David Bryan Crespo v. State of Georgia

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11323

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

DAVID BRYAN CRESPO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF GEORGIA,

ALEX STONE,

District Attorney, Walton County, Alcovy Judicial Circuit,

LAYLA H ZON,

Assistant District Attorney, Walton County, Alcovy Judicial Cir-

cuit,

BRIAN GRANGER,

Assistant District Attorney, Walton County, Alcovy Judicial Cir-

cuit,

JOE CHAPMAN,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11323

Sheriff, Walton County, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-00038-CAR

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

David Bryan Crespo, proceeding pro se, appeals the district

court’s grant of the defendants’ motions to dismiss his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 complaint bringing claims of false arrest and malicious pros-

ecution. He argues that the defendants maliciously prosecuted him

on a rape charge of which he was found innocent by jury. Because

each of these claims are precluded by the defendants’ absolute or

qualified immunity, and because there was sufficient probable

cause to initiate criminal process against Crespo, we affirm.

I.

In March 2016, Jeri Blakeman and her husband filed a crimi-

nal complaint with the Sheriff’s Office of Walton County, Georgia,

alleging that Crespo had raped her. A year after the Blakemans filed

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21-11323 Opinion of the Court 3

their complaint, Crespo was charged with rape and arrested. Cre-

spo then posted bail and was placed under house arrest with an

electronic ankle monitor. He alleges that, while he was under

house arrest, the defendants repeatedly harassed his pregnant girl-

friend and caused her to miscarry their unborn child. The defend-

ants also denied him permission to visit his girlfriend in the hospi-

tal.

In April 2017, the defendants obtained a grand jury indict-

ment against Crespo. But he alleges that, during the grand jury pro-

cess, the defendants ignored and concealed evidence, including

that Blakeman had a history of making false rape accusations. Cre-

spo was tried for rape in October 2019, and the jury acquitted him.

Crespo later filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

false arrest and malicious prosecution against the State of Georgia,

the prosecuting attorneys, Walton County, various personnel from

the Sheriff’s Office, Eric Yarbrough (an investigator for the District

Attorney’s office), and the Blakemans. The district court later per-

mitted him to amend his complaint to add claims for feticide under

Georgia law.

The defendants moved for dismissal, which the district court

granted. It first concluded that Crespo’s false arrest claims were

time-barred, and that they were improper because he was arrested

under a warrant.

As for the malicious prosecution claims, the court deter-

mined that the State of Georgia and the state officials acting in their

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11323

official capacities were entitled to sovereign immunity. It also held

that Walton County could not be liable for the actions of the pros-

ecutors or the Sheriff’s Office personnel because they were func-

tioning as state actors. The court then held that the prosecutors had

absolute prosecutorial immunity against claims of malicious pros-

ecution in their individual capacity. And it concluded that Crespo

failed to state a claim of malicious prosecution against the remain-

ing defendants in their individual capacities because none of them

instituted or influenced his prosecution, and because he was pros-

ecuted with probable cause. It likewise held that the Blakemans

could not be sued under Section 1983 because they were private

citizens, not state actors. Finally, the district court dismissed Cre-

spo’s state-law claims without prejudice because it was dismissing

all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Crespo now ap-

peals.

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss, “accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and constru-

ing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Chaparro v.

Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). We liberally

construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard

than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007).

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21-11323 Opinion of the Court 5

III.

On appeal, Crespo argues that the district court erred in dis-

missing his claims for malicious prosecution against the prosecut-

ing attorneys, Yarbrough, and the Sheriff’s Office personnel.

His initial brief does not challenge the district court’s hold-

ings that his false arrest claims were improper and time-barred, that

the State of Georgia and state officials acting in their official capac-

ities were entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity,

that Walton County could not be liable for malicious prosecution

based on the acts or omissions of state actors, that the Blakemans

could not be liable under Section 1983 as private citizens, or that

Crespo’s state-law claims should be dismissed on jurisdictional

grounds. He has therefore abandoned all those issues. See Timson

v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ssues not briefed

on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”); Sapuppo

v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681-83 (11th Cir. 2014)

(holding that a party abandons a claim or issue by failing to raise it

“plainly and prominently” in his initial brief). We accordingly limit

our discussion to Crespo’s malicious prosecution claims against the

prosecutors, Yarbrough, and the Sheriff’s Office personnel in their

individual capacities.

We first address Crespo’s malicious prosecution claims

against the prosecutors—Zon, Fletcher, Stone, and Granger. Cre-

spo argues that these individuals were not entitled to prosecutorial

immunity because they lied and presented fabricated evidence

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11323

before the grand jury and the trial court. But those allegations, even

if true, do not overcome the prosecutors’ immunity. “A prosecutor

enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from the

prosecutor’s function as advocate.” Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288,

1295 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281

(11th Cir. 1999)). That function includes seeking an indictment and

presenting the government’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.

409, 430–31 (1976)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986). And

when acting in such a capacity, prosecutors are immune even for

presenting false testimony and suppressing evidence. Imbler, 424

U.S. at 416, 430; Rowe v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271,

1279–80 (11th Cir. 2002). Because Crespo alleges only that the pros-

ecutors engaged in such misconduct in their capacities as advo-

cates, the district court correctly held that they are entitled to ab-

solute immunity.

We next consider Crespo’s malicious prosecution claims

against Yarbrough and certain officers from the Sheriff’s Office. It

is undisputed that all these individuals were law enforcement offic-

ers acting within their discretionary authority. So they are each en-

titled to qualified immunity unless Crespo shows that (1) they vio-

lated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlaw-

fulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time of the

alleged violation. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir.

2019).

Crespo’s malicious prosecution claims fail to meet the first

of these requirements. “A claim of malicious prosecution under the

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21-11323 Opinion of the Court 7

Fourth Amendment is only ‘shorthand’ for a claim of deprivation

of liberty pursuant to legal process, so the validity of these claims

depends on whether the seizure was justified . . . .” Laskar v. Hurd,

972 F.3d 1278, 1292 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, the plaintiff must

prove, among other things, that the defendants “instituted criminal

process against him ‘with malice and without probable cause.’” Id.

at 1284 (quoting Paez, 915 F.3d at 1285). Where an arrest warrant

is concerned, the plaintiff must “must establish either ‘that the of-

ficer who applied for the warrant should have known that his ap-

plication failed to establish probable cause’ or ‘that an official, in-

cluding an individual who did not apply for the warrant, intention-

ally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions necessary to

support the warrant.’” Id. at 1296 (quoting Williams v. Aguirre, 965

F.3d 1147, 1165 (11th Cir. 2020)).

“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” Paez, 915 F.3d at 1286

(quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018)).

It “requires only a probability or substantial chance”—not “con-

vincing proof”—of criminal activity. Id. (quoting Wesby, 138 S. Ct.

at 586; Manners v. Cannella, 891 F.3d 959, 968 (11th Cir. 2018)). To

establish probable cause, an officer need not “sift through conflict-

ing evidence or resolve issues of credibility, so long as the totality

of the circumstances present a sufficient basis for believing that an

offense has been committed.” Id. at 1286 (quoting Dahl v. Holley,

312 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds

by Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 138 S. Ct. 1945 (2018)). “Gen-

erally, an officer is entitled to rely on a victim’s criminal complaint

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as support for probable cause.” Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425,

1441 (11th Cir. 1998).

Crespo has failed to adequately allege that Yarbrough or any

of the Sheriff’s Office defendants maliciously prosecuted him. As

an initial matter, he does not specify which of these defendants in-

stituted or continued criminal process against him. But in any

event, the seizure and later indictment were apparently based in

part on a criminal complaint by Jeri Blakeman stating that Crespo

had raped her. This criminal complaint established probable cause,

which is fatal to Crespo’s malicious prosecution claims. See Laskar,

972 F.3d at 1284; Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1441.

Still, Crespo alleges that Blakeman had a history of making

false rape accusations. And he alleges that “the Defendants” ig-

nored and concealed this fact before charges were filed. But even if

Blakeman’s alleged history of false accusations had been disclosed

to the judge issuing the warrant and later to the grand jury, it

would not have negated a finding of probable cause. The officers

did not need to present “convincing proof” of Crespo’s guilt, and

the criminal complaint raised a sufficiently “substantial chance” of

criminal activity to support probable cause. See Paez, 915 F.3d at

1286. And in initiating criminal process, the officers were not re-

quired to “sift through conflicting evidence” to determine Blake-

man’s credibility. See Dahl, 312 F.3d at 1234. Because probable

cause existed, Crespo has failed to allege that he was maliciously

prosecuted in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. See Las-

kar, 972 F.3d at 1284. The defendant officers are therefore entitled

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21-11323 Opinion of the Court 9

to qualified immunity, and the district court correctly granted dis-

missal.

IV.

AFFIRMED.