Matthews v. City of East St. Louis

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-1168

A NTHONY M ATTHEWS and R OBERT G ILLESPIE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

C ITY OF E AST S T.L OUIS, V INCENT A NDERSON and

L ARRY G REENLEE,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 09-CV-870—Michael J. Reagan, Judge.

A RGUED F EBRUARY 23, 2012—D ECIDED M ARCH 27, 2012

Before F LAUM and T INDER, Circuit Judges, and SHADID,

District Judge. Œ

S HADID, District Judge. Anthony Matthews and Robert

Gillespie appeal the district court’s grant of a motion

Œ

The Honorable James E. Shadid, United States District

Court, Central District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

2 No. 11-1168

for summary judgment in favor of the defendants in

this case. For the following reasons, we affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the de-

fendants.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken according to Matthews

and Gillespie. On February 21, 2009, Appellants

Matthews and Gillespie were involved in a phys-

ical altercation with employees of the Club Casino

(“Club”), a nightclub located in East St. Louis, Illinois.

The altercation began when Matthews and Gillespie, an

R&B singer and his promoter, along with a group at-

tempted to enter the club without paying a cover-

charge because they were invited to the club for promo-

tional purposes. When the group arrived, initially they

were informed they were free to enter the club. However,

when entering the lobby, they were confronted by a

large security guard who was screaming at them and

demanding payment. The group decided to pay, and

when Matthews attempted to pay for himself and a

dancer in the group, the club owner, Cedric Taylor,

grabbed his arm and the large security guard who was

screaming at them struck Matthews in the face. A melee

ensued and numerous security staff struck and kicked

Matthews and Gillespie. Both men sustained numerous

visible injuries. After the beating, the employees took

the two outside, handcuffed them and called the police.

The first officer on the scene was Lieutenant Vincent

Anderson, recognized as a superior officer by his white

shirt. Anderson was the acting shift commander that

No. 11-1168 3

night. Anderson repeatedly yelled to Matthews and

Gillespie that he ran this town, in response to the two men

explaining that they were jumped by security staff. After

which they stopped trying to explain themselves and

resigned to be arrested. Another officer, Larry Greenlee,

arrived on the scene to a disturbance call, but did not

know the specific nature of the disturbance. Greenlee

attempted to speak with security staff, but was directed to

speak with Taylor. When interviewed by Greenlee, Taylor

stated that Matthews struck him in the face. Greenlee

stated that he heard one of the two arrestees admit

to hitting Taylor, so he filled out complaints against

both individuals and Taylor signed them. Matthews and

Gillespie were taken to Greenlee’s squad car and placed

in the rear seat, though they were never told they were

under arrest. Both were charged with assault and battery.

At some point during the investigation, Greenlee was

informed that there were video cameras that surveilled

the lobby and presumably would show what happened.

Greenlee chose not to check the video system. Taylor

stated that the video system was maintained by an

outside company and was constantly rolling, recording

over itself every thirty to sixty days, which meant

the altercation was taped-over prior to this action com-

mencing. Taylor stated that he never requested the

video because he felt it was unnecessary.

In October 2009, Matthews and Gillespie filed a five-

count complaint in the district court alleging violations

of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of East St. Louis, and

officers Vincent Anderson, Lester Anderson, and Greenlee

4 No. 11-1168

and La Bon Vie Corporation, d/b/a Club Casino and its

president and owner, Cedric Taylor. In June 2010, they

amended the complaint and the district court granted

their motion to voluntarily dismiss Lester Anderson

without prejudice. They then filed an amended com-

plaint containing five counts. Count 1 alleges Taylor,

acting in concert with Club employees as part of a con-

spiracy with the City through Anderson and Greenlee

used excessive force against them. Count 2 alleges the

same individuals unlawfully seized, detained and prose-

cuted them. Count 3 alleges the City failed to instruct,

supervise, control and discipline its officers. Count 4

was a state law claim alleging negligence against Taylor

and the Club in hiring, retaining and supervising em-

ployees and as alternative to Counts 1-4, Count 5 alleged

assault and battery against Taylor and the Club.

The district court granted summary judgment on

Counts 2 and 3 in favor of all defendants and dismissed

the state law claims without prejudice. Matthews and

Gillespie conceded in their response to defendants’

motion that summary judgment should be granted as to

Count 1. As to the remaining counts, the district court

held that at the time of the altercation, Taylor and the

Club were not functioning as state actors for purposes

of § 1983. The district court found that Taylor and the

Club did not have a pre-existing arrangement to use off-

duty police officers as security and the witnesses who

stated that the security staff was comprised of off-duty

officers based their beliefs on speculation. Also, even if

they were off-duty officers, they were not performing a

police function. Lastly the district court found that the

No. 11-1168 5

two failed to show a conspiracy between the City and

Taylor and the Club. The district court also granted

summary judgment as to the City, Anderson and

Greenlee holding that there was probable cause to

arrest Matthews and Gillespie and therefore there was

no unlawful seizure/arrest against Greenlee. Addi-

tionally, the district court held that Anderson had no

personal involvement or an affirmative link to the

arrest and therefore he was not liable. The district court

noted that probable cause defeats a claim of malicious

prosecution and Matthews and Gillespie failed to show

an express policy, widespread practice, or that their

arrests were caused by someone with final policymaking

authority as is required to sustain a claim of municipal

liability.

II. DISCUSSION

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo,

construing the facts and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the light most favorable to Matthews and

Gillespie. Castronovo v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 571 F.3d

667, 671 (7th Cir. 2009).

Matthews and Gillespie argue that officer Greenlee

lacked probable cause to arrest them both. In support of

this, they offer four arguments: (1) Greenlee failed to

exercise any discretion in assessing the credibility of the

witnesses; (2) Greenlee knew of the existence of a video-

tape which would exonerate the two arrestees and chose

to ignore it; (3) the totality of the circumstances should

have demonstrated to a reasonable officer that there

6 No. 11-1168

was no probable cause to arrest Matthews and Gillespie;

and (4) Greenlee lacked individualized probable cause

for the arrest of the men.

Probable cause is a determination made from assessing

whether, based on the facts and circumstances at the

time of the arrest, a reasonable officer would conclude

that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.

Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 996 (7th Cir. 2000).

The sufficiency of the evidence for a determination of

probable cause need not be enough to support a convic-

tion or even enough to show that the officer’s belief is

more likely true than false. Id. As such, “as long as a

reasonably credible witness or victim informs the

police that someone has committed a crime, or is com-

mitting, a crime, the officers have probable cause”. Spiegel

v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1998)). Addi-

tionally, “this court has emphasized that once probable

cause has been established, officials have ‘no constitu-

tional obligation to conduct further investigation in the

hopes of uncovering potentially exculpatory evidence.’ ”

Id. (quoting Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir.

1995)).

Matthews’ and Gillespie’s four arguments will be

addressed in turn, but the facts pertaining to each are

largely duplicative. They first argue that Greenlee failed

to exercise any discretion in arresting the two of them.

In support, they state that the evidence as Greenlee saw

it upon arriving showed two handcuffed men who

were badly beaten and protesting their innocence. Ac-

cording to them, this showed that any reasonable

No. 11-1168 7

officer would have concluded that they were the victims

rather than the aggressors. They further argue that

Greenlee testified that he “takes things at face value”

and believes victims are telling the truth whenever they

talk to him, apparently without thought. This ignores

the fact that when Greenlee arrived on scene, he spoke

with the Club owner Cedric Taylor, who gave him a

seemingly reliable account of what happened. Taylor

stated that the two men tried to enter the Club without

paying and when they were asked to leave, one struck

him in the face. Greenlee did attempt to speak with

M atthew s and Gillespie, but apparently they

were difficult to understand, and Taylor then signed the

complaints against the two men. There is nothing to

indicate that Taylor’s statement was incredible. The

fact that he had no visible injury and the two in hand-

cuffs did means little to Taylor’s credibility. The identity

of the winner of a fight is not always indicative of who

was the initial aggressor. Greenlee’s investigation may

have been brief, but his reliance on Taylor’s statements

was reasonable.

Matthews and Gillespie next argue that Greenlee

refused to view the videotape that conclusively would

show what happened. A videotape is certainly a valuable

piece of evidence and in many cases can be conclusive.

However, as stated above, once an officer has probable

cause, he need not seek out exculpatory evidence. Here,

probable cause was established by Taylor, therefore

he need not continue to investigate. It is correct to say

that all reasonable avenues of investigation must be

pursued, but given the atmosphere with which Greenlee

8 No. 11-1168

was confronted, it was not unreasonable for him to

elect not to view the tape. To hold otherwise would

put an undue burden on police to ascertain whether

a videotape existed prior to making an arrest for an

offense committed outside of their presence. There was

evidence to support probable cause and Greenlee did

not need to conduct any further investigation.

Matthews’ and Gillespie’s third argument is that the

totality of the circumstances suggest that a reasonable

officer would find there was no probable cause. As pre-

viously discussed, this is not the case. Matthews and

Gillespie again rely largely on the argument that

because they had visible injuries, a reasonable officer

would assume they were not the aggressors. According

to Matthews and Gillespie, a basic assessment of the

situation would indicate to Greenlee, and presumably

any reasonable officer, that Taylor’s story was obviously

false. A basic assessment of the situation would show

that Matthews and Gillespie were visibly injured

and handcuffed. Nothing about this suggests that

Greenlee was acting unreasonably when he concluded,

after speaking with the owner of the business, that these

two were the initial aggressors. Especially when con-

sidering that the owner of the business outside of

which they were sitting told Greenlee that the two tried

to enter without paying, then refused to leave, and then

started a fight. The district court correctly noted that

the events as described by Taylor indicated that the

two men were involved in a physical altercation with

security staff of the Club and their injuries support

that story; they do not negate its truthfulness. Greenlee’s

No. 11-1168 9

statements to the two men that they should file a report

and that this type of stuff happens all the time do little

to negate the fact that probable cause was established

when Taylor gave Greenlee a credible account of the

altercation.

Finally, Matthews and Gillespie argue that Greenlee

lacked individualized probable cause to arrest the two

men for battery, because Taylor stated only one man

struck him. Matthews and Gillespie argue that a charge

of disorderly conduct cannot be sustained because

there was not a breach of the peace nor did anyone

report to be alarmed and disturbed even though the

two men had to be physically removed from the Club

by security. At a minimum, everyone involved in

the altercation was alarmed and disturbed. And undoubt-

edly, the peace was breached during a fight in the

lobby of a nightclub after which two men had to be

handcuffed and the police were called. Regardless, it

was reasonable for Greenlee to believe that disorderly

conduct occurred, even if later the evidence could not

sustain a conviction. We need not address the issue

of qualified immunity for Greenlee because there was

probable cause to arrest both Matthews and Gillespie.

Contrary to their assertion, Greenlee was not merely

a pawn, he was an officer who reasonably relied on a

credible statement from a witness that was supported

by the totality of the circumstances. Furthermore, there

was sufficient probable cause to arrest each Matthews

and Gillespie.

Matthews and Gillespie next argue that the district

court erred when it granted summary judgment against

10 No. 11-1168

Lieutenant Anderson because he encouraged the false

arrest, condoned it, or turned a blind eye to it. In order

for a supervisor to be liable, they must be “personally

responsible for the deprivation of the constitutional

right.” Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651

(7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 555, 561

(7th Cir. 1995)). To show personal involvement, the super-

visor must “know about the conduct and facilitate

it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of

what they might see”. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d

985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988).

Anderson’s involvement was nothing more than re-

porting to the location and telling Greenlee to do his job.

Additionally, Greenlee had probable cause to arrest

Matthews and Gillespie, which means there was no

constitutional violation for Anderson to condone. As

the district court noted, Anderson had minimal involve-

ment, amounting to his awareness that Taylor signed

the complaints against Matthews and Gillespie. Aside

from that, he had little, if any, personal involvement.

We need not address whether he had qualified im-

munity because there was probable cause for Greenlee

to arrest Matthews and Gillespie.

Matthews and Gillespie next argue that the City is

liable for the actions of its officers. A municipality

cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation in

the absence of a custom, policy or practice that effec-

tively caused or condoned the alleged constitutional

violations. See, e.g., Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d

464, 467 (7th Cir. 2010); Monell v. New York Dep’t of Social

No. 11-1168 11

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Further, an inadequacy in

police training can serve as a basis for liability under

Section 1983, but only where the failure to train amounts

to deliberate indifference to the citizens the officers en-

counter. Hollins v. City of Milwaukee, 574 F.3d 822, 827

(7th Cir. 2009); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378, 388 (1989).

Matthews and Gillespie argue that even if the officers

are not liable for false arrest, the City may still be, citing

Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293 (7th

Cir. 2009). Thomas is quite instructive in this instance.

There, Cook County argued it could not be liable if all

its employees were acquitted, relying on Los Angeles v.

Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986), for that proposition. Id. at

304. The Court disagreed, noting that Los Angeles was

a case in which the municipality could not be found

liable when its officers committed no constitutional

violation in arresting the plaintiff. Id. We specifically

noted that the situation would differ if the officers

were acquitted based on a defense of good faith,

because there is still an argument that the city’s policies

caused the harm, though the officer was acting in

good faith. Here, there was no constitutional violation,

therefore no municipal liability.

Finally, a finding of probable cause defeats Matthews’

and Gillespie’s claim of malicious prosecution, regard-

less of whether it was properly developed below.

12 No. 11-1168

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is A FFIRMED

as to all defendants.

3-27-12