“The notion that a complaint weds a plaintiff to a particular theory of liability is foreign to Pennsylvania pleading. Ours is a system of fact pleading, not ‘theory’ pleading; a plaintiff is free to proceed on any theory of liability which the facts alleged in his complaint will support.”
How later courts described this case
- “The notion that a complaint weds a plaintiff to a particular theory of liability is foreign to Pennsylvania pleading. Ours is a system of fact pleading, not ‘theory’ pleading; a plaintiff is free to proceed on any theory of liability which the facts alleged in his complaint will support.”
- where a plaintiffs cause of action was implicit in the original complaint, plaintiff could amend complaint after the statute of limitations period had run to amplify original claim as long as the defendant was not prejudiced
- leave to amend liberally “subject to the qualification that any amendment may not introduce a new cause of action after the statute of limitations has run its course”
- decided before the modern trend in Pennsylvania products liability law stated in Berkebile, supra, and Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A. 2d 1020 (1978)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by Barnish v. KWI Building Co., 602 Pa. 402 (2009)
We reject the suggestion that the plurality decision in Kuisis is binding.
The opinion
Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Boberts :
I concur in the granting of a new trial on the ground that the trial court incorrectly refused to permit appellant’s expert to testify.
I also agree that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing appellant to amend his complaint. The reason for my conclusion that the amendment was proper can be stated simply and without embellishment. The facts alleged in appellant’s initial complaint plainly give rise to a section 402A claim. Eestatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1966).
However, I cannot join parts II and III of the majority’s opinion. There, the majority considers questions that are unnecessary for the present disposition of this appeal. Manifestly, this Court’s grant of a new trial makes consideration of those questions premature. The resolution of those questions, if indeed they arise, is better left for another day.
Mr. Justice Manberino joins in this concurring opinion.