Opinion

United States v. Rachele Brown

  • 474 F. App'x 328
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Apr 6, 2012
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Diaz, Keenan, Niemeyer, Per Curiam
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.1%

The opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5071

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

RACHELE LANEE BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers,

District Judge. (3:11-cr-00047-1)

Submitted: March 23, 2012 Decided: April 6, 2012

Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam

opinion.

Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne,

Appellate Counsel, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. R.

Booth Goodwin, II, United States Attorney, William Bryan King,

II, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia,

for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Rachele Lanee Brown pled guilty pursuant to a plea

agreement to conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, in violation of

21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to fifteen months in

prison. Counsel has filed an appeal pursuant to Anders v.

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he states that

“because of the appeal waiver provision in Brown’s plea

agreement, there appears to be no meritorious ground for

appeal.” Counsel nonetheless identifies as a possible issue for

this court’s review whether Brown’s fifteen-month sentence is

reasonable in light of the purposes of sentencing set forth in

18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2011). Brown has not

filed a pro se supplemental brief despite receiving notice of

her right to do so. The Government moves to dismiss the appeal

based on the appellate waiver in Brown’s plea agreement. We

affirm in part and dismiss in part.

A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that

waiver is knowing and intelligent. See United States v.

Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2007). Our independent

review of the record supports the conclusion that Brown

voluntarily and knowingly waived her right to appeal her

sentence. Thus, we conclude that the waiver is valid and

enforceable.

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However, even a valid waiver does not waive all

appellate claims. Specifically, a valid appeal waiver does not

preclude a challenge to a sentence on the ground that it exceeds

the statutory maximum or is based on a constitutionally

impermissible factor such as race, arises from the denial of a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance

of counsel, or relates to claims concerning a violation of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel in proceedings following the

guilty plea. See United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151

(4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Craig, 985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th

Cir. 1993). Moreover, the appellate waiver in Brown’s plea

agreement did not waive: (1) any challenges she may have if her

sentence were above the Guidelines range associated with the

adjusted offense level determined by the district court, prior

to consideration of acceptance of responsibility or any

departure or variance; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel

claims; or (3) any claims Brown may have pertaining to her

conviction. Brown’s sentence is below the Guidelines range

associated with her unreduced adjusted offense level and, thus,

she raises no claims that fall outside the scope of her

appellate waiver.

Accordingly, we grant the Government's motion to

dismiss the appeal as to Brown’s sentence. Although we are

charged under Anders with reviewing the record for unwaived

3

error, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found

no unwaived meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore dismiss

the appeal in part and affirm in part. This court requires that

counsel inform Brown, in writing, of her right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Brown

requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that

such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move this

court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s

motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Brown. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;

DISMISSED IN PART

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