Opinion

Wedner Unemployment Compensation Case

  • 449 Pa. 460
  • 296 A.2d 792
  • 1972 Pa. LEXIS 397
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Nov 17, 1972
Status
Published
Author
Pomeroy
On the bench
Beien, Eagen, Jones, Manderino, Nix, Pomeroy, Roberts
Cited by
78 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.2%

"Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the entire theory of the corporate entity ... useless." (internal quotation marks omitted

How later courts described this case

  • "Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the entire theory of the corporate entity ... useless." (internal quotation marks omitted
  • "The corporate entity or personality will be disregarded [o]nly when the entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime." (citation omitted)
  • “[A]ny court must start from the general rule *42 that the corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an excep-tion____ Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the entire theory of corporate entity * * * useless. Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir.1967)”
  • "[A]ny court must start from the general rule that the corporate entity should be recognized and upheld, unless specific, unusual circumstances call for an exception.... Care should be taken on all occasions to avoid making the entire theory of corporate entity useless. Zubik v. Zubik , 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967)"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Dissenting Opinion by

Mb. Justice Pomeroy:

The Court considers the inapplicability of Section (4) (1) (4) (5) of the Unemployment Compensation Law to be determinative of appellant’s eligibility for benefits. I am unable to agree with the rationale of the opinion. See Starinieri Unemployment Comp. Case, 447 Pa. 256, 260 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the result reached, in my opinion,, is faulty because it overlooks Section (4)(x)(10) of the Law, which at the times here involved * provided as follows:

“(x) ‘Wages’ means all remuneration . . . paid by an employer to an individual with respect to his employ *468 ment except that the term ‘wages’ shall not include:

“(10) The amount of any payment made after October first, 1961, to an individual by any corporation, partnership, association or other business entity in which fifty per centum (50%), or more of the proprietary interest is owned by such individual, his spouse, father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, or any combination of such persons, unless the tax imposed by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act [26 U.S.O.A. §§3301 et seq.] is payable with respect to such payment or payments.” (Emphasis added.)

Under Section 404 of the Law, an applicant such as appellant must have been paid a certain minimum ($440) in “wages” in the base year in order to qualify for benefits. As appellant’s husband owned 98% of the proprietary interest in the employing corporation, Golden Triangle Storage Co., Inc., it is clear that under Section (4) (x) (10) her remuneration from that corporation did not qualify as “wages”, unless a tax was payable by that company under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act. Because the record does not reveal whether or not such a federal tax was in fact payable, I would remand to the Board for such a determination. Since the remand ordered by the majority appears to be premised on the appellant’s eligibility for benefits, I am obliged to dissent.

Although repealed by the Act of September 27, 1971, P. D. , No. 108, §8, Section (4) (x) (10) was in force when the Board denied benefits to the applicant in the present case.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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