Opinion

Gentry, Charles v. Arapazuma, Inc.

  • 2022 TN WC 36
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Apr 27, 2022
Status
Published
On the bench
Kenneth M. Switzer
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 8.3%

The opinion

FILED

Apr 27, 2022

03:26 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT NASHVILLE

Charles Gentry, ) Docket No. 2019-06-2140

Employee, )

v. )

Arapazuma, Inc., ) State File No. 196998-2019

Employer, )

And )

Continental Nat’l Ins. Co., ) Judge Kenneth M. Switzer

Carrier. )

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING REQUESTED RELIEF

In this accepted claim, Mr. Gentry seeks an order for medical benefits in two

respects: additional physical therapy and a mileage reimbursement.

At an April 20 expedited hearing, Arapazuma contended that the physical therapy

is not medically necessary, relying on a denial from utilization review and the Medical

Director’s agreement with that decision. As to the mileage, Arapazuma argued that Mr.

Gentry’s routes to medical appointments were fewer than fifteen miles.

The Court holds that Arapazuma did not overcome the presumption of medical

necessity attached to the referral physician’s recommendation, so Mr. Gentry is entitled to

the requested physical therapy. As to the mileage, the Court accepts Mr. Gentry’s

calculation regarding trips for physical therapy and holds that Arapazuma must reimburse

him for those journeys, as well as those it agreed to pay on the record.

History of Claim

Mr. Gentry injured his left shoulder while working for Arapazuma on July 16, 2018,

resulting in him filing a petition for benefit determination a few months later. A mediator

issued a dispute certification notice in January 2020 listing medical benefits as one of

several issues. This is the second expedited hearing, and the Court has also resolved several

disputes by motions.

1

As to the present issues, Mr. Gentry treated with an authorized physician, who

referred him directly to Dr. Matthew Willis in August 2021. Arapazuma accepted the

referral.

At the first visit, Dr. Willis recommended a reverse shoulder arthroplasty, which he

performed in November aided by a physician assistant, Austin Bragdon. Afterward, Mr.

Gentry participated in physical therapy seven times in December 2021 and three times in

early January 2022.

At a January 11, 2022 appointment, Dr. Willis wrote that Mr. Gentry should

“continue therapy.” Mr. Bragdon wrote the order for physical therapy, twice a week, for

six weeks. Mr. Gentry attended eleven more sessions through February 17, for a total of

twenty-one visits.

Mr. Gentry returned to the referral doctor on February 22. The records state that the

provider was “Dr. Willis,” but they are signed by Mr. Bragdon. The records call for

additional physical therapy, twice per week, for eight weeks. The reason given was

“[p]resence of left artificial shoulder joint.”

Arapazuma did not approve the third round of physical therapy but instead requested

utilization review after the February visit. The utilization review physician, Dr. Sean

Lager, reviewed medical records beginning with the first visit to Dr. Willis in August 2021

and two visits with the physical therapist. As is customary in utilization review, he did not

examine Mr. Gentry.

Dr. Lager did not certify the additional physical therapy. His report gave the

rationale below:

Mr. Gentry requested an expedited hearing and appealed this decision to the Medical

Director. The Medical Director’s decision was not released at the time of the hearing, but

2

by Court order Arapazuma late-filed it.1 The Medical Director, Dr. Robert Snyder, agreed

with the denial. He wrote, “The medical records do not reflect the reasoning in light of

current measurements and a home exercise program.”

Mr. Gentry argued that he never saw Mr. Bragdon. He testified, without objection,

that on April 19, he returned to Dr. Willis, who recommended a third round of physical

therapy. Mr. Gentry testified that this was ordered “because it’s [the shoulder] not up to

the full strength he’s [Dr. Willis] thinking it should be.”

Concerning the mileage request, Arapazuma announced at the hearing that it agreed

to reimburse Mr. Gentry for trips to Concentra and Summit Medical Center and had already

posted a check. Sean O’Neill, Team Leader for the Southern Team adjusters, testified that

the amount owed for travel to these providers is $305.

The parties contested Mr. Gentry’s requested reimbursement for travel to Hughston

Clinic Orthopaedics, Urban Physical Therapy, and Stonecrest Medical Center. Mr. Gentry

filed a copy of a form given to him by the third-party administrator documenting his trips,

which his wife handwrote but he signed. The form, dated February 26, 2022, states that

the roundtrip miles for each visit to Hughston Clinic Orthopaedics was 28; 32 to Urban

Physical Therapy; and 30 to Stonecrest Medical Center.

Mr. Gentry testified that those figures represented the actual roundtrip mileage that

he drove. He acknowledged that, from what his wife wrote on the form, the Hughston

Clinic Orthopaedics journeys were fewer than fifteen miles one-way, and the Stonecrest

Medical Center trip was exactly thirty miles roundtrip. On cross-examination, Mr. Gentry

disagreed with the mileage to Urban Physical Therapy generated by Google Maps as 14.4

miles, saying that this distance is “not what’s actually driven.”

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Motion to Continue and Employer’s Objections to the Expedited Hearing

Before considering the merits of Mr. Gentry’s requests, Arapazuma filed a motion

to continue the expedited hearing five business days before the hearing. It argued in part

that on April 13, Mr. Gentry filed an appeal of the utilization review determination.

Proceeding with the hearing as scheduled would create the potential for inconsistent results,

Arapazuma contended, and the Medical Director’s decision could “moot” that issue.

1

Arapazuma also late-filed a “radius map” and additional medical records. The notices of filing contain

argument regarding these documents. The Court did not consider them in reaching its decision because the

parties’ proof was closed at the expedited hearing, except for the Medical Director’s opinion. Also,

fundamental fairness dictates that the Court reject Arapazuma’s attempt to supplement the record without

affording Mr. Gentry, a self-represented litigant, an opportunity to object.

3

Arapazuma further contended that it would suffer prejudice because it would be

simultaneously defending the utilization review before two bodies. Regarding the mileage

reimbursement, Arapazuma asserted that it was investigating and might pay disputed

amounts.

The Court denied the motion for two reasons. First, “a trial court is not bound by

the determination of the utilization review physician or the Bureau’s Medical Director but

is charged with conducting a de novo review to determine whether Employer rebutted the

presumption that the prescribed medical treatment is reasonably necessary to treat the work

injury.” Walls v. United Technologies, 2021 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 27, at *12

(Aug. 6, 2021). After the hearing, the Court ordered the parties to submit the Medical

Director’s decision upon its receipt, acknowledging Mr. Gentry’s right to pursue that relief

and that the Medical Director’s decision would undoubtedly be relevant.

Second, Arapazuma has not shown it suffered any prejudice. Mr. Gentry filed

medical records on March 28. They were the same records provided to Dr. Lager (along

with two visits to physical therapy). Mr. Gentry filed the documentation regarding his

mileage request on March 27. So, Arapazuma has known the evidence that Mr. Gentry

planned to rely upon with sufficient time to prepare. Arapazuma contended it was

defending the issue in two separate forums, but it did not explain how that prejudiced it.

Rather, Arapazuma was able to file prehearing witness and exhibit lists and additional

proof, and it fully briefed the issues.

Tennessee Compilation Rules and Regulations 0800-02-21-.11(8) (February, 2022)

states that expedited hearings may be continued only for “good cause.” The Court cannot

find that under these circumstances.

Arapazuma additionally contended that Mr. Gentry’s hearing should not proceed

because he filed a hearing request on March 15 and a declaration on April 7. It argued that

in Smith v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 52, at *9-10 (Aug. 31,

2017), the Appeals Board held that “accompanied by” contemplates that the supporting

documentation is to be filed in association with the hearing request and does not require

that it be filed “concurrently” or “contemporaneously.” In Smith, the party requesting a

hearing filed supporting documentation the next business day after filing the hearing

request. Arapazuma contended that, in contrast, Mr. Gentry filed his declaration twenty-

three days later, which prejudiced it by giving it “limited time” to submit pre-hearing

materials.

While a twenty-three day delay is discouraged, the Court remains unpersuaded. The

Appeals Board reasoned in Smith that the employee’s delay caused the employer no

prejudice. Id. at *10-11. The same is true here. As previously stated, Arapazuma was

aware of Mr. Gentry’s requested relief and evidence since late March and was able to

submit responsive evidence and pleadings. Moreover, the Court extended its deadline to

4

do so beyond the customary ten business days, due largely to the motion practice that

Arapazuma initiated. Relatedly, Arapazuma also contended that Mr. Gentry did not

disclose witnesses. However, on his March 15 Request for Expedited Hearing, Mr. Gentry

listed only himself as a witness.

Lastly, Arapazuma argued that the case was not properly before the Court because

the parties had not mediated the specific issues. It pointed out that a dispute certification

notice brought the case before the Court previously, but due to disagreements regarding

entirely different matters. Arapazuma relied on Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

239(b)(1) (2021), which states that only issues that have been certified by a workers’

compensation mediator within a dispute certification notice may be presented to the judge

for adjudication.

Here, neither party requested an order referring the parties back to mediation. The

dispute certification notice lists “medical benefits” as an issue; Mr. Gentry now seeks

additional medical benefits. Arapazuma’s argument overlooks that the same statute states

in subdivision(d)(1) that “at any time after a dispute certification notice has been issued .

. ., a workers’ compensation judge may, at the judge’s discretion, hear disputes over issues

provided in the dispute certification notice concerning the provision of . . . medical benefits

on an expedited basis[.]” (Emphasis added.)

Giving the statute a plain reading, this Court took jurisdiction of the case when a

dispute certification notice was filed. That document listed “medical benefits” as one of

the issues. The statute does not require or envision that parties mediate every aspect of the

provision of medical or other benefits that might arise throughout a case’s lifespan. To do

so would inject additional cost and delay, and it would defeat the Court’s ability to grant

relief on an expedited basis, in cases where the parties have already shown they cannot

agree on fundamental issues.

Arapazuma cited no additional authority to support its argument. Moreover, the

applicable rule and case law support this conclusion. The mediation rule states that parties

must mediate “when a party files a petition for benefit determination[.]” Tenn. Comp. R.

& Regs 0800-02-21-.10(1). The Appeals Board has characterized a petition for benefit

determination as “the Bureau’s general equivalent of a complaint as contemplated in the

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.” Vickers v. Amazon, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd.

LEXIS 52, at *7 (Aug. 20, 2019). The complaint commences the lawsuit, and the

mediation requirement is triggered at that point.

In sum, the Court rejects Arapazuma’s objections and now turns to the merits of the

parties’ evidence and claims.

5

Standard Applied

Mr. Gentry must show that he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits regarding

his entitlement to additional medical benefits. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1); McCord

v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9

(Mar. 27, 2015).

Physical Therapy

The Workers’ Compensation Law states that an employer must furnish, free of

charge, medical treatment made reasonably necessary by the work accident. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(1)(A). Any treatment recommended by a physician by referral is

presumed to be medically necessary and may be rebutted by a preponderance of the

evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-204(a)(3)(H); Walls, at *10-11. Therefore, the

recommendation of Dr. Willis, a referral physician, is presumed medically necessary.

Arapazuma sought to rebut this presumption with Dr. Lager’s opinion obtained through

utilization review, upheld on appeal by Dr. Snyder.

The utilization review process in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-124

offers employers a mechanism to assess the medical necessity of prescribed medical

treatment. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-06-.01(20) (January, 2017). Denials may be

appealed to the Medical Director. Id. at 0800-02-06-.03(5). However, as previously stated,

the Court is not bound by the opinion of a utilization review physician or the Bureau’s

Medical Director but must conduct “a de novo review to determine whether Employer

rebutted the presumption that the prescribed medical treatment is reasonably necessary to

treat the work injury.” Walls, at *12.

Thus, the Court must weigh the competing expert opinions to decide the issue. In

evaluating conflicting expert testimony, a trial court may consider, among other things,

“the qualifications of the experts, the circumstances of their examination, the information

available to them, and the evaluation of the importance of that information through other

experts.” Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc., 803 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. 1991).

Applying these principles, Dr. Willis treated Mr. Gentry since last August and

operated on his shoulder. Moreover, Mr. Gentry testified, without objection, that he saw

Dr. Willis the day before this hearing, and Dr. Willis again recommended additional

physical therapy. Dr. Willis has seen Mr. Gentry at least five times, while neither Dr. Lager

nor Dr. Snyder have examined him. “It seems reasonable that the physicians having greater

contact with the Plaintiff would have the advantage and opportunity to provide a more in-

depth opinion, if not a more accurate one.” Id. at 677. This consideration favors Dr. Willis.

As to the information available to them, Drs. Lager and Snyder reviewed limited

medical records. Dr. Lager cited a guideline from the ODG for a “sprained shoulder” or

6

“rotator cuff tear” for twenty-four physical therapy sessions. However, Mr. Gentry

underwent a reverse shoulder arthroplasty, or complete shoulder replacement.

Arapazuma’s counsel explained that the sprain/tear was the original diagnosis, which was

corrected by replacing his shoulder. But the two diagnoses are not interchangeable. No

evidence was presented regarding the guideline for physical therapy after a complete

shoulder replacement.

As for Dr. Snyder’s statement that “The medical records do not reflect the reasoning

in light of current measurements and a home exercise program[,]” the Court agrees that Dr.

Willis’s records offer measurements. They also do not explicitly document his rationale

for additional therapy, other than “[p]resence of left artificial shoulder joint,” nor do the

records mention the potential efficacy of a home exercise program. However, Dr. Snyder

offered no opinion about the ODG guideline that Dr. Lager cited. Therefore, the Court

affords Dr. Snyder’s opinion limited value. This factor also favors Dr. Willis.

The Court finds Dr. Willis’s opinion, presumed correct, is more persuasive than the

utilization review doctors’ conclusions regarding the medically necessary treatment.

Arapazuma has not rebutted Dr. Willis’s opinion by a preponderance of the evidence.

Therefore, Mr. Gentry is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits regarding his

entitlement to additional physical therapy.

Mileage Reimbursement

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(6)(A) provides that when an injured

worker is required to travel to an authorized medical provider or facility “located outside a

radius of fifteen (15) miles from the injured worker’s residence[,]” the employee shall be

reimbursed for reasonable travel expenses.

Here, by his own admission, Mr. Gentry traveled roundtrip twenty-eight miles for

appointments at Hughston Clinic Orthopaedics and thirty miles to Stonecrest Medical

Center. The statute’s plain language states that these trips are not eligible for

reimbursement because they are not, one-way, “outside a radius of fifteen miles.” So, Mr.

Gentry is not entitled to reimbursement for these visits.2

This leaves physical therapy. Mr. Gentry testified sincerely and repeatedly that he

drove more than fifteen miles, one-way, each time he attended. This is the mileage amount

that he actually measured. Mr. Gentry’s wife completed the form, which he signed, in late

February, without him knowing the statutory threshold for eligibility for reimbursement.

The form contains information against his own interest. Further, Mr. Gentry never wavered

2

Arapazuma also argued that the doctrine of laches applies to these requests. However, the Court need not

address that argument because Mr. Gentry’s admissions preclude his entitlement to reimbursement to these

locations.

7

on this point, despite lengthy and rigorous cross-examination. The Court finds him

credible.

Arapazuma relied solely on the Google Map it introduced into evidence without

objection. But Arapazuma did not support the map’s accuracy with other corroborating

proof. Considering the result generated by one algorithm, versus a human who completed

a form, partially against his own interest, coupled with his credible testimony as to the route

he actually drove and the measurement he took, the evidence preponderates in Mr. Gentry’s

favor. The Court finds he traveled thirty-two miles roundtrip for physical therapy twenty-

one times. Mr. Gentry is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits on this particular

request. He is entitled to $367.36 in reimbursement.3

It is, therefore, ORDERED as follows:

1. Arapazuma or its workers’ compensation carrier shall promptly authorize the

recommended physical therapy.

2. By agreement, Arapazuma shall reimburse Mr. Gentry $305.00 for mileage

expenses incurred for travel to Concentra and Summit Medical Center. It shall also

reimburse him for mileage expenses to Urban Physical Therapy totaling $367.36.

3. This case is set for a status hearing on June 13, 2022, at 9:30 a.m. central time.

You must call 615-532-9552 or 866-943-0025.

4. Unless interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed,

compliance with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from

the date of entry of this Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated

section 50-6-239(d)(3). The Employer must submit confirmation of compliance

with this Order to the Bureau by email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov

no later than the seventh business day after entry of this Order. Failure to

submit the necessary confirmation within the period of compliance may result

in a penalty assessment for non-compliance. For questions regarding

compliance, please contact the Workers’ Compensation Compliance Unit via

email at WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov.

ENTERED April 27, 2022.

3

The mileage reimbursement rate is available at the Bureau’s website. For trips on or before January 1,

2022, the rate was $.47 per mile; afterward, it increased to $.585 per mile. Mr. Gentry made seven trips

under the previous rate, subtotaling $105.28. At the current rate, he made fourteen trips, subtotaling

$262.08. The total mileage reimbursement is $367.36.

8

_____________________________________

JUDGE KENNETH M. SWITZER

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

1. Affidavit of Charles Gentry

2. Utilization review report

3. Employee’s medical records

4. Documentation of mileage

5. Affidavit of Sean O’Neill

6. Google Maps

6A. Hughston Clinic Orthopaedics

6B. Urban Physical Therapy

6C. Stonecrest Medical Center

7. Physical therapy records

8. Utilization Review Appeal (late-filed)

9. “Radius Map” and additional medical records (late-filed; identification only)

Technical record:

1. Petition for Benefit Determination

2. Dispute Certification Notice, and parties’ additional issues

3. Status Hearing Order, March 7, 2022

4. Motion for Missing Documents

5. Request for Expedited Hearing

6. Response to Employee’s Motion for Documents Pertaining to Utilization Review

7. Response to and Motion to Strike Employee’s Request for Expedited Hearing

8. Order Setting Expedited Hearing

9. Motion to Dismiss Expedited Hearing

10. Response to Motion [to] Dismiss

11. Hearing Request

12. Order Denying Motion to Dismiss

13. Employer’s Motion to Continue

14. Employer’s Pre-Hearing Brief

15. Employer’s Witness List

16. Employer’s Exhibit List

17. Employer’s Motion for Telephone Testimony

18. Order Granting Motion to Testify by Telephone

19. Order

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of this Order was sent as indicated on April 27, 2022.

Name Certified First Via Service sent to:

Mail Class Email

Mail

Charles Gentry, self- X X 3981A Vesta Rd.

represented employee Lebanon TN 37090

Chancy Miller, X cmiller@carrallison.com

Employer’s attorney kbcarr@carrallison.com

_____________________________________

Penny Shrum, Clerk of Court

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov

10

Expedited Hearing Order Right to Appeal:

If you disagree with this Expedited Hearing Order, you may appeal to the Workers’

Compensation Appeals Board. To appeal an expedited hearing order, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled: “Notice of Appeal,” and file the form with the

Clerk of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims within seven business days of the

date the expedited hearing order was filed. When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must

serve a copy upon all parties.

2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten

calendar days after filing of the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at

any Bureau office or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the

alternative, you may file an Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s

website or any Bureau office) seeking a waiver of the fee. You must file the fully-

completed Affidavit of Indigency within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of

Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will

result in dismissal of the appeal.

3. You bear the responsibility of ensuring a complete record on appeal. You may request

from the court clerk the audio recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. If a transcript of

the proceedings is to be filed, a licensed court reporter must prepare the transcript and file

it with the court clerk within ten business days of the filing the Notice of

Appeal. Alternatively, you may file a statement of the evidence prepared jointly by both

parties within ten business days of the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The statement of

the evidence must convey a complete and accurate account of the hearing. The Workers’

Compensation Judge must approve the statement before the record is submitted to the

Appeals Board. If the Appeals Board is called upon to review testimony or other proof

concerning factual matters, the absence of a transcript or statement of the evidence can be

a significant obstacle to meaningful appellate review.

4. If you wish to file a position statement, you must file it with the court clerk within ten

business days after the deadline to file a transcript or statement of the evidence. The

party opposing the appeal may file a response with the court clerk within ten business

days after you file your position statement. All position statements should include: (1) a

statement summarizing the facts of the case from the evidence admitted during the

expedited hearing; (2) a statement summarizing the disposition of the case as a result of

the expedited hearing; (3) a statement of the issue(s) presented for review; and (4) an

argument, citing appropriate statutes, case law, or other authority.

For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation

www.tn.gov/workforce/injuries-at-work/

wc.courtclerk@tn.gov | 1-800-332-2667

Docket No.: ________________________

State File No.: ______________________

Date of Injury: _____________________

___________________________________________________________________________

Employee

v.

___________________________________________________________________________

Employer

Notice is given that ____________________________________________________________________

[List name(s) of all appealing party(ies). Use separate sheet if necessary.]

appeals the following order(s) of the Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to the

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (check one or more applicable boxes and include the date file-

stamped on the first page of the order(s) being appealed):

□ Expedited Hearing Order filed on _______________ □ Motion Order filed on ___________________

□ Compensation Order filed on__________________ □ Other Order filed on_____________________

issued by Judge _________________________________________________________________________.

Statement of the Issues on Appeal

Provide a short and plain statement of the issues on appeal or basis for relief on appeal:

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

Parties

Appellant(s) (Requesting Party): _________________________________________ ☐Employer ☐Employee

Address: ________________________________________________________ Phone: ___________________

Email: __________________________________________________________

Attorney’s Name: ______________________________________________ BPR#: _______________________

Attorney’s Email: ______________________________________________ Phone: _______________________

Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________

* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellant *

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 1 of 2 RDA 11082

Employee Name: _______________________________________ Docket No.: _____________________ Date of Inj.: _______________

Appellee(s) (Opposing Party): ___________________________________________ ☐Employer ☐Employee

Appellee’s Address: ______________________________________________ Phone: ____________________

Email: _________________________________________________________

Attorney’s Name: _____________________________________________ BPR#: ________________________

Attorney’s Email: _____________________________________________ Phone: _______________________

Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________

* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellee *

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, _____________________________________________________________, certify that I have forwarded a

true and exact copy of this Notice of Appeal by First Class mail, postage prepaid, or in any manner as described

in Tennessee Compilation Rules & Regulations, Chapter 0800-02-21, to all parties and/or their attorneys in this

case on this the __________ day of ___________________________________, 20 ____.

______________________________________________

[Signature of appellant or attorney for appellant]

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 2 of 2 RDA 11082

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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