G W v. Ringwood Board of Education

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 20-3552

______________

G. W.; MK. W.,

Appellants

v.

RINGWOOD BOARD OF EDUCATION

______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-19-cv-13734)

District Judge: Honorable John M. Vazquez

______________

Argued: October 27, 2021

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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., KRAUSE, and PHIPPS, Circuit

Judges.

(Opinion Filed: March 16, 2022)

John D. Rue [ARGUED]

John Rue & Associates

40 South Fullerton Avenue

Suite 29

Montclair, NJ 07042

Donald A. Soutar

Coyle Law Group

55 Madison Avenue

Suite 400

Morristown, NJ 07960

Robert C. Thurston

Thurston Law Offices

100 Springdale Road A3

PMB 287

Cherry Hill, NJ 08003

Counsel for Appellants

Jessika Kleen [ARGUED]

Machado Law Group

1 Cleveland Place

Springfield, NJ 07081

Counsel for Appellee

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OPINION

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

2

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)

establishes an administrative process to vindicate a student

with a disability’s right to a free appropriate public education

(“FAPE”) from his or her school district. That process

culminates in a due process hearing wherein an impartial

hearing officer, usually an administrative law judge (“ALJ”),

considers whether the school district has provided a FAPE.

After the hearing, the IDEA envisions entry of an order

detailing the ALJ’s conclusions. The aggrieved party is then

permitted to appeal that administrative determination in a

federal district court. In this appeal, we consider whether the

entry of a “Decision Approving Settlement” in an IDEA

dispute satisfies the jurisdictional prerequisite to an appeal of

an administrative IDEA determination pursuant to 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i). We conclude that it does. Accordingly, we will

reverse the order of the District Court and remand the matter

for consideration of the merits.

I. BACKGROUND

M.W. is a minor child eligible for special education and related

services pursuant to the IDEA. Appellants G.W. and Mk. W.

are his parents. On August 16, 2018, Appellants filed a Petition

for Due Process against appellee Ringwood Board of

Education (the “Board”) before the Commissioner of

Education of the State of New Jersey. On September 17, 2018,

the New Jersey Department of Education gave the parties

notice that the matter had been transferred to the Office of

Administrative Law (“OAL”) and a hearing before an ALJ was

scheduled for October 4, 2018. After an adjournment, the

hearing was rescheduled for May 7, 2019. On May 7, prior to

the scheduled hearing time, the ALJ met with counsel for both

parties. After conferring with counsel, the ALJ met with G.W.

3

and a representative from the Board.1 The parties purportedly

entered into a settlement agreement and the terms of the

agreement were read into the record.

In a “Decision Approving Settlement,” the ALJ made the

following findings:

1. The parties have voluntarily agreed to the

settlement as evidenced by their signatures or

their representatives’ signatures on the attached

document.

2. The settlement fully disposes of all issues in

controversy between them and is consistent with

the law.

A50-51.

The ALJ also explicitly ordered “that the parties comply with

the settlement terms.” The settlement agreement, among other

things, reflects that the parties would each bear their own fees

and costs.

On May 10, 2019, Appellants wrote separately to the

Superintendent of Ringwood Public Schools and all members

of the Board repudiating the agreement. That same day,

Appellants filed a motion before the ALJ to “set aside the

settlement.”

On June 14, 2019, Appellants filed a complaint in the District

Court for the District of New Jersey. The complaint alleged

that Appellants did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into

the agreement; they sought relief pursuant to the IDEA (Count

1

Only G.W. was present at the hearing date for Appellants.

4

One), the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act to declare the

settlement void (Count Two), and the New Jersey Declaratory

Judgment and Civil Rights Acts to declare the attorney fee

waiver void (Count Three).

The Board moved to dismiss the complaint. In resolving the

motion, the District Court sua sponte raised the issue of subject

matter jurisdiction. It characterized Plaintiff’s complaint as

arising out of contract law and questioned whether the ALJ’s

bare findings that the settlement was entered into voluntarily

and resolved all disputes before the OAL satisfied the

jurisdictional requirements of the IDEA. Accordingly, the

District Court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice

and directed the parties to brief the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction.

After the parties briefed the issue, the District Court concluded

that it was without jurisdiction. It held that no jurisdiction was

conferred by two provisions of the IDEA providing for the

enforceability of settlement agreements in the federal courts:

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e), the mediation provision; or §

1415(f)(1)(B), the resolution session provision. It also held

that no jurisdiction attached pursuant to § 1415(i) because the

ALJ’s decision was not based on “substantive grounds,” as

required by § 1415(f). The District Court accordingly

dismissed the matter without prejudice for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Appellants filed this timely appeal.

5

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has “jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over

a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Nichols v.

City of Rehoboth Beach, 836 F.3d 275, 279 (3d Cir. 2016).2

“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s order

dismissing a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d

Cir. 2014) (citing Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458

F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006)). “A challenge to subject matter

jurisdiction . . . may be either a facial or a factual attack.” Davis

v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). This is a

facial attack on jurisdiction, “contest[ing] the sufficiency of the

pleadings.” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 271. This Court thus

“review[s] only whether the allegations on the face of the

complaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the

jurisdiction of the district court.” Id. (quoting Taliaferro, 458

F.3d at 188).

III. ANALYSIS

We begin from the premise that “[f]ederal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed

that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden

2

Though the Board argues that the dismissal without prejudice

is not an appealable final order, its contention is without merit.

See Nichols, 836 F.3d at 279; Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media

Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We have

appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291”).

6

of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted).

Appellants argue that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) confers jurisdiction

over Count One of the complaint to the District Court, and that

the District Court had supplemental jurisdiction over Counts

Two and Three of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367. They interpret this Court’s decision in P.N. v.

Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 2006), as

acknowledging jurisdiction over settlements of administrative

matters embodied in an ALJ’s consent order. They theorize

that the ALJ’s incorporation of the terms of the settlement into

its final order is a decision on the merits and that the ALJ’s

direction that the parties comply with the agreement preserves

jurisdiction for the District Court. Appellants also argue that

the District Court should have exercised general “arising

under” jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over Count

One. They submit that their claim arises out of the IDEA and

that the District Court was without discretion to decline

jurisdiction.

The Board denies that federal question jurisdiction is invoked

by Appellants’ claims. The Board submits that the IDEA only

empowers federal courts to review settlements arising out of

the prescribed mediation process or resolution session in

§ 1415. It notes that the settlement agreement in this matter

was not reached pursuant to either process. It maintains that §

1415(i)(2)(A) can only confer jurisdiction if, after a due

process hearing, an aggrieved party seeks review of a hearing

officer’s findings and decision determining on substantive

grounds whether the student received a FAPE. In its view, the

colloquy before the ALJ and accompanying order in this case

do not meet that standard.

7

A. IDEA Statutory Scheme

Congress enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children with

disabilities have available to them a [FAPE].” Y.B. v. Howell

Twp. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.4th 196, 198 (3d Cir 2021) (quoting 20

U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)). “‘The IDEA offers federal funds to

States in exchange for a commitment[ ] to furnish’ a FAPE ‘to

all children with certain physical or intellectual disabilities.’”

Id. (quoting Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 748

(2017)) (alteration in original). The IDEA directs States to

“implement specified procedural safeguards to ensure children

with disabilities and their parents are provided with due

process.” Batchelor, 759 F.3d at 272. “These safeguards,

known collectively as the IDEA’s administrative process,

provide parents with an avenue to file a complaint and to

participate in an impartial due process hearing” addressing,

among other things, “the provision of a [FAPE] to [their]

child.” Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A)).

“Following completion of the IDEA’s administrative process .

. . the IDEA affords ‘[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and

decisions’ made during or pursuant to the impartial due process

hearing an opportunity for judicial review.” Id. (quoting

§ 1415(i)(2)(A)) (alteration in original). Accordingly, “the

IDEA ‘confers upon disabled students an enforceable

substantive right to public education in participating States.’”

Y.B., F.4th at 198 (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 310

(1988)).

B. Jurisdiction over the Complaint

Appellants contend that the “Decision Approving Settlement”

entered by the ALJ here is an appealable determination arising

out of their due process complaint. We agree.

8

The Board submits that perfunctory approval of a settlement

agreement does not give rise to a civil action pursuant to the

IDEA. It insists that Appellants’ action is a request for judicial

review of a settlement agreement and that such review is only

available for settlement agreements reached in connection with

a mediation, § 1415(e)(2)(F), or resolution session,

§ 1415(f)(1)(B).

However, this mischaracterizes Appellants’ complaint.3

Appellants are challenging the ALJ’s order terminating their

due process petition. Appellants claim that they did not enter

into any settlement agreement purportedly resolving the issues

they raised. Whatever the merits of that claim, it must be

considered by the District Court. The appropriate inquiry is

whether the ALJ correctly determined that the purported

settlement agreement warranted entry of a final order in this

case. It does not confound jurisdiction that Appellants contend

that the ALJ’s determination was in error because the

purported settlement agreement was invalid as a matter of

contract law.4

3

The dissent also frames the issue as one of the validity of the

settlement agreement under state-law contract principles. See

Dissent at 1. This framing, however, disregards the ALJ’s

determination that the purported agreement was “consistent”

with the IDEA.

4

Our caselaw suggests that the substantive determination of

whether a party validly waived their rights pursuant to the

IDEA is not governed by ordinary contract principles but rather

by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See W.B. v.

Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 497-98 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated in part

by A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir.

9

The text and structure of the IDEA reflect Congressional intent

to permit judicial review of ALJ determinations impacting a

student with a disability’s substantive rights pursuant to the

IDEA. Here, the order itself purports to resolve “all issues in

controversy” between the parties on the grounds that “[t]he

parties have voluntarily agreed” to resolve the claims in a

manner “consistent with the law.” A50-51. Additionally, our

determination squares with our caselaw permitting

enforcement of the substantive terms of a settlement agreement

as embodied in an administrative order.

i. Section 1415’s text

Congress crafted the IDEA to provide a comprehensive

remedial scheme through which district courts may review

final administrative determinations. See A.W. v. Jersey City

Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). The

Board’s position, if adopted by this Court, would substantially

limit this remedial scheme by shielding from judicial review a

subset of determinations by an ALJ which affect a student’s

rights under the IDEA. Because this would be contrary to both

the text and purpose of the IDEA, we decline to introduce such

tension.

Section 1415(i)(2)(A) permits a civil action in state or federal

court where the party is challenging a “findings and decision

made under subsection (f).” Subsection (f), governing the

“[i]mpartial due process hearing,” establishes the baseline

procedures for due process hearings, including the time and

manner in which a complaint may be brought. § 1415(f)(1)(A)

2007) (en banc). We need not resolve that issue now. We

leave it to the District Court on remand to determine the

appropriate test for determining the validity of the waiver.

10

and (f)(3)(C); see also § 1415(b)(6) and (b)(7). It limits who

may preside over the hearing, what issues may be raised at the

hearing, and the scope of the hearing officer’s decision. §

1415(f)(3). It directs that “a decision made by a hearing officer

shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination

of whether the child received a [FAPE].” § 1415(f)(3)(E)(1).

By its own terms, the order appealed to the District Court

reflects the ALJ’s determination: (1) of what the issues raised

in the due process complaint are; (2) that there is an agreement

whose terms resolve the issues raised; (3) that the parties

mutually assented to that settlement agreement; and (4) that the

agreement’s material terms comply with the IDEA’s mandate

that participating school districts provide students with

disabilities a FAPE. Clearly, these terms fall within the scope

of a decision made on substantive grounds, as required by

subsection (f). 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(1).

The order also explicitly incorporates the terms of the

agreement, which undoubtedly address M.W.’s rights pursuant

to the IDEA, namely, the provision of a FAPE. It purports to

be “final” and informs the parties that they may appeal

pursuant to § 1415(i), demonstrating an understanding that the

ALJ’s duty to hear Appellants’ complaint was discharged.

These factors likewise compel a conclusion that the decision

approving settlement is an appealable order.5

5

The dissent argues that we seek to enlarge Appellants’

rights into a netherworld with which we are unfamiliar. See

generally Dissent. We highlight the characteristics of the

order at issue here because they compel a conclusion that the

ALJ issued a substantive decision on the matter at hand.

11

Adopting the Board’s position would require holding that, to

be appealable, any administrative order disposing of an IDEA

dispute must be premised on an explicit determination of

whether a student received a FAPE from the school district.

That ignores that subsection (f) contemplates a range of

findings by the ALJ and establishes a procedural baseline for

how the hearing is to be conducted.6

Such an interpretation would preclude, for example, federal

judicial review of an ALJ’s determination that a complaint was

filed out of time, § 1415(f)(1)(A), or that notice was lacking,

§ 1415(f)(3)(B). It would also remove from federal

jurisdiction a party’s claim that the hearing officer is neither

impartial nor qualified, a procedural defect presumably

undermining the entirety of the officer’s determination.

§ 1415(f)(3)(A). We do not construe § 1415 so narrowly. We

consider a party to be “aggrieved by the findings and decision”

of an ALJ when they articulate a challenge to the ALJ’s basis

for entry of a final administrative order.

ii. Our Prior Caselaw

Construing § 1415 to preclude jurisdiction in this case would

also call into question our holdings in P.N., 442 F.3d at 848

and D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260 (3d Cir.

2014). Instead, we take this opportunity to clarify implicit

premises latent in our IDEA jurisprudence. While neither case

6

The dissent protests that Section 1415 only confers

jurisdiction where an ALJ issues a “due-process-hearing

decision.” Dissent at 4. Section 1415(i), however, does not

refer to a “due-process-hearing decision,” but rather to the

“findings and decision made under subsection(f),” which go

beyond the due process hearing itself.

12

squarely addresses the jurisdictional question presented in this

case, they jointly suggest that jurisdiction arises under § 1415

when an administrative order disposing of an IDEA claim is

the subject of a complaint.

In P.N., we considered whether prevailing party status could

attach to plaintiffs whose administrative proceedings in an

IDEA dispute were terminated by a settlement agreement

embodied in a consent order. See 442 F.3d at 850-52. The

parties in that case entered into two separate settlement

agreements addressing plaintiffs’ complaint after P.N. was

suspended from school following an outburst. See id. at 850-

51. Each agreement was reflected in a consent order, the

second indicating that the order was a final decision of the ALJ.

See id. at 851. Before the district court, plaintiffs sought

attorney’s fees as a prevailing party pursuant to the IDEA. See

id. The district court entered judgment in favor of the school

district and denied attorney’s fees. See id. at 852.

We concluded that an administrative consent order could

satisfy the requirements imposed by Buckhannon Bd. and

Home Care, Inc. v. West Va. Dept. of Health and Hum. Res.,

532 U.S. 598 (2001), for the recovery of attorney’s fees in a

federally created action. See id. at 854-55.7 We reasoned that

7

A “stipulated settlement” confers prevailing party status

when it “(1) contain[s] mandatory language, (2) [is] entitled

‘Order,’ (3) [bears] the signature of the District Court judge,

not the parties’ counsel, and (4) provide[s] for judicial

enforcement.” John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty.

Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing

Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir.

2002)). While administrative orders incorporating settlements

do not bear a District Court judge’s signature, we explained in

13

“settlement of an administrative proceeding is the equivalent

of an administrative decree on the merits where, as here, the

parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement

agreement has been made part of the order of dismissal.” Id.

at 854. We recognized that the settlement agreement in that

case was accordingly “judicially enforceable” because the

“consent orders entered . . . were enforceable through an action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .” Id.

Our statement that there was an avenue for judicial

enforcement pursuant to § 1983 confirmed the district court’s

conclusion in that case that the consent order was enforceable

under § 1983, and comported with our then-existing caselaw.

See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995).

Subsequently, in A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791,

803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), we held that § 1983 was not an

appropriate vehicle for vindicating rights guaranteed by the

IDEA, partially abrogating W.B.

Then, in D.E., we considered a federal court’s ability to hear

an IDEA appeal from a party that received a favorable

administrative determination ignored by the school district.

765 F.3d at 274. Plaintiffs in that case obtained an

administrative order following a due process hearing directing

the school district to remediate its failure to provide D.E. a

FAPE. See id. at 266-67. No administrative appeal was taken

and the district’s failure to comply with the ALJ’s final order

was the basis for plaintiffs’ action for compensatory damages

in the district court. See id. at 267. The district court dismissed

P.N. that “administrative imprimatur” was sufficient to confer

prevailing party status under Buckhannon. 442 F.3d at 854

(citing A.R. ex rel R.V. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 407

F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir. 2005)).

14

the IDEA claims on the grounds that, among other things, there

was a failure of the parents to administratively exhaust those

claims. See id.

We held that parties in plaintiffs’ position “may properly

pursue such claims in [federal] court.” Id. at 278. Our holding

was premised on our determination that plaintiffs in that case,

though victorious below, were “‘aggrieved by the findings and

decision’ of the administrative proceedings,” and accordingly

were entitled to “bring a civil action in state or federal court”

to challenge the determination pursuant to § 1415(i)(2),

because no other options for enforcement of the order were

available to them. Id. at 276.

D.E. acknowledges a right to enforce administrative orders in

IDEA cases in a district court. P.N. acknowledges that an

administrative consent order may satisfy the IDEA’s attorney

fees’ shifting provision if it is judicially enforceable. While

our holding in P.N. reflected that such orders were judicially

enforceable pursuant to § 1983, our subsequent case law

clarifies that the appropriate statute under which enforcement

should be sought by a victorious party in an administrative

proceeding is § 1415. See D.E., 765 F.3d at 278; A.W., 486

F.3d at 803.

Unlike D.E., where the jurisdictional inquiry was complicated

by whether a party was “aggrieved” within the meaning of

§ 1415(i)(2) when they, for lack of a better term, won below,

the facts here present no such quandary. If a party that

prevailed before an ALJ may enforce a settlement agreement

embodied in an administrative consent order as an “aggrieved

party” under § 1415(i)(2), then a party seeking to challenge

such an order as improperly entered must likewise be able to

bring their challenge in federal court.

15

To the extent that Appellants’ complaint challenges the basis

for the ALJ’s final order, we hold that it is an appealable order

from which jurisdiction is properly taken in the District Court

pursuant to 20 U.S.C § 1415(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To the

extent that the remainder of Appellants’ claims address the

validity of the settlement agreement on the basis of New Jersey

contract law, we leave it to the District Court in the exercise of

its discretion to consider in the first instance whether

supplemental jurisdiction is appropriately taken to resolve that

matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the

District Court and remand the matter for consideration of the

merits consistent with this opinion.

16

G.W. v. Ringwood Board of Education, No. 20-3552

PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (‘IDEA’)

provides certain discrete causes of action that may be litigated

in federal court. The statute, however, does not create a federal

cause of action to challenge every decision related to a disabled

child’s education. Yet today the Majority Opinion announces

an expansive new principle, akin to a final-order rule for

decisions by state hearing officers: federal courts have

jurisdiction over any ruling by a state hearing officer that

resolves a formal complaint against a school district for

violating the IDEA. Applying that principle, the Majority

Opinion concludes that parents of a child with disabilities may

challenge in federal court a state hearing officer’s decision that

they voluntarily entered a settlement agreement with a school

district relating to their child’s education. I respectfully dissent

from that novel outcome, which no other court has ever

reached, because the parents’ claim sounds in state law and the

text of the IDEA contains no clear statement authorizing such

a federal cause of action. Thus, while the parents may seek to

redress their grievance in state court, they may not proceed in

federal court.

The IDEA does not confer broad power on federal courts to

micromanage every dispute related to the education of children

with disabilities. And nowhere does the statute provide a

federal cause of action to challenge the voluntariness of a

settlement agreement. Rather, the IDEA provides five discrete

causes of action that may be brought in federal court.1 Four of

1

Those five causes of action are (1) to enforce a settlement

agreement resolved through the mediation process, see

those are not relevant to this case.2 To permit this suit, the

Majority Opinion relies on the remaining cause of action,

which permits challenges to certain decisions and findings

made by a hearing officer following a due process hearing. See

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E), (i)(2)(A).

A due process hearing is an impartial state- or local-level

administrative adjudicatory process designed to resolve a due

process complaint. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.511(a); see generally 2 Ronna Greff Schneider & Phyllis

20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2)(F)(iii); (2) to enforce a settlement

agreement entered at a resolution meeting before the due

process hearing, see id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii)(II); (3) to

challenge a hearing officer’s findings and decision related to a

child’s placement in an alternative educational setting, see id.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A), (k); (4) to challenge the findings and decision

by a state educational agency on administrative appeal, see id.

see id. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (i)(1)(A)–(B); and (5) to challenge a

hearing officer’s findings and decision from a due process

hearing; see id. § 1415(i)(2)(A), (f). The IDEA also authorizes

reasonable attorney’s fees for prevailing parties in the causes

of action that it creates. See id. § 1415(i)(3)(B).

2

This case does not qualify for first two causes of action

because it seeks to set aside a settlement agreement, not to

enforce one. It likewise does not implicate the third cause of

action because the parents do not challenge findings and

decisions regarding placement in an alternative educational

setting. Nor does this case implicate the fourth causes of action

for administrative appeals as New Jersey provides only one tier

of administrative review, see N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14-

2.7(v).

2

E. Brown, Education Law: First Amendment, Due Process and

Discrimination Litigation § 6:9 (Oct. 2019 update); Charles J.

Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, Education Law § 5.07 (2021).

Through such a complaint, a person may claim that a school

district violated its obligations regarding “the identification,

evaluation, or educational placement” of a child with

disabilities or otherwise failed to provide a free appropriate

public education to that child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(A); see

34 C.F.R. § 300.507(a); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A),

(f)(1)(A); Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d

266, 272 (3d Cir. 2014). Only the grievances presented in the

due process complaint may be adjudicated at a due process

hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(B); see also 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.511(d).

A hearing officer may resolve a due process hearing in one

of two ways. The first is through a decision made on

“substantive grounds” as to “whether the child received a free

appropriate public education.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i);

see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(1). Alternatively, the hearing

officer may issue a decision based on findings of “procedural

inadequacies” that “impeded the child’s right to a free

appropriate public education,” “significantly impeded the

parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking

process” for their child’s education, or “caused a deprivation

of educational benefits.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); see

also 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2). Only after a hearing officer

issues a decision resolving a due process hearing through one

of those two means does such decision become reviewable in

federal court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i), (ii); see also

M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir.

2012) (upholding the dismissal of an action challenging an

3

interlocutory ruling as premature since the action was

commenced before a due process hearing had been completed).

Under these principles, the parents cannot bring a federal

cause of action. The hearing officer did not conduct a due

process hearing, and thus could not have issued a due-process-

hearing decision. Instead, the hearing officer oversaw

settlement discussions. Through that process, the parties

signed a settlement agreement, which the hearing officer

determined was voluntary. But that decision was not made on

substantive grounds related to the child’s education. Likewise,

that decision was not premised on a procedural inadequacy

related to the provision of educational services or benefits.

Rather, the hearing officer’s decision was based on the

voluntariness of the parents’ consent. Thus, the IDEA does not

create a federal cause of action to challenge the hearing

officer’s decision.

The Majority Opinion reaches a different conclusion. In

doing so, it looks to caselaw for guidance, but it admits that

precedent does not “squarely address[ ] the jurisdictional

question presented in this case.” Its best support comes from

two cases, P.N. v. Clementon Board of Education, 442 F.3d

848 (3d Cir. 2006), and D.E. v. Central Dauphin School

District, 765 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2014). Reading those together,

the Majority Opinion discerns an “implicit premise[ ] latent in

our IDEA jurisprudence,” which is that “jurisdiction arises

under § 1415 when an administrative order disposing of an

IDEA claim is the subject of a complaint.” In essence, the

Majority Opinion reduces the textual limitations on the IDEA’s

due-process-hearing cause of action to a final-order

requirement, similar to the one found in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, so

4

that any final order of a hearing officer may be disputed in

federal court.

That result has no grounding in statutory text. Yet, as

Spending Clause legislation, the IDEA can impose liability

only through a clear statement in legislation. See Arlington

Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 295–96

(2006); see generally Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (requiring Congress to

“speak with a clear voice” so that it “unambiguously” states

any “condition on the grant of federal moneys” in statutory

text). The Majority Opinion is unable to identify a clear

statement in the IDEA that subjects school districts to suit in

federal court for any final decision issued by a hearing officer

at (or outside of) a due process hearing. The text of the IDEA

similarly lacks a clear statement subjecting school districts to

suit in federal court based on a hearing officer’s allegedly

mistaken conclusion regarding the voluntariness of a

settlement agreement.

To support its outcome, the Majority Opinion references

this Circuit’s en banc holding that the IDEA creates a

comprehensive remedial scheme. See A.W. v. Jersey City Pub.

Schs., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). But that does not

mean that the IDEA permits every remedy conceivably needed

to redress its potential misadministration. To the contrary,

after concluding that the IDEA created a comprehensive

remedial scheme, this Circuit foreclosed claims that were not

grounded in the IDEA’s plain text. See id. at 802–03

(disallowing § 1983 claims premised on violations of the IDEA

because the IDEA provides a comprehensive remedial

scheme). The same principle operates here: the IDEA is

comprehensive and remedial, but not boundless, and the

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omission of a specific cause of action indicates that Congress

did not intend such a claim. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S.

537, 562 (2007) (“‘Congress is in a far better position than a

court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation’

against those who act on the public’s behalf.” (quoting Bush v.

Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 389 (1983))).

Under these circumstances, without a federal cause of

action, the parents may not proceed in federal court. The IDEA

confers federal jurisdiction only for the causes of action that it

creates. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A) (“The district courts of

the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought

under this section without regard to the amount in

controversy.”). Nor can the parents proceed under the federal-

question statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (conferring jurisdiction

on federal courts over “all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). To do so

without a federal cause of action, the parents would need to

demonstrate that their “state-law claims . . . implicate

significant federal issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc.

v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). But they

cannot make such a showing for their claim that the settlement

agreement “was procured through duress and coercion” and

lacked valid consent. Compl., at 11–12 ¶¶ 88–90 (JA39–40).

That is so because duress, coercion, and invalid consent are

classic state-law defenses to contract formation.3 And in the

3

See In re Remicade (Direct Purchaser) Antitrust Litig.,

938 F.3d 515, 522 (3d Cir. 2019) (noting that duress is a

“generally applicable” contract defense (quoting AT&T

Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011));

Agathos v. Starlite Motel, 977 F.2d 1500, 1506 (3d Cir. 1992)

(recognizing coercion as a defense that “ordinarily makes a

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absence of a federal cause of action, federal-question

jurisdiction does not exist when state law, as opposed to federal

law, “furnishes the substantive rules of decision.” Mims v.

Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 378 (2012).

For these reasons, the parents may bring their claim in state

court, but they do not have a federal cause of action, and federal

courts do not have jurisdiction over their state-law claim.

contract voidable”); see also 28 Williston on Contracts § 71:1

(4th ed. Nov. 2021 update) (discussing the historical origins of

duress and coercion as means of voiding contracts).

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