Opinion

Bailey, Marie v. Amazon

  • 2022 TN WC App. 16
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
May 3, 2022
Status
Published
On the bench
Timothy W. Conner, Pele I. Godkin
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.3%

The opinion

FILED

May 03, 2022

10:22 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Marie P. Bailey ) Docket No. 2021-01-0057

)

v. ) State File No. 800047-2021

)

Amazon, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )

Affirmed and Remanded

The employee reported an injury to her right arm and shoulder when it was struck by a

large cart at work. The employer initially accepted the claim as compensable and

authorized medical treatment. Following two missed medical appointments, the employer

denied the claim and refused to authorize additional medical care. After an expedited

hearing, the trial court concluded the employee had come forward with sufficient evidence

to show a likelihood of prevailing at trial with respect to her claim for additional medical

benefits. The employer has appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order and remand the

case.

Presiding Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which

Judge Pele I. Godkin joined.

W. Troy Hart and Matthew B. Morris, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant,

Amazon

Carmen Y. Ware, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Marie P. Bailey

Factual and Procedural Background

Marie P. Bailey (“Employee”) worked for Amazon (“Employer”) as a sorter. On

November 15, 2020, Employee was moving a large cart when another cart was pushed into

her, causing her to strike her right hand and arm against a cart. Employee reported the

incident and went to Employer’s onsite medical clinic where she received initial treatment

for pain, swelling, and bruising in her hand. The following day, she returned to the onsite

clinic and requested additional medical care. She was provided a panel of physicians from

1

which she selected Dr. Robert Sass. On November 24, 2020, Dr. Sass ordered x-rays of

the right hand, which revealed no fractures, and diagnosed Employee with a contusion of

the right hand. Employee was scheduled for a return visit on December 1, but the record

on appeal contains no report of a medical visit on that date.

On January 1, 2021, Employer notified Employee it had denied her claim due to her

missing two scheduled appointments on December 1 and December 17, 2020. Employer

then terminated her employment as of January 7, 2021. When Employee returned to Dr.

Sass’s office on January 11, 2021, Dr. Sass recommended an MRI of the right hand

“regarding pain [in the] thumb area following crush injury.” There is nothing in the record

indicating the MRI was authorized or completed, and there are no records indicating she

received any additional medical treatment.

Thereafter, Dr. Sass received a “Medical Questionnaire” from Employer’s counsel,

which he answered and signed on May 27, 2021. In question 2, Dr. Sass was advised “[p]er

Tennessee law” that “medical noncompliance occurs when patients fail to attend a single

scheduled doctor’s visit.” Dr. Sass was also advised that Employee had “missed at least

three regularly scheduled visits.” Dr. Sass was then asked, “Was this medical

noncompliance a negative impact on the treatment of [Employee]?” He responded “yes.”

He also responded “yes” to the following questions: “Is it your medical opinion that

[Employee]’s medical noncompliance acted as an intervening event that impacts her

recovery and treatment from her right hand contusion?” and “Do you believe that

[Employee]’s medical noncompliance and the delay in her treatment that it caused

contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing her current condition?”

After Employer denied her claim, Employee filed a petition for benefits and a

request for an evidentiary hearing. 1 During the hearing, Employee disputed Employer’s

characterization of the missed medical appointments. She testified she missed the

December 1 appointment because she was diagnosed with COVID-19, and she stated she

was never advised of the December 17 appointment.

Following the hearing, the trial court concluded Employee had come forward with

sufficient evidence to indicate a likelihood of her prevailing at trial in showing an

entitlement to additional medical benefits. The court put little weight on Dr. Sass’s

responses to the medical questionnaire and noted that several of the questions “assumed

facts not in evidence.” The trial court also noted that the statutory remedy for medical

noncompliance, if such noncompliance were proven, is the suspension of benefits during

the period of noncompliance, which was not done in this case. As a result, the court ordered

Employer to authorize additional medical care with Dr. Sass, and Employer has appealed.

1

At the time of the expedited hearing, Employee was self-represented. During the pendency of this appeal,

Employee’s attorney entered an appearance.

2

Standard of Review

The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the court’s

factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2021). When the trial judge has had the opportunity

to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable

deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn.,

Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar deference need be

afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.” Goodman v.

Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at *6 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and application of

statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with no presumption

of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone

N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are also mindful of our

obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, impartially, and in

accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a way that does not favor

either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2021).

Analysis

The issue in this appeal is whether Employee came forward with sufficient evidence

indicating she is likely to prevail at trial in proving an entitlement to additional medical

benefits. In circumstances where an employer alleges the employee has failed to comply

with prescribed medical treatment or failed to attend medical appointments, a court must

consider several statutory provisions. First, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

204(a)(3)(A)(i) requires an injured worker to “accept the medical benefits afforded under

this section” if the employer has satisfied its statutory obligation to provide a proper panel

of physicians in accordance with that subsection. In this case, it is undisputed that

Employer provided a proper panel and that Employee selected Dr. Sass from that panel.

Second, if an injured employee “refuses to comply with any reasonable request for

examination or to accept the medical or specialized medical services that the employer is

required to furnish,” then the employee’s “right to compensation shall be

suspended . . . while the injured employee continues to refuse.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-

204(d)(8) (emphasis added). We previously addressed this subsection in Newell v. Metro

Carpets, LLC, No. 2015-05-0091, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 57 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 28, 2016), as follows:

Since at least 1940, the Tennessee Supreme Court has interpreted this

provision to mean that in circumstances where an employee is noncompliant

with medical treatment, “compensation shall be held in abeyance, not

terminated.” Blevins v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co., 144 S.W.2d 781,

783 (Tenn. 1940); see also Hughes v. All Weather Insulation Co., 394 S.W.2d

3

638 (Tenn. 1965) (employee’s refusal to undergo recommended surgery

supported suspension of compensation).

Id. at *4-5. Here, it is questionable whether Employee’s actions constituted noncompliance

under subsection 204(d)(8). Employer has provided no evidence establishing Employee

“refused” authorized medical treatment offered by Employer. Employee testified without

refutation that she missed the December 1, 2020 appointment because she had been

diagnosed with COVID-19, and she was not aware of the December 17 appointment. 2

Thus, the evidence submitted at the expedited hearing supports the trial court’s conclusion

that Employee “never refused to accept the medical treatment [Employer] offered.”

Moreover, even if we assume the two missed appointments in December 2020

constituted medical noncompliance in accordance with subsection 204(d)(8), Employer’s

remedy, as noted above, was to suspend Employee’s compensation during the period of

noncompliance. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Amazon.com, LLC, No. 2018-01-0349, 2019 TN Wrk.

Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 24, at *23-24 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. June 11, 2019)

(“Employee’s refusal to attend [a medical appointment] based on location [of the

physician’s office] was unreasonable, and Employer appropriately suspended his right to

compensation as provided in section 50-6-204(d)(8).”). Instead, apparently before seeking

any explanation for the missed appointments from Employee, Employer issued a notice of

denial on January 1, 2021, and specifically based its denial on the alleged noncompliance.

Further, Employer’s efforts to support its denial by sending Dr. Sass a medical

questionnaire sometime later is unpersuasive. The questionnaire acknowledges Employee

suffered a work injury, but it asks Dr. Sass to presume certain statements of law as accurate

without providing any support for such statements. For example, the questionnaire

includes the following as a preamble to question 2: “Per Tennessee law, medical

noncompliance occurs when patients fail to attend a single scheduled doctor’s visit.”

(Emphasis added.) This statement of law is unsupported by any statutory or case law

reference. Moreover, question 3 suggested that medical noncompliance can act as “an

intervening event,” but, instead of using that phrase in the context of medical causation,

which is how that term is typically used in workers’ compensation cases, it asked whether

the noncompliance was “an intervening event that impacts her recovery and treatment.” 3

2

Employer asserts in its brief that Employee’s reasons for missing the appointments are immaterial. We

disagree. To establish medical noncompliance, Employer must show Employee refused treatment.

Cancelling an appointment due to a COVID-19 diagnosis and missing an appointment because she was

unaware of it do not demonstrate a refusal to accept medical services. Thus, Employee’s reasons for

missing the appointments are central to the determination of whether medical noncompliance exists.

3

The “independent, intervening act” defense was analyzed by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Anderson

v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690 (Tenn. 2008). The defense can be established with evidence that an

independent, intervening act broke the chain of causation between the work-related accident and the

employee’s injury. Id. at 697. The Court made clear that when such a defense is based on an employee’s

conduct, the conduct must be deemed intentional, reckless, or negligent. Id. at 698-99. There is no proof

4

(Emphasis added.) Dr. Sass’s response to that question is irrelevant to the issue of whether

Employee suffered a work-related injury that resulted in the need for medical care.

In its brief, Employer argues that, by assessing the content of the questions posed to

Dr. Sass, the trial court became an advocate for Employee. We disagree. Pursuant to Rule

703 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, a trial court is instructed to consider “[t]he facts

or data . . . upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference.” A trial court is further

instructed to disallow opinion testimony “if the underlying facts or data indicate lack of

trustworthiness.” Tenn. R. Evid. 703. When evaluating expert proof, a trial court “is

allowed, among other things, to consider the qualifications of the experts, the

circumstances of their examinations, the information available to them, and the evaluation

of the importance of that information by other experts.” Bass v. The Home Depot U.S.A.,

Inc., No. 2016-06-1038, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 36, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’

Comp. App. Bd. May 26, 2017) (emphasis added). The trial court had an obligation to

consider the facts or data underlying Dr. Sass’s opinions, including the hypothetical

conditions specified in the question, and it properly did so in this case.

Employer further argues that it “is not obligated to condition [its] questions to

experts in such a way as to present a beneficial case for the Employee.” While we agree

an employer need not couch questions to an expert in a light favorable to the employee, the

manner in which such questions are worded is relevant in considering the expert’s

responses. An employer risks a trial court giving little weight to an expert’s response to a

question that contains one or more misstatements of law or fact. In short, we agree with

the trial court’s assessment of the weight given to Dr. Sass’s responses to the medical

questionnaire.

In sum, it is undisputed that Employee suffered a work-related injury to her right

upper extremity. It is undisputed that Employee selected Dr. Sass as her authorized treating

physician. It is undisputed that Dr. Sass recommended an MRI and additional treatment

as a result of her work-related crush injury. It is undisputed that this recommendation for

additional treatment occurred after the two missed appointments that formed the basis of

Employer’s denial of the claim. Employer’s decision to deny Employee’s claim based on

her missing two medical appointments, without considering any explanation as to why she

missed the appointments, is unsupported by Tennessee law. The delay in treatment caused

by Employee’s unsupported denial of the claim is far more onerous under the

circumstances of this case than the two missed medical appointments.

Finally, Employee has asked that we deem Employer’s appeal frivolous and award

attorneys’ fees and costs. Although we disagree with Employer’s assertions regarding the

applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(8) and the independent,

in this record that Employee’s failure to attend medical appointments on December 1 and 17 constituted

intentional, reckless, or negligent conduct and, in fact, Employer made no attempt to offer such proof.

5

intervening act defense, we conclude Employer’s appeal is not frivolous under the

circumstances presented in this case.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order and remand the case.

Costs on appeal are taxed to Employer.

6

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Marie P. Bailey ) Docket No. 2021-01-0057

)

v. ) State File No. 800047-2021

)

Amazon, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 3rd day

of May, 2022.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Matthew B. Morris X mbmorris@mijs.com

W. Troy Hart wth@mijs.com

Carmen Y. Ware X cyware@thewarelawfirm.com

Audrey A. Headrick, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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