Shaykh Muhammad Al Saud v. Pannan Days

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHAYKH MUHAMMAD ABDUL BIN No. 21-15089

TALAL AL SAUD, AKA Shaykh

Muhammad Abdul Aziz Khalid Bin D.C. No.

Talal Alsaud, 2:19-cv-04863-

Plaintiff-Appellant, SPL

v.

OPINION

PANNAN DAYS, Deputy Warden at

SMU II Eyman Florence; STEPHEN

MORRIS, Warden, Warden at

Complex Eyman; CHARLES L. RYAN,

Director at Arizona State Prison;

UNKNOWN PARTY, Named as

“NROD; Northern Regional

Operation Director” at Arizona State

Prison; THOMAS, Sergeant;

BURCHETT, COII; ARNALD, COII;

PLANCARTE, COII,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2022

San Francisco, California

2 AL SAUD V. DAYS

Filed June 8, 2022

Before: RICHARD R. CLIFTON and MILAN D. SMITH,

JR., Circuit Judges, and CHRISTINA REISS, *

District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

SUMMARY **

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment on the

pleadings in an action brought by Shaykh Muhammad Al

Saud, a Muslim inmate who alleged that he is unable to pray

five times a day, as the Qur’an requires, because he is housed

with people who harass him as he prays; and who had asked

the prison to accommodate his religious practice by housing

him exclusively with other prisoners based on their religious

beliefs and practices.

Al Saud brought suit pursuant to the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment, and Arizona state law.

*

The Honorable Christina Reiss, United States District Judge for the

District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

AL SAUD V. DAYS 3

The panel held that Al Saud’s RLUIPA claim failed

because denying his request to be housed only with Muslims

was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

governmental interest. The panel concluded that the

outcome of this case was largely controlled by Walker v.

Beard, 789 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015), which held that a

prison could deny a prisoner’s religious accommodation

when he sought to be housed with only white people.

Because both race and religion are suspect classes, the

likelihood that equal protection liability would flow from

housing prisoners based on religion was substantially

identical to the likelihood of liability for housing prisoners

based on race and, therefore, was sufficient to serve as a

compelling interest. Defendants had no alternative but to

deny Al Saud’s request because he requested only one thing:

to be housed exclusively with Muslims.

The panel held that defendants did not violate Al Saud’s

First Amendment free exercise rights because denying Al

Saud’s request was also reasonably related to a legitimate

penological interest—avoiding the potential legal liability of

housing inmates based on their religious beliefs and

practices. Denying the request was rationally related to

avoiding liability because by denying Al Saud’s requested

accommodation, the Arizona Department of Corrections

Rehabilitation and Reentry completely eliminated its risk of

litigation from other prisoners based on that claim.

COUNSEL

William Fernholz (argued) and Susan Yorke, Supervising

Attorneys; Chelsea Bray (argued) and Reginaldo Valdez

(argued), Certified Law Students; Ninth Circuit Practicum,

Berkeley, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

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Daniel P. Schaack (argued), Assistant Attorney General;

Mark Brnovich, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney

General, Phoenix, Arizona; Michael E. Gottfried and Jason

D. Corley, Assistant Attorneys General; Office of the

Attorney General, Tucson, Arizona; for Defendants-

Appellees.

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Shaykh Muhammad Al Saud is Muslim, and is

incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison Complex-Eyman.

He claims that he is unable to pray five times a day, as the

Qur’an requires, because he is housed with people who

harass him as he prays. He alleges that his faith requires that

he live only with other Muslims. He asked the prison to

accommodate his religious practice by housing him

exclusively with other Muslims. In order to do so, the prison

would have to classify and house other prisoners based on

their religious beliefs and practices. The Arizona

Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry

(ADCRR) did not respond to Al Saud’s request.

Al Saud brought suit against the ADCRR and prison

officials pursuant to the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc et seq., the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment, and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1493.01. The district

court issued a judgment on the pleadings for defendants,

concluding that the infringement on Al Saud’s religious

practice was justified because the state’s action was

narrowly tailored to address the compelling interest of

AL SAUD V. DAYS 5

avoiding equal protection liability for classifying other

prisoners based on their religion.

We conclude that the outcome of this case is largely

controlled by Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.

2015), in which we held that a prison could deny a prisoner’s

religious accommodation when he sought to be housed with

only white people. We affirm the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Although Al Saud is now represented by pro bono

counsel, he handwrote his complaint. He alleges that his

sincerely held religious beliefs require that he “be housed

with [his] own Muslim believers in [their] faith.” He claims

to be housed with:

racists Nazi and Racist Chicanos which

violates the sacredness of my 5 daily salats =

prayers and cleanlynest of area of prayer and

my faith demands all believers to associate

with our own believers an not associate with

anyone thats unclean and hostile towards our

Islamic faith and these racist Chicanos and

White Nazi supremacy inmates all process

hatred towards Muslims.

(Misspellings in original). He alleges that “Infidels cause

the prayer area an house be unclean an not pure with their

evil hate and practise that goes against Allah” and that these

“racist hateful inmates [have] displayed very hostile

behavior towards Muslims.” (Misspellings in original). He

claims an injury of “sleepless nights and effect of my prayers

due uncleanlynest of present infidel . . . One don’t feel really

connected with Allah like I do with other Muslim cellmates.”

6 AL SAUD V. DAYS

(Misspellings in original). He does not allege that he has

been physically harmed or is in any physical danger.

Al Saud filed a grievance with the prison, requesting to

be housed only with other Muslims. Defendants never

responded. Al Saud alleges that the state had no penological

reason for not housing him with other Muslims.

The district court required defendants to answer the

complaint, and defendants moved for judgment on the

pleadings. The district court granted judgment on the

pleadings for the defendants. Al Saud timely filed this

appeal.

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review a decision on a motion for judgment on the pleadings

de novo. Daewoo Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Opta Corp., 875 F.3d

1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 2017). We view the allegations in the

complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.

2009). We also liberally construe pro se pleadings. Thomas

v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010).

ANALYSIS

I. RLUIPA Claim

RLUIPA protects “institutionalized persons who are

unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are

therefore dependent on the government’s permission and

accommodation for exercise of their religion.” Cutter v.

Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005). The statute provides

that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on

the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to

AL SAUD V. DAYS 7

an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of

general applicability,” unless the government shows that the

burden is “in furtherance of a compelling governmental

interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that

compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-

1(a). In other words, “[t]o state a claim under RLUIPA, a

prisoner must show that: (1) he takes part in a ‘religious

exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions have substantially

burdened that exercise. If the prisoner satisfies those

elements, then the State must prove its actions were the least

restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental

interest.” Walker, 789 F.3d at 1134 (internal citation

omitted). The second half of this inquiry is analogous to

strict scrutiny. Id. at 1136. Only injunctive relief, not

monetary damages, is available pursuant to RLUIPA, and

the claim must be against defendants in their official

capacities. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 287–88

(2011).

The parties agree that Al Saud’s request concerns a

religious exercise and that the state’s actions substantially

burden that exercise. The issue before us, then, is whether

defendants’ conduct is the least restrictive means of

furthering a compelling governmental interest.

a. Compelling Interest

Defendants contend that they have a compelling interest

in avoiding the equal protection liability that comes with

classifying and housing prisoners based on their religious

beliefs and practices. In order to house Al Saud with only

Muslims, defendants would necessarily have to classify and

house other prisoners based on their religious beliefs and

practices. The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the

government from classifying people based on suspect

classes, unless the classification is narrowly tailored to

8 AL SAUD V. DAYS

satisfy a compelling governmental interest (i.e., the

government’s action passes strict scrutiny). See Kadrmas v.

Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 457–58 (1988). Religion

is a suspect class. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes,

427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Accordingly, housing prisoners

based on their religious beliefs and practices would result in

classifying them based on membership in a suspect class,

and would violate the Equal Protection Clause unless the

classification satisfies strict scrutiny.

Applying those principles to this case, we need to

determine if the state has a compelling interest in classifying

prisoners based on their religious beliefs and practices.

Were the state to so classify prisoners, it would be doing so

to accommodate Al Saud’s religious beliefs and practices.

The compelling interest justifying the classification,

therefore, would be to avoid RLUIPA liability for refusing

to accommodate Al Saud’s religious practice. But is

avoiding RLUIPA liability a compelling interest? It could

be, if there actually is RLUIPA liability in refusing to house

Al Saud with exclusively Muslims because that refusal is not

narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.

These considerations lead us back to the question with

which we began. The analysis is circular. To know if there

is a RLUIPA violation, we must know if avoiding equal

protection liability is a valid compelling interest, but in order

for us to know if avoiding equal protection liability is a valid

compelling interest, we must know if avoiding RLUIPA

liability is a valid compelling interest.

Fortunately, there is an offramp. Defendants are correct

that complying with the Constitution, and statutes, can be a

compelling state interest. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.

263, 275 (1981); Walker, 789 F.3d at 1136. “Our

precedents, however, are less clear on how certain a

AL SAUD V. DAYS 9

constitutional violation must be to justify actions aimed at

avoiding a potential breach.” Walker, 789 F.3d at 1136. Al

Saud argues that the risk of violating the Equal Protection

Clause here is too speculative to be a compelling interest.

The circularity in the equal protection analysis reveals that

the risk of a violation is at least somewhat speculative.

Defendants, on the other hand, rely on Walker v. Beard,

789 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015), a case also decided on the

pleadings, to argue that the potential equal protection

violation is sufficiently concrete to be a compelling interest.

That case also examined RLUIPA and Free Exercise Clause

claims when a white California prisoner challenged being

housed with people who are not white based on religious

grounds. We held that the California prison’s interest in

avoiding liability for potential equal protection claims for

housing prisoners based on race justified not

accommodating the plaintiff and the infringement on his

religious liberty.

Walker controls the outcome in this case. In Walker, we

noted that we need not determine the “exact probability of

constitutional harm necessary to give the State a compelling

interest.” 789 F.3d at 1137. Avoiding equal protection

liability was a compelling interest because the state showed

“more than merely a good faith belief that exempting Walker

would be constitutionally suspect.” Id. The court decided

that “the State has shown a sufficient likelihood of liability

to give it a compelling interest in refusing Walker’s request

for an exemption.” Id. We did not evaluate whether

accommodating a religious practice is itself a compelling

interest justifying racial segregation, but rather made “no

conclusive determination as to the constitutional effect of

racially-based exemptions from the Housing Policy.” Id.

10 AL SAUD V. DAYS

Likewise, we do not need to conclusively decide here if

housing prisoners based on religion would lead to an equal

protection violation. We need only decide if there is “more

than merely a good faith belief that [accommodating Al

Saud] would be constitutionally suspect.” Id. In Walker, we

relied on Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) to reach

our conclusion. The Supreme Court in Johnson held that an

equal protection challenge to California’s race-conscious

prison housing policy should be subject to strict scrutiny but

remanded the case to the district court to undertake that

analysis. Id. at 515.

Here, defendants have also shown more than a good faith

belief that housing prisoners based on their religion would

be constitutionally suspect. As we noted above, there is

clearly a likelihood of liability. Because both race and

religion are suspect classes, the likelihood that equal

protection liability would flow from housing prisoners based

on religion is substantially identical to the likelihood of

liability for housing prisoners based on race and, therefore,

is sufficient to serve as a compelling interest.

Al Saud contends that a state’s interest is compelling

only when it is not legally speculative, and it has a strong

basis in the evidence. He cites Fulton v. City of

Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881–82 (2021) and Bush v.

Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 977 (1996) for this proposition.

In Fulton, the City of Philadelphia would not contract

with a foster care agency that refused to certify same-sex

couples as foster parents. 141 S. Ct. at 1874. Philadelphia

justified this action with a compelling interest in avoiding

litigation for violating anti-discrimination law, but the

Supreme Court concluded that the risk of litigation was too

speculative to be a compelling state interest. Id. at 1881–82.

Here, housing Al Saud with only Muslims would require

AL SAUD V. DAYS 11

defendants to actively and directly engage in religious

classification, thus exposing them to liability. By contrast,

the City of Philadelphia’s risk was particularly speculative

because the State of Pennsylvania, not the city, delegated the

authority to select foster parents to the agency and,

therefore, the city’s liability was decreased. Id. at 1882.

The litigation and the state’s interest in avoiding it is

considerably less speculative in this case.

In Bush v. Vera, the Supreme Court examined racial

gerrymandering. In discussing narrow tailoring, not

compelling interests, the Court stated that strict scrutiny

requires a strong basis in the evidence. 517 U.S. at 978. Al

Saud asks us to extend this rule to our compelling interest

analysis as well. In other words, he argues that there must

be an evidentiary basis for the government’s compelling

interest, which, he asserts, requires discovery. However,

taking the facts in the complaint as true, as we must, we see

no open questions of material fact that would change the

outcome of this appeal and no need for discovery.

Al Saud tries to distinguish Walker on the basis that

Walker had not alleged a concern for his personal safety, but

neither has Al Saud made such an allegation. The Supreme

Court in Johnson agreed that safety is a compelling interest

that justifies the use of race in housing when the use is

narrowly tailored. 543 U.S. at 514. ADCRR policy provides

an exception that allows consideration of race when safety is

at issue. However, Al Saud did not allege in his complaint

that he had experienced any physical harm or fears any

danger to his physical safety. Al Saud brought a RLUIPA

claim alleging an infringement into his religious practice, not

an Eighth Amendment or other claim, alleging unsafe prison

conditions. Both this case and Walker address religious

accommodations, not accommodations for personal safety.

12 AL SAUD V. DAYS

Al Saud also attempts to narrow Walker by claiming

differences between race and religion in the equal protection

analysis. However, both race and religion are suspect

classes, Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303, both are subject to strict

scrutiny, and both require that the state’s action be narrowly

tailored to a compelling interest. Id. Further, the state does

not need to demonstrate that a definite equal protection

violation would occur if it satisfied Al Saud’s demand, only

a likely one, and it has done so here.

Al Saud makes several additional arguments that are

without merit. First, he argues that we should look to the

Establishment Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause to

analyze accommodations and exemptions. This argument is

misplaced because, in this RLUIPA claim, we perform an

equal protection analysis only to evaluate the government’s

stated compelling interest, which is avoiding an equal

protection violation. The Establishment Clause is not at

issue.

In another argument, Al Saud cites to Roman Catholic

Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66 (2020) to

argue that there would be no equal protection violation if

defendants were to house prisoners based on religion. In that

case, the Supreme Court found a likelihood of success on the

merits of a free exercise claim when New York had an

exception to COVID-19 restrictions for acupuncture

services, campgrounds, and other secular facilities, but not

for houses of worship. In evaluating an application for

injunctive relief pending appellate review, the Court found

the restrictions were not neutral pursuant to Church of the

Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,

533 (1993) because they singled out houses of worship for

especially harsh treatment as compared to secular spaces.

Because the restrictions were not neutral, they triggered

AL SAUD V. DAYS 13

strict scrutiny. Although the state had a compelling interest

in stopping the spread of COVID-19, the Court found that

the regulation was not narrowly tailored to satisfy that

interest.

Al Saud thus tries to add a free exercise component to

our equal protection analysis, but Roman Catholic Diocese

of Brooklyn does not apply here. He argues that religion-

based housing would not violate equal protection because to

not house prisoners based on religion would be to treat

religion more harshly than other classes. The harsh

treatment, he says, stems from defendants having an explicit

exception to their race-neutral housing policy when an

inmate is deemed unsafe because of his race, but no

exception to the religion-neutral housing policy for inmate

safety. If the prison’s housing policy were not neutral

toward religion, under Lukumi, the policy would violate free

exercise unless it passed strict scrutiny. That free exercise

analysis, however, is distinct from the question of whether

classifying prisoners based on religion violates their equal

protection rights. Further, as previously noted, Al Saud is

not requesting a change based on his personal safety. He is

requesting an accommodation for his religious beliefs and

practices. There is no unequal treatment here. If he were

requesting a move to accommodate his religion based on

race, the request would also be denied. That is Walker

exactly. There is more than a good faith basis to believe that

an equal protection challenge would be successful and,

therefore, defendants have presented a compelling interest.

That is the dispositive conclusion.

b. Narrow Tailoring

To prevail on a RLUIPA claim, in addition to showing

that it has a compelling interest, the government must also

show that its action was the least restrictive means available

14 AL SAUD V. DAYS

to further that compelling interest. Walker, 789 F.3d at 1137.

Defendants must show that they “actually considered and

rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before

adopting the challenged practice.” Warsoldier v. Woodford,

418 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). “Where a prisoner

challenges their justifications, prison officials must set forth

detailed evidence, tailored to the situation before the court,

that identifies the failings in [any] alternatives advanced by

the prisoner. In some cases, this showing might call for an

evidentiary hearing.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 564–

65 (9th Cir. 1997).

In Walker, we determined that denying the plaintiff’s

request to be housed with only white people was the least

restrictive means. We said:

The gravamen of Walker’s complaint is that

the State’s failure to offer him an exemption

from race-neutral celling constitutes a

violation of RLUIPA. But granting that

exemption would be race-conscious action

implicating the Equal Protection Clause, so

the only way to avert potential constitutional

liability was to deny the requested

exemption. Anything else would have

introduced a non-race-neutral element into

the celling policy, thereby raising the specter

of a credible equal protection claim brought

by non-white prisoners. There is thus an

‘exact fit’ between the potential harm and the

challenged state action.

789 F.3d at 1137 (citation omitted). In his complaint,

Walker alleged that the state failing to exempt him from

race-neutral housing violated RLUIPA. The only choice the

AL SAUD V. DAYS 15

state had was to grant or deny the exemption. Granting it

would have implicated equal protection principles, so the

state had no other choice but to deny the accommodation.

We found not only that the denial was narrowly tailored but

that it was an exact fit. Here, the analysis is the same.

Defendants had no alternative but to deny Al Saud’s request,

because he requested only one thing: to be housed

exclusively with Muslims.

Like Al Saud, Walker also argued that the state failed to

consider less restrictive alternatives. However, because

Walker asked only for segregated housing, the state had “no

additional obligation under RLUIPA independently to

research and propose every possible way of mitigating that

practice’s negative effects.” Id. We concluded that “[i]f

Walker wants time outside his cell to perform [his religious

practice], he needs to ask for it. If the State were to refuse

him, that might be the basis for a separate RLUIPA

challenge, but it does not bear on the challenge here, which

is to the application of the Housing Policy to him without an

exemption.” Id. at 1138. Similarly here, if Al Saud wanted

an accommodation besides religion-based housing, he

should have asked for it. Defendants’ housing regulations

take inmate conflicts into account, and if other inmates

threatened or harmed Al Saud based on his religious

practices, he should have asked the prison to take effective

measures to protect his physical safety, rather than seeking

the broad corrective measure of being housed with only

Muslims.

II. Free Exercise Claim

Prisoners have First Amendment protection, but their

rights under the Free Exercise Clause are necessarily limited

by “institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom

concomitant with incarceration.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of

16 AL SAUD V. DAYS

Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). To

state a free exercise claim in the prison context: “(1) the

claimant’s proffered belief [must be] sincerely held; and

(2) the claim [must be] rooted in religious belief, not in

purely secular philosophical concerns.” Walker, 789 F.3d

at 1138 (cleaned up). However, “a prisoner’s Free Exercise

Clause claim will fail if the state shows that the challenged

action is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests.” Id. (citation omitted).

In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), the Supreme

Court laid out four factors to be considered when

determining whether a legitimate penological interest is

reasonably related to a challenged action: “(1) whether there

is a valid, rational connection between a state interest and the

prison regulation; (2) whether prisoners have an alternative

method of engaging in religious practice; (3) the impact

accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would

have on guards and other inmates; and (4) the absence of

ready alternatives to the challenged regulation.” Walker,

789 F.3d at 1138–39 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90).

The district court concluded that Al Saud proffered a

sincerely held religious belief and that the claim was rooted

in religious belief. No one disputes those findings on appeal.

Thus, we turn to the four Turner factors to examine if there

is a legitimate penological interest reasonably related to the

challenged action.

On appeal, Al Saud contends two ways in which

ADCRR has violated his right to free exercise, namely: not

responding to his request for religious accommodations and

not considering the hostility he experienced based on his

Muslim faith in making his housing assignment.

AL SAUD V. DAYS 17

Walker also controls the outcome of Al Saud’s free

exercise claim. Defendants’ legitimate penological interest

is the potential legal liability of housing inmates based on

their religious beliefs and practices. Walker held that

“[p]otential legal liability may constitute a legitimate

penological interest,” and we have already concluded that

such a potential liability exists here. 789 F.3d at 1138.

Accordingly, the state has a legitimate penological interest.

Looking to the Turner factors to determine whether a

legitimate penological interests is reasonably related to the

challenged action, three of the four factors weigh in

defendants’ favor. Although Turner can require a fact-

intensive inquiry, here the pleadings allege facts that compel

our ruling for the government. See Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d

873, 879 (9th Cir. 1993); Weisbuch v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,

119 F.3d 778, 783 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1997).

On the first factor, there is a valid, rational connection

between denying Al Saud’s religion-based housing request

and avoiding equal protection liability, given the likelihood

of a violation if the accommodation were granted. See

Walker, 789 F.3d at 1139. Denying the request is rationally

related to avoiding liability because by denying the

accommodation ADCRR completely eliminates its risk of

litigation from other prisoners based on that claim. This

factor weighs in favor of the defendants.

For the second factor, as pled, Al Saud did not have an

alternative method of engaging in his religious practice

where he was housed. Al Saud alleged that he had no viable

way to pray where he was housed. This factor weighs in Al

Saud’s favor.

The third factor is the impact on guards and inmates of

housing inmates based on their religious beliefs and

18 AL SAUD V. DAYS

practices. The district court noted that failing to provide

similar accommodations to other prisoners “might

exacerbate tensions within Arizona’s prisons and endanger

guards and other prisoners.” We agree that the

accommodation could cause tension in the prison and have

an impact on guards and other inmates.

Finally, as discussed, there are no alternative means to

denying Al Saud’s request that would mitigate defendants’

equal protection liability concerns.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s order granting judgment on

the pleadings to defendants. Al Saud’s RLUIPA claim fails

because denying his request to be housed only with Muslims

was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

governmental interest. Defendants did not violate Al Saud’s

free exercise rights because denying Al Saud’s request was

also reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 1

AFFIRMED.

1

Defendants also argued to the district court that qualified immunity

protects the officials in their individual capacities from this suit. The

district court decided the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the

merits and did not rule on qualified immunity. Because we also affirm

on the merits of the claims, we do not analyze the qualified immunity

defense.