlee voiced to Shankle

was that his stomach hurt, and the only thing he requested was to use the

restroom. Shankle let him do so, then he went about business as usual—

including checking on Brownlee at regular intervals. To describe those

circumstances is to explain why Nerren has nothing to do with them.

Williams also cites Thompson and Dyer. Those cases have three key

characteristics in common with each other—none of which appear in this

case. First, in both Thompson and Dyer, the detainee was suffering from some

form of psychosis. See Thompson, 245 F.3d at 452–54 (alcohol-related delirium

tremens); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 377–78 (LSD). Second, the psychosis brought on

seizures in each case, which in turn caused the detainee to thrash around and

inflict himself with serious and obvious head wounds. See Thompson, 245 F.3d

at 454 (Thompson had begun “to collide with objects in his cell, sometimes

falling and striking his head against the window, floor or concrete bench.”);

Dyer, 964 F.3d at 378–789 (The detainee had “thrashed violently . . . and

slammed his head . . . against the interior of [a patrol] car” a total of more

than 40 times.). Third, the relevant officers had first-hand knowledge of

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these traumatic injuries and nevertheless did little or nothing to help—and

the detainees eventually died as a result. See Thompson, 245 F.3d at 454 (jailor

provided some care but, at the end of her shift, specifically instructed her

colleagues not to seek help without contacting her first and to contact her

only if the detainee was “dying”); Dyer, 964 F.3d at 384–85 (despite

witnessing the eventually fatal injuries as they occurred, transporting officers

gave jailors the impression that all was well by “inform[ing] the jail sergeant

only that Graham had been medically cleared at the scene”). Again, as the

Dyer court itself explained, “Thompson define[d] clearly established law in

sufficient detail to have notified the Officers [in Dyer] that their actions were

unconstitutional” precisely because the cases shared these factual similarities.

964 F.3d at 384.

This case has none of the three characteristics that—as the Dyer court

recognized—were central to Thompson’s holding. Brownlee (i) wasn’t

suffering from psychosis. He (ii) didn’t have seizures, head injuries, or

traumatic injuries of any sort. And (iii) because he didn’t suffer traumatic

injuries, the officers necessarily didn’t witness him undergoing such injuries.

Those three dissimilarities mean that Thompson, just like Nerren,

doesn’t put it “beyond debate” that Zachary violated Brownlee’s

constitutional rights. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741; see also Dyer, 964 F.3d at 384

(properly framing Thompson in very particularized terms). Put simply:

Because there were no psychosis-related, self-inflicted injuries to ignore,

Zachary can’t have ignored them. That means Zachary can’t have violated

any law Thompson clearly established. Doubly so given that, even on

Williams’s own account, Zachary had no reason to believe Brownlee was at

serious risk of a cardiac event. See Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 239

F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (a fortiori case holding that “the failure to

alleviate a significant risk that the official should have perceived, but did not[,]

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is insufficient to show deliberate indifference.” (quotation omitted)

(emphasis added)).

Exactly the same reasoning applies to Shankle. His actions and

omissions have nothing to do with psychosis, seizures, head injuries, acute

trauma, or anything else that was in play in Thompson. That is the end of the

inquiry.

4.

“To the extent we can identify clearly established law” in this case, it

supports Zachary and Shankle rather than Williams. Morrow, 917 F.3d at 877.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), is arguably the most on-point case.

There, a prisoner complained of back pain after a heavy object fell on him.

See id. at 99, 107. Prison doctors “diagnosed his injury as a lower back strain

and treated it with bed rest, muscle relaxants and pain relievers.” Id. at 107.

When his symptoms worsened, they also treated him for high blood pressure.

See id. at 99–100. But the prisoner continued to get worse, and the doctors

eventually discovered that he had “irregular cardiac rhythm.” Id. at 101. The

prisoner sued a prison doctor. The Court held the doctor had not violated the

prisoner’s rights—even if the doctor had misunderstood the import of the

prisoner’s symptoms, and even if the doctor had accordingly mistreated the

prisoner.

Estelle is not directly on point. But its facts are arguably closer to this

case than are any of Williams’s cited cases. There, as here, a detainee

complained of severe back pain. There, as here, the relevant state employees

treated the detainee as if he had a back injury. And there, as here, it turns out

that there was something seriously wrong with the detainee’s heart—not just

his back. As far as it goes, then, Estelle seriously undercuts Williams’s

argument. See id. at 107–08 (holding there was no constitutional violation);

see also Batiste v. Theriot, 458 F. App’x 351, 355–57 (5th Cir. 2012) (per

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curiam) (granting qualified immunity to officers who failed to perceive that a

detainee, whom they had just tased, was undergoing a drug-induced and

ultimately fatal medical emergency).

B.

Williams also urges us to vacate the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Chickasaw. Williams argues Chickasaw failed to train its jailors

adequately, and that this failure amounted to a violation of Brownlee’s

constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court says failure to train can give rise to municipal

liability under Monell. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). But

because Monell claims focus on customs and policies, failure-to-train theories

are an awkward fit for the doctrine. The Supreme Court recognized this in

Canton—and its solution was to make it very difficult to show liability on a

failure-to-train theory. Id. (acknowledging, “[i]t may seem contrary to

common sense to assert that a municipality will actually have a policy of not

taking reasonable steps to train its employees” but going on to provide a

narrow route toward liability). The doctrinal bottom line: “Only where a

municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a

‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of its inhabitants can such a

shortcoming be properly thought of as a city ‘policy or custom’ that is

actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 389; see also id. at 391 (“To adopt lesser

standards of fault and causation would open municipalities to unprecedented

liability under § 1983.”).

In this case, the district court correctly explained Williams did not

clear that high bar. The district court held that “[n]othing in the record

indicates a systemic failure to provide officers with training related to inmate

medical assessment, and certainly not to the level required to invoke the

[Canton] exception to Monell.” We agree. After reviewing the record and the

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briefing, we see no reversible error in the district court’s decision to grant

summary judgment to Chickasaw.

AFFIRMED.

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