Sheila Adams v. Henry Hughes

04/25/2022

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs February 1, 2022

SHELIA ADAMS v. HENRY HUGHES

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-10028-19 Jerry Stokes, Judge

___________________________________

No. W2020-00450-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This appeal arises from an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff, who is the

former fiancé of the defendant, claimed the defendant retained some of her personal

property after he forced her to vacate the premises where they previously resided. This

action was initiated with the filing of a civil warrant in the general sessions court. After the

general sessions court awarded the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $7,500, the

defendant appealed to the circuit court. Following a trial, the circuit court awarded the

plaintiff a judgment of $4,745.30. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CARMA

DENNIS MCGEE and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Henry Hughes, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, pro se.

Shelia Adams, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, pro se.1

MEMORANDUM OPINION2

Shelia Adams (“Plaintiff”) and Henry Hughes (“Defendant”) lived together until

November of 2018, when their engagement terminated. Following some discord, Mr.

1

The appellee, Shelia Adams, did not file a brief or make an appearance in this appeal.

2

Tenn. Ct. App. R. 10 states:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse

or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion

Hughes called the police to escort Ms. Adams off of his property. During her eviction, Ms.

Adams removed some but not all of her personal property, leaving behind, inter alia,

designer handbags and jewelry.

In the unpleasantness that ensued, Mr. Hughes filed a police report in which he

alleged that Ms. Adams used his debit card without his permission. According to the report,

Ms. Adams spent approximately $1,900. The charges were later dropped by the prosecutor.

Meanwhile, Ms. Adams filed a Civil Warrant to Recover Personal Property in the

general sessions court and requested a judgment in the amount of $11,000. The civil

warrant identified a variety of Ms. Adams’ personal property, including several “designer

purses.” To support her claim, Ms. Adams submitted photos of the property that she

claimed Mr. Hughes retained. For his part, Mr. Hughes denied that he possessed any of

Ms. Adams’ property. On February 20, 2019, the general sessions court awarded Ms.

Adams a monetary judgment of $7,500.

Mr. Hughes appealed the general sessions court decision to the circuit court.

Although Mr. Hughes denied having any of Ms. Adams’ property, Mr. Hughes

subsequently delivered a “Notice of Abandoned Property” to Ms. Adams’ counsel in which

he acknowledged having some of her property, but insisted that she had forfeited the right

to recover the property. Thereafter, on May 27, 2019, Mr. Hughes allowed Ms. Adams’

counsel to go to his home and retrieve some of Ms. Adams’ property. Subsequently, Ms.

Adams submitted an affidavit stating that she had still not recovered all of the property

requested in the Civil Warrant.

The case subsequently went to trial. The Statement of the Evidence, as certified by

the trial court, reveals that the court heard testimony from Ms. Adams; her daughter,

Darrielle Adams; Ms. Adams’ friend, Terrence Moorehead; and Mr. Hughes. In her

testimony, Ms. Adams identified the property that she left in Mr. Hughes’ home following

her police supervised eviction, and she introduced photographic evidence depicting some

of the property she identified. Her testimony was supported, in part, by that of her daughter

as well as Mr. Moorehead, both of whom recalled seeing some of the property in Mr.

Hughes’ home when Ms. Adams was living there. For his part, Mr. Hughes testified that

“he asked her to leave and he denied having her property. He also demanded proof that the

handbags that she alleges that remains in his home are ‘name brand.’ However, he did not

necessarily deny having them.”3

would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall

be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not be

cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.

3

The quote is from the Statement of the Evidence.

-2-

Following the hearing, the circuit court entered a judgment against Mr. Hughes,

ordering him to either return possession of the personal property detailed within the Final

Order or to pay Ms. Adams $4,745.30. This appeal followed.

ISSUES

Although Mr. Hughes’ statement of the issues is incomprehensible,4 from reviewing

his pro se brief we believe his issues can be summarized as follows:5 (1) whether the trial

court erred by not requiring further authentication as to Ms. Adams’ ownership of the

designer handbags; and (2) whether the trial court erred by not considering the police report

he filed against Ms. Adams?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a trial court’s findings of fact is de novo, and we presume

that the findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.

4

Appellant’s statement of the issues reads exactly as follows:

Does a Plaintiff have a right of prevailing a case theft to

another party when no evidence has been presented support the case nor theft of any property

The right to Protect Hughes’ Fourteenth Amendment Right of false claims?

5

Subject to few exceptions, issues must be presented in the manner prescribed by Rule 27 to be

properly raised on appeal. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tenn. 2012). Rule 27 requires the

argument section of a brief to contain citations to the record or caselaw and more than conclusory statements

to further the parties’ argument. Tenn. R. App. P. 27. “[T]he failure to make appropriate references to the

record and to cite relevant authority in the argument section of the brief as required by [Tenn. R. App. P.]

27(a)(7) constitutes a waiver of the issue.” Bean v. Bean, 40 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (citations

omitted). Although Mr. Hughes’ statement of the issues required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure

27(b) only raises two issues, the body of his appellate brief mentions four separate issues. The two issues

included in his statement of the issues are each supported with a singular, conclusory statement, absent any

citation to the record or caselaw. Because of the skeletal argument coupled with the lack of citation to

authority or to the record, these two issues fail to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27

and are waived on appeal. As for the remaining two issues, which were mentioned in the body of the brief

but not included in the statement of the issues, we note that “an issue may be deemed waived when it is

argued in the brief but is not designated as an issue in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4).” Hodge,

382 S.W.3d at 335. Yet, this Court may, in its discretion under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 2,

waive the briefing requirements and adjudicate the issues on their merits. Owen v. Long Tire, LLC, No.

W2011-01227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6777014, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011). This occurs on

occasion when, for example, a party appeals pro se or when resolution of the case impacts innocent, third

parties. Id. Acknowledging that the two issues raised in the argument section of his brief were not included

in his statement of the issues, we have decided to exercise our discretion and waive the briefing

requirements.

-3-

R. App. P. 13(d); see Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

For the evidence to preponderate against a trial court’s finding of fact, it must support

another finding of fact with greater convincing effect. See Walker v. Sidney Gilreath &

Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Realty Shop, Inc. v. R.R. Westminster

Holding, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 581, 596 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). A trial court’s conclusions of law

are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Estate of Walton v. Young, 950

S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 1997).

“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard.” Collins v. Arnold, No. M2004-02513-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL

4146025, at *22 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2007) (citing Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462,

468 (Tenn. 2005)). A trial court abuses its discretion “only when it applies an incorrect

legal standard, or reaches a decision which is against logic or reasoning that causes an

injustice to the party complaining.” Id. (quoting Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85

(Tenn. 2001)). “[I]n order to raise an issue on appeal regarding the admissibility of

evidence, the party raising the issue must have made a contemporaneous

objection.” McGarity v. Jerrolds, 429 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013); see Tenn.

R. App. P. 36(a).

ANALYSIS

I. Admissibility of Police Report

We begin our analysis by discussing Mr. Hughes’ contention that the trial court

erred by not considering the police report filed against Ms. Adams for the alleged

unauthorized use of Mr. Hughes’ debit card. Mr. Hughes insists that the charges should

have impacted the court’s credibility findings as to Ms. Adams.6 In his appellate brief, Mr.

Hughes specifically complained:

Since this case involves the same party related in a criminal case against

Hughes, the court failed to review the criminal complaint in to support malice

caused by Adams in an attempt to extort monies from Hughes by

unauthorizing the use of her credit card and second by filing a civil suit for

lost designer purses than to file a police report. Adams was aware filing a

false report would constitue [sic] incarceration and fines.

Importantly, police reports are hearsay and are not admissible as evidence.

McDonald v. Onoh, 772 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989); see Tenn. R. Evid. 803(8).

“The primary problem with the admissibility of police reports is that the report is hearsay

6

Mr. Hughes does not cite to any of the Rules of Evidence in making his arguments for the

admissibility of the police report.

-4-

made up of opinion or conclusion not based on personal knowledge.” Id. (citing

Paine, Tennessee Law of Evidence § 108 (1974)). Specifically, this Court has explained:

Police reports based upon statements of witnesses are hearsay and are not

admissible in evidence. The reasoning behind this rule is that if the officer is

present he can testify as to his firsthand knowledge. He cannot testify as to

what was told to him and such matters could not be admitted with the report

in any event. If the report is admitted, it may not contain material to which

the author, had he been present, would be incompetent to testify.

McDonald, 772 S.W.2d at 914. Thus, we find no error with the circuit court’s

discretionary decision to disregard the police report.7

II. Ownership and Authenticity of the Handbags

Mr. Hughes argues that the trial court erred by granting judgment in favor of Ms.

Adams when Ms. Adams presented nothing other than photographs to establish both her

ownership and the authenticity of the designer handbags at issue.

Tennessee Code Annotated Section 29-30-103 sets forth the requirements for

commencing an action to recover personal property. It explains that the action can be

commenced with a complaint in the circuit or chancery court or with a warrant in the

general sessions court. To state a claim, the following facts must be sworn to:

(1) That the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the described property and

the reason plaintiff is so entitled;

(2) A description which reasonably identifies the property sought; and

(3) The value of the property.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-30-103(c).

The civil warrant filed by Ms. Adams included her sworn statement that she was

entitled to the property, a description of the property, and assessed a value of $11,000. The

7

Under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609 evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime

is admissible to impeach the witness. See Tenn. R. Evid. 609. However, Rule 609 only applies to

convictions; as the police report contained only an allegation, it was not admissible under Rule 609.

Alternatively, Tennessee Rule of Evidence 608 sets forth the requirements for admission of character

evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness. With some exceptions not applicable here, a witness’s

character for truthfulness cannot be either attacked or supported by extrinsic evidence of specific instances

of conduct. Tenn. R. Evid. 608(b). The police report was not admissible under Rule 608(b) because it was

evidence of a specific instance rather than general opinion or reputation evidence of Ms. Adams’ character

for truthfulness.

-5-

designer purses were described within the warrant as “name brand purses.” To further

identify the property, Ms. Adams submitted photographs of the property that she claimed

still remained in Mr. Hughes’ possession as exhibits during the hearing. The certified

Statement of the Evidence summarizes Ms. Adams’ testimony that Mr. Hughes would not

permit her to retrieve her belongings from his residence. Ms. Adams explained that shortly

before the trial “Mr. Hughes gave her a bag of her ‘belongings’ including letters, cards, etc.

that she knows were emptied out of the handbags that she left at his home.” Ms. Adams’

daughter and Mr. Terrence Moorehead also testified as to the property that Ms. Adams left

at Mr. Hughes’ property when she vacated his property. Meanwhile, according the

Statement of Evidence, Mr. Hughes “demanded proof that the handbags she alleges that

remains in his home are ‘name brand’” but “did not necessarily deny having them.”

As required to recover personal property, Ms. Adams claimed that she was entitled

to possession, described the property, and asserted a value of $11,000. The trial court

agreed that Ms. Adams was entitled to possession of the described property, but disagreed

with Ms. Adams’ valuation. Instead, the trial court awarded Ms. Adams possession of the

property and ordered an award of $4,745.30 if the personal property identified was not

returned to Ms. Adams “within a reasonable time period.”

It is apparent from the court’s ruling that it found the testimony of Ms. Adams, her

daughter, and Mr. Mooreheadwhich was supported by photographic evidencemore

credible than Mr. Hughes’ testimony. “Because the trial judge is in a better position to

weigh and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses who testify orally, we give great weight

to the trial judge’s findings on issues involving credibility of witnesses.” In re Estate

of Walton v. Young, 950 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Randolph v.

Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tenn. 1996) (citations omitted)). “[F]indings that are

related to the issue of credibility will not be disturbed by this court, absent other concrete

evidence to the contrary which shows that the trial judge erred in his judgment of the

veracity of the witnesses.” Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Dyersburg Prod. Credit

Ass’n, 728 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). Giving appropriate weight to the trial

court’s implicit finding of credibility in Ms. Adams’ favor, we cannot find that the decision

to award possession of the designer handbags to Ms. Adams was against the preponderance

of the evidence.

IN CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs of appeal

are assessed to Henry Hughes.

________________________________

FRANK G. CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S.

-6-