Opinion

Stephen May v. David Shinn

Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Jun 10, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Habeas
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.7%

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHEN EDWARD MAY, Nos. 17-15603

Petitioner-Appellee/ 17-15704

Cross-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v. 2:14-cv-00409-

NVW

DAVID SHINN, Director; MARK

BRNOVICH, Attorney General,

Respondents-Appellants/ ORDER

Cross-Appellees.

Filed June 10, 2022

Before: Sandra S. Ikuta and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit

Judges, and Frederic Block, * District Judge.

Order;

Concurrence by Judge Block

*

The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge

for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

2 MAY V. SHINN

SUMMARY **

Habeas Corpus / Mandates

Denying Stephen Edward May’s motion to recall a

mandate, the panel wrote (1) motions that assert a judgment

is void because of a jurisdictional defect generally must

show that the court lacked even an arguable basis for

jurisdiction, (2) May has not met that standard in arguing

that the statutory “in-custody” requirement was satisfied,

and (3) the additional details provided in the motion and

accompanying exhibits do not demonstrate this Court’s

holding on mootness lacked an arguable basis.

Constrained by his oath of office to concur in his

colleagues’ decision rejecting May’s last effort to escape

lifetime incarceration, District Judge Block wrote separately

to reinforce Judge Friedland’s conclusion that “this case, an

in particular May’s sentence, reflects poorly on our legal

system,” May v. Shinn, 954 F.3d 1194, 1209 (9th Cir. 2020),

cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 1740 (2021), and that justice compels

that May’s sentence be commuted by the State of Arizona.

COUNSEL

Robert A. Walsh (argued), Assistant Attorney General,

Criminal Appeals Section; Mark Brnovich, Attorney

General; Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, Arizona;

for Respondents-Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

MAY V. SHINN 3

Erica T. Dubno (argued), Fahringer & Dubno Herald Price

Fahringer PLLC, New York, New York; Robert J.

McWhirter, Law Offices of Robert J. McWhirter, Phoenix,

Arizona; Michael D. Kimerer, Kimerer & Derrick P.C.,

Phoenix, Arizona; for Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Mikel Patrick Steinfeld, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amicus

Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice.

J. Thomas Sullivan, Little Rock, Arkansas, for Amicus

Curiae National Association for Rational Sex Offense Laws.

ORDER

May’s motion to recall the mandate (Dkt. No. 135) is

DENIED. “[M]otions that assert a judgment is void because

of a jurisdictional defect generally” must show that “the

court that rendered judgment lacked even an ‘arguable basis’

for jurisdiction.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.

Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271 (2010) (citations omitted). May

has not met that standard in arguing that the statutory “in-

custody” requirement was unsatisfied. Maleng v. Cook, 490

U.S. 488, 490–91 (1989) (per curiam); Carafas v. LaVallee,

391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). Nor do the additional details

provided in the motion and accompanying exhibits

demonstrate that this Court’s holding on mootness lacked an

arguable basis. Kernan v. Cuero, 138 S. Ct. 4, 7 (2017) (per

curiam).

4 MAY V. SHINN

BLOCK, Senior District Judge, concurring:

This is another failed attempt by the defendant Stephen

May to avoid spending the rest of his life in prison. Although

I am constrained by my oath of office to concur in my

colleagues’ decision rejecting May’s latest effort to escape

lifetime incarceration, I write separately to reinforce Judge

Friedland’s conclusion that “this case, and in particular

May’s sentence, reflects poorly on our legal system,” May v.

Shinn, 954 F.3d 1194, 1209 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied

141 S.Ct. 1740 (2021), and that justice compels that May’s

sentence be commuted by the State of Arizona.

I

As shown by the past decisions of this panel, this is a

bizarre case. May stands convicted by an Arizona jury of

five of eight counts of child molestation of three children

between the ages of six and eight. He was acquitted on two

counts with respect to a nine-year-old child. See May v.

Ryan, CIV 14-0409-PHX-NVW (MHB), 2015 WL

13188352, at *13 (D. Ariz. Sept. 15, 2015). 1

The convictions occurred after the trial judge had

declared a mistrial when the jury had announced that it could

not reach a verdict. Although the judge had discharged the

jury, the judge allowed the jury to recommence its

deliberations after the bailiff—as the lawyers were preparing

to leave the courtroom—had advised the judge that the jurors

wished to continue deliberating, and defense counsel

consented. May’s conviction was rendered following a

weekend break after several more hours of deliberations. At

1

For reasons unrelated to the merits, the final count was dismissed

at the behest of the victim’s parents. Id. at *14.

MAY V. SHINN 5

the age of 37, May was sentenced to 75 years of

incarceration without parole. Unless he lives to be 112, he

will die in jail.

May had served ten years of his term of imprisonment as

the case wended its way through the state and federal judicial

systems before the district court granted his habeas petition

and released him from incarceration. See May v. Ryan,

245 F. Supp. 3d 1145 (D. Ariz. 2017). In a lengthy opinion

Judge Wake ruled that May’s trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668 (1984), because he did not object to the

constitutionality of the Arizona law placing the burden of

proving lack of intent on the defendant. May, 245 F. Supp.

3d at 1166.

On appeal, we unanimously disagreed, explaining:

Given the long-standing status of the law in

Arizona that the State is not required to prove

sexual intent to successfully prosecute a

defendant for child molestation, which

provided the background for the “prevailing

professional practice at the time of trial,” we

cannot conclude that trial counsel’s failure to

object to the constitutionality of the statute

placing the burden of proving lack of intent

on the defendant fell “below an objective

standard of reasonableness.”

6 MAY V. SHINN

May v. Ryan, 766 F. App’x 505, 507 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal

citations omitted). 2

Nevertheless, Judge Friedland and I affirmed the district

court’s grant of habeas on other grounds: We first noted that

“the State’s case turned entirely on the jury’s believing the

testimony of several child victims who all had struggled to

provide details of the alleged molestation on the stand,

including failing to remember whether some of the incidents

even took place.” Id. at 507. We concluded that, in light of

the particular circumstances, “when the trial judge asked if

either party objected to the jury resuming deliberations after

the court had already declared a mistrial and discharged the

jury, competent counsel would have objected.” Id at 508.

Consequently, we ruled that “[t]he decision not to object was

completely unsupportable on this record and, therefore,

under the circumstances, could not have been considered a

sound trial strategy.” Id. (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). We also held that the prejudice prong of

Strickland was satisfied. 3

2

Although we could not agree with Judge Wake that trial counsel

was remiss in failing to object to the statute’s constitutionality, Judge

Wake’s opinion makes a compelling case that the statute is indeed

unconstitutional. Notably, the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue.

In May’s petition for certiorari, the issue of the statute’s constitutionality

was not presented. Three Questions Presented were advanced, each

dealing with the application of Strickland. Petition for Certiorari at 2,

May v. Shinn, 141 S.Ct. 1740 (2021) (No. 20-1080).

3

Judge Ikuta dissented. She believed that the majority’s decision

was based on “pure speculation” about “how a second trial would

unfold,” but that “pure speculation was insufficient to establish deficient

performance” and that “we should reject such uninformed

prognostications.” May, 766 Fed. App’x at 509.

MAY V. SHINN 7

However, Judge Friedland changed her vote in response

to the State’s petition for rehearing, which pointed out that

the panel had misunderstood an aspect of the case’s

procedural history. Writing for what was now a majority of

the panel, she reasoned that since the State’s case was so

weak, “it was reasonable [for trial counsel] to think that the

jury might acquit May if it continued deliberating.” May,

954 F.3d at 1204. Accordingly, trial counsel could not be

faulted for consenting to further deliberations. She explained

that the alleged sexual molestation charges were predicated

upon the brief touching of the children’s genitals by May on

the outside of either their clothing or bathing suits, and

nothing more. Id. at 1197. As she elaborated:

The fact that the jury was deadlocked meant

that at least one juror wanted to acquit May.

And both parties agree that the State’s

evidence against May was far from

overwhelming. All four children testified that

other people were nearby when May touched

their genital areas. Luis and Danielle testified

that May touched them when more than

twenty people, including other adults, were in

the vicinity—but none of those people

claimed to see anything. Luis was also unable

to identify May in court. Taylor and Danielle

testified that they were unable to remember

an incident in which May had touched them

that they had previously disclosed to police.

And Sheldon testified that he thought that

May’s touching was accidental until Taylor’s

mother told him otherwise. The State had not

offered any expert testimony to try to explain

away these discrepancies in the children’s

accounts. Based on these and other

8 MAY V. SHINN

weaknesses in the State’s case, it was

reasonable to think that the jury might acquit

May if it continued deliberating. Indeed, the

jury ultimately did acquit May on the counts

related to Sheldon.

Id. at 1204. I dissented, concluding that “[b]ecause I would

find that May’s counsel was objectively deficient in not

objecting to resumed jury deliberations, and because there

was a reasonable probability that an objection would have

been sustained, I would affirm the grant of habeas relief.”

May, 954 F.3d at 1221.

In a brief concurring opinion, Judge Ikuta reasoned:

It is our duty to impartially follow and apply

the law. Here, as required to “reflect our

enduring respect for the State’s interest in the

finality of convictions that have survived

direct review withing the state court system,”

we adhered to the limited scope of federal

habeas review. In doing so, we uphold the

fundamental principles of our legal system.

Id. at 1208 (internal citations omitted). In a separate

concurring opinion, Judge Friedland wrote “to express [her]

dismay at the outcome of this case:”

While I certainly recognize the seriousness of

child molestation, the evidence that May was

actually guilty of the five counts of

molestation he was convicted on was very

thin. May’s conviction on those counts was

based almost entirely on the testimony of the

children who were the alleged victims. Yet,

as described in the opinion, that testimony

MAY V. SHINN 9

had many holes. The potential that May was

wrongly convicted is especially concerning

because he was sentenced to seventy-five

years in prison—a term that all but ensures he

will be incarcerated for the rest of his life.

Given the significant constraints on the scope

of our review, we are not in a position to do

more than decide the narrow question

whether the proceedings in this case were so

egregiously unfair that they violated the

Constitution. But I agree with the dissent that

this case, and in particular May’s sentence,

reflects poorly on our legal system.

Id. at 1208–09 (emphasis added). After having been at

liberty for more than four years May returned to prison.

II

I have profound respect for my two judicial colleagues

who denied May’s habeas petition. Judge Ikuta certainly

cannot be faulted for her commitment “to follow and apply

the law.” Id. at 1208. But, as Judge Friedland poignantly

comments, we have reached a point in our judicial decision-

making that “reflects poorly on our legal system.” Id.

at 1209.

Judge Friedland’s clarion call about the current status of

our legal system triggered my thoughts about a period of

time over a half-century ago when the Supreme Court had

issued a spate of ground-breaking decisions that spoke well

of our judicial system. There was Brown v. Board of

Education in 1954, Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, Baker v. Carr in

1962, Gideon v. Wainright in 1963, Jackson v. Denno in

10 MAY V. SHINN

1964, and Miranda v. Arizona in 1966. And I thought about

the Clayton case.

In 1968 I was a young solo practitioner in Suffolk

County, New York, when the New York State Court of

Appeals assigned me to represent Robert Clayton. It was just

a few years after the Supreme Court had held in Jackson v.

Denno that those who had been convicted based on a

confession had the right to a hearing to determine if it was

voluntary.

Clayton had been indicted and convicted for murder as a

result of a fight he had with a fellow migrant farm worker.

Pursuant to People v. Huntley—the New York equivalent to

Jackson—the trial court held a hearing to determine whether

his confession was voluntary. People v. Clayton,

342 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108 (1973). I was assigned to handle this

appeal. Ultimately, Clayton’s conviction was ruled to be the

product of “a pattern of police dominance and coercion.”

Mancusi v. United States ex rel. Clayton, 454 F.2d 454, 456

(2d Cir. 1972).

Clayton had spent about 20 years in jail when I gave him

the good news: Rather than retry him, the Suffolk County

District Attorney had agreed to allow him to plead to

involuntary manslaughter. With credit for time served,

Clayton would be a free man.

To my surprise, he rejected the offer. He told me that he

had adjusted to a life in prison and wasn’t sure he could

adjust to a life out of prison as a convicted felon. I didn’t

know what to do, but the trial court, on its own motion,

dismissed the indictment in the interests of justice pursuant

to N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.40. See People v. Clayton,

350 N.Y.S.2d 495, 495 (Co. Ct. 1973). That statute re-

codified an obscure provision of the Code of Criminal

MAY V. SHINN 11

Procedure, dating back to 1881: “The court may, either of its

own motion, or upon the application of the district attorney,

and in furtherance of justice, order an action, after

indictment, to be dismissed.” People v. Campbell, 48 Misc.

2d 798, 799 (N.Y. Misc. 1966) (citing Sec. 671 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure); see also Practice Commentaries,

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 210.40.

The government appealed, arguing before the

intermediate appellate court that never in the annals of the

law had a murder indictment been dismissed on the court’s

own motion, and in the absence of the District Attorney’s

consent, in the so-called interests of justice.

In a precedent-making decision, Judge Hopkins, writing

for a unanimous court, (1) affirmed the power of a court to

dismiss any indictment, upon its own initiative, in the

interests of justice; (b) established the substantive standards

to be henceforth employed in evaluating when principles of

justice required dismissal, and (c) asserted that a hearing

must be held to determine if dismissal was warranted. See

Clayton, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 109–111. The court specified

seven considerations that must be considered at such a

hearing: “(a) the nature of the crime; (b) the available

evidence of guilt; (c) the prior record of the defendant;

(d) the punishment already suffered by the defendant; (e) the

purpose and effect of further punishment; (f) any prejudice

resulting to the defendant by the passage of time, and (g) the

impact on the public interest of a dismissal of the

indictment.” Id. at 110. As the court wrote, the dismissal of

an indictment “depended only on principles of justice, not on

the legal or factual merits of the charge or even on the guilt

or innocence of the defendant.” Id. at 109.

On remand, I conducted the first “interest of justice”

hearing in the state’s history. The trial court granted the

12 MAY V. SHINN

motion, and Clayton’s murder indictment was dismissed.

Thus, was born the Clayton hearing, which exists to this

date.

Almost a half-century ago, I wrote an article for the New

York State Bar Journal recounting my Clayton journey. See

Frederic Block, The Clayton Hearing, N.Y. State B.J., Oct.

1973, 409. I was struck by the notion that because of New

York’s embrace of interest of justice hearings, “our legal

system, though predicated upon the fundamental concept of

due process, recognizes that the law must be possessed of an

even more pervasive spirit; one that transcends common,

codified or even constitutional law.” Id. at 411. I

commented that “it is, after all, the principle of ‘justice’

which is the hallmark of our jurisprudence, and that the letter

of the law is not the final word.” Id. I concluded by stating

that dismissal in the interests of justice may be appropriate—

even for a murder indictment, such as in Clayton—“for

reasons transcending the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id.

at 412.

Although Clayton hearings abound to this day in New

York State, there is no federal counterpart. The concept of

justice tempering the strictures of the law is anathema to the

federal justice system. Accordingly, as Judge Friedland

laments, “this case, and in particular May’s sentence,

reflects poorly on our legal system.”

III

There are two relevant injustices that have impacted

May’s lifetime sentence: (1) the strictures of habeas relief;

(2) the emotional overlay that contributes to irrational

MAY V. SHINN 13

sentencing when the nature of the crime entails sexual

misconduct involving children. 4

It is my hope that by calling attention to these injustices

this opinion will be of considerable value to those who will

undoubtedly one day be deciding whether May’s sentence

should be commuted. I believe it is the responsibility of

judges who have had the opportunity to identify injustices in

the sentencing of a defendant to play an active role in sharing

that information with those who will be passing final

judgment on the life of a human being. I believe, therefore,

that “there is no reason why judges could not play a more

regular role in clemency.” Jessica A. Roth, The “New”

District Court Activism in Criminal Justice Reform,

72 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 187, 382 (2018). This is in

keeping with the moral responsibility of judges, who are

“uniquely positioned to bring perceived injustices to other’s

attention and must.” Jessica A. Roth, Jack Weinstein:

4

These are not the only injustices that reflect “poorly on our legal

system:” We are the world leader in “mass incarceration.” With a prison

population of more than 2.3 million, we incarcerate our populace at more

than twice the rate of Russia, four times that of China, and more than

fourteen times that of Japan. See James Kilgore, Understanding Mass

Incarceration: A People’s Guide to the Key Civil Rights Struggle of Our

Time 11 (The New Press 2015). Congress—the first branch of

government—has usurped much of the power of the judiciary by

imposing mandatory minimums in over 25% of the sentences that judges

must mete out, threatening to reduce the third branch of government to a

twig. Our Sentencing Guidelines are often irrational and of little value.

See, e.g., United States v, Parris, 573 F.Supp.2d 744 (2008) (White

Collar Crimes); United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010)

(Child Pornography). And we make it difficult for ex-felons to re-enter

society by imposing an inordinate number of restrictions as “collateral

consequences.” See United States v. Nesbeth, 188 F.Supp.3d 179

(E.D.N.Y. 2016).

14 MAY V. SHINN

Reimagining the Role of the District Court Judge, Federal

Sentencing Reporter, Vol. 33, No. 3 163, 165 (Feb. 2021).

A. The Strictures of Habeas Relief

My first exposure to the writ of habeas corpus as a

district judge was in 1995 during my first year on the bench.

Winston Moseley, who had been convicted of killing Kitty

Genovese in 1964, sought the writ decades after his

conviction. The murder had caught national attention since

it was one of the most infamous and brutal murders

committed during that century and “symbolized urban

apathy [since] 38 people heard her screams but did nothing.”

214 N.Y.L.J. 29 (July 25, 1995).

My initial reaction was that the inordinate passage of

time had to preclude my asserting jurisdiction over the case.

But to my surprise I learned that there was no statute of

limitations for habeas petitions. I therefore conducted a

hearing because Moseley’s trial lawyer had testified in state

court that he had previously represented Genovese and

consequently “didn’t try this case . . . objectively, calmly,

just as a lawyer defending a client [should].” Moseley v.

Scully, 908 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). This

disclosure and admission compelled me to conduct the

hearing to inquire into the nature, duration, breadth and

bounds of this prior representation for the purpose of

determining whether Genovese’s lawyer labored under a

constitutionally impermissible conflict of interest that

adversely affected his representation. I denied Moseley’s

habeas petition on the merits, but only after determining that

neither the passage of time nor other procedural grounds

barred Moseley’s claim.

A year after my decision, Congress enacted the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).

MAY V. SHINN 15

It created a one-year statute of limitations and “departed

from earlier efforts to reform the federal postconviction

process by implementing strict new procedural and

substantive barriers to successful federal habeas corpus

relief.” David Goodwin, An Appealing Choice: An Analysis

of and a Proposal for Certificates Of Appealability in

“Procedural” Habeas Appeals, 68 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am.

L. 791, 792 (2013). Under AEDPA a federal court “shall

not” grant habeas relief “unless” the state court’s decision

was (1) “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of”

clearly established federal law, as determined by the

decisions of the Supreme Court, or (2) based on an

“unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented” in the original proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); (2).

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown v.

Davenport, No. 20-826, 2022 WL 1177498 (Apr. 21, 2022),

traces how AEDPA “represented a sea change in federal

habeas law.” Id. at *8. As Justice Gorsuch framed the issue:

After a state court determines that an error at

trial did not prejudice a criminal defendant,

may a federal court grant habeas relief based

solely on its independent assessment of the

error’s prejudicial effect under Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)? Or must

a federal court also evaluate the state court’s

decision under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(AEDPA)?

Id. at *3.

Justice Gorsuch traced the reach of habeas relief during

the country’s history. He explained how by 1953 federal

16 MAY V. SHINN

habeas practice had taken on a permissive scope. In that year

the Supreme Court held that a state-court judgment was

“‘not res judicata’ in federal habeas proceedings with

respect to a petitioner’s federal constitutional claims.” Id.

at *7 (citing Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953)).

Thus, “[f]ull-blown constitutional error correction became

the order of the day.” Id. Eventually, the Supreme Court

“responded to the post-Brown [v. Allen] habeas boom by

devising new rules aimed at separating the meritorious

needles from the growing haystack.” Id. at *8.

For example, in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18

(1967), the Court had held that “when a defendant

demonstrates on direct appeal that a constitutional error

occurred at his trial, his conviction cannot stand unless the

government proves the error’s harmlessness ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Brown v. Davenport, 2022 WL

1177498, at *8 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). But in

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993), it “resolved that

this same standard was inappropriate for use in federal

habeas review of final state-court judgments.” Brown v.

Davenport, 2022 WL 1177498, at *8 (citing Brecht,

507 U.S. at 633–34). “Instead, the Court reasoned, a state

prisoner should not receive federal ‘habeas relief based on

trial error unless’ he can show the error had a ‘substantial

and injurious effect or influence’ on the verdict.” Id.

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637). In so doing, “the Court

stressed that undoing a final state-court judgment is an

‘extraordinary remedy,’ reserved for only ‘extreme

malfunctions in the state criminal justice system’ and

different in kind from providing relief on direct appeal.” Id.

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633–34).

Not satisfied with Brecht’s restrictions, Congress

doubled down by enacting its AEDPA “sea change,”

MAY V. SHINN 17

imposing new “demanding” obstacles in the path of habeas

petitions. Id. Consequently, the majority held in Brown v.

Davenport that in order to qualify for habeas relief, a

petitioner must satisfy both Brecht and AEDPA. It reasoned

that “where AEDPA asks whether every fairminded jurist

would agree that an error was prejudicial, Brecht asks only

whether a federal habeas court itself harbors grave doubt

about the petitioner’s verdict.” Brown v. Davenport, 2022

WL 1177498, at *9.

An empirical study conducted ten years after AEDPA

disclosed that it had effectively neutered habeas relief. As it

reported, compared to a 40% success rate prior to AEDPA,

by 2007 out of a sample of 2,384 cases that year, only 7 writs

were granted by the federal courts in non-capital cases. Z.

Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, 121 Colum. L.

Rev. 159, 174 (2021). Thus, the practical effect of AEDPA

was “to halt the prior federal practice of employing habeas

review to bring new conditions of fairness to the steamroller

systems of justice found in too many states.” Jed S. Rakoff,

The Magna Carta Betrayed?, 94 N.C. L. Rev. 1423, 1429

(2016).

Now, with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.

Davenport, superimposed on the difficulties in surmounting

the strictures imposed under Strickland when seeking relief

for ineffective counsel—as reflected by this case—habeas

relief today is virtually a dead letter. Brown v. Davenport,

therefore, realistically put the final nail in the habeas coffin. 5

See also Shinn v. Martinez Ramirez, No. 20-1009, slip op. at

5

Indeed, Arizona’s habeas regime includes many of the same

procedural and substantive roadblocks found in the federal system. See

Keith J. Hilzendeger, Arizona State Post-Conviction Relief, 7 Ariz.

Summit L. Rev. 585 (2014).

18 MAY V. SHINN

15–17 (U.S. May 23, 2022) (imposing further procedural

requirements on federal habeas ineffective assistance of

counsel claims).

B. Irrational Sentencing of Sexual Misconduct Crimes

Involving Children

Nothing provokes more emotionality than sex crimes

perpetrated on a child. The public widely regards child sex

offenders as the “worst of the worst” and “better off dead.”

Colleen M. Berryessa & Chaz Lively, When A Sex Offender

Wins the Lottery: Social and Legal Punitiveness Toward Sex

Offenders in an Instance of Perceived Injustice, 25 Psychol.

Pub. Pol’y & L. 181 (2019).

Congress has responded to this emotional outrage. For

example, it has created Sentencing Guidelines for child

pornographers that place all of them—be they mere

possessors or inveterate distributors—at “a typical total

offense level of 35.” United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174,

186 (2d Cir. 2010). As explained in Dorvee, “[a]n ordinary

first-time offender is therefore likely to qualify for a

sentence of at least 168 to 210 months.” Id.

I cite Dorvee because it is an extraordinary circuit-court

case that exemplifies how raw emotions can trigger irrational

sentences when children are the victims of sexual

misconduct. See also United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d

955, 965–69 (9th Cir. 2011) (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing

Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 186–88). Foremost, are the irrational

Guidelines that Congress has created for convicted child

pornographers. Thus, as Dorvee points out: “[T]he

Guidelines actually punish some forms of direct sexual

contact with minors more leniently than possession or

distribution of child pornography.” Id. at 184.

MAY V. SHINN 19

The current status of the child pornography Guidelines

dates to Congress’ enactment of the PROTECT Act of 2003,

Pub. L. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. It was the culmination of the

Sentencing Commission’s multiple amendments to these

Guidelines—at Congress’ direction—since their

introduction in 1987, each time calling for harsher penalties.

Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 184. And “it was the first instance since

the inception of the Guidelines where Congress directly

amended the Guidelines Manual.” Id.

But, as explained in Dorvee, these congressionally

mandated Guidelines were “fundamentally different from

most” and “unless applied with great care, c[ould] lead to

unreasonable sentences.” Id. The circuit court quoted from

the comments by a former United States Attorney for the

Eastern District of New York that the changes effected by

the PROTECT Act evinced a “blatant disregard for the

Commission” and were “the most significant effort to

marginalize the role of the Sentencing Commission in the

federal sentencing process since the Commission was

created by Congress.” Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks

omitted). As he explained, Congress:

(i) adopted sentencing reforms without

consulting the Commission, (ii) ignored the

statutorily-prescribed process for creating

guideline amendments, (iii) amended the

Guidelines directly through legislation,

(iv) required that sentencing data be

furnished directly to Congress rather than to

the Commission, (v) directed the

Commission to reduce the frequency of

downward departures regardless of the

Commission’s view of the necessity of such

a measure, and (vi) prohibited the

20 MAY V. SHINN

Commission from promulgating any new

downward departure guidelines for the next

two years.

Id. (citation omitted).

The upshot of all of this congressional frenzy was that

“sentencing enhancements cobbled together through this

process routinely result[ed] in Guidelines projections near or

exceeding the statutory maximums, even in run-of-the-mill

cases.” Id. at 186. Thus, Dorvee’s sentencing range was

calculated by the district court to be 262 to 327 months for

having sexually explicit conversations with an undercover

agent posing as a 14-year-old-boy, sending sexually explicit

videos and images via the internet to the agent, and meeting

another undercover agent, also posing as a 14-year-old boy,

with a camera that he intended to use to photograph the “[the

boy’s] feet and penis.” Id. at 176.

Dorvee illustrates the irrationality of the child

pornography Guidelines with two examples: (1) “An adult

who intentionally seeks out and contacts a twelve-year-old

on the internet, convinces the child to meet and to cross state

lines for the meeting, and then engages in repeated sex with

the child, would qualify for a total offense level of 34,

resulting in a Guidelines range of 151 to 188, with a criminal

history category of 1.” Id. at 187. Dorvee, meanwhile, had

the same criminal history category and had “never had any

contact with an actual minor,” yet “was sentenced by the

district court to 233 months of incarceration,” based,

ironically, in part on the district judge’s fear “that Dorvee

would sexually assault a child in the future.” Id. (2) A

defendant convicted of possessing on his computer two

nonviolent videos of seventeen-year-olds engaging in

consensual conduct, with no criminal history, would result

MAY V. SHINN 21

in a Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. “This,” the court

noted, “is the same Guidelines sentence as that for an

individual with prior criminal convictions placing him in a

criminal history category of II, who has been convicted of an

aggravated assault with a firearm that resulted in bodily

injury.” Id.

Thus, although the circuit court recognized that

“enforcing federal prohibitions on child pornography is of

the utmost importance,” it held that “it would be manifestly

unjust to let Dorvee’s sentence stand.” Id. at 188. Therefore,

it remanded the case for resentencing, cautioning the district

court that it was “dealing with an eccentric Guideline of

highly unusual provenance which, unless carefully applied,

can easily generate unreasonable results.” Id.

The public’s hatred of child pornographers is part of its

emotional reaction to all sexual crimes involving children.

Indeed, “[i]ndividuals living with pedophilic disorder are the

most universally despised group in modern society.” Margo

Kaplan, Taking Pedophilia Seriously 72 Wash. & Lee L.

Rev. 75, 128 (2015). Judges are not exempt from such

emotional reactions. If anyone sexually assaulted one of my

two adorable little grandchildren, I would probably be

indicted for murder. But I understand as a rational jurist that

I cannot let my judgments be based on my emotions.

Realistically, the public’s fear of pedophiles running

loose and abusing children should be tempered by the

knowledge that we judges impose enormous constraints on

their freedom even when they are not incarcerated. The

PROTECT Act authorizes life supervision by the Probation

Department and, in some cases, requires it. The Adam

Walsh Act requires those convicted of specified sex crimes

to register as sex offenders and sets up a national database to

coordinate state sex-offender registries.

22 MAY V. SHINN

Moreover, stringent special conditions are routinely

imposed during supervised release. My list is fairly typical

and includes mental health treatment, limitations on contact

with children, limitations on computer access, and

submission to random searches and other monitoring to

ensure compliance.

Consequently, the data suggest that the recidivist rates

for child sex offenders are low. For example, compared to a

67.8% re-offense rate for state prisoners in general over a

three-year period ending in 2018, there was only a 3.5% re-

offense rate for child sex offenders during that same time

period. Maureen F. Larson & Robert F. Schopp, Sexual

Predator Laws: Clarifying the Relationship Between Mental

Health Laws and Due Process Protections, 97 Neb. L. Rev.

1167, 1169 (2019).

I have discussed the Second Circuit’s decision in Dorvee

at length because it is a clear exposition of how Congress has

responded to the public’s emotional pedophilia hysteria by

creating irrational child pornography Guidelines—which

still exist. But this hysteria has obviously impacted the harsh

sentences that the states have created for crimes entailing the

sexual molestation of children, such as reflected in this case.

Incredibly, May faces the rest of his life in prison for briefly

fondling three children over their outer garments in broad

public. Moreover, Judge Friedland correctly explains that

the evidence against May “was very thin,” and “had many

holes.” Thus, as she acknowledges, there was “[t]he

potential that May was wrongly convicted.” May v. Shinn,

954 F.3d 1194, 1208 (9th Cir. 2020).

But such are the harsh realities of life where thousands

of innocent people are incarcerated and many are even on

death row. Jay Robert Nash, “I am Innocent!”: A

Comprehensive Encyclopedic History of the World’s

MAY V. SHINN 23

Wrongly Convicted Persons (2008); Daniel H. Benson,

Executing the Innocent, 3 Ala. C.R. & C.L.L. Rev. 1 (2013);

see also Frederic Block, Prosecutors aren’t above the law:

Gov. Cuomo must sign legislation creating an oversight

commission, The Daily News (Jul. 30, 2018). 6 Nonetheless,

I doubt that even the most hardened believers that child

molesters should be severely punished would objectively

conclude that sentencing May to life was rational, and would

agree with me and Judge Friedland that it “reflects poorly on

our legal system.”

IV

May has now apparently run the gamut of any judicial

recourse that might have been available. The only chance he

has of not being incarcerated for the rest of his life would

seem to be executive commutation. The Arizona Board of

Executive Clemency (“Clemency Board”), comprising five

members appointed by the Governor, may recommend the

commutation of a sentence to the Governor “after finding by

clear and convincing evidence that the sentence imposed is

clearly excessive given the nature of the offense and the

record of the offender and that there is a substantial

probability that when released the offender will conform the

offender’s conduct to the requirements of the law.” Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 31-402.

Statistics provided by the Clemency Board show that

between 2004 and 2016, it heard an annual average of 594.9

clemency hearings and recommended a yearly average of

6

Available at: https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-

prosecutors-arent-above-the-law-20180726-story.html.

24 MAY V. SHINN

only 48.2 prisoners to the Governor who, in turn, granted an

average of only 6.7 per year.

Given the nature of his offense, it is unlikely that the

Clemency Board would recommend that the Governor

commute May’s sentence. But he would seem to be a perfect

candidate for commutation. He had already served a decade

of his sentence before being released by Judge Wake, and

the record before me reflects that he was a law-abiding

citizen during his more than four years of freedom before

being returned to prison: He never attempted to abscond

even though he knew that if Judge Wake’s decision were

reversed he would be spending the rest of his life in jail, and

he faithfully complied with his terms of supervised release.

Hopefully the Clemency Board will recognize the

unusual nature of this case and recommend that the

Governor commute May’s sentence. And hopefully the

Governor will agree that to do so in this particular case

would be the humane thing to do in the interests of justice.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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