The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4722
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JERMAINE BROWN, a/k/a Jeezy,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Rebecca Beach Smith,
District Judge. (4:09-cr-00063-RBS-TEM-10)
Submitted: March 23, 2012 Decided: April 5, 2012
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Angela D. Whitley, THE WHITLEY LAW FIRM, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Timothy R.
Murphy, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Robert E.
Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Jermaine Brown was convicted
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute cocaine base, distribution of cocaine base,
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and distribution
of cocaine base, cocaine, and marijuana, and two counts of
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2006). He appeals,
contending that the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury verdict on the firearm charges, and that the district court
abused its discretion by instructing the jury that the
Government was not required to use any specific investigative
techniques. We affirm.
Brown first contends the district court erred in
denying his motions for judgment of acquittal under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29 because the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
that his possession of the firearms was “in furtherance of” a
drug trafficking crime. A jury’s verdict must be upheld on
appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to support
it. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In
determining whether the evidence in the record is substantial,
we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, and inquire whether there is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
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sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). In evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence, we do not review the credibility of the witnesses and
assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the
testimony in favor of the government. See United States v.
Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998).
To establish illegal possession of a firearm in
violation of § 924(c), the government must prove that the
defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. Brown does not
contest that he possessed the firearms in question. We have
construed the “in furtherance of” provision of § 924(c) to
require “the government to present evidence indicating that the
possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped forward a
drug trafficking crime.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701,
705 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of the record convinces us that
the jury heard sufficient evidence to find Brown guilty of the
firearm offenses.
Brown also challenges the jury instruction in which
the court advised the jury that the Government was not required
to use any specific investigative techniques. He contends that
this instruction amounted to an indirect comment on the weight
of the evidence in violation of his due process rights and his
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right to a jury trial. The challenged instruction is very
similar to the instruction that was challenged and upheld in
United States v. Mason, 954 F.2d 219, 222 (4th Cir. 1992). The
instructions, viewed in their entirety, did not mislead the jury
into believing that it could not consider and weigh the type of
evidence that was presented. Rather, the instruction properly
emphasized the Government’s burden of proof, but also noted that
the Government was not required to prove its case in any
particular manner. See, e.g., United States v. Arrington, 719
F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983) (“[U]ncorroborated testimony of
one witness may be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.”).
We conclude that the instruction was proper, did not
amount to a comment by the court on the weight of the evidence,
and was not an abuse of discretion. See Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo,
174 F.3d 394, 408 (4th Cir. 1999) (providing standard).
Accordingly, we affirm Brown’s convictions. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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