recognizing issues with formulating a standard of care in that "proper education and training does not have a fixed meaning but varies with the needs of the child"
How later courts described this case
- recognizing issues with formulating a standard of care in that "proper education and training does not have a fixed meaning but varies with the needs of the child"
- Pennsylvania educational malpractice case alleging negligent diagnoses of mental disability
- holding that the court is not properly in a position to determine methods of promoting or holding back students or what special classes should be provided to remedial students
- Pennsylvania educational malpractice case alleging failure to provide "adequate, proper and quality" instruction
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
J-A22029-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PATRICIA B. GRADY, AS EXECUTRIX : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF : PENNSYLVANIA
THE ESTATE OF STEPHEN P. GRADY :
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
: No. 53 MDA 2021
:
AERO-TECH SERVICES, INC. D/B/A :
AERO-TECH SERVICES AND ZACH :
HURST & DAVID PEACHEY, :
INDIVIDUALLY :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 22, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at
No(s): CI-20-03159
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: MARCH 8, 2022
Appellant, Patricia B. Grady, as executrix and personal representative of
the Estate of Stephen P. Grady, appeals from the order entered on December
22, 2020. The December 22, 2020 order sustained the preliminary objections
in the nature of a demurrer that were filed by Aero-Tech Services, Inc. d/b/a
Aero-Tech Services (“Aero-Tech”), Zach Hurst, and David Peachey
(hereinafter, collectively, “the Defendants”) and dismissed Appellant’s
complaint. We affirm.
On April 4, 2020, Appellant filed a complaint against the Defendants.
The trial court thoroughly summarized the factual allegations and averments
in Appellant’s complaint:
J-A22029-21
[Appellant,] Patricia Grady[,] is the widow of Stephen
Grady[; Stephen Grady] died in an airplane crash on April 19,
2018. The aircraft involved in the accident which is the
subject of this litigation was a 2001 Cirrus SR22 G1,
registration number N451TD, serial number 0064 ("Cirrus
aircraft") owned and piloted by James J. Durkin, the pilot in
charge of the aircraft ("PIC Durkin"). Stephen Grady was the
only passenger on board the Cirrus aircraft on April 19, 2018.
Stephen Grady was not trained as a pilot, nor did he have
experience operating aircraft. The Cirrus aircraft was
operated solely by PIC Durkin on April 19, 2018 under the
provisions of 14 C.F.R. Part 91 as a personal flight. The Cirrus
aircraft departed the Lancaster Airport at 7:34 a.m. with a
destination of South Bend, [Indiana]. The Cirrus aircraft
crashed in rural central Pennsylvania at approximately 8:44
a.m. Prior to the commencement of the flight, PIC Durkin
filed an Instrument Flight Rules ("IFR") flight plan and he had
the appropriate certificates and recent instrument flight
experience to operate the Cirrus aircraft under IFR on the
date of the accident. The Cirrus aircraft was not certified for
flight in known icing conditions.
[In 2011, PIC Durkin began taking flight instruction with
Defendant Aero-Tech. Defendant Aero-Tech “is in the
business of providing initial and recurrent flight training
programs[,] as well as classroom training for a variety of
general aviation and business aircraft.” It employed both
Defendant Hurst and Defendant Peachey as Certificated
Flight Instructors (“CFI”).]
On September 5, 2012, PIC Durkin passed his "private pilot
check ride," which is the aerial practicum required prior to
obtaining a private pilot license. [PIC Durkin began taking
instruction for Instrument Rating certification with Defendant
Aero-Tech on September 14, 2012. This certification would
“enable him to operate an airplane during instrument
meteorological conditions.” “Most, if not all of the flight
instruction for the Instrument Rating certification was
conducted by Defendant Peachey.”]
PIC Durkin first flew the aircraft involved in the accident on
January 31, 2014 and on that same day, PIC Durkin's logbook
notes that he received instruction titled "Cirrus demo/intro."
-2-
J-A22029-21
On April 1, 2014, Durkin passed his Instrument Rating check
ride permitting him to operate under IFR. Between January
31, 2014 and April 19, 2018, PIC Durkin's logbook contains
approximately [90] logged training flights. PIC Durkin flew
the Cirrus aircraft exclusively from April 9, 2014 until April
19, 2018. In the six months prior to the accident, PIC Durkin
received flight instruction on at least six occasions from
Defendant Peachey, Defendant Hurst, or other unknown
instructors employed by Defendant Aero-Tech.
The Cirrus aircraft was equipped with an S TEC 55 autopilot
and with a Cirrus Ballistic Parachute System known as
["CAPS"]. [CAPS] is designed to prevent uncontrolled flight
into terrain in the event of serious and unrecoverable control
issues during flight. [CAPS] consists of a ballistic rocket-fired
parachute that extracts a large, rotund parachute attached
to the airframe of the aircraft. When utilized properly,
[CAPS] has been shown to drastically reduce pilot and
passenger fatalities. The Pilot's Operating Handbook ("POH")
for the Cirrus aircraft at "Normal Procedures, Pre-flight walk-
around" states at item 1 to remove the safety pin on the CAPS
activation handle. The removal of the safety pin from the
CAPS activation handle is the first step that must be taken by
a pilot when entering the cabin and beginning the preflight
check of the aircraft. The POH for the Cirrus aircraft also
states at the "Before Starting Engine" checklist to verify the
removal of the safety pin from the CAPS handle. After the
pilot completes preflight actions and when the aircraft is
ready for departure, the POH for the Cirrus aircraft lists as
the first item on the "before takeoff checklist" to verify that
the pin has been removed from the CAPS handle. The
wreckage of the Cirrus aircraft showed that the safety pin
remained in the CAPS parachute handle, exhibiting that PIC
Durkin did not remove the pin when executing his preflight
checklist. Accordingly, [CAPS] was not able to be activated
by PIC Durkin prior to impact.
The Cirrus Flight Operations Manual for instructors provides
that if the pilot has loss of aircraft control, the pilot must
immediately[:] 1) attempt manual recovery if able, or 2)
engage autopilot if within limits, or 3) activate CAPS. On April
19, 2018, PIC Durkin was unable to manually recover control
after losing control of the Cirrus aircraft in a left turn. PIC
Durkin did not engage the autopilot, nor did he activate the
-3-
J-A22029-21
CAPS after losing control of the Cirrus aircraft in the left turn.
...
[Appellant alleged] that Defendants Peachey and Hurst failed
to teach [CAPS] to PIC Durkin and that[,] had Defendants
Peachey and Hurst correctly taught [CAPS] to PIC Durkin, PIC
Durkin would have had the option of immediately deploying
the lifesaving CAPS [] when he lost control of the Cirrus
aircraft in the left turn on April 19, 2018. [Appellant] also
[alleged] that had either Defendant Peachey or Defendant
Hurst taught PIC Durkin to engage the autopilot in loss of
control situations, the fatal accident on April 19, 2018 would
not have occurred.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/21, at 3-5.
Appellant claimed that the Defendants were negligent in that they failed
to properly instruct PIC Durkin in the use and operation of both CAPS and the
autopilot on the Cirrus aircraft and that Defendant Aero-Tech was negligent in
failing to ensure that its flight instructors were qualified to train PIC Durkin in
the use of CAPS.
The Defendants filed preliminary objections to Appellant’s complaint. As
is relevant to the current appeal, the Defendants claimed that Appellant’s
complaint failed to set forth a valid cause of action and must be dismissed, as
the complaint solely alleged that the Defendants committed educational
malpractice – which is a tort that is not recognized in Pennsylvania. See
Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, 4/29/20, at 5-6.
On December 22, 2020, the trial court sustained the Defendants’
preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed Appellant’s
complaint. Trial Court Order, 12/22/20, at 1-2. As the trial court held:
“[Appellant’s] complaint fails as a matter of law as it is solely based upon a
-4-
J-A22029-21
theory of educational malpractice against the Defendants. Pennsylvania
courts have not permitted cases of negligence resulting from alleged
educational malpractice to persist.” Id. at 1 n.1.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; Appellant raises one claim to
this Court:
Whether the [trial court] erred in granting Defendant[s’]
preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer when all
of the well-pled facts support a legally sufficient cause of
action sounding in negligence, where the educational
malpractice doctrine should not be applied to specialized
training for ultra-hazardous activities and when public policy
supports holding such training facilities accountable for failing
to adequately train pilots resulting in fatalities that would
otherwise be avoided[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 6 (some capitalization omitted).
We have stated:
A preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer is
properly sustained where the contested pleading is legally
insufficient. Preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer require the court to resolve the issues solely on the
basis of the pleadings; no testimony or other evidence
outside of the complaint may be considered to dispose of the
legal issues presented by the demurrer. All material facts set
forth in the pleading and all inferences reasonably deducible
therefrom must be admitted as true.
In determining whether the trial court properly sustained
preliminary objections, the appellate court must examine the
averments in the complaint, together with the documents
and exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the
sufficiency of the facts averred. The impetus of our inquiry
is to determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint and
whether the pleading would permit recovery if ultimately
proven. This Court will reverse the trial court's decision
regarding preliminary objections only where there has been
-5-
J-A22029-21
an error of law or abuse of discretion. When sustaining the
preliminary objections will result in the denial of claim or a
dismissal of suit, the preliminary objections may be sustained
only where the case is free and clear of doubt.
Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540, 547-548 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quotation marks,
citations, and corrections omitted).
On appeal, Appellant acknowledges: that her negligence claims sound
in educational malpractice; that Pennsylvania courts have not recognized
negligence claims sounding in educational malpractice; and, that Pennsylvania
law does not permit educational malpractice claims to succeed against
traditional educational institutions. See Appellant’s Brief at 17, 26, and 48.
Nevertheless, Appellant contends that she has stated a valid cause of action
because students, such as PIC Durkin, pay flight schools to teach them a
precise activity, which Appellant contends is ultrahazardous, and because
Appellant specifically alleged that: the accident was caused by PIC Durkin’s
failure to engage CAPS; the Defendants were negligent in failing to teach CAPS
to PIC Durkin; and, Defendant Aero-Tech was negligent in failing to ensure
that its flight instructors were qualified to train PIC Durkin in the use of CAPS.
See Appellant’s Brief at 17, 20, 47, and 49.
Appellant’s claims fail for the reasons stated in the well-written and
scholarly opinion of the able trial court judge, the Honorable Leonard G.
Brown. Therefore, we affirm on the basis of Judge Brown’s thorough, March
1, 2021, opinion and adopt it as our own. In any future filing with this or any
other court addressing this ruling, the filing party shall attach a copy of Judge
Brown’s March 1, 2021 opinion.
-6-
J-A22029-21
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/8/2022
-7-
Circulated 02/18/2022 02:33 PM
R. 57 a
ENTERED AND FILED
PROTHONOTARY'S OFFICE
LANCASTER, PA
+Electronically File
.._Mar,01,2021 09:14AM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNS[Moad
CIVIL ACTION --LAW
PATRICIA B. GRADY, as Executrix and EKHiiT
Personal Representative of the Estate of
STEPHEN ~.
GRADY
Plaintiff
l} [
v.
No. Cl-20-03159
AERO-TECH SER VICES, INC., dbla AERO-
TECH SERVICES, and ZACH HURST, and
DAVID PEACHEY, individually
Defendants
1925(A) OPINION
This case involves the tragic crash of a private airplane that took the lives of two people,
the pilot and his passenger. However, because no legal basis exists in Pennsylvania law to hold
defendants liable for the crash, the court dismissed plaintiff's educational malpractice case as one
barred under Pennsylvania law. It is true that liability for the alleged improper education of those
engaged in an inherently dangerous activity is a matter of first impression in Pennsylvania. The
court concludes that public policy suggests tha schools,
t and their regulating, accrediting, and
certifying agencies, not courts, need to make curriculum decisions.
This opinion is written pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Plaintiff, Patricia B. Grady (hereinafter "Plaintiff) appeals this court's order dated
December 18, 2020 to the Pennsylvania Superior Court for the reasons stated in her concise
statement of errors dated February 4, 2021. The December 18, 2020 order should be affirmed for
the reasons set forth below.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Patricia Grady initiated this case by filing a complaint on April 7, 2020. The
complaint contains four counts, Count I-- Wrongful Death Through Negligence as to David
Peachey (hereinafter "Defendant Peachey"), Count II -- Wrongful Death Through Negligence as
R. 58 a
to Zach Hurst (hereinafter "Defendant Hurst"), Count III- Respondeat Superior as to Aero-Tech
Services, Inc. d/b/a Aero-Tech Services (hereinafter "Defendant Aero-Tech"), and Count IV --
Negligence as to Defendant Aero-Tech.
On April 28, 2020, Defendant Peachey, Defendant Hurst, and Defendant Aero-Tech
(hereinafter collectively "Defendants") filed preliminary objections to Plaintiffs complaint
under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(4) in the nature of a demurrer. Specifically,
Defendants contend that the complaint fails as a matter of law for four reasons:
I. Plaintiffs well-pled facts establish that the pilot was negligent per se and the pilot's
negligence per se should not allow the trial court to consider the Defendant's contribution
to negligence.
2. Defendants owe no duty to the decedent as a matter of law because they had no
contractual, direct, or professional relationship with the decedent.
3. Plaintiff cannot establish causation as a matter of law because it was the pilot's
negligence and not the Defendants that was the causation of the injury.
4.Even if Plaintiff properly pled the elements of a negligence claim, such claims sound in
educational malpractice, a tort that is not recognized under Pennsylvania law.
Defendants filed their memorandum of law simultaneously with the preliminary objections. On
May 18, 2020, Plaintiff filed a response and memorandum of law in opposition to Defendants'
preliminary objections. On May 21, 2020, Defendants filed a memorandum of law in reply to
Plaintiff's memorandum of law.
On September 9, 2020, the file was forwarded to chambers for disposition. On December
18, 2020, the court issued an order overruling Defendants' first three preliminary objections and
sustained the fourth objection. As a result, the complaint was dismissed. On January 6,2021,
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On January 20, 2021, the
court issued an Order directing the Plaintiff to file her concise statement of errors. On February
4, 2021, Plaintiff filed her concise statement of errors claiming one error.
2
R. 59 a
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
Plain tiff, Patricia Grady is the widow of Stephen Grady who died in an airplane crash on
April 19, 2018. The aircraft involved in the accident which is the subject of this litigation was a
2001 Cirrus SR22 G1, registration number N451TD, serial number 0064 ("Cirrus aircraft")
owned and piloted by James J. Durkin, the pilot in charge of the aircraft ("PIC Durkin"). Stephen
Grady was the only passenger on board the Cirrus aircraft on April 19, 2018. Stephen Grady was
not trained as a pilot, nor did he have experience operating aircraft. The Cirrus aircraft was
operated solely by PIC Durkin on April 19, 2018 under the provisions of 14 C.F.R. Part 91 as a
personal flight. The Cirrus aircraft departed the Lancaster Airport at 7:34 a.m. with a destination
of South Bend, IN. The Cirrus aircraft crashed in rural central Pennsylvania at approximately
8:44 a.m. Prior to the commencement of the flight, PIC Durkin filed an Instrument Flight Rules
("IFR") flight plan and he had the appropriate certificates and recent instrument flight experience
to operate the Cirrus aircraft under IFR on the date of the accident. The Cirrus aircraft was not
certified for flight in known icing conditions.
On September 5, 2012, PIC Durkin passed his "private pilot check ride," which is the
aerial practicum required prior to obtaining a private pilot license. PIC Durkin first flew the
aircraft involved in the accident on January 31,2014 and on that same day, PIC Durkin's
logbook notes that he received instruction titled "Cirrus demo/intro," On April 1, 2014, Durkin
passed his instrument Rating check ride permitting him to operate under IFR. Between January
31, 2014 and April 19, 2018, PIC Durkin's logbook contains approximately ninety logged
training flights. PIC Durkin flew the Cirrus aircraft exclusively from April 9, 2014 until April 19,
2018. In the six months prior to the accident, PIC Durkin received flight instruction on at least
six occasions from Defendant Peachey, Defendant Hurst, or other unknown instructors employed
3
R. 60 a
by Defendant Aero-Tech.
The Cirrus aircraft was equipped with an S TEC 55 autopilot and with a Cirrus Ballistic
Parachute System known as a "CAPS" system. The CAPS system is designed to prevent
uncontrolled flight into terrain in the event of serious and unrecoverable control issues during
flight. The CAPS system consists of a ballistic rocket-fired parachute that extracts a large, round
parachute attached to the airframe of the aircraft. When utilized properly, the CAPS system has
been shown to drastically reduce pilot and passenger fatalities. The Pilot's Operating Handbook
(POH") for the Cirrus aircraft at "Normal Procedures, Pre-flight walk-around" states at item I to
remove the safety pin on the CAPS activation handle. The removal of the safety pin from the
CAPS activation handle is the first step that must be taken by a pilot when entering the cabin and
beginning the preflight check of the aircraft. The POH for the Cirrus aircraft also states at the
"Before Starting Engine" checklist to verify the removal of the safety pin from the CAPS handle.
After the pilot completes preflight actions and when the aircraft is ready for departure, the POH
for the Cirrus aircraft lists as the first item on the "before takeoff checklist" to verify
'that the pin
has been removed from the CAPS handle. The wreckage of the Cirrus aircraft showed that the
safety pin remained in the CAPS parachute handle, exhibiting that PIC Durkin did not remove
the pin when executing his preflight checklist. Accordingly, the CAPS system was not able to be
activated by PIC Durkin prior to impact.
The Cirrus Flight Operations Manual for instructors provides that if the pilot has loss of
aircraft control, the pilot must immediately, I) attempt manual recovery if able, or 2) engage
autopilot if within limits, or 3) activate CAPS. On April 19, 2018, PIC Durkin was unable to
manually recover control after losing control of the Cirrus aircraft in a left tum. PIC Durkin did
not engage the autopilot, nor did he activate the CAPS after losing control of the Cirrus aircraft
4
R. 6l a
in the left turn. Plaintiff believes that Defendants Peachey and Hrst
u failed to teach the CAPS
system to PIC Durkin and that had Defendants Peachey and Hurst correctly taught the Cirrus
CAPS system to PIC Durkin, PIC Durkin would have had the option of immediately deploying
the lifesaving CAPS system when he lost control of the Cirrus aircraft in the left tum on April
19, 2018. Plaintiff also asserts that had either Defendant Peachey or Defendant Hurst taught PIC
Durkin to engage the autopilot in loss of control situations, the fatal accident on April 19, 2018
would not have occurred.
Ill. ISSUE ON APPEAL
In her concise statement of erors complained of on appeal dated February 4, 2021,
Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal:
Whether Pennsylvania courts should apply the educational malpractice doctrine in
the context of the specialized training of flight instruction, an inherently dangerous
activity, specifically where proper training by the instructors on utilization of the
Cirrus Airframe Parachute System has been shown to effectively eliminate pilot
and passenger fatalities in otherwise unsurvivable aircraft accidents.
IV. LAW
A. Standard of Review
A demurrer is an assertion that a complaint does not set forth a cause of action or a claim
on which relief can be granted. Binswanger v. Levy, 457 A.2d 103, 104 (Pa. Super. 1983).
Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved
in favor of overruling it. Wawa. Inc. v. Alexander J. Litworia & Associates, 8I7 A.2d 543, 544
(Pa. Super. 2003). A demurrer by a defendant admits all relevant facts sufficiently pleaded in the
complaint and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, but not conclusions of law or unjustified
inferences. Binswanger, supra at 104. In ruling on a demurrer, the trial court may consider only
such matters as arise out of the complaint itself. Lerner v. Lerer, 954 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa.
5
R. 62 a
Super. 2008). All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom are admitted as true for the purpose of appellate review. Id, A trial court's
sustaining of preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only if,
assuming the averents of the complaint to be true, the plaintiff has failed to assert a legally
cognizable cause of action and the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Kramer v.
Dunn, 749 A.2d 984, 990 (Pa. Super. 2000).
B. Educational Malpractice
Educational malpractice claims fall into one of three different categories: (1) the student
alleges that the defendant-school negligently failed to provide him or her with adequate skills;
(2) the student alleges that defendant-school negligently diagnosed or failed to diagnose the
student's learning or mental disabilities; or (3) the student alleges that the defendant-school
negligently supervised his or her training. See Sheesley v, The Cessna Aircraft Co,, CIV. 02-
4185-KES, 2006 WL 1084103, at15 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).' In addition to claims brought
against a school by the student himself, third parties injured by the conduct of the allegedly
inadequately trained student may also attempt to assert educational malpractice claims against a
school. Moss Rehab. v. White, 692 A.2d 902, 905 (Del. 1997). Where a plaintiff contests the
substance and manner of a student's training, plaintiffs' claims encompass the traditional aspects
of education, and thus, sound in educational malpractice. Id. Educational malpractice claims
against a flight school allege the pilot was not taught what he needed to know to be able to safely
fly the aircraft. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp, 796 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Minn. App. 2011),
'Cavaliere v. Duffs Bus, [nst, 605 A.2d 397,399 (P.a Super. 1992) (Pennsylvania educational malpractice case
alleging failure to provide "adequate, proper and quality" instruction); Agostine v, Sch. Dist of Philadelphia, 527
A.2d 193 (Pa. Cmmw. 1987) (Pennsylvania educational malpractice case alleging negligent diagnoses of mental
disability); McKnight y. City of Philadelphia, 445 A.2d 778 (Pa. Super. I982) (Pennsylvania case by a student
against their school alleging negligent supervision within the program resulting in injury),
6
R. 63 a
gfd, 816 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 2012); Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Inter.. Inc, 277
S.W.3d 696, 701 (Mo. App. W. Dist. 2008).
V. DISCUSSION
A. Pennsylvania Law on Educational Malpractice
In its research, the court found five Pennsylvania cases where the issue of educational
malpractice has been analyzed beyond a mere mention. Swartley v. Hoffner, 734 A.2d915 (Pa.
Super. 1999); Cavaliere v. Duffs Bus, Inst, 605 A.2d 397 (Pa. Super. 1992); Agostjne v. Sch,
Dist. of Philadelphia, 527 A.2d 193 (Pa. Cnunw. 1987); Aubrey v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia,
437 A.2d 1306 (Pa. Cmmw. 1981); and Alley v. Bellwood Antis Sch. Dist., 27 Pa. D. &C3d
307 (Pa. Com. PI. 1983). All these cases leave no doubt that Pennsylvania does not recognize
educational malpractice as a valid cause of action.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Cavaliere y.Duffs Business Institute defines
educational malpractice as a claim brought against an educational institution where "the
allegation is simply that the educational institution failed to provide a quality education."
Cavaliere, supra at 403. In Cavaliere, the plaintiffs were students enrolled in a two-year court
reporting school facilitated by the defendant. The plaintiffs purchased their books and paid their
tuition for the first two quarters of the program. Plaintiffs alleged that the instruction during the
first quarter of the program was deficient such that they were unable to advance to the second
quarter. Having to repeat the first quarter, the plaintiffs elected to withdraw from the program.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected plaintiffs claims finding that the claims sound in
educational malpractice.
The sole allegation is that the instruction and instructors provided by the school
were generally inadequate and of low quality. Such a complaint invites the court to
enter into precisely the kind of generalized review of the entire course of instruction
that so many other courts have wisely refrained from doing.
7
R. 64 a
[d, at 404. The Cavaliere court noted that the conflicting theories of the science of pedagogy
prevented the construction of a workable standard of care for these cases and that public schools,
private schools, and trade schools are regulated by Pennsylvania statutes. [d, at 400-401. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court held that it would be unwise to have trial courts attempt to
formulate an adequate standard of care and link causation between alleged breach of duty owed
to a plaintiff and alleged damages against schools that are already regulated by a statutory
scheme. Id.
Upon review of Pennsylvania case law regarding educational malpractice, the court can
find no cases that have permitted negligence claims that challenge the quality of education to
proceed under a theory of educational malpractice. Claims are permitted against a school that
are based in breach of contract (i.e, the school ignored or violated portions of the written
contract )or claims resulting from negligent supervision during the instruction process (i.e. a
student was injured during the course of instruction under the school's supervision). See
Swartley, supra; McKnight, supra. The Pennsylvania cases that have not permitted causes of
actions that sound in educational malpractice have done so based on public policy grounds,
including the four grounds analyzed by the court in Part V.CI-4 of this opinion. See Cavaliere,
supra at 400-401, 403 fn. 2 (recognizing that permitting educational malpractice claims would
likely result in a "litigation explosion" and that the nature of educational malpractice claims
"prevents a finding of legal causation"); Swartley, supra at 921 (recognizing Pennsylvania
Expanding its research to federal courts applying or reciting Pennsylvania law on the issue of educational
malpractice, the court again found no support to permit a cause of action based in a claim of educational malpractice
to proceed. See Vurimindi v, Fuqua Sch. of Bus. No. CIV.A I0-234, 2010 WL 3419568 (E.D. P±. Aug. 25, 2010),
a(fd, 435 F. App'x 129 (3d Cir. 2011); [ re Allegheny Health. Educ. and Research Found., 321 B.R 776 (Bakr.
w.D. Pa. 2005); Manningv. TempleU,, CIV.A. 03-4012, 2004 WL 3019230 (E.D. Pa. Dee. 30, 2004), afd, 157
Fed. Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2005) (unreported) Dillon v. Ultrasound Diagnostic Schools, CIV. A. 96-8342, 1997 WL
805216(E.D. Pa. Dee. 18, 1997) (unreported).
8
R. 65 a
court's policy of nonintervention in purely academic matters and that courts should not become
involved unless the process itself has been found to be biased, prejudicial or lacking in due
process); Agostine, supra at 196 (recognizing issues with formulating a standard of care in that
"proper education and training does not have a fixed meaning but varies with the needs of the
child")
The specific facts of this case appear to be a matter of first impression in Pennsylvania. In
reviewing the well-pled facts, the current law regarding educational malpractice in Pennsylvania,
the stated rationale for why Pennsylvania does not recognize educational malpractice, and
considering the persuasive authorities of other jurisdictions interpreting similar factual scenarios
under similar legal frameworks, the court concludes that the clear interpretation of existing
Pennsylvania law is to find that Plaintiff's claims sound in educational malpractice and thus the
court cannot permit Plaintiff's claims to proceed.
B. Qther Jurisdictions Denial of Educational Malpractice Claims in Similar Factual
Scenarios
I. Law in Other States
Looking to other jurisdictions, the court can find no states other than Montana° that
permit educational malpractice claims to be brought against public schools, private schools, trade
schools, or specialty schools. There have been several cases where state courts of other
jurisdictions have addressed educational malpractice claims against flight schools (and other
schools where the subject matter is arguably "inherently dangerous" such as utility pole climbing
and teaching the physically disabled to drive). These cases are of special benefit to the analysis
of the facts of this case and highlight why the majority of states refuse to permit negligence
claims that challenge the quality of instruction to proceed against an educational entity.
B.M by Burger y. State, 649 P.2d 425 (Mont. 1982).
9
R. 66 a
i. Waugh v. Morgan Stanley &Co,
In Waugh, the pilot in charge ("PIC) and three passengers were en route from Kansas to
Illinois, following a business trip in January 2006. As the PIC approached for landing at the
airport, the aircraft crashed, killing all four occupants on board. Prior to the accident, the PIC
received flight simulator training, flight instruction, and a five-hour flight observation and
instruction from the defendants. The accident aircraft crashed at night while in a landing traffic
pattern to land at the Illinois airport. Much of the PIC's five-hour flight observation and
instruction occurred in the aircraft he was flying at the time of the accident, in the landing traffic
pattern, and in the same location as the crash site. Plaintiffs did not argue that the PIC was not
properly qualified to pilot the subject aircraft under FAA regulations.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the flight school on the basis that
Illinois does not recognize educational malpractice claims. The appellate court concluded that
the plaintiffs' claims asserted that defendants failed to properly train the PIC in how to fly and
land the aircraft; accordingly, such claims clearly sound in educational malpractice. Waugh y,
Morgan Stanley and Co., Inc., 966 N.E.2d 540 (Ill. App. I st Dist. 2012). The appellate court
noted the four public policy grounds under which courts of other states have refused to recognize
claims of educational malpractice and concluded that such policy grounds properly apply to
flight training schools and flight instructors. Id, at 552. The public policy grounds underpinning
the educational malpractice bar are compelling and persuasive. These grounds include: () the
lack of a satisfactory standard of care by which to evaluate an educator; (2) the inherent
uncertainties about causation and the nature of damages in light of such intervening factors as a
student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience, and home environment; (3) the
potential for a flood of litigation against schools; and (4) the possibility that such claims will
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embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day operations of schools. [, These public policy
grounds are discussed in more detail below.
ii. Gloryvigen v Cirrus Design Corp,
In @lorvigen, the PIC of a Cirrus SR22, the same type of plane at issue in this case,
crashed his plane killing himself and a passenger. The passenger's family sued Cinrus, the
manufacturer of the PIC's plane which also provided two days of "transition training" to the PIC
after he bought the Cirrus SR22. The FAA did not require Cirrus to provide transition training,
but it was included by the plane manufacturer in the purchase price of the plane. Transition
training is a specialized type of training that is provided when a licensed pilot learns to fly a new
type of plane to teach them the intricacies of the new plane. The plaintiffs' claim is that Cimts
undertook a duty to provide the P[C with flight training and that Cirrus breached an implied
warranty of merchantability by omitting a flight lesson regarding how to handle the plane via use
of instruments when the pilot loses visibility in the clouds. The Minnesota Court of Appeals
citing the four public policy grounds held that determining whether the transition training was
ineffective because the instructor failed to provide a flight lesson on a specific topic would
involve "an inquiry into the nuances of the educational process, which. is exactly the type of
determination that the educational-malpractice bar is meant to avoid." Glorvigen, supra at 553.
iii. Dallas Airmotive, Inc, y. FlightSafety Intern, Inc,
In Dallas Airmotive, the plaintiff brought an action against the flight school that trained
the PIC who crashed a Piper turboprop airplane after he encountered engine failure and was not
properly able to feather the propeller and thus avoid the crash. The PIC held an FAA commercial
pilot certificate and FAA-certified flight instructor certificate. While he had extensive experience
as a pilot, he had no experience in operating a turboprop aircraft prior to attending a course
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offered by the defendant flight school nine days before the crash. It was undisputed that the flight
instructor knew its FAA--approved simulator did not accurately replicate the extreme drag a pilot
would experience in a turboprop engine failure and that it nonetheless continued to use the
simulator. The plaintiff alleged the flight school's curriculum "inadequately prepared" the pilot to
handle the situation and that the flight school had a duty to war the pilot of the known dangers
of shutting down an engine in flight without the ability to properly feather the propeller.
The Missouri Court of Appeals refused to recognize educational malpractice as a valid
cause of action or to carve out an exception for pilot training. The Dallas Airmotive court noted
that this was not a case of an injury sustained during the instruction but completely centered around
the quality of the instruction. The court noted:
In order to recover for negligence, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a
duty on the part of the defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury, the defendant's
failure to perform that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the failure to
perform the duty owed. Bunker v. Ass'n of Mo. Elec, Coop5,, 839 S.W.2d 608, 6!l
(Mo.App.1992). Whether a duty exists is a matter of law and question for the courts
to decide. Id.
. . .
The judicial determination of the existence of a duty rests on sound public
policy as derived from a calculus of factors: among them, the social consensus that
the interest is worthy of protection; the foreseeability of harm and the degree of
certainty that the protected person suffered injury; moral blame society attaches to
the conduct; the prevention of future harm; consideration of cost and ability to
spread the risk of loss; the economic burden upon the actor and the community and
others. Id.
Dallas Airmotive, supra at 699. "Missouri, along with most other jurisdictions that have
considered the issue, has found that educational malpractice claims are not cognizable because
there is no duty." Id. The court found that the four public policy considerations apply to for-
profit flight instruction schools and that "[pJublic policy also suggests that schools, and their
regulating, accrediting, and certifying agencies, not courts, need to make curriculum decisions."
Id. at 701.
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iv. Page v. Klein Tools, Inc.
In Page, an apprentice linesman brought a cause of action against a private trade school
alleging that it negligently failed to instruct him regarding use of safety equipment during a
three-week course on climbing wooden utility poles. The Michigan Supreme Court held that this
was a claim of educational malpractice not recognized in Michigan. In its analysis, the Page
court cited many public policy grounds for why courts have refused to recognize claims of
educational malpractice. Page is notable because it is one of the first cases which analyzed
educational malpractice outside of the public school setting and addressed a trade school
specifically teaching an inherently dangerous activity. The opinion in Page is also one of the first
cases to analyze the public policy concerns surrounding educational malpractice claims in depth.
The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that "[a]llowing individuals such as plaintiff to assert
claims of negligent instruction would avoid the practical reality that, in the end, it is the student
who is responsible for his knowledge, including the limits of that knowledge." Page v. Klein
Tools; Inc., 610 N.W.24 900, 906 (Mich. 2000).
v. Moss Rehab. v. White,
Moss Rehab Driving School ("Moss Rehab") provided driver evaluation and training for
individuals with physical disabilities. Moss Rehab would assess a disabled applicant to
determine whether the applicant was capable of learning to drive a motor vehicle and then
provide that person with driver training. Moss Rehab conducted driver training with a Mr. Sharp
and noted that he struggled with being a little jerky with the steering wheel, needing to slow
down and struggling with his turn radius when making right-hand turns. Mr. Sharp continued
with driver training to the point that Moss Rehab thought the issues had been corrected and
training was concluded. Mr. Sharp failed his first driver's test because he hit a cone during the
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exam. He passed the test on his second attempt. Approximately two months after receiving his
Delaware driver's license, Mr. Sharp caused a fatal accident while attempting to merge onto a
highway exit ramp. The plaintiffs sued Moss Rehab alleging that their negligent training of Mr.
Sharp resulted in the fatal accident.
The Delaware Supreme Court noted that driver competency and certification of driver
training schools are extensively regulated by statute. The court also focused attention on the
analogous case of Moore v. Vandeloo, 386 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1986), which involved a licensed
chiropractor and the public policy rationale for why educational malpractice claims are
disfavored. The Delaware Supreme Court held that a third-party claim for educational
malpractice against a driving school is not a cognizable common-law cause of action in
Delaware. Just as the General Assembly oversees the licensure of drivers, "[t]he General
Assembly is best able to address the competing public policy issues that must be reconciled with
regard to recognizing a third-party claim for educational malpractice by a driving school" Moss
Rehab, supra at 909.
2. Federal Courts Applying State Law
Expanding the search of relevant cases to federal courts applying the laws of states other
than Pennsylvania, the court found three cases where a federal court concluded that educational
malpractice claims against a flight school could possibly proceed under the law of that state.
The remaining cases of educational malpractice claims against flight schools do not pennit the
claim to proceed because the claims are not recognized in those states, even in the situation of
flight schools.
The three states being Florida, New York, and Texas.
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i In re Cessna 208 Series
The federal district court in Kansas applying Texas law dismissed the defendant flight
school's motion for summary judgment in which defendant relied on the educational malpractice
bar. The federal court chose not to disturb the ruling of a Texas state trial court allowing claims
that the flight school negligently failed to properly instruct the pilots of a specific aircraft on how
to avoid ice accumulation, the umusual dangers of airframe icing associated with the specific
aircraft, and how to control that aircraft should ice accumulation occur. The prior opinion of the
Texas state court judge held that the plaintiffs claims are sufficient to withstand summary
judgment under Texas law and was entered prior to the case's removal to federal court. See In re
Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liab. Litig., 546 F. Supp. 2d 11S3 (D. Kan. 2008).
In re Cessna appears to make a distinction for situations where a flight school is charged
with the task of teaching a student one distinct concept, how to fly a specific plane, or how to
address the discrete issues associated with a specific plane (such as airframe icing). While it is
possible to limit such causes of action to very specific situations, this court is still troubled by the
public policy concerns. The trial court would still be required to analyze the flight school's
instructional materials to see if they adequately cover ice accumulation concerns, whether their
flight simulators accurately simulated such circumstances, and whether the in-flight situational
instruction was satisfactory. The trial court would be required to delve into the minutia of how
detailed flight instruction and simulation should be to prevent pilot error. The issue of causation
is still a concern because there is no way to discern how much of the accident is related to (1) the
student's lack of knowledge; (2) how much of the student's lack of knowledge is the result of
faulty teaching; or (3) the student's ability to accurately discharge any knowledge -- the skill of
the pilot. Every plane crash still has the potential to result in double litigation against the
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insurance company/estate of the pilot first and then against any flight instructor who ever taught
the pilot.
ii, Newman y. Socata SAS
In Newman, plaintiffs sued the defendant flight school after a deadly plane crash
involving a Socata TBM 700B aircraft ("TBM 700"). Seven months prior to the crash, the PIC
attended and successfully completed the defendant flight school's program that was designed to
train experienced pilots to fly the TBM 700 aircraft. As of the time of the accident, there were at
least fifteen reported cases of crashes involving the TBM 700 all of which referenced a "torque
roll" or similar condition. Plaintiffs asserted that the flight school owed a duty to wam the PIC of
the TBM 700's known, dangerous propensity to torque roll and to otherwise competently train
him to fly that type of aircraft.
The federal district court found that "[t]he public policy considerations that are relied
upon to bar traditional educational malpractice claims do not carry over to the flight training
setting, at least not on-the facts of this case."Newman v. Socata SAS, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1322,
1329 (M.D. Fla. 2013). The court reasoned:
Florida courts have barred "educational malpractice" claims, but it is not likely that
the Supreme Court of Florida would extend that bar to the claims against ... a
private, for-profit flight school that allegedly owed and breached a duty to warn
and train regarding a known lethal propensity of an aircraft.
[d, at 1323. The court concluded that causation and damages would not be as difficult to
determine as it would be in the case of the minor public-school pupil. The court noted that
Florida courts have long recognized negligence actions based on failure to warn and to apply the
doctrine of educational malpractice to flight schools would amount "to a categorical grant of
immunity to all entities engaged in instruction in the operation of dangerous equipment." [d, at
1330. Under this blanket of immunity, "[a] flight school could, without the burden of
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accountability, by omission or even affirmative misstatement encourage its students to engage in
conduct that would endanger the student and others." Id Finding that the Supreme Court of
Florida would not likely "sanction a policy absolving the school of responsibility to advise pilots
in training of deadly flight characteristics of the subject aircraft that had resulted in a
disproportionate number of crashes and fatalities", the federal district court predicted that the
Supreme Court of Florida would allow the case to proceed despite Florida's failure to recognize
traditional claims of educational malpractice. [d,
Unlike Newman this is not a case of a flight instructor's failure to wam of a death knell
torque roll propensity present but not readily apparent in the aircraft. The Cirrus aircraft here is
not alleged to have a "deadly flight characteristic" but is equipped with a CAPS system that is
conspicuous within the aircraft and clearly addressed both in the Cirrus Flight Operations
Manual and preflight checklist. Furthermore, the Newman court analyzed its case and the related
public policy implications through a very fact-specific lens without consideration of the greater
-implications of opening the doors for educational malpractice to be applied on a vast scale. To
permit plaintiff's educational malpractice claim here to proceed in Pennsylvania would cause any
trade school or instructor to potentially defend litigation based upon a former student's
performance errors.
iii. In re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr.
In In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center, the defendant flight school was responsible for
providing the necessary flight simulator and ground training to the captain and first officer of a
Bombardier Dash 8--0400 ("Dash 8) that crashed in February 2009 on approach to Buffalo
Niagara International Airport, killing all 49 people aboard and one person on the ground,
Plaintiffs alleged that the flight school never instructed the captain and first officer to use the
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stick-pusher mechanism in the Dash 8 and trained them using simulators and equipment that did
not accurately represent the performance of the Dash 8. The federal district court analyzed prior
New York precedent on educational malpractice and held "although the court rejected the nature
of the claim before it in [a prior educational malpractice case], this Court cannot conclude with
certainty that Plaintiffs would be unable to materially distinguish their claims from those in
which the educational malpractice bar has been applied." [n_re Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr., 09-
CV-10399, 20l0 WL 5185106 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010) (unreported).
In re Air Crash Near Clarence Center is unpersuasive because the federal district court
granted a motion to remand a matter to state court, not because it found an exception to the
educational malpractice bar, but because, in part, it found that the state court could possibly
determine that the educational malpractice bar would not apply in that particular situation under
New York law. The federal district court distinguished the flight instruction case from the New
York educational malpractice precedent which applied heavily to public schools and generalized
. curricula. The public policy concems addressed by the majority of educational malpractice cases
in other jurisdictions were not considered in the opinion and to date, even after remand of In re
Air Crash Near Clarence Ctr, New York has not recognized an exception for educational
malpractice cases for flight schools.
C. Public Policy Rationale for Not Permitting Educational Malpractice Claims
The overwhelming majority of states do not permit educational malpractice claims, even
in factual scenarios where the training received is for an inherently dangerous activity. The cases
most instructive to the court have outlined a compelling public policy rationale of why
educational malpractice is disfavored, which are: ( 1) the lack of a satisfactory standard of care by
which to evaluate an educator; (2) the inherent uncertainties about causation and the nature of
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damages in light of such intervening factors as a student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past
experience, and home environment; (3) the potential for a flood of litigation against schools; and
(4) the possibility that such claims will embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day
operations of schools.
I Lack ofa Satisfactory Standard of Care
A cause of action seeking damages for acts of negligence in the educational process must
be precluded by considerations of public policy, specifically being the absence of a workable
standard of care against which the defendant educational institution's conduct may be measured.
Moore, supra at H4. Upon review of the caselaw in Pennsylvania and every other jurisdiction,
there is no clear definition of the standard of care for a reasonably prudent flight school for
instruction on airplane specific safety mechanisms. Simply stated the plaintiff is asking that the
court decide how much was Defendant Aerotech required to teach.
This court would be hard pressed to determine which of several alternative methods
of teaching court reporting, or auto repair, or any other specialized business or trade
skill was the appropriate one, Nor would it be an easy task to determine why a
particular student failed to acquire certain skills after pursuing a course of
instruction aimed at teaching those skills.
Cavaliere, supra at 403-404. It is a difficult task to ask a trial court to determine what a
reasonable flight school should have or would have taught its students above and beyond that
which is required by the FAA for pilot licensure or for the school to maintain its own Part 14l
certification through the FAA. Furthermore, 14 C.F.R. $ 6L.57 provides the requirements that no
person may act as a pilot in command of an aircraft carrying passengers unless that PIC has (I)
made at least three takeoffs and three landings within the preceding 90 days, (2) the PIC acted as
the sole manipulator of the flight controls, and (3) the required takeoffs and landings were
performed in an aircraft of the same category, class and type. In cases like the one at bar where
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the PIC was licensed in 2012, first flew the Cirrus aircraft in 2014, and subsequently completed
the requisites to maintain his private pilot's license, the standard of care of what he should have
been taught in his post-licensure flight instruction would be incredibly difficult, or impossible to
ascertain.
2. Uncertainties About Causation and the Nature ofDamages
The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Page v. Klein Tools, Ince:
Since education is a collaborative and subjective process whose success is largely
reliant on the student, and since the existence of such outside factors as a student's
attitude and abilities render it impossible to establish any quality or curriculum
deficiencies as a proximate cause to any injuries, we rule that there is no workable
standard of care here and defendant would face an undue burden if forced to litigate
its selection of curriculum and teaching methods.
Page, supra at 904 (emphasis added) (quoting Tolman v. CenCor Career Colleges, Inc.. Div. of
CenCor, Inc,, 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. App. 1992)). The court echoes this second public policy
concern as it is difficult to determine if the Defendants' instruction on a certain subject would
have prevented the Plaintiffs damages. Furthermore, even if a defendant school provided
. .
adequate training on every relevant topic, there are a variety of reasons why the student might
not have learned the subject matter. The recognition of liability against a flight school would be a
great invitation to speculate as to causation since many factors contribute to the quality of a
student's education and the quality of his later performance. Dallas Airotive, supra at 701.
Factors such as the student's attitude, motivation, temperament, past experience and
home environment may all play an essential and immeasurable role in learning .. ,.
Consequently, it may be a practical impossibility to prove that the alleged
malpractice of the teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the
plaintiff student.
Ross v. Creighton U., 957 F.2d 410, 414 (7th Cir, 1992) (quotations omitted). A defendant
instructor could be a thorough and exemplary teacher, but if the student does not listen, does not
apply himself, or is simply not able enough, he will not learn the material.
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Determination of causation is incredibly difficult in a situation where the pilot is months
or years past the training in question and the issue of causation hinges on the deceased pilot's
aptitude. Was the pilot properly taught on a topic at some point but became lazy, rusty, or
apathetic? Was he knowledgeable, but careless in not properly adhering to his preflight
checklist? Did he make the calculated decision to not pull the pin in the CAPS system because he
did not intend to utilize the system even in the event of crisis?
Taking an example of training in explosives, which is highly specialized and an
inherently dangerous activity-a student can be educated on the type and amount of explosives,
length of time fuse, placement of a charge, environmental issues, etc., but the variables in the
student's ability to retain this knowledge and accurately execute all of these things in a stressful
environment runs the gamut and is often the dispositive factor in an accident. Another
complicating factor for the court on causation is the presence of Federal Aviation Regulations
which specifically place the responsibility for knowledge to safely fly the aircraft squarely on the
shoulders of the pilot in command.°
' Relevant provisions under Par 91 (14 CF.R.9I)read as follows:
591.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.
The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the
operation of that aircraft. ...
891.9 Civil aircraft flight manual, marking, and placard requirements.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section [providing an exception for helicopters], no
person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the
approved Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual, markings, and placards, or as otherwise prescribed
by the certificating authority of the country of registry. ...
$91.103 Preflight action.
Each pilot in command shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with all available
information conceming that flight. This information must include--- .•.
(2) For civil aircraft other than those specified in paragraph (b)(I) of this section, other reliable
infonation appropriate to the aircraft, relating to aircraft performance under expected values
of airport elevation and runway slope, aircraft gross weight, and wind and temperature.
$91.505 Familiarity with operating limitations and emergency equipment.
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Lastly, tangentially related to the issue of speculative causation and damages is the
concern elucidated by the Michigan Supreme Court in Page which states that even where the
chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be denied on public policy
grounds because:
(I) the injury is too remote from the negligence; or
(2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent
tortfeasor; or
(3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have
brought about the harm; or
(4) because allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on the
defendant; or
(5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the way for
fraudulent claims; or
(6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping
point,
Page, supra at 905 (quoting Wilson v. Continental Ins. Cos,, 87 Wis.2d 310,323-324, 274
N.W.2d 679 (1979)). The court finds this rationale compelling in the case sub jdice.
3. Potential for a Flood ofLitigation
"If a cause of action for educational malpractice is recognized..., any malpractice case
would have a malpractice action within it." Cavaliere, supra at 403, fn. 2 (quoting Moore, supra
at 115). This public policy rationale is especially relevant in the case of flight schools and other
specialty schools where the subject matter involves an inherently dangerous activity. "[I]f the
court recognizes educational malpractice in this case, virtually every future plane crash will raise
the specter of a negligent training claim against the flight school or aviation training center."
Sheesley, supra at 17. In cases where potential damages are high, motivations exist to pursue
(a) Each pilot in command of an airplane shall, before beginning a flight, become familiar with the
Airplane Flight Manual for that airplane, if one is required, and with any placards, listings,
instrument markings, or any combination thereof, containing each operating limitation prescribed
for that airplane by the Administrator, including those specified in $9L.9(b)
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claims against any and all persons connected to the negligent actor. Every plane crash due to
pilot error could lead to a lawsuit against those who trained the pilot for no other reason than
they have an attenuated connection to the pilot's actions on the date of the crash since the flight
school provided the pilot the knowledge to become licensed by the FAA.
4. Possibility that Such Claims Will Necessitate Court Oversight Over Day-to-Day
School Operations
Claims regarding the quality of education provided will invariably entail a review of the
instructional materials and pedagogical methods employed in addition to administrative
functions." The policy rationale against such judicial oversight has been the stated position of
Pennsylvania Courts going back to 1937:
All this [the day-to-day functions of schools], being purely administrative, must be
left to persons of experience who have made a life study of it, and certainly is not
to be subjected to the consideration of jurists who have little or no training to
appraise school systems or their necessities.
Wilson_v. Sch. Dist, of Philadelphia, 195 A.90, 97 (Pa. 1937). "[Courts are in no position to
exercise control over schools and determine the policy of school administration; the judges
ordinarily are not equipped for this immense task." See id, (holding that issues of day-to-day
oversight of schools, such as the number of instructors hired, class sizes, how students are
separated by grades in accordance with mental aptitudes are all questions which the school board
alone should determine); see also, Regan v. Stoddard, 65 A.2d 240, 242 (Pa. 1949) (holding that
the court is not properly in a position to determine methods of promoting or holding back
students or what special classes should be provided to remedial students).
Trial courts have no business meddling in the field of day-to-day educational standards of
pilot schools, such as what content appears in the pilot's logbook and at what point did the pilot
6Vaugh, supra at 549; Glorvigen, supra at 552; Dallas Airmotivs, supra at 700; Alsidces y. Brown Inst. Ld,, 592
N.W.2d 468,473 (Mina. App. 1999); Andre,Pace U_, 655 N.Y.S.24 777, 779 (N.Y. App. Ten. 1996)
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immerse himself in the safety features of his own plane. Furthermore, flight/pilot education is by
no means the wild west where content and standards of education vary greatly. Federal
regulations clearly delineate standards for the certification and operation of Part 14l schools.
The court finds great similarity between the case at bar and the third-party educational
malpractice cases out of Iowa, Moore y, Vanderloo, and the U.S. District Court of South Dakota,
Sheesley v. The Cessna Aircraft Co.
In Moore, the plaintiff suffered a cerebral stroke after undergoing a chiropractic
manipulation of her neck. As a result of the stroke, plaintiff sustained permanent bodily and
emotional impairment, She filed against the chiropractor and Palmer College of Chiropractic
which he had attended and graduated from four years earlier. The Iowa Supreme Court noted that
in addition to graduating from chiropractic school, a chiropractor must pass a state regulated
licensure examination to be licensed in the state of Iowa. The Moore court found that the
licensure process added an additional layer of state oversight into the chiropractor's competency
and thus negated an educational malpractice claim against the school that educated the
subsequently licensed chiropractor. "[W]e refuse to interfere with legislatively defined standards
of competency." Moore, supra at [15. In the realm of aviation where oversight over student
flight instruction and standards for pilot certification is already set forth by the Federal Aviation
Administration with Flight Standards District Offices in place to enforce these regulations, the
injection of the non-pilot trial judge's oversight into the operation of Part 14I flight schools is
grossly misplaced.
In Sheesley, after a fatal plane crash, the plaintiff sued a plane manufacturer, plane
mechanic, and the flight school who trained the pilot regarding the specific aircraft. The
14C.FR. $ I41.1 through 14127 sets fonth the requirements for a Part 14! school to be certified. I4 C.ER. $
141.5L through I41.57 lays out the requirements for a Part I4l school's training course outline and curricula.
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allegation against the flight school is that it did not properly teach the pilot regarding what to do
in the event of an exhaust system failure. This is noteworthy, because like Sheesley, the Plaintiff
here is attacking a distinct portion of the Defendants' instruction of PC Durkin alleging that
Defendants did not adequately instruct on the Cirrus Aircraft CAPS system. Addressing the
differentiation between claims alleging a failure to educate on a specific topic versus claims
attacking the quality of the educational process as a whole, the Sheesley court held that the
public policy concerns are still the same.
The gravamen of plaintiffs' claims are that FlightSafety negligently trained [the PIC] by
failing to provide him the skills and training necessary to detect and safely land following
an exhaust system failure. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that FlightSafety negligently
created its curriculum by failing to include emergency procedures relating to an exhaust
systemn failure.... In other words, plaintiffs are contesting the substance and manner of
FlightSafety's training. Plaintiffs' claims 'encompass the traditional aspects of education,'
and thus, sound in educational malpractice....
[T]he court finds that negligent failure to provide an overall education and negligent
failure to train how to perform a specific procedure is a distinction without a difference. In
both instances, the plaintiff is alleging that the school did not teach the student what he or
she needed to know....
If the court here decides that FlightSafety should have taught a different curriculum,
there is no principled basis to stop it from determining what curriculum should be taught
at medical schools, paramedic schools, commercial truck driving schools, and innumerable
other technical and higher education facilities.
Sheesley, supra at 16. In consideration of the rationale stated in More and Sheesley, the court
echoes the sentiment "Schools, not courts, are in a better position to determine what should be
taught." [d, Similarly, the federal government, not the courts, provides the educational oversight
to a pilot's training and licensure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Educational malpractice claims against a school for failure to adequately educate a
student are not permitted in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff seeks to distinguish her case from other
educational malpractice cases because flying a plane is an inherently dangerous activity. The
25
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public policy concerns as set forth in this opinion stand regardless of the subject matter or the
dangerousness of the content taught. For the reasons set forth above, the Order dated December
. .
18, 2020 should be affirmed.
Attest;
Copies to:
Darrell C. Dethlefs, Es4. /4//U
Laurie A. Salita, Esq. CS€REl
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