Opinion

La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Harris Cty Repub

  • 29 F.4th 299
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Mar 25, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Civil Rights
Cited by
32 cases
Authority
More cited than 84.8%

finding that a public interest group has satisfied the impairment element for intervention where “amendments to the Texas Election Code [would] change the entire election landscape for those participating as the Committees’ members and volunteers”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that a public interest group has satisfied the impairment element for intervention where “amendments to the Texas Election Code [would] change the entire election landscape for those participating as the Committees’ members and volunteers”
  • holding that public interest groups who would be required to expend significant resources and whose ability to participate in the election process would be impacted by a lawsuit had demonstrated sufficient interest for intervention
  • expounding that despite the intervenor-affiliate group and current government- party sharing the “same objective” of defending the constitutionality of a statute, the affiliate-group’s interests were “less broad than those of the governmental defendants” and “different in kind from the public interests of the State or its officials”
  • holding that a security interest must be more than solely “ideological, economical, or precedential”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 21-51145 Document: 00516254625 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/25/2022

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 25, 2022

No. 21-51145 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

La Union del Pueblo Entero; Friendship–West Baptist

Church; The Anti-Defamation League Austin,

Southwest, and Texoma; Southwest Voter Registration

Education Project; Texas Impact; Mexican American

Bar Association of Texas; Texas Hispanics Organized

for Political Education; JOLT Action; William C.

Velasquez Institute; James Lewin; Fiel Houston,

Incorporated; Mi Familia Vota; Marla Lopez; Paul

Rutledge,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Gregory W. Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas, et al.,

Defendants,

Harris County Republican Party; Dallas County

Republican Party; National Republican Senatorial

Committee; National Republican Congressional

Committee; Republican National Committee,

Movants—Appellants,

______________________________

OCA–Greater Houston; League of Women Voters of

Texas; REVUP-Texas; Texas Organizing Project;

Workers Defense Action Fund,

Case: 21-51145 Document: 00516254625 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/25/2022

No. 21-51145

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Jose A. Esparza, in his official capacity as Deputy Secretary of the State of

Texas, et al.,

Defendants,

Harris County Republican Party; Dallas County

Republican Party; National Republican Senatorial

Committee; National Republican Congressional

Committee; Republican National Committee,

Movants—Appellants,

______________________________

Houston Justice; Delta Sigma Theta Sorority,

Incorporated; Houston Area Urban League; The Arc of

Texas; Jeffrey Lamar Clemmons,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Gregory Wayne Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas,

et al.,

Defendants,

Harris County Republican Party; Dallas County

Republican Party; National Republican Senatorial

Committee; National Republican Congressional

Committee; Republican National Committee,

Movants—Appellants,

______________________________

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LULAC Texas; Vote Latino; Texas Alliance for Retired

Americans; Texas AFT,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Jose Esparza, in his official capacity as the Texas Deputy Secretary of

State, et al.,

Defendants,

Harris County Republican Party; Dallas County

Republican Party; National Republican Senatorial

Committee; National Republican Congressional

Committee; Republican National Committee,

Movants—Appellants,

______________________________

Mi Familia Vota; Marla Lopez; Marlon Lopez; Paul

Rutledge,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Gregory Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of Texas, et al.,

Defendants,

Harris County Republican Party; Dallas County

Republican Party; National Republican Senatorial

Committee; National Republican Congressional

Committee; Republican National Committee,

Movants—Appellants,

______________________________

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No. 21-51145

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

State of Texas, et al.,

Defendant,

Harris County Republican Party; Dallas County

Republican Party; National Republican Senatorial

Committee; National Republican Congressional

Committee; Republican National Committee,

Movants—Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 5:21-CV-844

Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Higginbotham and Elrod, Circuit

Judges.

Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:

The Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 1 in August 2021 and

Governor Greg Abbott signed it into law the next month. SB 1 amended the

Texas Election Code in various ways. Five groups of private plaintiffs and

the United States sued the State of Texas and an assortment of state and local

officials to enjoin enforcement of some or all of the new provisions. Several

committees associated with the Republican Party moved to intervene as

defendants. The district court denied their motions. Because the

Committees have a right to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

24(a)(2), we REVERSE and REMAND.

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I.

In one of many special sessions in 2021, the Texas Legislature passed

SB 1. See An Act Relating to Election Integrity and Security, S.B. 1, 87th

Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (2021). SB 1 amended various provisions of the Texas

Election Code pertaining to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers,

and more. Before Governor Abbott could sign it into law, plaintiffs had

already filed two of the lawsuits which make up part of this appeal. The rest

of the private plaintiffs sued shortly thereafter. The United States later sued,

and the district court joined that suit with the five consolidated cases. The

lawsuits challenge SB 1’s validity under the U.S. Constitution and other

federal laws. They specifically seek to enjoin enforcement of SB 1 by the

following defendants: the State of Texas; Governor Abbott, Texas Secretary

of State John Scott, and Attorney General Ken Paxton (together, the “state

officials”); and the Elections Administrators of Bexar, Hidalgo, Dallas, El

Paso, and Harris Counties, plus the Travis County Clerk (together, the

“local officials”).

About a month after the district court consolidated the private suits at

the end of September, and a week and a half before the United States filed

suit, the Republican Committees sought to intervene as defendants. The

Republican Committees include the local chapters of Harris and Dallas

Counties, the Republican National Committee, the National Republican

Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican Congressional

Committee. The local chapter committees make “significant contributions

and expenditures to support Republican candidates” in Texas’s elections,

primarily by “devoting substantial resources towards educating, mobilizing,

assisting, training, and turning out voters, volunteers, and poll watchers” in

their respective counties. The national chapter committees do much the

same on the national level, but also provide resources to local Republican-

affiliated groups in Texas.

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The district court denied the Committees’ motion to intervene.

Though the court noted that the motion was “undoubtedly timely,” it held

that the Committees failed to satisfy the other three requirements in Rule

24(a)(2). The Committees appealed. Relevant here, the district court

entered a scheduling order and accelerated proceedings in the district court,

such that discovery would be completed in May 2022 and trial would be set

for July 2022. The Committees then moved to expedite this appeal, which

this court granted over opposition from the plaintiffs.

II.

Rule 24 allows certain parties to intervene by right. Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(a). 1 If the right to intervene is not granted by some other federal statute,

see id. R. 24(a)(1), a party can still intervene if it satisfies the four elements of

Rule 24(a)(2):

(1) the application for intervention must be timely;

(2) the applicant must have an interest relating to the property

or transaction which is the subject of the action;

(3) the applicant must be so situated that the disposition of the

action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to

protect that interest; [and]

(4) the applicant’s interest must be inadequately represented by

the existing parties to the suit.

Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting New

Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co. (“NOPSI”), 732 F.2d 452,

463 (5th Cir. 1984)). It is the movant’s burden to establish the right to

intervene, but “Rule 24 is to be liberally construed.” Brumfield v. Dodd, 749

1

Rule 24(b) also allows for permissive intervention. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The

Committees argued that they were entitled to permissive intervention below, but they

abandoned that argument on appeal. Thus, we do not address it here.

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F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2014). “Federal courts should allow intervention

‘where no one would be hurt and the greater justice could be attained.’”

Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting McDonald v.

E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970)); see Miller v. Fed’n of S.

Coops., No. 21-11271, 2022 WL 851782, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (noting

“our broad policy favoring intervention” and the intervenor’s “minimal

burden” (internal quotes and citation omitted)). At this stage, the court

takes the movant’s factual allegations as true. See Mendenhall v. M/V Toyota

Maru No. 11, 551 F.2d 55, 56 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977). We review the denial of a

right to intervene de novo. Texas, 805 F.3d at 656.

The Committees argue that they are entitled to intervene by right and

that they satisfy each of Rule 24(a)(2)’s requirements. The United States

and the private plaintiffs agree that the Committees’ motion was timely (the

first requirement), but they contest that the Committees satisfied any of the

remaining Rule 24(a)(2) requirements.

A.

First, the interest requirement. To intervene by right, the

Committees must claim “an interest relating to the property or transaction

that is the subject of the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The precise

definition of an “interest” has been hard to pin down, but we have

interpreted Rule 24(a)(2) to require a “direct, substantial, legally protectable

interest in the proceedings.” Edwards v. City of Houston, 78 F.3d 983, 995

(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (quoting NOPSI, 732 F.2d at 463). By contrast,

intervention by right will not be granted for purely “ideological, economic,

or precedential” reasons. Texas, 805 F.3d at 657. Property interests are the

quintessential rights Rule 24(a) protects, but we have made clear that Rule

24(a)(2) does not require “that a person must possess a pecuniary or

property interest to satisfy the requirement of Rule 24(a)(2).” Mothersill

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D.I.S.C. Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, S.A., 831 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1987). In

addition, a “legally protectable interest” does not mean the interest must be

“legally enforceable”: “[A]n interest is sufficient if it is of the type that the

law deems worthy of protection, even if the intervenor does not have an

enforceable legal entitlement or would not have standing to pursue her own

claim.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 659. In fact, we have said that in a case involving

“a public interest question” that is “brought by a public interest group,” the

“interest requirement may be judged by a more lenient standard.”

Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 344 (quoting 6 James W. Moore, et al., Moore’s Federal

Practice § 24.03[2][c] (3d ed. 2008) (hereinafter “Moore’s”)).

The Committees have satisfied the interest requirement of Rule 24(a).

Specifically, the Committees expend significant resources in the recruiting

and training of volunteers and poll watchers who participate in the election

process. 2 SB 1 unquestionably regulates the conduct of the Committees’

volunteers and poll watchers. See Texas, 805 F.3d at 658 (quoting Northland

Fam. Plan. Clinic, Inc. v. Cox, 487 F.3d 323, 343 (6th Cir. 2007)). As noted

by the Committees, they expend resources regarding the recruitment,

training, and appointment of poll watchers, and SB 1 changes the legal

landscape for what it takes to carry out that duty. 3 This interest goes beyond

2

The United States and private plaintiffs contend that the Committees forfeited

any argument pertaining to poll watchers. We disagree. “Although issues not raised before

the district court are generally waived, an argument is not waived on appeal if the argument

on the issue before the district court was sufficient to permit the district court to rule on

it.” Bradley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 620 F.3d 509, 519 n.5 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotes

omitted). The arguments pertaining to poll watchers were adequately addressed in the

briefing before the district court, so the argument is not forfeited on appeal.

3

This interest is not unlike the ones claimed by the private plaintiffs to support

their arguments over whether they have standing to pursue these claims in the first place.

See, e.g., LULAC Complaint at 7 (“LULAC regularly engages in voter registration, voter

education, and other activities and programs designed to increase voter turnout among its

members and their communities, which is critical to LULAC’s mission.”); id. at 8 (“In

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a purely “ideological” reason for intervention and amounts to a “direct” and

“substantial” interest in the proceedings. See Texas, 805 F.3d at 657–59.

Because the burden is lower for a “public interest group” raising a “public

interest question,” see Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 344, the Committees clear this

hurdle because many of the claims brought by the plaintiffs could affect the

Committees’ ability to participate in and maintain the integrity of the election

process in Texas. 4 Accordingly, the Committees have a legally protectable

interest in these proceedings to support intervention by right. 5

B.

Second, the impairment requirement. Because the Committees have

established an interest in these proceedings, they must next show that

“disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede [their]

ability to protect that interest.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 657 (quoting NOPSI, 732

2022, Voto Latino anticipates making expenditures in the millions of dollars to educate,

register, mobilize, and turn out Latinx voters across the United States, including in

Texas.”). We express no views on whether those interests are sufficient to establish the

private plaintiffs’ standing. See Newby v. Enron Corp., 443 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2006)

(“[T]here is no Article III requirement that intervenors have standing in a pending case.”).

4

The plaintiffs argue that the Committees did not fully present this argument to

the district court, and thus it was forfeited. We disagree. The Committees have maintained

all along that their interests are tied to their expenditure of resources regarding “their

voters” and “their members.” Their poll watchers fall within those groups, as they further

explained to the district court in reply. Those arguments were properly before the district

court when it denied the Committees’ intervention motion, so we can properly address

them here.

5

Because we deem this interest sufficient, we need not address whether the

Committees’ more election-specific interests are enough to establish intervention by right.

See, e.g., Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 85–87 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (articulating an interest in

maintaining an election’s “competitive environment” sufficient to establish the injury-in-

fact requirement of Article III standing); Issa v. Newsom, No. 20-CV-1044, 2020 WL

3074351, at *3–4 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (intervention by right granted for committees

of the Democratic Party); Paher v. Cegavske, No. 20-CV-00243, 2020 WL 2042365, at *2

(D. Nev. Apr. 28, 2020) (same).

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F.2d at 463). Though the impairment must be “practical” and not merely

“theoretical,” the Committees need only show that if they cannot intervene,

there is a possibility that their interest could be impaired or impeded. See

Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 344–45.

The Committees have established that their interest may be impaired

if they are denied intervention. SB 1 makes several amendments to the Texas

Election Code which change the entire election landscape for those

participating as the Committees’ members and volunteers.

The poll watchers are the prime example. The Texas Election Code

already provides that the “county chair for each political party” that has

nominees on the ballot “may appoint [poll] watchers.” Tex. Elec. Code

§ 33.003(a). Poll watchers “observe the conduct of an election on behalf of”

the “political party.” Id. § 33.001. Under SB 1, the Secretary of State must

“develop and maintain a training program for” poll watchers, and

prospective watchers must “complete[] the training with a certificate of

completion” to participate in the election. See S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Spec.

Sess., art. IV, § 4.04 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 33.008). This squarely

regulates the conduct of the Committees’ members, and the outcome of this

lawsuit may change what the Committees must do to prepare for upcoming

elections.

SB 1 also provides poll watchers with more rights. Under SB 1, poll

watchers “may not be denied free movement where election activity is

occurring within the location at which the watcher is serving.” See id. § 4.07

(codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 33.056(e)). It also further clarifies that an

election official breaks the law by “taking any action to obstruct the view of a

watcher or distance the watcher from the activity or procedure to be observed

in a manner that would make observation not reasonably effective.” See id.

§ 4.09 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 33.061(a)). Poll watchers may also now

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observe the sealing and transfer of election-related data at the polling places

they serve. See id. § 4.08 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 33.0605). And with

those new rights comes new remedies, specifically for the Committees

themselves (not just for their members): “The appointing authority for a

watcher who believes that the watcher was unlawfully prevented or

obstructed from the performance of the watcher’s duties may seek”

injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus, and “any other remedy available under

law.” Id. § 4.10 (codified at Tex. Elec. Code § 33.063).

If the district court either partially or fully grants the relief sought by

the plaintiffs here, the Committees will have to expend resources to educate

their members on the shifting situation in the lead-up to the 2022 election.

Further, SB 1 grants rights to the Committees and their members that could

be taken away if the plaintiffs prevail. Because that result could practically

impair the Committees’ interest in their absence, they have satisfied the

impairment requirement under Rule 24(a)(2).

C.

Third, the inadequacy-of-representation requirement. Having

satisfied the rest of Rule 24(a)(2)’s requirements, the Committees must

show that their interests are not adequately represented by the State of Texas

or the state officials. Texas, 805 F.3d at 661–64. The Committees “need not

show that the representation by existing parties will be, for certain,

inadequate,” but instead that it may be inadequate. See id. at 661 (quoting

Moore’s § 24.03[4][a][i]; Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of Am., 404 U.S.

528, 538 n.10 (1972)).

Though we have characterized this burden as “minimal,” Edwards,

78 F.3d at 1005, to give it some “teeth,” we have recognized “two

presumptions of adequate representation,” Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 345. The

first presumption arises when the intervenor “has the same ultimate

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objective as a party to the lawsuit.” Texas, 805 F.3d at 661–62. This

presumption can be overcome by showing “adversity of interest, collusion,

or nonfeasance on the part of the existing party.” 6 Id. (quoting Edwards, 78

F.3d at 1005). An intervenor can establish an adversity of interest if “its

interests diverge from the putative representative’s interests in a manner

germane to the case.” Id. at 662. The second presumption arises when the

existing party “is a governmental body or officer charged by law with

representing the interests” of the intervenor, which can be overcome by

showing that the intervenor’s “interest is in fact different from that of the”

governmental party “and that the interest will not be represented by” the

existing governmental party. Id. at 661–62 (quoting Edwards, 78 F.3d at

1005).

Assuming either presumption applies, the Committees have rebutted

each. It is uncontested that the starting point is that the Committees and the

defendants have the same objective: uphold SB 1. But as the Committees

point out, there are reasons to believe the Committees’ interests are less

broad than those of the governmental defendants, which may lead to

divergent results. See Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 346. The Committees’ interests

diverge first and foremost with how to carry out the ultimate objective. The

State and its officials would prefer to not resolve this case on the merits at

all—they vigorously contend that these lawsuits should be dismissed on

sovereign-immunity and standing grounds. Were the State and its officials

to succeed on those arguments, the remaining local officials would not

adequately represent the Committees’ interests—neither the United States

6

As we noted in Texas, “adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance on the part

of the existing party” is not an exclusive list of ways to rebut the presumption, though we

have yet to clearly articulate other factors in our cases. 805 F.3d at 662 n.5.

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nor the private plaintiffs contend the local officials could. 7 That is likely

because at least some of the local officials have already said that they will not

substantively defend the constitutionality of the law in this lawsuit. And one

of the officials is a plaintiff in another case challenging the constitutionality of

provisions in SB 1. See Longoria v. Paxton, No. 22-50110, 2022 WL 832239,

at *1–2 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2022) (certifying questions to the Supreme Court

of Texas). This would leave the Committees, especially the local committees

involved here, without recourse to protect their interests in SB 1 being

upheld. The Committees, by contrast, would benefit from the finality and

certainty of SB 1’s legality being resolved on the merits.

Specific to the governmental-representative presumption, the

Committees’ private interests are different in kind from the public interests

of the State or its officials. The Committees interests primarily rely on the

expenditure of their resources to equip and educate their members, along

with relying on the rights of the Committees’ members and volunteers who

participate in the election. See Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1207 (finding this

requirement satisfied where government was defending public interests

while the intervenors sought to vindicate only their economic interests).

Though the Committees’ interests are not solely ideological, see Texas, 805

F.3d at 658, they are nevertheless incidentally partisan—if for no other

7

The dissenting opinion raises sua sponte the argument that the local officials could

adequately defend the Committees’ interests. As support, it points to the motion to

dismiss filed by Medina County Election Administrator Lupe Torres, which defended SB 1

on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits. See post at 5–6. However, when the private

plaintiffs amended their complaints, they removed Administrator Torres as a defendant.

The rest of the local officials have said they want to stay out of it, instead letting the state

officials take the lead. Nor is it helpful that the United States’ suit against the State of

Texas does not raise sovereign immunity. Post at 5. The United States is not challenging

many of the relevant provisions that affect the Committees’ interest—specifically, the poll-

watcher provisions, which are most important to the Committees.

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reason than that they are brought on behalf of a partisan group, representing

its members to achieve favorable outcomes. 8 Neither the State nor its

officials can vindicate such an interest while acting in good faith. Cf.

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009)

(government actors “are accorded a presumption of good faith because they

are public servants, not self-interested private parties”). Moreover, the State

and its officials have many interests that the Committees do not—

“maintaining not only” SB 1, “but also its relationship with the federal

government and with the courts” that routinely hear challenges to the State’s

election laws. See Brumfield, 749 F.3d at 346.

Though we “cannot say for sure that the state’s more extensive

interests will in fact result in inadequate representation,” we can say that

“surely they might, which is all that [Rule 24(a)(2)] requires.” Id. Because

the Committees here have “satisfied the minimal burden of showing

inadequacy,” id., the fourth requirement is satisfied.

III.

The Committees made a timely application to intervene by right, they

claim interests relating to SB 1 which is the subject of this consolidated suit,

their absence from the suit may practically impede their ability to protect

their interests, and the existing parties might not adequately represent those

interests. Because this is enough to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2), we REVERSE the

8

The United States and the private plaintiffs raise concerns about whether

allowing the Committees to intervene here will allow special-interest or political groups to

intervene in every high-profile case. Those concerns are misplaced. Every intervenor must

satisfy each of the four requirements of Rule 24(a)(2)—though some can, e.g., Texas, 805

F.3d at 663–64, many cannot, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 21 F.3d 603, 606 (5th Cir. 1994). With

the interests at issue in the present case, the Committees have carried their burden, and

thus they are entitled to intervene by right.

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district court’s contrary determination and REMAND to allow the

Committees to intervene by right in this suit.

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Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Both local and national Republican committees (“the Committees”)

seek to intervene as of right as defendants in five consolidated lawsuits

brought by private plaintiffs against Texas state and local officials and a suit

by the United States against the State of Texas and Texas’s Secretary of State

challenging various provisions of SB 1. The Local Committees seeking to

intervene are the Harris County Republican Party and Dallas County

Republican Party. The National Committees are the National Republican

Senatorial Committee, National Republican Congressional Committee, and

the Republican National Committee. I write separately because, to these

eyes, the Committees have not shown that they are entitled to intervene as

of right under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1

I.

I agree with the panel decision that the Local Committees presented a

sufficient interest in the proceedings. But in my view, the National

Committees failed to present a direct interest related to defending SB 1. An

intervenor must show a “direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the

proceedings,” 2 and the interest must be “one that the substantive law

recognizes as belonging to” the intervenor. 3 A “generalized preference that

the case come out a certain way” is not enough to show an interest. 4 Nor are

purely “ideological, economic, or precedential reasons” for intervention. 5

1

FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).

2

Edwards v. City of Hous., 78 F.3d 983, 1004 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal

quotations and citations removed).

3

Id.

4

Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015).

5

Id.

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A.

The Local Committees assert that they have an interest in the lawsuit

because they “recruit, train, and appoint poll watchers ‘to observe the

conduct of . . . election[s]’ in Texas.” Section 4.04 of SB 1 requires the

Secretary of State to develop and maintain training for poll watchers. 6 SB 1

requires poll watchers to complete the training, though it also requires that

this free training be accessible online “at any time, without a requirement for

prior registration.” 7 While SB 1 does not regulate whom the Local

Committees recruit or appoint as poll watchers, the Local Committees assert

a direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings as SB 1’s

training requirements will affect how the Local Committees recruit and train

their poll watchers.

B.

The same cannot be said of the National Committees. The National

Committees assert that they have an interest in the lawsuit because they

“fund recruiting, education, and support activities for poll watchers.” This

is not a direct interest in the poll watching provisions of SB 1. The National

Committees’ purported interest is too remote to allow them to intervene as

of right.

Several of our sister circuits likewise use the “direct, substantial,

legally protectable” standard. 8 In American Lung Association, the Second

Circuit held that electric utility companies did not have an interest in various

6

S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2021).

7

Id. See also Online Poll Worker Training Program, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE,

https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/onlinepollworker.shtml.

8

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 463 (5th

Cir. 1984) (en banc).

17

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No. 21-51145

private plaintiffs’ action against the EPA for failing to review and promulgate

national air quality standards within the statutorily required period. 9 The

court reasoned that the air quality standards at issue did not directly impact

the utilities industry so the utility companies’ interest was too remote to

allow them to intervene as of right as defendants. 10 Here too, the National

Committees do not claim that they assist in training or recruiting poll

watchers; their interest only relates to funding local poll watching activities.

This is more attenuated than the Local Committees’ interest. Further, the

National Committees fail to specify how the poll watching training provision

of SB 1 affects its allocation of funding to the Local Committees’ poll

watching activities, given that the training is free, easily accessible, and

simple to complete.

In sum, I would find that only the Local Committees presented a

direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings. That is not

to say that the National Committees have no interest in the outcome of the

litigation. Rather, their interest is too broad and indirect to support

intervention as of right, especially as compared to the existing parties to the

lawsuit and the Local Committees. In this situation, courts typically welcome

their advocacy by amicus briefs. Here, the National Committees’ position is

most efficiently and appropriately considered as friends of the court rather

than as parties to the lawsuit.

II.

Second, even if both the National and Local Committees had a direct,

substantial, legally protectable interest in the proceedings, the Committees

9

Am. Lung Ass’n v. Reilly, 962 F.2d 258, 261 (2d Cir. 1992).

10

Id.

18

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failed to rebut the presumption that the existing defendants adequately

represent the Committees’ interests.

There is a presumption that the existing parties adequately represent

the intervenors interests when the intervenor and an existing party share the

same ultimate objective. 11 Here, the Committees concede that they share

same ultimate “objective” “of upholding SB 1.” To rebut the presumption

of adequate representation, the Committees “must show adversity of

interest, collusion, or nonfeasance on the part of the existing party.” 12 The

Committees allege that their interests diverge from the existing defendants.

That the state defendants are defending SB 1 on jurisdictional grounds

whereas the Committees seek to defend SB 1 on the merits does not create

an adversity of interest. This case is dissimilar to Brumfield, in which the

intervenors and the existing party had divergent views on the same

substantive issue. 13 Indeed, the party in Brumfield conceded a legal issue

whereas the intervenors wished to contest it. 14 Here, however, the existing

defendants and the Committees are unified in defending the substance of the

lawsuit—seeking to uphold SB 1. The state defendants are working towards

that objective via jurisdictional challenges. Both procedural and merits-based

11

Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1005.

12

Id.

13

Brumfield v. Dodd, 749 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2014).

14

Id. This Court’s recent decision allowing a non-profit cooperative of Black

farmers to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit brought by white farmers who were excluded

from a relief program reserved for “socially disadvantaged farmer[s],” also differs from

this case. In Miller, the Black farmers wishing to intervene wanted to defend the program’s

constitutionality by arguing that continuing discrimination created a compelling

government interest. However, the existing government defendant defended the program

only on the grounds that the lingering effects of past discrimination created a compelling

government interest. See Miller v. Vilsack, No. 21-11271, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7563, at

*8–*9 (5th Cir. Mar. 22, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished).

19

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challenges can accomplish the defendants’ and Committees’ shared

objective. If the defendants prevail on jurisdictional grounds, SB 1 yet stands.

A win is a win—regardless of whether it rests on jurisdictional grounds or on

the merits.

The panel decision contemplates that adversity of interests between

the local officials named as defendants and the Committees could arise if the

state officials are later dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. But the

Committees’ purported adversity of interest must be “more than merely

theoretical; there must be a serious probability that the existing party and the

movant may not share the same ultimate objective.” 15 The panel decision

moves too quickly in its sovereign immunity analysis. First, one of the

consolidated actions is the United States’ action against the State of Texas.

Obviously, Texas cannot assert protection on sovereign immunity grounds

against the United States. 16 The Committees fail to explain why Texas would

not continue to defend its own legislation on the merits when the State has

been actively defending SB 1. Second, abrogation is a promising means to

ensure that the state defendants remain in the lawsuit, as all the complaints

bring claims under the Voting Rights Act to which the State enjoys no

immunity. 17

15

Helt v. Sethi Petro., L.L.C., No. 20-40240, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 1026, at *3

(5th Cir. Jan. 13, 2022) (per curiam) (unpublished) (citing 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1909 (3d ed.)) (internal

quotations removed).

16

Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).

17

OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017). For a general

discussion of sovereign immunity, particularly the importance of Ex parte Young, and other

jurisdictional challenges in election cases, see Lewis v. Scott, No. 20-50654, 2022 U.S. App.

LEXIS 6795 (5th Cir. Mar. 16, 2022) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).

20

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Finally, sovereign immunity aside, the Committees fail to show that

the local officials do not intend to defend SB 1. The panel decision notes that

one local official declined to defend SB 1. However, multiple local officials

were named as defendants: the Elections Administrators of Medina, El Paso,

Harris, Bexar, Hidalgo, and Dallas County as well as the County Clerk of

Travis County. Before these cases were consolidated, the Election

Administrator of Medina County filed a motion to dismiss, defending SB 1

both on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits. And far from “stay[ing] out

of” the lawsuit, other local defendants have “reserve[d] the right to raise any

additional defenses that become apparent throughout the factual

development of this case.”

Because the Committees cannot point to a meaningful adversity of

interest beyond a theoretical possibility that all the state defendants who are

actively defending the lawsuit could drop out, the Committees failed to meet

their burden to rebut the presumption that the existing defendants will

adequately protect the Committees’ interest.

III.

Of course, this Court favors intervention when the elements are met;

however, there is no “broad policy” favoring intervention when the

intervenor fails to meet the strictures showing intervention as of right. 18 To

me, the Committees failed to meet their burden to show they are entitled to

intervention as of right. The price of relaxing the showing required for

intervention as of right risks undue complication of litigation. An amicus

brief, as invited by the able district court judge, would have been the

18

See Texas, 805 F.3d at 661 (noting that for the inadequate representation element,

“[a]lthough we have characterized the intervenor’s burden as ‘minimal,’ it cannot be

treated as so minimal as to write the requirement completely out of the rule”) (internal

quotations and citations removed).

21

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No. 21-51145

appropriate mechanism to welcome the Committees’ participation without

the attending risk of future inefficiencies in this and other time-sensitive

cases. 19 Indeed, amici enjoy a unique position with the opportunity to

advocate outside the confines of controlling issues, both in the lower federal

courts and the Supreme Court. I respectfully dissent.

19

The transcript of the district court’s hearing regarding the Committees’ motion

to intervene makes plain the management difficulties brought to this case as well as the

district court’s grasp of these issues.

22

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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