Jose Mendoza, Jr. v. Amalgamated Transit Union

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE MENDOZA, JR., individually and No. 20-16079

as a member and representative of

the Amalgamated Transit Union D.C. Nos.

Local 1637, 2:17-cv-02485-

Plaintiff-Appellant, JCM-CWH

2:18-cv-00959-

v. JCM-DJA

(Consol.)

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION

INTERNATIONAL; JAMES LINDSAY III,

individually and in his official

capacity as ATU International Vice

President and Trustee; LAWRENCE

HANLEY, individually and in his

official capacity as International

Union President; ANTONETTE

BRYANT, individually and in her

official capacity as International

Representative and Hearing Officer;

TERRY RICHARDS; CAROLYN

HIGGINS; KEIRA MCNETT; DANIEL

SMITH; TYLER HOME,

Defendants-Appellees.

2 MENDOZA V. ATU

JOSE MENDOZA, JR.; ROBBIE No. 20-16080

HARRIS; ROBERT NAYLOR; MYEKO

EASLEY; DENNIS HENNESSEY; GARY D.C. No.

SANDERS; LINDA JOHNSON- 2:18-cv-00959-

SANDERS; CESAR JIMENEZ, JCM-DJA

individually and each as members

and on behalf of Amalgamated

Transit Union Local 1637 OPINION

membership, and as majority of the

Local 1637 Executive Board,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION

INTERNATIONAL; JAMES LINDSAY III,

individually and as ATU

International Vice President and

Trustee; LAWRENCE HANLEY,

individually and as ATU

International Union President;

ANTONETTE BRYANT, individually

and as Hearing Officer; RICHIE

MURPHY, individually and as

International Vice President; KEIRA

MCNETT, individually and as ATU

Associate General Counsel; DANIEL

SMITH, individually and as ATU

Associate General Counsel; TYLER

HOME, individually and as ATU

Auditor; KEOLIS TRANSIT AMERICA

INC.; KEVIN MANZANARES,

individually, and as an employee of

Keolis; MILLER KAPLAN & ARASE, a

MENDOZA V. ATU 3

limited liability partnership; ANN

SALVADOR, individually and as an

employee of MKA; ALEXANDER

CHERNYAK, individually and as an

employee of MKA,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 11, 2021

Seattle, Washington

Filed April 7, 2022

Before: William A. Fletcher, Paul J. Watford, and

Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Collins

4 MENDOZA V. ATU

SUMMARY *

Labor Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of labor

law claims as barred by the doctrine of claim-splitting.

These appeals arose from two overlapping suits

challenging a national union’s imposition of a trusteeship

over one of its local unions. After discovering apparent

financial malfeasance by Jose Mendoza, then president of

Local 1637, the Amalgamated Transit Union (“ATU”)

imposed the trusteeship, thereby removing Mendoza and the

other Local 1637 executive board members from office.

Mendoza filed a single-plaintiff action (“Mendoza I”)

against ATU and several of its officers. Later, while that

action was still pending, Mendoza filed a second, multi-

plaintiff action (“Mendoza II”) in which he and a majority of

the other former executive board members of Local 1637

asserted related claims against ATU, the same ATU officers,

and several other defendants.

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all

claims against ATU and its officers in Mendoza II as barred

by claim-splitting. The panel held that, with respect to the

claims against ATU and its officers, the additional plaintiffs

in Mendoza II were adequately represented by Mendoza in

Mendoza I. Because the claims against these defendants in

the two cases otherwise involved the same causes of action

and the same parties, the assertion of those claims in the

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

MENDOZA V. ATU 5

second suit (Mendoza II) violated the doctrine of claim-

splitting.

The panel resolved remaining issues in a concurrently

filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Michael J. Mcavoyamaya (argued), Las Vegas, Nevada, for

Plaintiffs-Appellants.

April H. Pullium (argued) and Ramya Ravindran, Bredhoff

& Kaiser PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-

Appellees Amalgamated Transit Union International, James

Lindsay III, Lawrence Hanley, Antonette Bryant, Terry

Richards, Carolyn Higgins, Keira McNett, Daniel Smith,

Tyler Home, and Richie Murphy.

Laurent R. G. Badoux (argued), Buchalter, Scottsdale,

Arizona, for Defendants-Appellees Keolis Transit America

Inc. and Kevin Manzanares.

Efren A. Compeán (argued) and Stephen J. Tully, Garrett &

Tully PC, Pasadena, California, for Defendants-Appellees

Miller Kaplan & Arase LLP, Ann Salvador, and Alexander

Chernyak.

6 MENDOZA V. ATU

OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

These consolidated appeals arise from two overlapping

suits challenging a national union’s imposition of a

trusteeship over one of its local unions. After discovering

apparent financial malfeasance by Jose Mendoza, then

president of Local 1637, the Amalgamated Transit Union

(“ATU”) imposed the trusteeship, thereby removing

Mendoza and the other Local 1637 executive board members

from office. In September 2017, Mendoza filed a single-

plaintiff action (“Mendoza I”) against ATU and several of its

officers. In May 2018, while that action was still pending,

Mendoza filed a second, multi-plaintiff action (“Mendoza

II”) in which he and a majority of the other former executive

board members of Local 1637 asserted related claims against

ATU, the same ATU officers, and several other defendants.

The district court dismissed all claims against ATU and its

officers in Mendoza II, concluding that they were barred by

the doctrine of claim-splitting. After rejecting all remaining

claims in rulings on motions to dismiss or for summary

judgment, the district court entered judgment in favor of

Defendants. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

In this opinion, we address only the district court’s ruling

on claim-splitting, and we resolve all remaining issues in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition. As to claim-

splitting, we hold that, under the unusual facts of this case,

the district court correctly concluded that, with respect to the

claims against ATU and its officers, the additional Plaintiffs

in Mendoza II were adequately represented by Mendoza in

Mendoza I. Because the claims against these Defendants in

the two cases otherwise involved the same causes of action

and the same parties, the assertion of those claims in the

MENDOZA V. ATU 7

second suit (Mendoza II) violated the doctrine of claim-

splitting. We therefore affirm the district court.

I

A

Because the claim-splitting issue was raised in a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), we may “consider only allegations contained in the

pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters

properly subject to judicial notice,” as well as any “writing

referenced in [the] complaint but not explicitly incorporated

therein if the complaint relies on the document and its

authenticity is unquestioned.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP,

476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007). Based on those materials,

we take the following facts as true for purposes of reviewing

the district court’s ruling on the claim-splitting issue.

Local 1637, an affiliate of ATU, is a union in Las Vegas,

Nevada that represents coach operators and mechanics.

After receiving various complaints from Local 1637

members Terry Richards and Carolyn Higgins about alleged

financial malfeasance by the Local’s President, Jose

Mendoza, the ATU on April 10, 2017 imposed a temporary

trusteeship over Local 1637. The letter from ATU

International President Lawrence Hanley that informed

Local 1637 of the temporary trusteeship cited a variety of

alleged “issues severely impacting the effective

administration and functioning of Local 1637.” Chief

among these was the allegation that Mendoza had been

overpaid in terms of his salary and vacation pay. The letter

further stated that, by operation of the ATU’s Constitution

and General Laws (“CGL”), this “imposition of the

trusteeship automatically suspends all officers and executive

board members of the local union from office.” ATU

8 MENDOZA V. ATU

International Vice President James Lindsay was designated

as the trustee of Local 1637.

In May 2017, the ATU held a two-day evidentiary

hearing to determine whether the trusteeship was justified

and should be continued. The hearing was overseen by

Antonette Bryant, an ATU representative, together with

assistance from two members of ATU’s General Counsel’s

Office, Keira McNett and Daniel Smith. Mendoza

represented Local 1637 at the hearing. Mendoza presented

an opening statement, sworn testimony, and a closing

statement, and he submitted a post-hearing statement as well.

Mendoza also cross-examined several witnesses called by

ATU. Bryant concluded that the trusteeship was justified,

and her conclusions were upheld by the ATU General

Executive Board in June 2017. As a result, pursuant to the

CGL, the board members were formally removed from their

positions and the trusteeship remained in place until new

officer elections were held in May 2018.

In her report explaining why the trusteeship was

warranted, Bryant relied on the following five grounds, all

of which exclusively or overwhelmingly rested upon

malfeasance on the part of Mendoza.

First, Mendoza had been overpaid more than $140,000

over an approximately six-year period. Specifically,

Mendoza’s salary was at a rate of pay higher than the bylaws

allowed, and he was paid for more vacation time than he was

entitled.

Second, Local 1637 had failed for years to conduct

required annual audits, despite ATU’s specific reminders to

Mendoza and the Local 1637 board. When an ATU auditor,

Tyler Home, conducted a thorough accounting, he

uncovered a pattern of improper expense reimbursements,

MENDOZA V. ATU 9

particularly to Mendoza. He also learned that Mendoza had

been improperly receiving a $250 monthly advance on

reimbursable expenses as well as reimbursement “for the

cost of his home internet service,” and that Mendoza and

another local officer had made improper withdrawals of

cash.

Third, Local 1637 persistently failed to achieve a

quorum at its meetings, with the result that, as one ATU

official put it, “Whatever the president [Mendoza] wants, the

executive board goes along with.” Members of the Local

also complained that, at meetings, Mendoza referred to

“female members in derogatory terms,” such as “bitch,” and

that Mendoza showed “favoritism . . . toward particular

officers and executive board members.”

Fourth, Local 1637 persistently failed to process

grievances in a timely manner, and in at least once instance

there was evidence that Mendoza had held up a member’s

grievance to retaliate against that member’s vocal criticism

of Mendoza.

Fifth, Local 1637 failed to obey direct orders from

ATU’s leadership. In particular, Mendoza was repeatedly

instructed that the position of secretary-treasurer was

required to be a full-time position, but he ignored these

directives. Mendoza also ignored a directive informing him

that delegates to the ATU International Convention must be

elected; instead, he proceeded to appoint those delegates

himself. After further intervention by ATU forced the Local

to back down, Mendoza still required the Local to cover the

nonrefundable airfare and registration fee of a delegate he

had wrongly appointed.

After the ATU board upheld the trusteeship, Mendoza’s

employer, Keolis Transit America, Inc. (“KTA”), made clear

10 MENDOZA V. ATU

that it expected Mendoza to return to work immediately.

(Mendoza had been on a leave of absence from his position

as a coach operator while serving as president of Local

1637.) However, in October 2016, before the trusteeship

proceedings began, Mendoza was convicted of driving under

the influence, which resulted in the suspension of his

commercial driver’s license. In response to KTA’s threat to

terminate him, Mendoza asked Local 1637 to file a grievance

against KTA on his behalf. Pursuant to a subsequent

settlement between KTA and Local 1637 (which Trustee

Lindsay accepted on Mendoza’s behalf but without his

consent), Mendoza was offered an opportunity to resume

work for KTA if he could recertify his license within five to

seven days. After he failed to do so, he was terminated by

KTA in 2017.

B

In September 2017, Mendoza filed Mendoza I in state

court against ATU, Lindsay, Hanley, Bryant, McNett,

Smith, and Home (the “ATU Defendants”), as well as Local

1637 members Higgins and Richards. In his complaint in

that case, Mendoza challenged the imposition of the

trusteeship and the removal of the executive board members

on a variety of grounds, including breach of the ATU

Constitution, fraudulent misrepresentation, and malicious

prosecution. In its prayer for relief, the complaint sought,

inter alia, an order declaring “that the process for placing the

Local Union under trusteeship was invalid” and directing

“that the trusteeship over Local 1637 be terminated, and that

Mr. Mendoza and the rest of Local 1637’s Executive Board

be restored to their positions.” ATU removed the action to

federal court several days later, asserting, inter alia, that the

breach-of-contract claims based on the ATU Constitution

were “completely preempted” by § 301(a) of the Labor

MENDOZA V. ATU 11

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and

therefore necessarily arose under federal law. See Garcia v.

Service Emps. Int’l Union, 993 F.3d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 2021)

(holding that § 301(a) “completely preempts state law claims

based on contracts between labor unions, which may include

union constitutions”).

After discovery closed in Mendoza I, Mendoza filed

Mendoza II in May 2018 in federal court, asserting similar

claims against the same ATU Defendants. 1 This new suit,

however, added seven of the former executive board

members of Local 1637 as co-plaintiffs (the “Executive

Board Plaintiffs”). The complaint also named several

additional defendants—viz., KTA; Miller Kaplan & Arase

(“MKA”), a firm that had audited Local 1637’s finances; and

several of KTA’s and MTA’s employees.

The ATU Defendants moved to dismiss the claims

against them in Mendoza II on claim-splitting grounds.

1

The operative complaint in Mendoza II added as a defendant an

additional ATU vice president named Richie Murphy, and it dropped

Higgins and Richards as defendants. The complaint alleges that

Mendoza had previously asked Hanley in 2015 to bring certain charges

against Murphy and that the actions ATU took against Mendoza in 2017

were in retaliation for his complaints about Murphy. This same

contention had been raised and rejected during the trusteeship

proceedings before ATU hearing officer Bryant, and it was also alluded

to in the Mendoza I complaint even though Murphy was not named as a

defendant there. Under these circumstances, the naming of Murphy as

an additional ATU Defendant does not affect the application of

preclusion or claim-splitting principles. U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria

Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1992). In

any event, the Mendoza II complaint pleads no facts that would plausibly

establish that Murphy played a role in the events in 2017 that led to the

imposition of the trusteeship over Local 1637. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

12 MENDOZA V. ATU

While that motion was still pending, and without prejudice

to its disposition, the district court ordered Mendoza I and

Mendoza II to be otherwise consolidated. 2 On September 5,

2019, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Mendoza II

claims against the ATU Defendants, holding that they were

barred by the doctrine of claim-splitting. After the district

court entered final judgment against Plaintiffs on all claims

on May 4, 2020, Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II

Plaintiffs “generally have ‘no right to maintain two

separate actions involving the same subject matter at the

same time in the same court and against the same

defendant.’” Adams v. California Dep’t of Health Servs.,

487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To

determine when such improper claim-splitting is present,

“we borrow from the test for claim preclusion.” Id. Under

the federal claim-preclusion principles that apply in these

federal-question-based suits, the bar of claim-splitting is

applicable if the second suit involves (1) the same causes of

action as the first; and (2) the same parties or their privies.

Id. at 689. 3 Reviewing de novo the district court’s

determination that both requirements are satisfied in this

2

We reject Plaintiffs’ suggestion that, by first consolidating

Mendoza I and Mendoza II, the district court somehow lost the ability to

apply claim-splitting principles. The district court made sufficiently

clear, on the record, that its consolidation of the cases was subject to the

then-pending motion to dismiss the portions of Mendoza II that were

asserted to be impermissibly duplicative of Mendoza I.

3

Adams’s expansive conception of the “same party” requirement

was rejected by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,

904 (2008), but Adams remains good law for the particular points for

which we cite it here.

MENDOZA V. ATU 13

case, see, e.g., Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. Whitehall

Co., 853 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1988), we affirm.

A

Whether two suits involve the same causes of action

turns, at least in federal-question cases, on the application of

the Restatement of Judgments’ same-transaction test. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982);

Adams, 487 F.3d at 689. That test directs us to consider four

factors:

(1) whether rights or interests established in

the prior judgment would be destroyed or

impaired by prosecution of the second action;

(2) whether substantially the same evidence

is presented in the two actions; (3) whether

the two suits involve infringement of the

same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise

out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.

Adams, 487 F.3d at 689 (quoting Costantini v. Trans World

Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 1982)). Each of

these factors confirms that Mendoza I and Mendoza II

involve the same causes of action.

The “most important” factor is “whether the two suits

arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Adams,

487 F.3d at 689 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). That is obviously true here: the gravamen of both

suits is that, based on its findings concerning Mendoza’s

extensive malfeasance, ATU was able to place Local 1637

into receivership and to oust its then-existing board. And

given that core overlap, it is equally obvious that the two

suits involve “infringement of the same right”; that litigation

of the suits would involve “substantially the same evidence”;

14 MENDOZA V. ATU

and that continued litigation of a second suit could impair

any “rights or interests” that might be established in a

judgment in the first. Id. The fact that Mendoza II involves

somewhat different legal theories and a somewhat broader

range of related conduct and damages does not alter the

underlying fundamental identity of the suits under the

Restatement’s same-transaction test. See Kremer v.

Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982)

(“Res judicata has recently been taken to bar claims arising

from the same transaction even if brought under different

statutes.”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 61(1) (Tentative Draft No. 5, Mar. 10, 1978) (additional

citations omitted)).

B

The more difficult question concerns whether the two

cases involve the same parties or their privies. Ordinarily, a

different set of parties—such as the additional Plaintiffs in

Mendoza II—would be entitled to bring their own suit

concerning the very same events that are the subject of an

existing suit by a different plaintiff or plaintiffs. See, e.g.,

South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 167–68

(1999) (claim preclusion could not be applied as between

two suits brought by separate corporations challenging

constitutionality of state tax in different tax years). But

under the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor, a nonparty to

a first action may nonetheless be subject to claim

preclusion—and therefore also to the bar against claim-

splitting—when, inter alia, that nonparty was “adequately

represented by someone with the same interests who was a

party” to the first suit. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894 (simplified).

Under the unique facts of this case, the district court

correctly held that the Executive Board Plaintiffs were

adequately represented by Mendoza in Mendoza I.

MENDOZA V. ATU 15

As the Supreme Court has explained, a nonparty is

adequately represented in a prior suit when, “at a minimum:

(1) [t]he interests of the nonparty and her representative are

aligned; and (2) either the party understood herself to be

acting in a representative capacity or the original court took

care to protect the interests of the nonparty.” Taylor,

553 U.S. at 900 (citations omitted). “In addition, adequate

representation sometimes requires (3) notice of the original

suit to the persons alleged to have been represented.” Id. All

three of these requirements are satisfied here.

1

First, the Executive Board Plaintiffs’ interests

completely aligned with Mendoza’s. Mendoza I expressly

sought to have the trusteeship terminated and to have all

prior board members—including both Mendoza and the

Executive Board Plaintiffs—be reinstated to the board.

Moreover, all of the relevant claims and injuries in Mendoza

II arose from the trusteeship that was challenged in Mendoza

I. 4 And, as our review of the ATU hearing officer’s findings

4

The only possible exception is Plaintiffs’ defamation claim, which

alleges that the ATU Defendants falsely accused them of embezzlement

by circulating the campaign literature of competing candidates in a

subsequent board election. But that claim also rests on the asserted

falsity of the underlying allegations of wrongdoing against Mendoza,

and so it provides no basis for concluding that the interests of Mendoza

and the Executive Board Plaintiffs were not aligned. In any event, the

defamation claim cannot salvage the claims against the ATU Defendants

in Mendoza II, because it improperly seeks to impose liability on conduct

that is mandated by federal regulations governing union elections. See

29 C.F.R. § 452.70 (expressly stating that “a union’s contention that

mailing of certain campaign literature may constitute libel for which it

may be sued has been held not to justify its refusal to distribute the

literature, since the union is under a statutory duty to distribute the

material”).

16 MENDOZA V. ATU

confirms, the ruling upholding the trusteeship rested

dispositively, if not exclusively, on misconduct committed

by Mendoza. See supra at 8–9. Indeed, all seven of the

Executive Board Plaintiffs submitted declarations in

Mendoza I with identical language attesting to the fact that

the “trusteeship was imposed solely to remove Jose

[Mendoza] from office” (emphasis added). Given that all of

the Executive Board Plaintiffs’ injuries rested on the validity

of the ATU Defendants’ findings concerning Mendoza’s

misconduct, it follows that Mendoza’s interests were aligned

with those of the Executive Board Plaintiffs when, in

Mendoza I, he challenged those findings, the resulting

imposition of a trusteeship, and the accompanying removal

of the entire board.

Furthermore, because the trusteeship was imposed as a

result of Mendoza’s malfeasance, as opposed to any wholly

independent conduct by other individual Plaintiffs, the

Executive Board Plaintiffs’ claims necessarily rise and fall

with Mendoza’s claims—further confirming that their

interests are aligned. Indeed, on every cause of action the

Executive Board Plaintiffs allege, they are joined together

with Mendoza and they seek relief on identical grounds. 5

The Executive Board Plaintiffs, even after amending

their complaint to add fourteen additional causes of action,

make no claims that are independent of Mendoza’s, and the

gravamen of their shared claims is that the trusteeship, and

the concomitant removal of Plaintiffs from their positions,

5

The sixth claim in Mendoza II—which alleged breach of the duty

of fair representation—is the sole claim that is asserted only by

Mendoza. Because that claim is asserted by the same party who is the

plaintiff in Mendoza I, it is unquestionably barred by the claim-splitting

doctrine. The claim is therefore irrelevant to the analysis with respect to

the Executive Board Plaintiffs.

MENDOZA V. ATU 17

was based on allegations that were “unsupported by

evidence or facts.” Thus, the Executive Board Plaintiffs’

argument is that the trusteeship was wrongly imposed

because Mendoza did not commit misconduct, not that they

were improperly removed for alleged misconduct of their

own of which they were innocent. This is also consistent

with the CGL: Section 12.6 of the ATU Constitution makes

clear that, once a trusteeship is imposed, individual board

members are automatically suspended, and if the trusteeship

is subsequently upheld after a hearing (as occurred here),

those board members are automatically removed from

office. Once ATU imposed a trusteeship over Local 1637

on account of Mendoza’s extensive misconduct, the other

board members were automatically stripped of their

responsibilities, regardless of whether they, individually,

committed any misconduct. And under the applicable

procedures governing review of the trusteeship, the

Executive Board Plaintiffs could regain their positions only

if the imposition of the trusteeship was itself invalidated.

Accordingly, the Executive Board Plaintiffs’ claims

concerning their ouster rise and fall with Mendoza’s. Put

simply, the allegations of the operative complaint in

Mendoza II provide no basis upon which to conclude that the

Executive Board Plaintiffs’ interests were not aligned with

those of Mendoza.

2

It is also clear that, in Mendoza I, Mendoza understood

himself to be acting in a representative capacity on behalf of

the other board members and that the other board members

had notice that he was doing so. The second and third

elements of the adequate-representation test, see supra at 15,

are thus also satisfied here.

18 MENDOZA V. ATU

In Mendoza I, Mendoza specifically requested that, inter

alia, the court declare that the trusteeship and the removal of

Mendoza and “the rest of Local 1637’s Executive Board”

was unlawful—the same core remedy those board members

seek in Mendoza II. Before the district court in Mendoza I,

Mendoza clarified his own view of the relationship between

Mendoza I and the claims of the Executive Board Plaintiffs

in Mendoza II as follows (emphases added):

Plaintiff Mendoza brought this action

individually, and on behalf of Local 1637, of

which the Mendoza 2 Plaintiffs are members.

As such, the Mendoza 2 Plaintiffs have an

interest in this case as members of Local

1637, and this Motion will proceed by

referencing the Mendoza 1 and Mendoza 2

Plaintiffs collectively as “Plaintiffs.”

Moreover, as noted earlier, all of the Executive Board

Plaintiffs themselves submitted declarations in support of

Mendoza’s effort to get them restored to their positions—

thereby confirming, not only that they were aware of

Mendoza I, but that they supported Mendoza’s efforts in that

suit on their behalf. See supra at 15–16. This is the rare

situation in which the litigants in the two suits, despite not

sharing a formal legal relationship, cannot be characterized

as “‘strangers’ to one another.” Richards v. Jefferson Cnty.,

517 U.S. 793, 802 (1996) (citation omitted).

III

Accordingly, we agree with the district court that

Mendoza viewed himself as acting in a representative

capacity in Mendoza I and that he was an adequate

representative of the Executive Board Plaintiffs in that suit.

The district court therefore properly dismissed the

MENDOZA V. ATU 19

duplicative claims against the ATU Defendants in Mendoza

II.

AFFIRMED.