Campbell v. Porter

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THEDRESS CAMPBELL v. MAURICE PORTER ET AL.

(AC 43753)

Bright, C. J., and Elgo and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, a church and

its pastor, P, and the city of Hartford and its police officer, J, in connec-

tion with his arrest by J for his alleged trespass at the church. The

plaintiff had been a member of the church for several decades, but,

after a dispute between the plaintiff and P, church leaders voted to

dismiss the plaintiff from the church. Church leadership sent the plaintiff

a letter notifying him of his dismissal and informing him that he was

no longer allowed on the church premises. After the plaintiff received

the letter from the church, he instituted a lawsuit challenging his dis-

missal. While the lawsuit was pending, the plaintiff attended a funeral

at the church. After P called the police, J arrested the plaintiff for

criminal trespass in the first degree. That charge was later dismissed.

The plaintiff revised his complaint in this action to set forth, inter alia,

a claim against J and the city for J falsely arresting him without probable

cause in violation of the applicable federal law (42 U.S.C. § 1983), a civil

conspiracy claim alleging that all of the defendants had conspired to

violate his civil rights in violation of the applicable federal law (42 U.S.C.

§ 1985 (3)), and a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress

against the church and P. The city and J filed a motion to strike the

civil conspiracy claim, and the trial court granted that motion. In their

answer and special defenses, the city and J pleaded several special

defenses of immunity, including that J was entitled to qualified immunity

because his conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. After

trial, the jury returned a verdict for the city and J on the § 1983 claim.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on the claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress and awarded him $30,000 in compensa-

tory damages, but found that he was not entitled to punitive damages.

The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.

On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held:

1. The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict

for the city and J on the § 1983 claim, as the jury reasonably could have

concluded that J had either actual or arguable probable cause to arrest

the plaintiff for criminal trespass: prior to arresting the plaintiff, J had

been told that the plaintiff had been warned numerous times not to

return to the church, and the plaintiff admitted to J that he had received

the letter telling him that he was banned from the church; moreover,

although the plaintiff told J that he had a lawsuit with the church and

that he and his family were longtime members, which the plaintiff argued

provided J with exculpatory evidence, the jury could have credited J’s

testimony that the plaintiff never told him that he disputed the validity

of his expulsion from the church in the lawsuit, such information would

not undermine a reasonable conclusion that probable cause existed to

arrest the plaintiff, and this was not a case where, even if J had investi-

gated further, the plaintiff would have been exonerated, as any further

investigation would result in the same facts that J already knew; further-

more, although the plaintiff argued that he believed he had a right to

be at the church and that the funeral was open to the public, both of

which constitute affirmative defenses to criminal trespass, the existence

of a possible affirmative defense to a criminal charge is neither inconsis-

tent with nor undermines the existence of probable cause in the absence

of plainly exculpatory evidence, and the jury reasonably could have

concluded that further investigation by J would not have conclusively

established either of the claimed affirmative defenses.

2. The trial court properly granted the motion to strike the civil conspiracy

claim filed by the city and J: the plaintiff’s revised complaint failed to

set forth any facts alleging an agreement of any type, explicit or implicit,

between the four defendants, as required to establish a civil conspiracy;

moreover, an allegation that one defendant merely took action on the

basis of a request of, and false information provided by, another defen-

dant is, without more, insufficient to set forth a claim brought pursuant

to § 1985 (3).

3. This court declined to review the plaintiff’s claim that the jury erred when

it failed to award him punitive damages on his intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim despite returning a verdict for him on that

count: the plaintiff failed to properly preserve this claim, as he never

argued before the trial court that if the jury rendered a verdict for him

on his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, then he was

necessarily entitled to an award of punitive damages; moreover, the

plaintiff failed to object to, and, in fact, approved of, the verdict form

as written and submitted to the jury, which left the question of whether

to award punitive damages to the jury’s discretion; furthermore, the

plaintiff did not object to the trial court’s instruction to the jury that it

was not required to award punitive damages.

Argued November 30, 2021—officially released May 10, 2022

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and for other relief,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Hartford, where the court, Hon. A. Susan Peck, judge

trial referee, granted the motion to strike filed by the

defendant city of Hartford et al.; thereafter, the matter

was tried to the jury before Noble, J.; verdict in part for

the plaintiff; subsequently, the court, Noble, J., rendered

judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which

the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Kirk D. Tavtigian, Jr., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Wesley S. Spears, for the appellees (named defendant

et al.).

David R. Roth, with whom, on the brief, was Aaron

S. Bayer, for the appellees (defendant city of Hartford

et al.).

Opinion

BRIGHT, C. J. The plaintiff, Thedress Campbell,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered

after a jury verdict in part in favor of the defendants,

Maurice Porter, the city of Hartford (city), Officer Omar

Jones, and Shiloh Baptist Church (church).1 On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that (1) the jury erred in returning

a defendants’ verdict on his false arrest claim against

Jones and the city, (2) the court erred in striking his

civil conspiracy claim against all of the defendants, and

(3) the jury erred in not awarding him punitive damages

despite returning a plaintiff’s verdict on his intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim against Porter and

the church.2 We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as reasonably could have been

found by the jury, and procedural history are relevant

to this appeal. The plaintiff was a decades long member

of the church. As a member of the church, he served

on the church’s board of trustees and as the church’s

property manager, led Sunday school services, became

a deacon, and participated in the church’s philanthropic

efforts, among other acts of service to the church.

In 2014, the church appointed Porter as its new pas-

tor. Initially, the plaintiff and Porter got along, but their

relationship soon soured. Shortly after Porter took over

as pastor, he removed the plaintiff from his role as the

church’s property manager because Porter had con-

cerns about how the plaintiff was carrying out his duties.

Thereafter, the plaintiff began questioning the validity

of certain relocation expenses that Porter had claimed

for his move from South Carolina to Hartford. The plain-

tiff eventually sent an e-mail about Porter’s relocation

expenses to another member of the church, and that

e-mail was later forwarded to Porter. Porter then held

a meeting of the church’s deacons, at which he read

the plaintiff’s e-mail aloud to those in attendance. Porter

did not initially reveal who had written the e-mail, but

the plaintiff, who was at the meeting, revealed himself

as the author after the e-mail was read. One of the

deacons then recommended that the plaintiff be removed

as a deacon, at which point the plaintiff voluntarily

resigned from that post.

After the e-mail incident, the plaintiff’s relationship

with Porter and the church worsened. Church leader-

ship made repeated efforts to reconcile with the plain-

tiff, but those efforts were unsuccessful and, eventually,

the church leaders made the decision to dismiss the

plaintiff from the church. To that end, on February 2,

2016, church leadership sent the plaintiff a letter which

stated in relevant part:

‘‘Dear Brother Campbell,

‘‘Please be advised that in accordance with Section

7.3, Dismissal of Members, of the Amended and Restated

has exercised rights granted to it under this provision

and hereby has DISMISSED you from membership of

[the church] for: continually disregarding the [c]hurch’s

authority and for creating contention and strife.

‘‘Accordingly, pursuant to state law concerning tres-

passing, you are NOT allowed on any premises owned

or operated by [the church] and you are not allowed

to attend any function or activity held or hosted by [the

church]. Any violation of this law will immediately be

reported to the appropriate law enforcement authority

and the appropriate civil remedy will be sought. You

will only be allowed on any premises owned or operated

by [the church] or any function or activity held or hosted

by [the church] provided you have sought and received

written consent to do so. All requests for permission

should be made to the church office in writing prior to

whatever event you wish to attend and we will respond

accordingly. . . .’’ The letter was signed by Porter and

Bradley Jones, the chairman of the deacons.

The letter was sent, in part, at the suggestion of Doug-

las Antuna, the faith based community service officer

for the Hartford Police Department (department). In

that capacity, Antuna served as the liaison between the

department and the churches that are located in the

city. While serving in that role, Antuna became aware

of the fraught relationship between the plaintiff and

the church, and, after he learned that the church had

decided to dismiss the plaintiff as a member, Antuna

suggested that the church draft a letter informing the

plaintiff of his dismissal and telling him that he was no

longer allowed at the church.

The plaintiff received the letter from the church,

either by mail or hand delivery, but believed that it was

invalid because he had not been dismissed in accor-

dance with the church’s bylaws. According to the plain-

tiff’s understanding of the bylaws, the entire congrega-

tion was required to vote on the dismissal of a member,

and church leadership alone did not have the power to

dismiss a member, as it had attempted to do with the

letter. The plaintiff then instituted a lawsuit against

Porter and the church in an attempt to prevent the

church from dismissing him.3

While the plaintiff’s lawsuit against Porter and the

church was pending, and even though he disputed the

church’s authority to dismiss him as a member without

a vote by the full congregation, the plaintiff stayed away

from the church. This decision was driven in part by

the plaintiff’s concern that ‘‘even though I knew I was

right, based on the church bylaws and the decisions

that we had received, I didn’t [want to] take a chance on

going into the church for service and having a policeman

come into the church . . . and escort me out of the

church . . . .’’ On July 1, 2016, however, before there

had been any resolution in his lawsuit challenging his

dismissal, the plaintiff attended a friend’s funeral at the

church. While the plaintiff was sitting in the church

sanctuary and waiting for the funeral to begin, he was

approached three separate times by different church

leaders, each of whom reminded him that he was not

allowed at the church without permission and told him

that if he wanted to stay at the church for the funeral,

he first needed to ask Porter for such permission. The

plaintiff repeatedly declined to ask Porter for permis-

sion to attend the funeral because he believed that he

had a right to be at the church, given his view that the

letter dismissing him was invalid. The church leaders

then told the plaintiff that if he was not going to ask

for Porter’s permission, he needed to leave the prem-

ises. After the plaintiff ignored those requests, Andre

McGuire, the church’s assistant pastor, informed him

that if he remained at the church without permission,

the police would be called. Despite that warning, the

plaintiff still refused to leave.

Porter then called the police. He first called Antuna,

but, because he was off duty at the time, Antuna told

Porter to call the department, which he did. The depart-

ment then dispatched Jones to the church. While Jones

was en route, his supervisor told him that the church

had been coordinating with Antuna regarding the plain-

tiff and that he should call Antuna for more information.

Jones then called Antuna, who provided him with addi-

tional information about the conflict between the plain-

tiff and the church. Specifically, Antuna told Jones that

the church had voted to dismiss the plaintiff as a mem-

ber of the church and had given the plaintiff a letter

telling him that he had been dismissed from the church

and was no longer allowed there.

After he arrived at the scene, Jones spoke with McGu-

ire,4 who also explained that the church had voted to

dismiss the plaintiff as a member and had sent the

plaintiff a letter telling him that he had been dismissed

and was no longer allowed at the church. McGuire fur-

ther told Jones that church officials had repeatedly

asked the plaintiff to leave the property but that he had

ignored those requests. On the basis of this information,

Jones determined that the situation constituted a ‘‘crim-

inal trespass call.’’

Jones then asked the plaintiff to step outside,5 which

he did. He and the plaintiff had a brief conversation,

during which Jones told the plaintiff that he had heard

that the plaintiff had received a letter informing him

that he was not allowed at the church. The plaintiff

admitted to receiving the letter but told Jones that there

was a pending legal case between him and the church.6

The plaintiff also told Jones that he and his family were

longtime members of the church. The plaintiff did, how-

ever, concede that several church officials had told him

that day that if he did not get Porter’s permission to

be at the funeral then he could not be at the church

and needed to leave. During this conversation, the plain-

tiff did not tell Jones that he disputed whether the

church had the authority to dismiss him or provide any

specific details about his lawsuit. Jones also did not

ask for such information.

Jones then arrested the plaintiff for criminal trespass.

A different officer arrived at the church and transported

the plaintiff to the police station, where he was booked

and released on his own recognizance. On September 2,

2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the criminal

trespassing charge, and that motion to dismiss was

granted by the court on January 13, 2017.

On July 18, 2017, the plaintiff instituted the underlying

action against the four defendants and the Hartford

Police Department by way of a thirteen count com-

plaint.7 In October, 2017, the plaintiff filed a revised

complaint that included two additional counts, bringing

the total number to fifteen counts. The second count

of the revised complaint alleged that the defendants

had conspired to deprive the plaintiff of his civil rights

in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3).8 The city and Jones

moved to strike that count, arguing that the plaintiff

had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish the exis-

tence of an agreement between the defendants regard-

ing their intent to harm the plaintiff. The court, Hon.

A. Susan Peck, judge trial referee, granted the motion

to strike. The city and Jones then filed an answer and

special defenses to the plaintiff’s revised complaint. In

addition to denying the plaintiff’s allegations that they

had engaged in any wrongful conduct, the city and Jones

pleaded several special defenses of immunity, including

that Jones was entitled to qualified immunity because

his conduct ‘‘was reasonable under the circumstances.’’

Thereafter, the case went to a jury trial on three counts:

false arrest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 19839 (count one)

as to Jones and the city, and intentional infliction of

emotional distress (count eleven) and slander per se

(count fifteen) as to Porter and the church.10 After a

four day trial, the jury found for the city and Jones on

the § 1983 claim. The jury also found for Porter and the

church on the slander per se claim. On the intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim, however, the jury

found for the plaintiff and awarded him $30,000 in com-

pensatory damages, but found that the plaintiff was not

entitled to punitive damages because Porter and the

church had not acted in reckless disregard of the plain-

tiff’s rights. The court, Noble, J., accepted the jury’s

verdict. Although Porter and the church filed motions

to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, which the

court denied, the plaintiff filed no posttrial motions

challenging the jury’s verdict. This appeal followed.11

Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth

below as necessary.

I

The plaintiff claims that the jury erred by not

returning a plaintiff’s verdict on his § 1983 claim. Specif-

ically, the plaintiff argues that there was insufficient

evidence for the jury to have reasonably concluded that

Jones had probable cause to arrest him. We are not

persuaded.

We first address whether this claim was properly

preserved for appellate review. Jones and the city argue

that this court cannot consider the plaintiff’s sufficiency

of the evidence claim because the plaintiff never chal-

lenged the jury’s verdict at trial through a motion for

a directed verdict or any postverdict motions at all and,

thus, the claim is unpreserved and unreviewable. Jones

and the city further argue that we should not apply

plain error review to this unpreserved claim because the

plaintiff never requested such review in his initial brief.

Generally speaking, this court ‘‘shall not be bound

to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at

the trial or arose subsequent to the trial.’’ Practice Book

§ 60-5. Both this court and our Supreme Court, however,

have left open the question of whether a party in a civil

case must file a motion to set aside the verdict in order

to secure full appellate review of a sufficiency of the

evidence claim. See Thorsen v. Durkin Development,

LLC, 129 Conn. App. 68, 74 n.6, 20 A.3d 707 (2011)

(‘‘[w]e note . . . that the Santopietro [v. New Haven,

239 Conn. 207, 213 n.9, 682 A.2d 106 (1996)] court explic-

itly left open the question of whether a motion to set

aside the verdict is essential to full appellate review

of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)); see also Santopietro v. New

Haven, supra, 213 n.9. We need not resolve this question

in the present case because we conclude that the plain-

tiff’s claim fails on the merits. See Blumberg Associates

Worldwide, Inc. v. Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc.,

311 Conn. 123, 158 n.28, 84 A.3d 840 (2014) (‘‘[r]eview-

ing an unpreserved claim when the party that raised the

claim cannot prevail is appropriate because it cannot

prejudice the opposing party and such review presum-

ably would provide the party who failed to properly

preserve the claim with a sense of finality that the party

would not have if the court declined to review the

claim’’).

We begin with the applicable standard of review and

principles of law that guide our analysis. ‘‘A party chal-

lenging the validity of the jury’s verdict on grounds that

there was insufficient evidence to support such a result

carries a difficult burden. In reviewing the soundness

of a jury’s verdict, we construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. . . . We do

not ask whether we would have reached the same

result. [R]ather, we must determine . . . whether the

totality of the evidence, including reasonable inferences

therefrom, supports the jury’s verdict . . . . If the jury

could reasonably have reached its conclusion, the ver-

dict must stand.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Wager v. Moore, 193 Conn. App. 608, 616, 220 A.3d 48

(2019); see also Carrano v. Yale-New Haven Hospital,

279 Conn. 622, 645, 904 A.2d 149 (2006) (‘‘[i]t is not the

function of this court to sit as the seventh juror when

we review the sufficiency of the evidence’’ (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

The plaintiff’s § 1983 claim was based on his allega-

tion that Jones falsely arrested him for criminal trespass

in the first degree without probable cause. False arrest

‘‘is the unlawful restraint by one person of the physical

liberty of another.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Outlaw v. Meriden, 43 Conn. App. 387, 392, 682 A.2d

1112, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 946, 686 A.2d 122 (1996).

To prevail on a claim of false arrest, the plaintiff must

establish that the arrest was made without probable

cause. See Beinhorn v. Saraceno, 23 Conn. App. 487,

491, 582 A.2d 208 (1990), cert. denied, 217 Conn. 809,

585 A.2d 1233 (1991). ‘‘Because probable cause to arrest

constitutes justification, there can be no claim for false

arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause

to arrest the plaintiff.’’ Escalera v. Lunn, 361 F.3d 737,

743 (2d Cir. 2004).

‘‘Probable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts

as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reason-

able mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to

believe that criminal activity has occurred. . . . It is

a flexible common sense standard that does not require

the police officer’s belief to be correct or more likely

true than false. . . . Probable cause for an arrest is

based on the objective facts available to the officer at

the time of arrest, not on the officer’s subjective state

of mind. . . . [W]hile probable cause requires more

than mere suspicion . . . the line between mere suspi-

cion and probable cause necessarily must be drawn by

an act of judgment formed in light of the particular

situation and with account taken of all the circum-

stances. . . . The existence of probable cause does not

turn on whether the defendant could have been con-

victed on the same available evidence. . . . Indeed,

proof of probable cause requires less than proof by

a preponderance of the evidence.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Washington v.

Blackmore, 119 Conn. App. 218, 221–22, 986 A.2d 356,

cert. denied, 296 Conn. 903, 991 A.2d 1104 (2010). ‘‘The

determination of whether probable cause exists . . .

is made pursuant to a totality of circumstances test.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Days, 89

Conn. App. 789, 803, 875 A.2d 59, cert. denied, 275 Conn.

909, 882 A.2d 677 (2005).

Moreover, when, as here, the defense of qualified

immunity has been asserted, ‘‘the defending officer need

only show arguable probable cause. . . . This is

because at its heart, [t]he concern of the immunity

inquiry is to acknowledge that reasonable mistakes can

be made as to the legal constraints on particular police

conduct. . . . Officers can have reasonable, but mis-

taken, beliefs as to the facts establishing the existence

of probable cause . . . and in those situations courts

will not hold that they have violated the [c]onstitution.

. . . Therefore, in situations where an officer may have

reasonably but mistakenly concluded that probable

cause existed, the officer is nonetheless entitled to qual-

ified immunity.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156,

162 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Weyel v. Catania, 52 Conn.

App. 292, 296, 728 A.2d 512 (‘‘[t]he defense of qualified

immunity shields government officials from civil liabil-

ity if . . . it was objectively reasonable for the official

to believe that the conduct did not violate such rights’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 248

Conn. 922, 733 A.2d 846 (1999).

Jones arrested the plaintiff for criminal trespass in

the first degree. General Statutes § 53a-107 (a) provides

in relevant part that ‘‘[a] person is guilty of criminal

trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that

such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such

person enters or remains in a building or any other

premises after an order to leave or not to enter person-

ally communicated to such person by the owner of the

premises or other authorized person . . . .’’

We now turn to the evidence presented to the jury

regarding whether probable cause existed for Jones to

arrest the plaintiff. Jones and the city rely on the follow-

ing evidence. Before arriving at the church, Jones was

told by Antuna that the church had given the plaintiff

a letter telling him that he had been dismissed from the

church and was no longer allowed on church property.

McGuire reiterated this same information to Jones after

he arrived at the church. McGuire also informed Jones

that the plaintiff had been verbally warned numerous

times, prior to Jones’ arrival that day, not to return to

the church. Further, when Jones spoke with the plaintiff

before arresting him, the plaintiff admitted to receiving

the letter telling him that he was banned from the

church. The plaintiff also admitted to Jones that several

church officials had told him that he needed to leave

the premises if he was not going to ask Porter for

permission to attend the funeral. Jones and the city

argue that, based on this evidence, it was reasonable

for Jones to believe that the plaintiff knew that he was

not allowed at the church and that he had failed to

obey repeated requests not to return from those with

authority over the church premises. See General Stat-

utes § 53a-107 (a) (1). Accordingly, there was sufficient

evidence from which the jury reasonably could have

concluded that Jones had either actual or arguable prob-

able cause to arrest the plaintiff.

In response, the plaintiff argues that the evidence

relied on by Jones and the city was insufficient evidence

to support the jury’s finding that probable cause existed

for his arrest because the plaintiff told Jones that he

had a right to be at the church, given (1) the pending

lawsuit between him and the church, and (2) the fact

that he and his family were longtime members.

According to the plaintiff, this information provided

Jones with possible exculpatory evidence and he was

therefore required to investigate the plaintiff’s version

of events before arresting him for trespass. Conse-

quently, because Jones failed to do this additional

investigating, which would have established that the

plaintiff did not know that he was not allowed at the

church, there could not have been probable cause for

him to arrest the plaintiff. On the basis of our review

of the record, and given our standard of review, we

conclude that the plaintiff’s claim fails.

First, the jury was not required to infer that because

the plaintiff had a lawsuit with the church that meant

that he was challenging his expulsion from the church.

In fact, Jones testified that the plaintiff never told him

that he disputed the validity of his expulsion from the

church. It was for the jury to decide whether to credit

Jones’ testimony on this issue. See Micalizzi v. Stewart,

181 Conn. App. 671, 691, 188 A.3d 159 (2018) (‘‘[i]t is

the [jury’s] exclusive province to weigh the conflicting

evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses’’

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Furthermore, the

fact that the plaintiff and his family had been longtime

members of the church did not require that the jury

infer that the plaintiff still must be welcome there. The

jury was free to accept the evidence it heard that the

plaintiff, although having been a longtime member, had

been expelled and told that he was no longer welcome

at the church.

Second, even if Jones had been told or could have

inferred that the plaintiff was challenging his expulsion,

such information would not undermine a reasonable

conclusion that probable cause existed to arrest the

plaintiff. Police are often confronted with conflicting

information, and an officer’s decision to rely on infor-

mation that is disputed does not mean that there is no

probable cause for the arrest. For example, in Curley

v. Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 68–70 (2d Cir. 2001), the plaintiff

brought a § 1983 claim for false arrest against the defen-

dant village and several officers after he was arrested

following a barroom brawl at Mugg’s Pub, an establish-

ment in which he was a part owner. When the defendant

officers arrived at Mugg’s Pub, they were given two

different stories about the plaintiff’s participation in the

brawl. Id., 69. The plaintiff told the officers that he was

trying to break up the fight when he accidentally hit

the victim, but the victim told the officers that the plain-

tiff had ‘‘punched him in the arm and thrown an ashtray

at him.’’ Id. Despite these two different versions of

events, the police arrested the plaintiff and charged him

with assault, resisting arrest, obstructing governmental

administration, and disorderly conduct. Id., 68. After

the assault charge was dismissed, the plaintiff’s criminal

case went to trial where he was acquitted by the jury

on the remaining counts. Id. He then sued the village

and the officers who arrested him for false arrest in

violation of his civil rights by arresting him without

probable cause. The United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York granted a motion

for summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit held that there was sufficient probable

cause for the plaintiff’s arrest, even in light of the con-

flicting factual accounts. Id., 70. This was so because

probable cause for an arrest exists even when an officer

is presented with different stories from the arrestee

and the alleged victim. Id. Thus, an arresting officer is

not required to disprove an arrestee’s version of events

before arresting him. Id. The court further held that

probable cause existed despite the officer’s failure to

conduct a more thorough investigation into the plain-

tiff’s story, because ‘‘[o]nce a police officer has a reason-

able basis for believing there is probable cause, he is not

required to explore and eliminate every theoretically

plausible claim of innocence before making an arrest.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In the present case, like in Curley, neither the plain-

tiff’s version of events nor Jones’ failure to investigate

the plaintiff’s story negates the fact that Jones had prob-

able cause to arrest the plaintiff based on what Antuna,

McGuire, and the plaintiff himself told Jones regarding

whether the plaintiff was allowed at the church. See

id.; see also Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d

Cir. 2000) (‘‘[P]olice officers, when making a probable

cause determination, are entitled to rely on the victims’

allegations that a crime has been committed. . . . They

are also entitled to rely on the allegations of fellow

police officers.’’ (Citation omitted.)). Further, ‘‘[i]t

would be unreasonable and impractical to require that

every innocent explanation for activity that suggests

criminal behavior be proved wrong, or even contra-

dicted, before an arrest warrant could be issued with

impunity. . . . It is up to the factfinder to determine

whether [an arrestee’s] story holds water, not the

arresting officer.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Dubinsky v. Black, 185 Conn. App. 53, 68, 196 A.3d

870 (2018).

The plaintiff is correct that officers may not wholly

ignore information that they receive from suspects and

that probable cause will not exist when minimal further

investigation would have exonerated the suspect. See

Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650–51 (8th Cir. 1999).

That, however, is not the case here, where the jury

was presented with evidence from several witnesses,

including the plaintiff, that Jones was repeatedly told

that the plaintiff (1) was not supposed to be at the

church unless he had prior permission from Porter that

he refused to seek, (2) knew that he was not otherwise

supposed to be there, and (3) had ignored orders by

church officials to leave because he did not otherwise

have permission to be there. See id., 650 (weight of all

evidence must be analyzed when determining if proba-

ble cause exists). Furthermore, this is not a case where,

had Jones investigated further, the plaintiff would have

been exonerated. Instead, any further investigation by

Jones would have resulted in the same facts that he

already knew, namely, that the church had purported

to dismiss the plaintiff as a member and had banned

him from church property, and that the plaintiff was

aware of his banishment but disagreed with it. See id.

(‘‘[a]n officer need not conduct a ‘mini-trial’ before mak-

ing an arrest’’). Therefore, the fact that the plaintiff

provided Jones with a different version of the facts and

his rights than that which had been conveyed to him

by Antuna and McGuire does not necessitate a conclu-

sion that the evidence was insufficient to support the

jury’s finding that probable cause existed for his arrest.

Finally, we are not persuaded by the plaintiff’s argu-

ment that it was unreasonable for the jury to conclude

that Jones had probable cause to arrest him because

(1) the plaintiff believed that he had a right to be at

the church and (2) the funeral was open to the public.

Both of these factual contentions constitute affirmative

defenses to criminal trespass. See General Statutes

§ 53a-110 (‘‘[i]t shall be an affirmative defense to prose-

cution for criminal trespass that . . . (2) the premises,

at the time of the entry or remaining, were open to the

public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions

imposed on access to or remaining in the premises; or

(3) the actor reasonably believed that . . . he was

licensed to [enter or remain in the premises]’’). The

existence of a possible affirmative defense to a criminal

charge is neither inconsistent with nor undermines the

existence of probable cause, in the absence of plainly

exculpatory evidence, for an arrest on that charge. The

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

has recently explained: ‘‘To be sure, we have held that

an ‘officer’s failure to investigate an arrestee’s protesta-

tions of innocence generally does not vitiate probable

cause,’ Panetta [v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 396 (2d Cir.

2006)], as ‘[i]t is up to the factfinder to determine

whether a defendant’s story holds water, not the

arresting officer,’ Krause [v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 372

(2d Cir. 1989)]. But we have also consistently held . . .

that ‘an officer may not disregard plainly exculpatory

evidence.’ Panetta [v. Crowley, supra], 395.’’ Washing-

ton v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2022); see

also Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557, 571 n.21, 572

(6th Cir. 1999). In Painter, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit discussed when alleged

affirmative defenses should play a role in the probable

cause determination, stating: ‘‘[W]here a reasonable

police officer would conclusively know that an [arrest-

ee’s] behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affir-

mative defense, that officer lacks a legal foundation to

arrest that person for that behavior. . . . In all other

cases, the merits of an alleged affirmative defense

should be assessed by prosecutors and judges, not

policemen.’’ (Citation omitted.) Painter v. Robertson,

supra, 571 n.21. In the present case, the jury reasonably

could have concluded that further investigation by

Jones would not have conclusively established either

of the claimed special defenses to a charge of criminal

trespass.

In sum, on the basis of the evidence introduced at

trial, the jury reasonably could have concluded that

Jones had either actual or arguable probable cause to

arrest the plaintiff for criminal trespass. Accordingly,

the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict

for the city and Jones on the § 1983 claim.

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court erred in strik-

ing the civil conspiracy count in his revised complaint.12

We are not persuaded.

We first set forth our standard of review and the

applicable law. ‘‘The standard of review in an appeal

challenging a trial court’s granting of a motion to strike

is well established. A motion to strike challenges the

legal sufficiency of a pleading, and, consequently,

requires no factual findings by the trial court. As a

result, our review of the court’s ruling is plenary. . . .

We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint

that has been stricken and we construe the complaint

in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal

sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in the com-

plaint would support a cause of action, the motion to

strike must be denied. . . . A motion to strike is prop-

erly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions

of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.’’ (Cita-

tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Donar

v. King Associates, Inc., 67 Conn. App. 346, 349, 786

A.2d 1256 (2001).

In the second count of his revised complaint, the

plaintiff alleged that all of the defendants conspired, in

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3), to violate his civil

rights. As for the underlying facts supporting his claim,

the plaintiff incorporated into the second count the

factual allegations he pleaded in his first count alleging

his § 1983 claim for false arrest. The plaintiff alleged,

relevant to his conspiracy claim, that the church and

Porter ‘‘falsely informed the [Hartford Police Depart-

ment] that the plaintiff was trespassing and sought [his]

removal from the church and his arrest and criminal

prosecution.’’ The plaintiff further alleged that Jones

‘‘[i]n response to [the church and Porter’s] request . . .

[and] without undertaking any investigation . . .

arrested the plaintiff . . . .’’ The city and Jones moved

to strike the § 1985 (3) count because the complaint

failed to allege facts showing a conspiratorial purpose

among the defendants. The court agreed, holding that

the plaintiff failed ‘‘to set forth specific facts alleging an

‘agreement between the [defendants] to inflict a wrong

against or injury upon another . . . .’ ’’

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the revised com-

plaint sufficiently alleged his § 1985 (3) claim because

it ‘‘explicitly alleged and necessarily implied [facts]

. . . that the defendants maliciously conspired’’ to vio-

late the plaintiff’s civil rights. He also argues that the

complaint alleged acts taken in furtherance of the con-

spiracy in that Porter and the church were ‘‘working

together’’ with Jones and the city as evidenced by Jones

‘‘simply accepting false information without doing any

investigation . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.

‘‘In order to state a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985 (3), a plaintiff must show: (1) a conspiracy; (2)

for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indi-

rectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro-

tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities

under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspir-

acy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person

or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a

citizen of the United States. . . . A § 1985 (3) conspir-

acy must also be motivated by some racial or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidious discriminatory animus

behind the conspirators’ action.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Cine SK8, Inc. v.

Henrietta, 507 F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir. 2007). Further, to

maintain an action for civil conspiracy, ‘‘the plaintiff

must provide some factual basis supporting a meeting

of the minds, such that [the] defendants entered into

an agreement, express or tacit, to achieve the unlawful

end.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chen v. Zhao,

799 Fed. Appx. 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2020).

The plaintiff’s complaint, even when read broadly,

wholly fails to set forth any facts that allege a conspira-

torial agreement between the four defendants. With

regard to the specific actions that the defendants alleg-

edly took in concert, the complaint states only that

Porter and the church falsely reported that the plaintiff

was trespassing and that, ‘‘[i]n response,’’ Jones arrested

the plaintiff without conducting any investigation. These

allegations, however, make no mention of any agree-

ment between the defendants to inflict harm or injury

upon the plaintiff, as is required to establish a civil

conspiracy. See Chen v. Zhao, supra, 799 Fed. Appx. 19.

In fact, the word ‘‘agreement’’ is not mentioned once

in the entire complaint and there are also no facts

alleged that would support the conclusion that an agree-

ment of any type, explicit or implicit, existed between

the four defendants. An allegation that one defendant

merely took action based on a request of, and false

information provided by, another defendant is, without

more, insufficient to set forth a § 1985 (3) claim that

the defendants had reached an agreement to engage in

illegal conduct. Accordingly, because the facts alleged

in the complaint do not sufficiently support an action

for a § 1985 (3) civil conspiracy, the court did not err

in striking that claim.

III

Finally, the plaintiff claims that the jury erred when it

failed to award him punitive damages on his intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim, despite returning

a verdict for him on that claim. Specifically, the plaintiff

argues that because the jury found Porter and the

church liable for the intentional infliction of emotional

distress, the jury must have also determined that Porter

and the church had engaged in outrageous conduct and,

thus, the plaintiff was entitled to punitive damages. We

conclude that this claim was not properly preserved

and, therefore, decline to review it.

We begin by setting forth the legal principles relevant

to our determination of whether a claim properly was

preserved for appellate review. ‘‘It is well settled that

[o]ur case law and rules of practice generally limit [an

appellate] court’s review to issues that are distinctly

raised at trial. . . . [O]nly in [the] most exceptional

circumstances can and will this court consider a claim,

constitutional or otherwise, that has not been raised

and decided in the trial court. . . . The reason for the

rule is obvious: to permit a party to raise a claim on

appeal that has not been raised at trial—after it is too

late for the trial court or the opposing party to address

the claim—would encourage trial by ambuscade, which

is unfair to both the trial court and the opposing party.

. . . [See] Practice Book § 60-5 (‘court shall not be

bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised

at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial’). [T]he

determination of whether a claim has been properly

preserved will depend on a careful review of the record

to ascertain whether the claim on appeal was articu-

lated below with sufficient clarity to place the trial court

[and the opposing party] on reasonable notice of that

very same claim.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Alpha Beta Capital Partners, L.P. v.

Pursuit Investment Management, LLC, 193 Conn. App.

381, 454–55, 219 A.3d 801 (2019), cert. denied, 334 Conn.

911, 221 A.3d 446 (2020), and cert. denied, 334 Conn.

911, 221 A.3d 446 (2020).

The following additional procedural history is rele-

vant to this claim. Prior to the start of jury deliberations,

the court and all of the parties agreed to submit a

single verdict form to the jury. With regard to punitive

damages, the verdict form asked: ‘‘Do you find that [the]

plaintiff proved that [the] defendants acted in reckless

disregard of [the] plaintiff’s rights and therefore that

[the] plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages?’’ The

plaintiff never argued before the court that if the jury

returned a verdict for the plaintiff on his intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim, he was necessar-

ily entitled to an award of punitive damages. Nor did

the plaintiff request that the question of whether to

award punitive damages be left to the court, if the jury

returned a verdict for the plaintiff. Instead, with the

plaintiff’s agreement, the question of whether to award

punitive damages on that claim was left to the jury’s

discretion.13

The plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument

before this court that he had reviewed and approved the

verdict form before it was submitted to the jury. He further

conceded at oral argument that he never objected to

the verdict form as drafted. He also never requested

that the form be changed to say that if the jury found

for the plaintiff on the intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim then it was required to award him puni-

tive damages. Finally, the plaintiff did not object during

the trial when the court instructed the jury: ‘‘The law

does not require you to award punitive damages. It is

instead a matter for your sound discretion.’’

Given the plaintiff’s failure to challenge in the trial

court the verdict form or jury instructions, and, in fact,

his agreement with the form as written and submitted

to the jury, we conclude that the plaintiff’s challenge

on appeal to the jury’s verdict regarding punitive dam-

ages was not preserved. Accordingly, we decline to

review this claim. See Practice Book § 60-5.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In his initial complaint, the plaintiff also named the Hartford Police

Department (department) as a defendant. The plaintiff, however, withdrew

his action against the department before trial. Accordingly, the department

is not participating in this appeal, and all references to the defendants are

to Porter, the city, Jones and the church.

2

Porter and the church filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal on

the basis of untimeliness, lack of preservation, and because the plaintiff’s

notice of intent to appeal, filed after trial but before the court ruled on

posttrial motions, referred to Jones and the city only, and did not include

the church and Porter. The plaintiff filed an objection and argued therein

that Porter and the church’s motion to dismiss was untimely. This court

denied the motion to dismiss.

3

More specifically, on April 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed a four count com-

plaint against Porter and the church, alleging violations of his constitutional

rights to free speech and freedom of religion, slander, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The

plaintiff requested that an injunction be issued to prevent the church from

dismissing him and also sought money damages. Porter and the church later

filed an answer to the plaintiff’s complaint. They also filed a counterclaim

against the plaintiff, alleging counts of defamation, libel per se, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.

In July, 2016, the court held an evidentiary hearing in the matter on the

plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. During the hearing, the court raised,

sua sponte, the issue of whether it had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve

that request given that the first amendment to the United States constitution

generally prohibits state involvement in the internal doctrinal matters of

religious organizations. The court heard argument from the parties on that

issue in August, 2016. Then, in December, 2016, the court issued a memoran-

dum of decision wherein it determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction

to resolve the plaintiff’s claim for an injunction. In that same decision, the

court agreed with the plaintiff that, under the church’s bylaws, church

officials alone did not have the authority to dismiss members. Instead, the

church’s membership as a whole was the only body with such authority.

The court, however, also concluded that the church had not yet had an

opportunity to present evidence on whether a proper vote to expel the

plaintiff had occurred. Given that, in March, 2017, the court held a second

evidentiary hearing, at which the church conceded that its original dismissal

of the plaintiff was not ‘‘an act expressly within the authority of’’ church

leadership. By then, though, the church had held a formal meeting during

which the congregation as a whole voted to dismiss the plaintiff from the

church. On April 3, 2017, the court issued a second memorandum of decision,

in which it concluded that the congregation’s vote to dismiss the plaintiff

‘‘was a valid expression of the corporate body of the church.’’ Accordingly,

the court denied the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. The plaintiff

appealed that judgment to this court, and we dismissed the appeal for lack

of a final judgment.

The plaintiff’s nonconstitutional counts remained viable after the court’s

April 3, 2017 decision, and the plaintiff continued to litigate those claims.

On January 28, 2019, after a bench trial, the court rejected the plaintiff’s

remaining claims. The court then rendered judgment for Porter on his negli-

gent infliction of emotional distress counterclaim and awarded him $15,000

in damages. The plaintiff appealed that judgment to this court, and we

affirmed. Campbell v. Shiloh Baptist Church, 201 Conn. App. 902, 239 A.3d

387 (2020).

4

Jones testified at trial that he talked with Porter at the church. Porter,

however, testified that he never spoke to Jones and that it was instead

McGuire that Jones spoke with.

5

Jones testified at trial that he asked an usher to direct the plaintiff to

go into the foyer of the church, and that, from there, Jones asked the plaintiff

to step outside. The plaintiff, however, testified that Jones came up to him

while he was sitting in the sanctuary, tapped him on the shoulder, and

ordered him to go outside.

6

See footnote 3 of this opinion.

7

As noted in footnote 1 of this opinion, the plaintiff withdrew his action

against the department before trial.

8

Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1985 (3), provides in relevant part:

‘‘If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise

on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving,

either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;

or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of

any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such

State or Territory the equal protection of the laws . . . in any case of

conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein

do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspir-

acy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of

having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States,

the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of

damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more

of the conspirators.’’

9

Title 42 of the United States Code, § 1983, provides in relevant part:

‘‘Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-

tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding

for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for

an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief

shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory

relief was unavailable. . . .’’

10

The remaining counts were dispensed with in various ways. In response

to a request to revise that was filed by the city and Jones, the plaintiff

submitted a revised complaint that deleted count ten. The plaintiff later

withdrew counts three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, twelve, and fourteen.

As to count thirteen, the parties stipulated that the city was liable to indem-

nify Jones for any damages awarded to the plaintiff for which he would be

responsible.

11

Although Porter and the church never appealed or cross appealed from

the judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the intentional infliction of emotional

distress claim, they did file preliminary papers pursuant to Practice Book

§ 63-4 in this appeal, suggesting that they intended to pursue a cross appeal.

In response, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss any possible cross appeal

as untimely. This court ordered that it was unnecessary to rule on the

plaintiff’s motion because Porter and the church never actually filed a cross

appeal. Thereafter, Porter and the church took no further action to pursue

a cross appeal.

12

For the sake of clarity and ease of discussion, we have reordered the

claims as they are set forth in the plaintiff’s brief.

13

We note that this is consistent with Connecticut law. See Kenny v. Civil

Service Commission, 197 Conn. 270, 277, 496 A.2d 956 (1985) (‘‘[t]he extent

to which exemplary damages are to be awarded ordinarily rests in the

discretion of the trier of the facts’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).