Opinion

Vann v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

  • 508 Pa. 139
  • 494 A.2d 1081
  • 1985 Pa. LEXIS 391
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jun 28, 1985
Status
Published
Author
Hutchinson
On the bench
Flaherty, Hutchinson, Larsen, McDermott, Nix, Papadakos, Zappala
Cited by
90 cases

stating that “any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing”

How later courts described this case

  • stating that “any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing”
  • stating that a layperson who represents himself in legal matters must, to an extent, “assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his undoing”
  • pointing out that pro se litigant must to some extent assume the risk that his lack of legal training will prove his undoing
  • “any layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training will prove his - 14 - J-A20043-25 undoing”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Jennings v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 1996 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 187 (1996)

    Vann is inapplicable here because Claimant does not assert that the referee refused to assist him, but contends that when he went to the Job Center to inquire about benefits, an employee orally advised him that he had been denied.
    Commonwealth Court of PennsylvaniaMay 3, 1996Read it

The opinion

HUTCHINSON, Justice,

dissenting.

I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which sets forth the limits on a referee’s duty to advise an unemployment compensation claimant at a hearing. I would, however, not disturb the referee’s finding of fact affirmed by the board, which is based on the reasonable inference that the adult son of the principal shareholder of a closely held corporation operating a restaurant had authority in the course of his employment by that corporation to direct and give reasonable instructions to a short order cook. I, therefore, dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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